JUDGMENT 1. Mr. C.R. Das.-A portion of the order, viz., " and the officers of the said Government recruited in England" is not in accordance with sec. 4 under which the order is made. The section refers to a class in British India. The officers referred to in the order may or may not be in India. So the class set out is either narrower or wider than the class stated in sec. 4, cl. (c), and in passing this order therefore, so far as that portion is concerned, the Government of Bengal has not complied with the provisions of sec. 4, cl. (c). Mookerjee, J. The order may be set aside on the ground that the words are not of the nature described in see. 4 (1), therefore the Court is bound to examine and determine further, irrespective of what the Government order may say, whether the words used are of the nature described in sec. 4 (1).] 2. Mr. Das - What has been, described in the order is not provided for in the section and if is the order I ask your Lordships to set aside. Secs. 17 and 19 have to he taken together. If your Lordships leave out the order altogether and merely consider whether the words did or did not come under sec. 4 (1) that would not he correct. 3. The law which is contained in sec. 4 (1) is exactly the same as is the law in sec. 124A of the Indian Penal Code and is the same as English law. 4. The language of the two sections are practically identical. If yon leave out the clause " any class of His Majesty's subjects in British India," the rest of the section is the same as sec. 124A. The three explanation are taken bodily from there, the only difference being that the word "disapproval" occurs in sec. 4, Expln. II, whereas the word "disapprobation" occurs in sec 124A, Expln. II. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras (2) 35 T.L.R. 500 : s.c. 23 C.W.N. 986 (1919) say "sec. 124A, Penal Code, has been the subject of careful consideration in the case of Queen-Empress v. Tilak ILR 22 Bom. 112 (1897). these judgments are of considerable assistance toward the consideration of sec. II. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras (2) 35 T.L.R. 500 : s.c. 23 C.W.N. 986 (1919) say "sec. 124A, Penal Code, has been the subject of careful consideration in the case of Queen-Empress v. Tilak ILR 22 Bom. 112 (1897). these judgments are of considerable assistance toward the consideration of sec. 4." This shows that they are practically the same thing, although the language is not precisely the same. 5. It is clear from the words of the see. 4 that the question of intention is material. It is not possible to consider the words "attempt to excite" (which occur in see. 4, Expln. II), without considering the question of intent. In Besant v. Emperor I.I.R. 39 Mad. 1085(1916)it is held that see. 4, Expln. II, requires that the writer must intend to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection if his writings are to be brought within cl. c. [MOOKERJEE, J.--YOU say Expln. II implies intent, but it does not seem to refer to bringing into hatred or contempt a class or section of His Majesty's subjects.] 6. Mr. Das.--I submit, the question of intention arises in that case also because the Privy Council in Besant v. Advocate-General and Crown Prosecutor of Madras 35 T L. R. 500 : s.c. 23 C.W.N. 986 (1919). had held that even without the explanation the question of intention is material from the wordings in the section itself, for it says "it is perhaps not easy to sec how Expln. II with its qualifications adds to or detracts from the direct language of para. c." Their Lordships were considering the question as the ordinary law of sedition in which seditious intent is a necessary ingredient. According to their Lordship's' judgment the question under sec. 1 (c) comes to this : Are the passages such as to excite or do they disclose an attempt which implies intent to excite hatred... towards Government or any class of His Majesty's subjects. It is clear from this that their Lordships are not thinking of the explanation as the reference to a class is not to be found in the explanation. towards Government or any class of His Majesty's subjects. It is clear from this that their Lordships are not thinking of the explanation as the reference to a class is not to be found in the explanation. You can look at it from another point of view, if to repeal a particular measure is my primary intention and if in doing that I have to attack and specially point out the people who are dealing with the Government, properly sneaking that would be a class, but I am entitled to protection because what I say is put forward merely as ground for my asking for a radical change in the system of administration, and therefore I had no seditious intent. 7. Their Lordships again say " in judging the question of intent...." thereby meaning that question of intent has got to be judged. Tendency alone is not sufficient without there being seditious intent. The very use of the word "tendency" shows what is aimed at is the mentality of the thing. When you use the word " tendency " you are looking at the effect which may be produced in other people's minds and you also consider the intention. Woodroffe, J. 8. We take your contention to he that if the Court comes to the conclusion that there was no seditious intent, then the fact that the articles had the tendency mentioned in the Section would not he sufficient. Mr. Das.-Yes. 9. Mr. Das--Seditious intent defined in Art. 93, Stephen's Digest, in the same way as the offence of sedition in sec. 124A. The second paragraph of the articles tells you what is not sedition and these are the things which form part of the Explns. II and III to sec. 124A of the Indian Penal Code and Expln. II, see. I. of the Press Act. It now follows that, even for the purpose of the Press Act, the proprietors of any paper cannot be said to have been guilty of sedition unless there is Seditious intent. The statement in Stephen's Digest has been adopted by eminent Judges as sound principle. 10. Mr. Das referred to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. IX, p. 463, see. 909, p. 460, Fraser on Libel, 5th Edn., p. 334, Russel on Crimes, Vol. I (pp. 302-310, Reg. v. Sullivan 11 Cox. Cr. C 44 (1863). and Reg. v. Burn 16 Cox. Cr. C.355 (1886). 10. Mr. Das referred to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. IX, p. 463, see. 909, p. 460, Fraser on Libel, 5th Edn., p. 334, Russel on Crimes, Vol. I (pp. 302-310, Reg. v. Sullivan 11 Cox. Cr. C 44 (1863). and Reg. v. Burn 16 Cox. Cr. C.355 (1886). 11. Mr. Das.- As to the method of construction of the articles, I submit, your Lordships should take them as a whole and should attach no importance to isolated passages or instances of harsh or strong language. You must read the articles in a fair, generous and liberal spirit, and also you should look to them from the view of the actual politics of the day. Your Lordships cannot expect the accuracy and the precision of a lawyer or a man of science in the writings, of journalist. Your Lordships will also consider the persons or class of persons who read the Amrita Bazar Patrika and having considered these, questions, it is for your Lordships to say whether they are or are not of the nature such as described in sec. 4 (c). 12. Mr. Das referred to Reg. v. Burn 16 Cox. Cr. C. 355 (1886), R. v. Aldred 22 Cox. Cr. C. 1 (1909), Reg. v. M' Hugh [1901] 2 I.R. 569 at p. 585, Queen-Empress v. Tilak I. L. R. 22 Bom 112 at p. 142 (1897), Manomohon Ghosh v. Empress (21) and Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras 35 T.L.R. 500 : s.c. 28 C.W.N. 986 (1919). on the question of construction of the articles. 13. Mr. Das.--All these that I have submitted go to show that your Lordships will have to go into the evidence and I summarise the heads of evidence on which I intend to rely. on the question of construction of the articles. 13. Mr. Das.--All these that I have submitted go to show that your Lordships will have to go into the evidence and I summarise the heads of evidence on which I intend to rely. They are-- (1) General policy of the paper, (2) Documentary evidence of (a) different charters, (b) proclamations, (c) official despatches, (d) statements made by Ministers of the Crown from 1833 to the present day, (3) Documentary evidence of different reforms proposed by the Government from time to time but defeated by the activity of Government officials, e.g., Ilbert Bill, Minto-Morley Reforms, (4) Industrial Commission Report to show how industries were not allowed to be developed by the officials and these were sacrificed for the interest of Manchester, (5) Public Services Commission Report, (6) Present Reform Scheme--What it is and how it is sought to be killed by the officials here, (7) Illustration of the practical independence of a dependency. In our constitution the responsibility of this Government is to Parliament through Secretary of State for India, but in reality Parliament has not exercised any control and the officials are not responsible, to anybody, (8) Documentary and oral evidence as to state of public feeling and of events which have happened in the Punjab, (9) Oral evidence as to (i) effect of these articles on the people, (ii) class of persons who read the Amrita Bazar Patrika. 14. Mr. Das then analysed the first, article under the following heads :- (a) Compact between England and India that England should govern India on righteous principles, i.e., as equals. (b) Reference to Parliamentary Statutes and official despatches in proof of that. (c) Is India governed by England? It answers the question in the negative. (d) The system of Government is not for the good of the country and then it proceeds to give reasons :-- (i) Those allowed to govern look after themselves. (ii) It is a kind of lease to them. (iii) Comparison with leases to indigo planters. (iv) Government so conducted is despotic, un-British and barbarous. (v) Comparison with Japan. (e) Result is seething discontent. (f) This would not have happened if England directly ruled India. (g) Therefore the present mode of administration must be radically changed. Fletcher, J. 15. What is meant by measures in Expln. II? They are primo facie "legislative measures." 16. Mr. (iv) Government so conducted is despotic, un-British and barbarous. (v) Comparison with Japan. (e) Result is seething discontent. (f) This would not have happened if England directly ruled India. (g) Therefore the present mode of administration must be radically changed. Fletcher, J. 15. What is meant by measures in Expln. II? They are primo facie "legislative measures." 16. Mr. Das--That presents no difficulty to my case. The system of administration is under the Government of India Act and my comments are in connection with contemplated change. I am asking for it for I cannot get any reform unless by an act of Parliament Government of India Act is repealed or amended. Mookerjee, J. 17. What is the difference between measures and administrative actions ? 18. Mr. Das.--Measure there means something which is permanent that which has continuous effect and therefore there is room for alteration, but an administrative action is an action which has done its effects. Woodroffe, J. 19. We should like to hear the Advocate-General whether evidence is admissible or not. 20. Advocate-General.--The act has no relation to sedition per se. The act was passed for a special purpose, namely, better control of the press. Secondly, the governing words of sec. 4, namely, " which are likely or may have a tendency" are not found in the Penal Code. Then these words exclude intention. Expln. II deals with measures of Government which mean legislative measures and acts of Government. If on a fair interpretation of the articles your Lordships are of opinion that they are comments expressing disapproval of measures of Government, then the question is whether it excites or attempts to excite hatred, etc. If it does not excite, then there is no offence, if it does not attempt to excite, then also no offence. If it excites then the matter is concluded--it is an offence. If it attempts to excite, then the question of intention comes in. But the framers of the act never intended that evidence other than that contemplated in sec. 20 should he given. Mookerjee, J. 21. Sec. 20 deals with newspapers. Sec. 4 has a wider scope, it deals with newspapers, books or other documents containing any words, signs or visible representations. But the framers of the act never intended that evidence other than that contemplated in sec. 20 should he given. Mookerjee, J. 21. Sec. 20 deals with newspapers. Sec. 4 has a wider scope, it deals with newspapers, books or other documents containing any words, signs or visible representations. Now, suppose the question arose with reference to a matter contained in a book or document and that it had reference to a sign or visible representation and the question as to the meaning of that sign, then what would happen.] 22. Advocate-General.--I think the Court might very properly call evidence as to the meaning of that. Woodroffe, J. 23. If intention is not material it might be argued that the applicant might produce evidence under sec. 20 for the purpose of the nature or tendency.] 24. Advocate-General.--I submit that sec. 20 enables the Government only to give evidence and not the applicant. Mookerjee, J. 25. The applicant can say that I put in a dozen others which clearly negative what they say. Would it not be open to the applicant to put in other issues of the paper to contradict evidence? Nature or tendency of words is the matter to be proved. The Court has to decide between two conflicting contentions.] 26. Advocate-General.--Evidence can only be given in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency, but not to disprove the nature or tendency. 27. The first article is neither a comment on measures of Government nor of the administrative or other actions of the Government. 28. It is an attack on a class and on Government. It comes under sec. 4 (c) and not under Expln. II. 29. Mr. Das replied.--Apart from Expln. II the action describes something which requires seditious intent. I draw your attention to the word "purpose" in sec. 4. Purpose of what ? The purpose is of printing or publishing something which is likely or may have a tendency directly or indirectly to result in say a, b, or c. Purpose means intent, it connotes some kind of mentality. Fletcher, J. 30. The word "purpose", has no reference to printing press. 31. Mr. Das.--But the printing press does not use itself for that purpose. It is used by somebody for a purpose. The purpose must be the purpose of somebody else. Fletcher, J. 30. The word "purpose", has no reference to printing press. 31. Mr. Das.--But the printing press does not use itself for that purpose. It is used by somebody for a purpose. The purpose must be the purpose of somebody else. The words '' likely or may have a tendency '' have been taken from decided cases which had decided that the seditious intent, is necessary. Sec. 20 only deals with such evidence as is not admissible under the general law. Under sec. 20 the newspaper itself is regarded as an organic entity, whereas under sec. 14, Evidence Act, it is not. Sec. 20 is a statutory enactment which enables me to give evidence as much as it entitles the prosecution to give evidence. The only question is whether sec. 20 was intended to shut out evidence which may be admissible under the Evidence Act. I submit there is no bar by reason of sec. 20. If there is the question of intent then evidence is admissible. Fletcher, J. 32. What is the evidence that can be relevant, if the question of intention is not relevant?] 33. Mr. Das.--I shall claim to put in evidence as to time, place, surrounding circumstances and occasion to show that under the circumstances they are not likely to have that tendency. Evidence as to general policy of the paper, and to sources as to the meaning of the words used would also be admissible. Woodroffe, J. 34. Have you got any case in which there was evidence as to the state of feeling in the country ?] 35. Mr. Das.--I find from the Bangabashi case [Queen-Empress v. Jogendra Chandra Bose (22)] that Mr. Jackson was allowed to (22) I L. R. 19 Cal. 35 (1891).cross-examine prosecution witnesses to elicit the state of feeling and so on. I submit that question of intent, is material and evidence is admissible. 36. Here the Court intimated that evidence upon the question of intention was inadmissible, and so far as evidence by sec. 20 was concerned it would be considered when tendered. 37. The following issues of the Amrita Bazar Patrika were tendered and they were all rejected :-- 15th February 1917, 7th April 1917, 18th April 1917, 24th May 1917, 4th June 1917, 25th September 1917, 27th September 1917, 21st August 1918. 20 was concerned it would be considered when tendered. 37. The following issues of the Amrita Bazar Patrika were tendered and they were all rejected :-- 15th February 1917, 7th April 1917, 18th April 1917, 24th May 1917, 4th June 1917, 25th September 1917, 27th September 1917, 21st August 1918. 23rd August 1918, 16th August 1918, 8th January 1919, 10th January 1919, 18th January 1919, 9th February 1919, 26th March 1919, 10th July 1917, 13th July 1919, 14th July 1917, 3rd August 1919, 1st, April 1919, 2nd April 1919, 4th April 1919, 7th April 1919, 8th April 1919, 9th April 1919, 10th April 1919, 11th and 12th April 1919, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th May 1919, 7th November 1918, 15th June 1919, 24th August 1917, 14th December 1911. 38. The Advocate-General was not called upon to reply.C.A.V. Woodroffe, J. 39. This is an application by the Keeper of the Amrita Bazar Patrika Press and of the Amrita Bazar Patrika Co., Ld., under sec. 17 of the Press Act I of 1910, asking that this Court may, under sec. 19, set aside the order of forfeiture which was passed by the Government of Bengal in respect and in consequence of two articles published in the Amrita Bazar Patrika newspaper on the 10th and 12th April 1919, which are reproduced as annexures to the petition. The grounds of the forfeiture are that the first article was, in the opinion of the Governor in Council, likely and had a tendency, directly or indirectly, by influence, suggestion, implicacation or otherwise, to bring into hatred and contempt the Government established by law in India, and the officers of the said Government recruited in England and to excite disaffection towards the said Government, and that the second was likely and had a tendency, directly or indirectly, by inference, suggestion, implication, or otherwise, to bring into hatred the Government established in British India and to excite disaffection towards the said Government. The Government therefore acted under the provisions of sec. 4, cl. (c). 40. I will deal at once with a contention of Mr. C.R. Das, Counsel for the Applicant, that the order was bad in so far as it does not state that the ''officers of the said Government recruited in England " were in India. It would have been more formally correct if this had been expressly stated. 4, cl. (c). 40. I will deal at once with a contention of Mr. C.R. Das, Counsel for the Applicant, that the order was bad in so far as it does not state that the ''officers of the said Government recruited in England " were in India. It would have been more formally correct if this had been expressly stated. It is however obvious that the reference is to officers in India and not as suggested to officers in Mesopotamia, England or elsewhere. Further, whatever the order may say, we have (as pointed out by my brother Mookerjee, J., during the argument), in disposing of the application, to see whether the article is not obnoxious to the provisions of sec. 4 which include, amongst others, attacks upon any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India. Further again under sec. 22 of the Press Act the only ground upon which the Court can set aside a forfeiture is that the matter which is the subject of it does not contain words of the nature described in sec. 4. sub-sec. (1). No objection can be taken against the forfeiture itself, but it may be set aside under sec 19. I hold, therefore, that this objection fails. 41. The substantial question is whether the articles or either of them fall within the provisions of sec. 4, cl. (c), or are excluded therefrom, on the ground that they are comments expressing disapproval of the measures of Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, or of the administrative or other action of the Government established in British India without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection towards the said Government, or hatred and contempt towards a class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, viz., the officers of the said Government in India recruited in England. 42. No one I think reading these articles could come to the conclusion that they were not likely and had not a tendency to excite hatred and contempt towards the Government and class against whom they were directed. But it is urged for the Applicant that even if, standing by themselves, the articles have this effect, it is open to the Applicant to show and he offers by evidence to show that they were written without seditious intent. But it is urged for the Applicant that even if, standing by themselves, the articles have this effect, it is open to the Applicant to show and he offers by evidence to show that they were written without seditious intent. He then says that if he can show this alleged absence of seditious intent the forfeiture must be set aside. The argument involves the following considerations :-- 43. Is the question of intention immaterial in any, or is it material in every, case coming under sec. 4? If the answer is in the negative to both propositions, then as regards what provision of sec. 4 is intention to be investigated, and do the articles in question come under that provision or not? 44. If I were dealing with the matter as res integra and without reference to two of the decisions to which I later refer, I should have been disposed to hold that the intention of the legislature was that the Court should look at the articles and say whether the meaning of them was such that they were likely or had a tendency to have the effect mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) of sec. 4, and that, upon a consideration of this Question, the enquiry into what was the intention of the writer or publisher was not material, though in judging the nature or tendency of the words used, evidence of the particular character mentioned in sec. 20 might, if it were necessary, be admissible. 45. Here I may interpose to point out that the word '' intention'' is often loosely used. Thus we hear the expression "intention of a document.'' A document cannot have an intention nor a motive nor can it "attempt " to do anything. Intention, motive, attempt have reference to persons and denote psychological facts of which a document may be evidence. The so-called " intention of a document '" as distinguished from the state of mind of its author is nothing but its meaning. So far as the document is concerned, its so-called "intention'" is its meaning. The Press Act in my opinion was framed to enable the Government and the Court to deal with the meaning of documents and not with the intentions of their authors and publishers. It is the criminal law of sedition which deals with the latter. So far as the document is concerned, its so-called "intention'" is its meaning. The Press Act in my opinion was framed to enable the Government and the Court to deal with the meaning of documents and not with the intentions of their authors and publishers. It is the criminal law of sedition which deals with the latter. So on an application to set aside a forfeiture it was intended, I believe, that the Court should (apart from sec. 20) look at the document and ascertain on a fair reading what was its meaning and should then say whether the words used, when properly understood, were of the nature or tendency mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) of sec. 4. If it is not shown that they are not of this character then the forfeiture is upheld. If, however, on the true construction of a document the Court is of opinion that it is a disapproving comment on the measures or actions of Government or the administration of justice, which is not likely and has no tendency to excite the hatred, contempt op disaffection referred to in cl. (c), that is, if it is a temperate and allowable criticism of such measures or actions then the forfeiture is to be set aside. The Court in every case is; in this view, concerned with the meaning of the writing and not with the intentions of its writer. Intention is in this view the subject of criminal proceedings for direct sedition against persons under sec. 124A or indirect sedition under sec. 153A of the Penal Code and not of forfeiture of security given and document issued by a printing press. 46. It is true, however, that the wording of Expln. II to see. 4 does raise a difficulty, for it uses words winch have been relied on, and have been held, to show that the question of intention is, in certain cases, material; that is, the Applicant may in the case of disapproving comments on the measures (which in my opinion means legislative measures) or administrative or other action of Government, or the administration of justice, show that in the making of such comments there was no attempt (which implies intention) to excite the hatred, contempt or disaffection mentioned in cl. (c) of the section. (c) of the section. Not improbably, the wording of this explanation is due to care less drafting, the draughtsman overlooking the fact that he was importing into a section dealing with documents of a particular nature or tendency an explanation taken from sec. 124A of the Penal Code which deals with an offence by individuals for the establishment of which a seditious intention is necessary. This was pointed out by Abdur Rahim, J., Besant v. Emperor L.L.R. 39 Mad. 1085 at p. 1120 (1916)., in his observation that the explanation imported the question of intention, while cl. (c) of sec. 4 to which the explanation is attached is not concerned with the intention of the writer of the words charged. It may be as was argued on behalf of the Crown in Besant's case (1) that " attempting to incite " is a loosely worded equivalent, of "tending to excite," but this construction was overruled and we must, as Abdur Rahim, J., says, read Expln. II as we find it. 47. However this be, this view of the section is no longer open, for it has been held by the Madras High Court in the case cited that whilst intention is immaterial so far as cls. (a) to (f) of sec. 14 are concerned, it is material if the case falls within Expln.. II, when the Court is judging whether there was an attempt to excite hatred sad contempt by comments coming under that section. It follows, therefore, that intention is only material if we have to deal with comments on the measures or actions of Government or the administration of justice, and it is not otherwise material. These comments again are not protected if they in fact excite or attempt to excite hatred, contempt and disaffection, but are protected if the disapproving comments on the measures of Government are made with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, or if they are made on the actions of Government or administration of justice, and if in both cases there is no attempt to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection. As "attempt " implies intention, an enquiry Whether there has or has not been such an attempt involves, it has been held, a consideration of the question of intention. 48. As "attempt " implies intention, an enquiry Whether there has or has not been such an attempt involves, it has been held, a consideration of the question of intention. 48. This view must be taken to have been approved by the Privy Council which in the appeal from the decision of the Madras High Court observed as follows :--" Upon careful perusal of the several judgments their Lordships find that weight has been properly given to the several portions of the section. They do not find that the section has been misconstrued." [Mrs. Annie Besant v. The Advocate-General of the Government of Madras 35 T. L. R. 500 s c." 23 C.W.N. 986 (1919).]. 49. Mr. C.R. Das has argued that the Privy Council overruled the distinction which the Madras High Court drew between the operative part of sec. 4 and the explanation to cl. (c). I am unable to accept this contention. It is true that their Lordships say that it is not easy to see how Expln. II adds to, or detracts from, the direct language of cl. (c), but it does not therefore follow that the question of intention which is material in the particular cases mentioned in the explanation is thereby made material as regards either other cases under cl. (c), or all other clauses of sec. 4. I think, however, a legitimate argument may be raised as regards the subsequent passage of the judgment of the Judicial Committee which commences with " In substance the question under cl. (c) of sec. 4 " and which is relied on by the applicant to show that the Privy Council did not draw any distinction between an attack on the Government as such and comments on its measures and actions, and that it treated an attack on a class as involving intention though no mention is made of a class in Expln. II, and though, as the Judicial Committee later point out, the words in cl. (c) which refer to the hatred or contempt of a class or section are not limited by Expln. II. On the other hand the judgment of the Madras High Court, which is affirmed, clearly holds (p. 1120) that sec. 4 allows less scope to criticisms of the measures of Government, and that (as already stated) the operative portion of sec. (c) which refer to the hatred or contempt of a class or section are not limited by Expln. II. On the other hand the judgment of the Madras High Court, which is affirmed, clearly holds (p. 1120) that sec. 4 allows less scope to criticisms of the measures of Government, and that (as already stated) the operative portion of sec. 4 does not make the intention of the writer material when considering whether the words are not of the nature described in sec. 4. Attacks on a class or section are not mentioned in Expln. II, and the Judicial Committee point out that the words in cl. (c) which refer to the hatred or contempt of a class or section are not limited by Expln. II. Finally they say that "the section has not been misconstrued" by the High Court of Madras which very clearly distinguishes between the cases where intention is, and is not, material. Mr. C.R. Das has suggested that the Judicial Committee in making the last observation was referring to the manner in which the Madras High Court had applied the section, but this is not so, as the Judicial Committee then go on to deal with the application in detail of the principles of the law to the language of the various articles then before the Court. 50. These observations are sufficient to dispose of the argument that the question of seditious intent is material in every case coming under cls. (a) to (f) of the body of the section. But as the point is of importance and has been argued at great length I will further examine it. 51. Put in the most condensed form, the contention of the Applicants Counsel is, that before the Press Act can be pot into operation in any case, it must be shown that the offence of sedition has been committed, or to put the matter more accurately with reference to the terms of secs. 17 and 19, the forfeiture must be set aside if the Applicant shows that no sedition has been committed through the matter which is the ground of the forfeiture. In this view of the case the Act would mean that the Government may judge whether the offence of sedition has been committed and if it thinks that there has been such an offence, then it may make an order of forfeiture. In this view of the case the Act would mean that the Government may judge whether the offence of sedition has been committed and if it thinks that there has been such an offence, then it may make an order of forfeiture. Then the Applicant may come in and show that, there has-been no sedition, and the hearing of the application would take the form of a criminal trial, with this difference that the burden of proving that an offence had been committed would lie not on the Crown, but on the party whose property was forfeited, and the penalty would not be imprisonment of any person, but a forfeiture of security and copies of the newspaper. In such a trial all evidence would he admissible which was admissible in a criminal trial. 52. I do not think that such was the intention of the legislature. 53. It may be said that proceedings under the Press Act partake of a criminal character in so far as they involve forfeiture. It may also be that the matter forfeited might make the party responsible for it, liable to a criminal charge of sedition or charge under sec. 153A of the Penal Code; but the Act itself was not enacted for the punishment of such offences, but as its title and preamble shows for the better control of the Press. It is essentially a preventive measure : a measure with the view to prevent crime, that, is crime imperilling the existence of the State, the safety of its officers, public order and the like. It is to be observed that under see. 21 the procedure, until the framing of Rules by the High Court, is ordered to be that of the practice of the Court in proceedings other than suits and appeals. The only evidence for which direct provision is made by the Act is the admission of other copies of the newspaper in aid of the proof of the nature and tendency (sec. 20) and sec. 21 states that nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence under this Act. An offence under this Act is not sedition as such, but the printing or publishing of matter of the nature and tendency mentioned in sec. 21 states that nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence under this Act. An offence under this Act is not sedition as such, but the printing or publishing of matter of the nature and tendency mentioned in sec. 4, which attracts to itself the penalty of forfeiture. If the Crown is desirous in any case of proceeding against any party for sedition it will doubt less do so under the provisions of the Penal Code and according to the ordinary Criminal Procedure. Something may be said for Mr. C. B. Das's contention on the ground of thoroughness, for it may be argued either that intention is material in every case or in no case but the other circumstances I have mentioned are in my opinion against it and the question is concluded by precedent. 54. We must then, in my opinion, follow the decision as to the interpretation of the section given by the Madras High Court and affirmed, as I understand it, by the Judicial Committee. 55. The question then is, are the articles before us merely disapproving comments on the measures or actions of Government? If they are not. that, that is, if they are not such comments at all, or if, besides being in part such comments, they are also an attack on the Government itself, or on a class, then in so far as they are not such comments no question of intention arises. For it is to be observed that a writing may in part constitute an attack on the Government itself and in another part be a comment on its measures and actions. If it is the former, and of the nature specified in cl. (c) or if it is an attack on a class, then it is not covered by the Explanation, which alone, according to the Madras decision, imports the consideration of intention. 56. The first article in the order of forfeiture is alleged to be likely or to have a tendency to bring into hatred and contempt the Government established by law in British India and the officers of the said Government recruited in England and to excite disaffection against the said Government. 56. The first article in the order of forfeiture is alleged to be likely or to have a tendency to bring into hatred and contempt the Government established by law in British India and the officers of the said Government recruited in England and to excite disaffection against the said Government. I am unable to hold that this article does not contain words of the nature described seeing that it alleges, amongst other things, that England in breach of her pledges farmed this country out to English officers, who govern the people of India according to their own sweet will, on principles which are absolutely despotic and some of them un-British and barbarous, who serve themselves first and then only their mother country and increase their own pay looking down upon the people as mere human sheep, created only to minister to their (the officers') own comforts and material prosperity, the officers fattening themselves out of the country, whilst the Indians decay; the officers again governing India as their own property in such a way that, from being one of the richest of countries; it has become the permanent abode of famine, plague and malaria. 57. The second article is alleged in the order of forfeiture to be likely and to have the tendency to bring into haired, and to excite disaffection towards the Government. This article may be said to be in part a comment on the action of Government with respect to the proceedings taken with reference to the recent riots and there is a reference to the so-called Rowlatt Act which has robbed the people of many of the elementary rights of human beings." But it is more than this, as it is an attack upon the Government itself which is described as a " Common Enemy." It suggests that the people were provoked to violence, that on some pretence or another the police picked up a quarrel, that the people were shot at like eats and dogs. The article then speaks of unprovoked aggression and says '' we believe the Government of India will treat this awful incident with the same apathy as they have done with regard to the outrage at Delhi." Towards its close it says that as a result of what is said in the article '' the masses have at last been roused to realise that the reign of law is gone and people can be shot down at the sweet will of the Executive." I am unable to hold that this article does not contain words which are of the nature above described. 58. On this part of the case dealing with "nature or tendency" (corresponding to the words "are likely or may have a tendency" in sec. 4) certain evidence was tendered under sec. 20 of the Act. It may be a question whether the provisions of that section are equally available to the Crown and the accused. It speaks only of evidence in aid of the proof, and not disproof, of the nature and tendency of the words complained of. But this contention was overruled by the Madras High Court, and in the absence of any words of direct exclusion of evidence, it is fairer to assume that if an article is ambiguous or doubtful and therefore the Crown requires to supplement it by the evidence of other articles from the same newspaper, the person against whom the order of forfeiture is passed should have, the right to give evidence in rebuttal. I am, however, of opinion that the section only applies where, if the article stood alone, there may be doubt or ambiguity as to the character, nature or tendency of the words used, and not when the meaning of the article is apparent on its face, as is the case here. 59. Besides other leading articles in the newspaper extending from the year 1917 to 1919 a number of extracts from the newspaper were tendered which in my opinion do not in any case come within the scope of the section, namely, reports of events from press or private correspondents; proceedings in council, His Excellency the Viceroy's speech, the Bishop of Calcutta's sermon, Mr. Jinnah's (former member of Council) letter on his resignation, the Bight Honourable Mr. Jinnah's (former member of Council) letter on his resignation, the Bight Honourable Mr. Montague's speech in introducing the Reform Bill and on the Mesopotamian Commission, Message of His Majesty the King-Emperor, letter of resignation of Moulvie Mazurul Huq, dissentient minute of Sir Sankaran Nair on a Government despatch, a speech of Mr. B. Chakrabarti and the dissentient minute on the Industrial Commission. All such matters we rejected, whether it is claimed that they are admissible under sec. 20 of the Press Act or otherwise. We also rejected (after first fully reading them) the various leading articles tendered. In my opinion they do not aid in proof of the nature or tendency of the words used which are quite intelligible on their face. Nor are they admissible as evidence of policy of the paper, for policy is a matter of intention and for the reasons given such evidence is not admissible. Nor if they were admitted, would they, in my opinion, have helped the Plaintiff's case or affected my judgment as to the nature and tendency of the articles which have been selected by the Applicant as supporting his case. 60. The articles tendered are many and lengthy and I give only their essential gist. Issues tendered in connection with the first article, the subject of these proceedings, profess the following sentiments :--In the first place there are expressions of loyalty to the Throne sacred as the symbol of the collective life and of loyalty to the true or Ideal empire, wholly different from the reality, namely, the present British Empire which is the product of the conscious pursuit of lower ends and a determined effort to repudiate the true ideal of Empire (24th May 1917). At present there is only a "White imperialism," a confederacy of white men for the exploitation of the non-White members of the present Empire (ibid.). Independence is not sought, but Home Rule within the Empire, that is a combination of National freedom with Imperial subjection. Many passages insist on the fact and this is the general tenor of the articles as a whole, that the obstacle in the way of Indian Political well-being is the self-interested hostility of the bureaucracy or Indian Civil Service which one issue (20th January 1919) says means the Government of India. Many passages insist on the fact and this is the general tenor of the articles as a whole, that the obstacle in the way of Indian Political well-being is the self-interested hostility of the bureaucracy or Indian Civil Service which one issue (20th January 1919) says means the Government of India. All this is the " Psychology of selfishness " (27th September 1917) which the writer says has produced a dangerous discontent in the masses (ibid.). The Viceroy, it is said, has protected the interests of the foreign bureaucracy and foreign exploiters (19th February 1919). In one issue (26th March 1919) it is oven suggested that the Government is provoking some sort of physical conflict (26th March 1919). The foreign bureaucracy which governs India is striving to retain then powers (3rd August 1917). This absolute power of the alien official must be broken (14th July 1917) in order that there may be a transfer of power from the alien bureaucracy to the people. But loyalty to the Crown and the "Ideal Empire" is professed and anything but constitutional methods of agitation are discouraged. 61. There is no allegation in the order of forfeiture of disloyalty to His Majesty the King-Emperor. What is alleged is that the articles are likely, and have a tendency to bring into hatred and contempt the Government established by law in British India and to excite disaffection towards the said Government, and, as regards the first article, that it contains words which are likely or have the tendency to bring into hatred and contempt the officers of the said Government recruited in England. It has been held that the words "Government-established by law in India " in sec. 4 are not to be construed as indicating only the supremacy of the British Crown in India and the British connection with it, as opposed to independence, Besant v. Emperor I. L R. 39 Mad. 1085 (1016). For the rest the articles tendered do not assist the Applicant, or disprove the alleged nature or tendency of the words used, the meaning of which is plain on their face. Because on previous occasions language has been used which was either not obnoxious to the section or was, under the circumstances, passed over by the Government, does not in any sense disprove the nature or tendency alleged in this case. Because on previous occasions language has been used which was either not obnoxious to the section or was, under the circumstances, passed over by the Government, does not in any sense disprove the nature or tendency alleged in this case. What, however, they do show is that for about two years previous to the first article in question, the paper has been writing against the so-called bureaucracy, which it speaks of as being the Government and which that article has now attacked in terms which have led the Government to make the forfeiture, although there was, according to one of the previous issues (27th September 1917), a deep, widespread, and dangerous discontent in the masses in this country which should have led the paper to be careful of what it said and published. 62. Some further articles tendered deal with the recent grave riots in this country. The '"Delhi outrage" is described (2nd April 1919) as a wanton outrage. It speaks of the enormity of the police action in shooting unarmed people like sparrows : of the hecatombs in which natives were victims, of the resultant disappearance of "natives" from, the arena of their unfortunate "native" land. It points out that the unarmed people of this country are neither Germans nor Turks. Mr. C, EL Das says as to this that no enquiry was held and that this explains the reference to the " apathy " of the Government of India in the second article in question. An article on the "Delhi Tragedy," 4th April 1919, speaks of grave provocation. The issue, however, of the 11th April 1919 exhorts the public to behave with composure which the writer is sure that they will do. There is nothing in all this which disproves the alleged nature and tendency of the words of the second article in question. What they do show is that for two years the paper has been strongly criticising the so called bureaucracy and for a short time previous to the second article also the action taken as regards the recent riots without any intervention by Government. When, however, violent and inflammatory language was used at a time which, owing to the late riots, was one of public danger, then the Government felt itself compelled to take action under the Press Act with a view to prevent the spread of further disorder. 63. When, however, violent and inflammatory language was used at a time which, owing to the late riots, was one of public danger, then the Government felt itself compelled to take action under the Press Act with a view to prevent the spread of further disorder. 63. These findings dispose of the application, but I will now deal with the case on the assumption that evidence of intention was (as argued for the applicant) relevant and will record and deal with the evidence tendered on his behalf on this part of the case. The argument was that, over and above nature and tendency of the words used, the Court must be satisfied that there was a particular seditious intention, otherwise the order of forfeiture must be set aside. 64. Evidence was tendered of "time, place circumstance and occasion of the article." On this head we were invited to enter into an extensive historical enquiry from the year 1833 to the present time with a view to show the rights of the Indians as set forth in charters, proclamations, official despatches and statements made by Ministers of the Crown, that from time to time various reforms had been proposed by the Government such as Lord Ripon's Local Self-Government Act, and the Minto-Morley proposals, substantial as they left England, which are said to have been defeated or obstructed by the activity of Government officials in this country. It was proposed to tender the Public Service and Industrial Commissions' reports to show that the development of the country had been prevented by Government officials and the industrial interests of India had been sacrified to Manchester. Promises made had thus, it is said, not been allowed to be fulfilled. We were invited to receive evidence of the questions agitating the mind of the public and of the general "political environment." Secondly, evidence was offered of the state of the country and of public feeling. It was argued that evidence, oral and documentary, of political questions agitating the people and their feelings in general and of recent events in the Punjab was relevant to show that it was necessary in the interests of Government itself that, such an alleged state of things should be brought to its notice. It was argued that the object being to ventilate a grievance a seditious intention was negatived. It was argued that the object being to ventilate a grievance a seditious intention was negatived. Thirdly, evidence was offered of the character and description of that part of the public who might be expected to read the article. Mr. Das proposed to call evidence to show what effect the reading of the articles in question had upon the readers and then to show the class of persons who read the Amrita Bazar Patrika. These are said to be (and evidence was offered to show it) the politically-minded class amongst educated persons who were all engaged in bringing about a lawful change in the administration, which change had been practically promised. Fourthly, evidence of the previous general policy of the newspaper. Fifthly, evidence from other sources of the meaning of the whole articles. To explain the articles applicant's Counsel desired to refer to various legislative enactments, Government resolutions and utterances of Ministers of the Crown and other statesmen. Mr. C.R. Das in response to the question of the Court "What were the passages in the articles, the subject of these proceedings, which he said that these documents explain " replied that they were tendered to explain the whole of the articles, and any point made in them, and on the rejection of the above-mentioned evidence closed his case. 65. In the first place it is to be observed that the truth of the facts alleged is no answer. Even if there were the ''compact'' and promises alleged, and even if they were broken, and even if this was due to the alleged self-interested hostility of the class to which the first article refers, this would be no answer. 66. We must then distinguish between the meaning of an article and the intention of its writer. The construction of a document is a question of law to be determined by grammar or logic, the primary organs of interpretation aided when necessary by evidence to make the words which are used fit the external things to which the words are approprite [Evidence Act, sec. 92 proviso (6)] and by evidence of the character mentioned in secs. 95-98 of the Evidence Act. Where the words of the document are (as in my opinion is the case here) plain and unambiguous we must look to the document alone. Extrinsic evidence to explain a document is not admissible because not needed in such a case. 92 proviso (6)] and by evidence of the character mentioned in secs. 95-98 of the Evidence Act. Where the words of the document are (as in my opinion is the case here) plain and unambiguous we must look to the document alone. Extrinsic evidence to explain a document is not admissible because not needed in such a case. In my opinion there is no ground in this case for the admission of explanatory evidence. Passing then to evidence of intention, this should be gathered from the language employed. When the meaning of a document has been truly ascertained, that document itself is evidence of the intention of the writer. Intention is a psychological fact and can be proved under sec. 14 of the Evidence Act when the existence of intention is in issue or relevant provided that the collateral fact is not too remote. If then intention was rightly in issue in this case, that is if; for instance, the existence of intention were, relevant in the case of an attack on a class under cl. (c) of sec. 4, though under that clause intention is not material, and though the explanation to that clause which imports intention has no reference to words directed against a class, then speaking generally evidence of intention would be, according to the Madras decision, admissible. Seshagiri Ayyar, J., there said,." It is true that in the vast majority of cases the intention must be gathered from the language employed, but it is possible to show that what primo facie appears objectionable should not be given the meaning attributable to the words employed. The difference is very thin no doubt, but I think that the legislature was contemplating in Expln. II the possibility of proof by the person proceeded against that the intention to create disaffection was not in the mind of the writer." Besant v Emperor I.L.R 39 Mad 1086 at p. 1152 (1916). If, then, it be assumed, for the purpose of this judgment, that evidence of intention was relevant, then in my opinion such evidence as has been offered to us and tendered would not, if admissible, and in admitted, have established the applicant' claim to relief. If, then, it be assumed, for the purpose of this judgment, that evidence of intention was relevant, then in my opinion such evidence as has been offered to us and tendered would not, if admissible, and in admitted, have established the applicant' claim to relief. Let it be assumed (with out adjudging it to be so) that political promises have not been kept, but have been thwarted by either the Indian Government or its officials or both, and that the motive of the writer or writers of the articles was as alleged, to carry out the reforms said to have been promised, and to change the present political system, thus putting as end to the power of the Indian Civil Se vice, even then that would not justify the use of language likely or tending to create hatred, contempt or disaffection. Whether, notwithstanding such likelihood tendency, there was or was not an actual intention to create hatred, contempt or disaffection must be primarily determine upon a perusal of the writings themselves As the Judicial Committee say ''in judging the question of intent the publisher must be deemed fro intend that which is the natural result of the words used." The words used in these articles are in my opinion likely to produce hatred, contempt and disaffection. This must then be presumed to have been intended until the contrary is shown. If the words upon their true construction do not show the nature or tendency alleged, then there is no need to enquire into the existence of seditious intention which the true construction of the words negatives. If on the other hand the words used naturally clearly and indubitably have such tendency, then it must be presumed that the publisher intended that which is the natural result of the words used and no other evidence is (to say the least) likely to rebut the existence of such intention. If, however, the words used have the nature and tendency in doubt, it is not likely that Government action would be taken thereon, but if it did, it is not likely again that the Court would uphold the forfeiture, or that it would do so at any rate in the absence of strong evidence of seditious intent. Once therefore seditious intent is clearly inferred from the language used, other evidence on the question of actual intention becomes in practice of little moment,. Once therefore seditious intent is clearly inferred from the language used, other evidence on the question of actual intention becomes in practice of little moment,. As suggested by the passage cited from the judgment of Seshagiri Ayyar, J., the distinction between intention inferred from the document and as otherwise existing is there. However this may be, and dealing with the particular facts of this case, nothing of the political history and argument and other matter which have been opened to us and offered as evidence in this case would if accepted as evidence have shown that if the existence of the particular intention was necessary, that intention was not present. If intention is necessary, then I. think it is shown to exist. 67. To sum up :--In my opinion whatever else there is in the articles we are also dealing with a case outside Expln. II which it has been held imports intention. For there is here in both cases an attack on the Government itself, and not merely a comment on the measures or actions of Government, and in the first article there is also an attack on a class which is not covered by Expln. II. An enquiry into intention is therefore not material and it cannot be said that the words used are not of the nature described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (7), cl. (c). If. however, intention were material, then some of the evidence tendered is inadmissible and even if all that was opened to us and proffered in evidence had been admitted, it would not have rebutted the intention to be gathered from the articles themselves. The writer or writers must he deemed to have intended that which is the natural result of words used, namely, the hatred, contempt and disaffection alleged. 68. The application therefore must be missed. As I see no reason in this case departing from the usual rule that an unsuccessful party shall pay the costs, the order will he that the applicant do pay Government's costs of these proceedings as of a hearing on Scale No. 2. Mookerjee, J. 69. On the 10th April 1919. the "Amrita Bazar Patrika" published an article beaded " To Whom does India belong." Two days later, the paper published another article headed " Arrest of Mr. Gandhi, mere outrages." On the 15th April, the Governor of Bengal in Council took action under sec. Mookerjee, J. 69. On the 10th April 1919. the "Amrita Bazar Patrika" published an article beaded " To Whom does India belong." Two days later, the paper published another article headed " Arrest of Mr. Gandhi, mere outrages." On the 15th April, the Governor of Bengal in Council took action under sec. 4, sub-sec. (1) the Indian Press Act 1910 and the Keeper of the printing press where the paper was printed was thereupon served with a notice in the following terms :-- Whereas it appears to the Governor in Council that the printing press known as the Amrita Bazar Patrika Press Limited located at Nos. 19 and 20, Bagbazar Street, Calcutta, in respect of which security to the amount of Rs. 5,000 has been deposited in accordance with the provisions of sec. 3 (2) of the Indian Press Act, 1910, has been used for printing and publishing the issues of the newspaper called the '' Amrita Bazar Patrika" bearing date 10th April 1919 and 12th April 1919, and whereas the said issue of the said newspaper, dated 10th April 1919, contains an article entitled "To Whom does India belong" the whole tenor of which article and in particular the passage from the words " England having acquired India" to the words "they increased their own pay " are in the opinion of the Governor in Council likely and have a tendency directly or indirectly by inference, suggestion, implication or otherwise to bring into hatred and contempt the Government established by law in British India and the officers of the said Government recruited in England and to excite disaffection towards the said Government and whereas the said issue of the said newspaper, dated 12th April 1919, contains an article entitled " Arrest of Mr. Gandhi-- More outrages " the whole tenor of which article and in particular the passage " The masses have at last been roused to realise that the reign of law is gone and people can be shot down at the sweet will of the Executive'' are in the opinion of the Governor in Council likely and have a tendency directly or indirectly by inference, suggestion, implication or otherwise to bring into hatred the Government, established in British India and excite disaffection towards the said Government. Now therefore take notice that the Governor in Council in pursuance of sec. Now therefore take notice that the Governor in Council in pursuance of sec. 4 (2) of the Indian Press Act, 1910, declare the security of Rs. 5,000 deposited in respect of the 'Amrita Bazar Patrika Press Limited, Calcutta, and all copies of the issues of the newspaper called the "Amrita Bazar Patrika having date of 10th April and 12th April 1919 wherever found to be forfeited to His Majesty. 70. The security thus forfeited had been deposited pursuant to a notice issued on the 29th May 1913 under sec. 3, sub-sec. (2) in respect of an article which appear in the paper on the 12th April 1913. On the 13th June 1919 the Keeper of the Press applied to this Court to set aside the order of forfeiture made on the 15th April. The application was heard by a Special Bench constituted under sec. 18 and we have now to determine the matter in controversy. Under sec. 19, sub-sec. (1), the High Court is competent to set aside the order of forfeiture on one ground and one ground alone, namely, that the words contained in the newspaper in respect of which the order in question was made, were not of the nature described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1). In view of the elaborate arguments addressed to the Court, it is necessary to examine the scope of the relevant sections of the Indian Press Act. 71. The preamble states that the provisions were enacted, because it was necessary to provide for the better control of the press, and sec. 1, sub-sec (2) makes it clear that in the opinion of the legislature such necessity extended to the whole of British India. Sec. 2 contains the interpretation clause and defines a newspaper as a periodical work containing public news or comments on public news. Sec. 3 provides for the deposit of security by Keepers of printing presses. The first sub-section refers to deposits to be made at the time of the declaration under sec. 4 of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867. The second sub-section refers to presses in respect of which a declaration had been made prior to the commencement of the Act; in this class of cases, a deposit may be demanded only if it appears to the Local Government that the press is used for any of the purposes described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1). The second sub-section refers to presses in respect of which a declaration had been made prior to the commencement of the Act; in this class of cases, a deposit may be demanded only if it appears to the Local Government that the press is used for any of the purposes described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1). It was under this provision that security to the maximum amount (Rs. 5,000) was exacted from the Amrita Bazar Patrika Press in 1913. We now come to sec. 4 which invests the Local Government with authority to declare the security as also copies of the offending newspaper forfeited in certain cases. The section is in these terms:-- (1) Whenever it appears to the Local Government, that any printing press in respect of which any security has been deposited as required by sec. 3 is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other documents containing any words, signs or visible representations which are likely or may have a tendency directly or indirectly whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise-- (a) to incite to murder or to any offence under the Explosive Substances Act. 3 is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other documents containing any words, signs or visible representations which are likely or may have a tendency directly or indirectly whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise-- (a) to incite to murder or to any offence under the Explosive Substances Act. 1908, or to any act of violence, or (b) to seduce any officer, soldier or sailor in the Army or Navy of His Majesty from his allegiance or his duty, or (c) to bring into haired or contempt His Majesty or the Government established by law in British India or the administration of justice in British India or any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty, or any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, or to excite disaffection towards His Majesty, or the said Government or any such Prince or Chief, or (d) to put any person in fear or to cause annoyance to him and thereby induce him to deliver to any person any property or valuable security or to do any act which he is not legally, bound to do, or to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, or (e) to encourage or incite any person to interfere with the administration of the law or with the maintenance of law and order, or (f) to convey any threat of injury to a public servant, or to any person in whom that public servant is believed to be interested, with a view to inducing that public servant to do any act or to forbear or delay to do any act connected with the exercise of his public functions, the Local Government may, by notice in writing to the Keeper of such printing press spiting or describing the words, signs or visible representations which in its opinion are of the nature described above, declare the security desposited in respect of such press and all copies of such newspaper, book or other document wherever found to be forfeited to His Majesty. Explanation I.--In cl. (c) the expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation II. Explanation I.--In cl. (c) the expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation II. Comments expressing disapproval of the measures of the Government or of any such Native Prince or Chief as aforesaid with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, or of the administrative or other action of the Government or of any such Native Prince or Chief or of the administration of justice in British India without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection do not come within the scope of cl. (c). (2) After the expiry of ten days from the date of the issue of a notice under sub-sec. (1), the declaration made in respect of such press under sec. 4 of the Press and "Registration of Books Act. 1867, shall be deemed to he annulled. 72. It is plain that the power to declare the security forfeited can be exercised only with regard to a press in respect of which security has been deposited under either of the two sub-sections of sec. 3. In respect of such presses, the provisions of the section may be utilised, when it appears to the Local Government that the press is used for the purpose of printing or publishing any newspaper, book or other document which contains any words, signs or visible representations which are likely to produce the effects mentioned in cls. (a) to (f) or which may have a tendency, directly or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise (that is. in any other way or by any other process) to produce any of the effects mentioned in the six clauses. Notwithstanding the able argument of Mr. Das, I am not convinced that a question of intention at all arises with regard to that portion of sub-sec. (J) of sec. 4 which precedes the six clauses. A faint attempt was, indeed, made to deduce intention as a material element from the use of the word "purpose," but there was obviously no force in that contention. The press is used for the purpose of printing and publication: that clearly does not indicate that intention is a material factor in the determination of the question of the legal effect of the words, signs or visible representations contained in the newspaper, book or other document. The press is used for the purpose of printing and publication: that clearly does not indicate that intention is a material factor in the determination of the question of the legal effect of the words, signs or visible representations contained in the newspaper, book or other document. Reliance was next placed upon the expression " tendency," but clearly intention and tendency are entirely different things. Intention has reference to the state of the mind of the actor; tendency, on the other hand, has reference to the possible result of the act. The "tendency" of an act may, in fact, be exactly the reverse of the result which the actor intended should follow from the measure taken by him. Intention is one of the decisive elements in determining the moral character of an act and is an essential element in many a criminal offence. The tendency of an act implies that the act may tend to cause a particular result, but may or may not actually lead to that effect. I can discover no solid ground for the contention that the use of the word " tendency " shows that intention is an essential element in the determination of the true character of the words, signs or representations. We have next to consider the six clauses, but before we proceed to them, we may note that in the introductory words of this clause, the legislature has used every conceivable expression which could widen its scope. Thus, the legislature was not, content with the word "likely," but used as an alternative the expression " may have a tendency, directly or indirectly, whether by inference, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication or otherwise." Of the six clauses, we are concerned primarily with cl. (c) in the case before us. This clause contemplates five classes of possible effect :-- (i) To bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards His Majesty; (ii) To bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in British India; (iii) To bring into hatred or contempt the administration of justice in British India; (iv) To bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty; (v) To bring into hatred or contempt any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India. 73. 73. If the words, signs or visible representations contained in a newspaper, book or other document are likely to produce any of these effects or may have a tendency to produce any of these effects, the question of intention is immaterial; we are concerned, not with the intention of the author, but with the effect which they tend to produce or are likely to produce. In my opinion, if the section had stoped with the first paragraph of what is now sub-see. (1), the question of interpretation would thus have been fairly simple; the sub-section includes, however, two explanations which must be taken into account; the second of these has formed the subject of much discussion and comment. 74. The object of the second explanation is to exclude from the scope of cl. (c) comments of certain classes which may be enumerated in three groups as follows :-- (i) Comments expressing disapproval of the measures of the Government or of any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty : Provided that such comments are made with a view to obtain their alternation by lawful means Provided also that such comments are made without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection; (ii) Comments expressing disapproval of the administrative or other action of the Government or of any Native Prince or Chief under the suzerainty of His Majesty : Provided that such comments are made without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection; (iii) Comments expressing disapproval of the administration of justice in British India : Provided that such comments are made without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection. 75. In each of these cases, the question of intention is material; in the first case, we have to ascertain the purpose with which the comments have been made, and in all the three cases, we have to determine whether an attempt has been made to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection. In the language of Stephen (Digest of Criminal Law, Art 50), an attempt to commit a crime is an act done with an intent to commit that crime and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted. In the language of Stephen (Digest of Criminal Law, Art 50), an attempt to commit a crime is an act done with an intent to commit that crime and forming part of a series of acts which would constitute its actual commission if it were not interrupted. To put the matter differently, attempt is an act done in part execution of a criminal design, amounting be more than mere preparation, but falling short of actual consummation, and, possessing except for failure to consummate, all the elements of the substantive crime, in other words, an attempt consists in the intent to commit crime, combined with the doing of some act adapted to but falling short of its actual commission; it may consequently be defined as that which if not prevented would have resulted in the full consummation of the act attempted [Reg. v. Collins L. L. C. 471; 9 Cox. 497 (1861)]. The effect of the second explanation thus is to exclude from the operation of cl. (c) three classes of comments, subject to the qualifications formulated above. Consequently, where a case is alleged to fall within the scope of the second explanation, it is incumbent on the Court to examine the quest ton of intention. But even though the question of intention is found in favour of the person whose security has been forfeited, he cannot obtain the benefit of the explanation, if the comments do in fact excite or constitute an attempt to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection; The stringent provisions of the substantive portion of the subjection are consequently; relaxed only to a very limited extent: comments of the character mentioned in the second explanation may be permissible, even though they are likely or may have a tendency to produce the corresponding result mentioned in cl. (c), hut they must not excite or constitute an attempt to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection. The difference, between the clause and its explanation thus consists, in the main, of the recognition of the distinction between likelihood and tendency on the one hand and realisation or attempt on the other hand; this, though appreciable in theory, is likely to be valueless in practice to the person concerned. The difference, between the clause and its explanation thus consists, in the main, of the recognition of the distinction between likelihood and tendency on the one hand and realisation or attempt on the other hand; this, though appreciable in theory, is likely to be valueless in practice to the person concerned. The exception to the all-comprehensive general rule, contained in the so-called explanation, still further loses its effect, when it is borne in mind that comments may in one portion be protected by the second explanation, but may, in another portion, fall within the scope of cl. (c). In such an event the passage as a whole must plainly be deemed obnoxious. Sec. 17 authorises the person against whom an order of forfeiture has been made under sec. 4 to apply to the High Court within two months from the date thereof to set it aside on the ground that the newspaper, book, or other document in respect of which it was made did not contain any words, signs or visible representations of the nature described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1). Sec. 18 provides for the hearing of the application by a Special Bench of the Court. Sec. 19, sub-sec. (1), provides that the Special Bench shall set aside the order of forfeiture if it appears to the Bench that the words, signs or visible representations contained in the newspaper, book or other document in respect of which the order in question was made were not of the nature described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1). Two propositions indisputably result from these provisions, namely, first, that the validity of the order of forfeiture can be questioned only on the ground, namely, that the words. signs or visible representations in question are not of the nature described in sec. 4. sub-sec. (1), and, secondly, that although the order may have been made by the Local Government on the ground that the words, signs or visible representations were of the nature described in one or other of the six clauses of sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), the High Court can set aside the order of forfeiture only if satisfied that they do not fall within any of those clauses. 4, sub-sec. (1), the High Court can set aside the order of forfeiture only if satisfied that they do not fall within any of those clauses. In this connection, n question of burden of proof was raised in the course of argument and reference was made to the decisions in Protab v. Empress 11 C E. R. 25(29)(1882), Rohimuddi v. Queen-Empress I. L. R. 20 Cal. 353 (357) (1892) and Milan Khan v. Sagar Bepari I. L. R. 23 Cal. 347 (319) (1895) to show the true functions of a Court of Criminal Appeal These cases affirm the doctrine that a Court of Criminal Appeal should approach the case before it with a View to determine whether the conviction can be sustained on the materials on the record. That principle clearly has no application to a hearing under sec. 18 of the Indian Tress Act. An order is made by the Local Government in exercise of the powers conferred by the statute. The person affected thereupon applies to the High Court to set aside the order on the allegation that the words, signs or visible representations are not of the nature described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1). It is manifest that the Court does not approach the case with the presumption that the order is erroneous: the burden lies upon the Petitioner to establish the validity of his contention. If he fails to satisfy the Court that the words, signs or visible representations are not of the nature described in sec. 4. sub-sec. (1), the application must be dismissed. There is no force in the contention that this interpretation compels the Petitioner to prove a negative; the argument is based on a superficial view of what must take place at the trial. The Court is invited by the Petitioner to examine the true nature of the words, signs or visible representations; he expounds his version before the Court; if he is able to persuade the Court to accept his exposition as the correct interpretation. the construction adopted by the Local Government stands displaced, with the result that the order of forfeiture is cancelled. The burden of proof thus clearly lies upon the Petitioner. We have next to consider sec. the construction adopted by the Local Government stands displaced, with the result that the order of forfeiture is cancelled. The burden of proof thus clearly lies upon the Petitioner. We have next to consider sec. 20 which is in these terms : "On the hearing of any such application with reference to any newspaper, any copy of such newspaper published after the commencement of this Act, may be given in evidence in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency of the words, signs or visible representations cantained in such newspaper which are alleged to be of the nature described in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1)." There has been considerable discussion at the Bar as to the object and meaning of this section. In my opinion, the object of the section was to widen, for a specified purpose, the rule of evidence embodied in sec. 14 of the Indian Evidence Act. Illustration (e) to that section shows that when A is accused of defaming B publishing an imputation intended to harm the reputation of B, the fact of previous publications by a respecting B showing ill-will on the part of A towards B is relevant as proving A's intention to harm B's reputation by the particular publication in question. Sec. 20 of the Indian Press Act lays down a more comprehensive rule in the case of newspapers, inasmuch as it allows any copy of the newspaper, published after the commencement of the Act, to be given in evidence in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency of the words, signs or visible representations. Sec. 14 of the Indian Evidence Act, on the other hand, would not make the evidence relevant, unless the existence of a state of mind or state of body or bodily feeling was in controversy. It must be observed, however, that the wider rule embodied in sec. 20 of the Indian Press Act does not apply to publications other than newspapers; in other words, if a question arises as to the nature or tendency of the words contained in a book, previous books by the author cannot be given in evidence under sec. 20. But it has been argued that sec. 20 has, at the same time, a restrictive effect in two directions, namely, first, that evidence of the type contemplated by sec. 20. But it has been argued that sec. 20 has, at the same time, a restrictive effect in two directions, namely, first, that evidence of the type contemplated by sec. 20 can be adduced only on behalf of the Crown, and, secondly, no evidence other than what is admissible under sec. 20 can be adduced at the trial either by the Petitioner or by the Crown. I am convinced that these propositions are not well-founded. The first, contention is based on a very narrow interpretation of the expression " in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency." In my opinion the matter before the Court is the determination of the question of the nature. or tendency of the words, signs or visible representations. The parties come forward with counter allegations, and each side relies upon copies of previous issues of the newspaper in support of the construction favoured by it. If the copies produced are relevant, plainly the language of the section is not unduly strained when we hold that the materials produced, whether by the one side or by the other, constitute evidence "in aid of the proof" of the nature or tendency. Besides, this is a manifestly just interpretation. The contrary view which seeks to confine the privilege production of evidence under the section to the Crown alone would lead to a position so obviously unjust that I cannot persuade myself to believe that such a departure could really have ever been intended by the legislature, to be achieved indirectly by the disguise, as it were, of sec. 20. I hold accordingly that sec. 20 may be utilised by the person affected by the order of forfeiture precisely in the same manner as by the Crown. [Amar Singh v. Emperor [1915] 15 P. R. Cr.; [1915] 33 F. W. R. Cr and Ghulam v. Emperor [1814] 87 P. W. R; [1914] 211 P.L.R.1. The second contention is equally groundless. If the legislature had intended that no evidence of any description whatever, other than what is contemplated by sec. 20, should be admissible at the trial, an express provision to that effect might no doubt have been easily framed. Besides, cases can be imagined without difficulty, where evidence other than what is admissible under sec. 20 might be indispensable to enable that Court to discharge the duty imposed upon it by sec. 19. 20, should be admissible at the trial, an express provision to that effect might no doubt have been easily framed. Besides, cases can be imagined without difficulty, where evidence other than what is admissible under sec. 20 might be indispensable to enable that Court to discharge the duty imposed upon it by sec. 19. To take one instance : if the order of forfeiture relates to signs or visible representations, evidence may be essential to enable the Court to determine their meaning before their tendency could be adjudged. Again, where the order of forfeiture relates to words, they may, it is not inconceivable, belong to a language not known to the members of the Special Bench; or their tendency to produce a specified effect may be by suggestion, allusion or implication which may stand in need of exposition by evidence. It is not necessary for our present purpose to attempt an exhaustive enumeration of the classes of evidence which might be admissible; but what appears to me to be clear is that sec. 20 was not enacted with a view to exclude all evidence other than what is rendered admissible thereby. 76. Sec. 21 requires the High Court to frame rules to regulate the procedure in the case of applications under sec. 17, the amount of the costs thereof and the execution of orders passed thereon and until such rules are framed, the practice of the Court in proceedings other than suits and appeals are to apply so far as may be practicable. The requisite rules have been framed by this Court, and are set out in the Volume of Rules and Orders edited by Mr. Hechle. Sec. 22 provides that, every declaration of forfeiture, purporting to be made under the Act, shall, as against all persons, be conclusive evidence that the forfeiture therein referred to has taken place, and no proceeding purporting to be taken under the Act shall be called in question by any Court except the High Court on such application as aforesaid, that is, the application mentioned in sec. 17. This section makes the declaration of forfeiture conclusive evidence of the factum of forfeiture; further the legality of the forfeiture can be questioned, only by the method mentioned in sec. 17 and to the extent provided thereby. 17. This section makes the declaration of forfeiture conclusive evidence of the factum of forfeiture; further the legality of the forfeiture can be questioned, only by the method mentioned in sec. 17 and to the extent provided thereby. To take one illustration; when an order of forfeiture has been made in respect of a book, the order, if not set aside in a proceeding under sec. 17, is conclusive evidence of the fact in a civil suit between the publisher and the author. Sec. 26 provides that nothing contained in the Act shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against the Act. Consequently, the fact that an order of forfeiture has been made under the Indian Press Act, does not stand in the way of a possible prosecution for sedition under the Indian Penal Code, in respect of selfsame writing. 77. I have so far analysed the relevant provisions of the Indian Press Act without the aid of judicial decisions. The object of the legislation was to secure control over presses, publishers and means of publication, as also the suppression of seditious or objectionable newspapers, hooks or other documents wherever found. It might legitimately have been expected that the provisions in a statute of this character, so comprehensive in its application and so far reaching in its consequences, would carefully be couched in language which leave no possible room for doubt as to their meaning and legal effect. The fact, however, is otherwise, and reference has consequently been made to judicial pronouncements on the subject, which themselves are not always easy to reconcile [In re Mahomed Ali (9), Purusottam v. Government of Bihar (10), Besant v. Emperor (1) and Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras 35 T.L.R. 500 : s. o. 23 C.W.N. 984 (1919)]. The views expressed in In re Mahomed Ali [1919] Pat. 65; 4 P.L.J. 174 (1919) were, on many vital points, not accepted by the Madras High Court in Besant v. Emperor ILR 89 Mad. 1085 (1916) and as the latter decision has now been approved by the Judicial Committee, the decision in In re Mahomed Ali ILR 41 Cal. 466 : s c. 18 C.W.N. 1 (1913) can no longer be treated as binding in so far as it is inconsistent with the decision of the Judicial Committee. 1085 (1916) and as the latter decision has now been approved by the Judicial Committee, the decision in In re Mahomed Ali ILR 41 Cal. 466 : s c. 18 C.W.N. 1 (1913) can no longer be treated as binding in so far as it is inconsistent with the decision of the Judicial Committee. I do not wish to examine minutely the judgment of the Judicial Committee as if it were a statute, but it is worthy of note that there are passages in it, which are, in appearance at least, of contradictory import. One of the controverted question is, whether the second explanation covers the whole of cl. (c) and thereby makes intention an essential factor in all cases comprised in the clause. There are four passages in the judgment of the Judicial Committee which bear directly on this point :- (i) It is perhaps not easy to see how Expln. II, with its qualifications, adds to or detracts from the direct language of para. (c). A similar observation might be made upon sec. 124A of the Penal Code. The utmost that can be said is that the addition of the explanation with its apparent repetition of the positive enactment, in the guise of a qualification of the explanation shows an almost meticulous care by the legislature to balance the two considerations." (Consideration of freedom of argument and consideration of the preservation of law and order or of harmony). (ii) "In substance, the question under cl. (c) of sec. 4, sub-sec. (1) comes to this Are the passages such as in fact to excite or do they disclose an attempt (which implies intention) to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection towards the Government or of any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in India." (iii) " It must be remembered that those words in cl. (c) which refer to the hatred or contempt of a class or section are not limited by Expln. II, and that there has been, in this respect, some departure from the policy of the Penal Code, which superadded a qualifying explanation which has not found place in the Press Act." (iv) '"All the (Madras) Judges thought that several passages were calculated to bring the Government in hatred and contempt, and this after giving due weight to Expln. II." 78. II." 78. Nothing would be gained by an endeavour to harmonise these passages, but taken together and read with the judgments of the Madras High Court, in which, according to their Lordships, they do not find that the section has been misconstrued, the Judicial Committee may be taken to have affirmed the view that no question of intention arises under sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), apart from the second explanation which does not cover all the cases comprehended in cl. (c). In this view find myself unable to accept the contention, pressed by Mr. Das with much learning and ingenuity, that we should interpret sec. 4 as if it were a re-enactment of the Indian and English Law of Sedition. I do not overlook that, towards the conclusion of their judgment their Lordships of the Judicial Committee describe the proceedings as a "Criminal case": nor am I unmindful that in an earlier passage, they refer to the cases of Queen-Empress v. Tilak I.L.R 22 Bom. 112(1897), Tilak v. Queen-Empress L.R. 26 I. A. 1 : s.c. I. L.R. 22 Bom. 528 (1897), Queen-Empress v. Ramchandra I. L. R. 22 Bom. 152 (1807) and Queen-Empress v. Ambaprasad I. L. R. 20 All 55 (F. B.) (1897)., wherein see. 124A of the Indian Penal Code was construed, and proceed to observe that these judgments are of considerable assistance towards the construction of sec. 4 but they also point out, in that, very passage, that the language of sec 124 A is not precisely the same as the language in the Press Act, and in another passage, they add that there has been in the Press Act some departure from the policy of the Penal Code. It may he pointed out further that, in the Indian Penal Code. the provision in respect of sedition is contained in sec. 124A, which finds a place in the sixth Chapter of the Code, devoted to offences against the State, whereas see. 153A, which relates to eases of promoting enmity between clases, finds a place in the eighth Chapter devoted to offences against private tranquillity. In the Press Act, on the other hand, what corresponds to but is not identical with the Law of Sedition is contained in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1) but what might have corresponded to sec. 153A does not at all find a place in cl. In the Press Act, on the other hand, what corresponds to but is not identical with the Law of Sedition is contained in sec. 4, sub-sec. (1) but what might have corresponded to sec. 153A does not at all find a place in cl. (c); as a matter of fact the provision was in the Bill as first published, but was omitted from the final version. We cannot also overlook what indeed is obvious on a comparison of the terms of sec. 124A of the Penal Code and sec. 4 of the Press Act. that the two provisions cannot be completely assimilated, far less can they be treated as identical. 79. The scope and purposes of the two legislations are fundamentally different, and however helpful the decisions on sec. 124A of the Penal Code may be, we cannot import into sec. 4 of the Press Act a meaning not justified by its language. No useful purpose would thus he served by an examination of the principles enunciated in the cases of R.v. Duffy 2 Cox. C C. 45; 9 Ir. L. R. 329 (1846)., R.v. Sullivan 11 Cox. Cr. C. 44 (1868), R.v. O'Brien 16 Cox. C. C. 180; 12 Ir. L.R. 29 (1883), R.v. Burns 16 Cox. Cr. C. 355 (1886), Reg. v. M'Hugh [1901] 2 I.R. 669. and R.v. Aldred 22 Cox. Cr.C.l (1909) which were relied upon by Mr. Das with a view to enumerate the elements of a seditious intention under the Law of England (Stephen's Digest of Criminal Law, 6th Ed., Art. 98). It would indeed be against all recognized canons of interpretation to import into the Press Act the provisions of the Law of Sedition as enacted in the Indian Penal Code or as administered in England. If the legislature had intended to make sec. 4 an exact reproduction of the Law of Sedition, the section might have been materially shortened; the purpose would have been served if a simple provision had been framed to the effect that an order of forfeiture might be made wherever a newspaper, book, or other document was found to contain matter such as would justify a conviction under see. 124A or see. 153A. I cannot consequently accede to the contention that the test of the validity of an order of forfeiture under see. 4 is whether the offending article justifies a conviction under sec. 124A. 80. 124A or see. 153A. I cannot consequently accede to the contention that the test of the validity of an order of forfeiture under see. 4 is whether the offending article justifies a conviction under sec. 124A. 80. A preliminary point must next be noticed before the subject-matter of the offending articles is scrutinised. It has been argued that the terms of the notice of forfeiture are defective, inasmuch as sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), cl. (c) refers to " hatred or contempt of any class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India," whereas the notice mentions " the officers of the Government recruited in England." It cannot he disputed that this variance between the language of the statute and the terms of the order should have been avoided, and there is no reason why the notice should not have adhered to the exact language of the section. This variance, however, even if it were treated as material, cannot be made a ground for cancellation of the order of forfeiture. There is one ground and one ground alone on which the validity of the order can be attacked under sec. 17. which can be set aside only under sec. 19; a defect in the form of the notice under sec. 4, sub-sec. (1) is not included in such ground. The articles must consequently be now examined with a view to determine whether the words are not of the nature described in sec. 1, sub-sec. (1). 81. It is necessary to keep before us the precise issue which requires investigation. because the question of the admissibility of the evidence tendered under see. 20 or under the general law must be decided from the point of view of its relevancy. 82. The questions, then, are as follows :-- (i) Are the words contained in the newspaper likely to produce or have they a tendency to produce any of the five categories of consequences mentioned in cl. (c) as analysed above; (ii) If the answer is in the affirmative, do the articles fall within one or more of the three classes of comments enumerated in the second explanation as analysed above. 83. As regards the first question, the opinion I have formed is that both the articles, read without elucidation, have a tendency to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in British India. 83. As regards the first question, the opinion I have formed is that both the articles, read without elucidation, have a tendency to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in British India. Besides this, the first article has also a tendency to bring into hatred or contempt a class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, namely, the officers of that Government recruited in England. The language of the articles is plain and unambiguous and does not stand in need of, possibly does not admit of, a commentary and exposition. There is in both the articles an open and incisive attack, of the most direct and straight forward character imaginable, on the Government established by law in British India; in addition to this, the Anglo-Indian officers are described in the first articles as the lease-holders of India who serve themselves first, then their mother country, and next the three hundred and fifteen millions in India who are governed by them at their sweet, will on principles which are absolutely despotic and some of them un-British and barbarous. I shall not attempt a summary or an analysis, because in the process of condensation, many a choice phrase and expression would be left out; to appreciate fully the articles, they must be read in their entirety. In my judgment, when they are so read, there can be no doubt as to their tendency. But Mr. Das has made an ingenious attempt to adduce evidence to elucidate their probable effect and to prove that their real tendency is the reverse of their apparent tendency. In my judgment, when they are so read, there can be no doubt as to their tendency. But Mr. Das has made an ingenious attempt to adduce evidence to elucidate their probable effect and to prove that their real tendency is the reverse of their apparent tendency. He foreshadowed the classes of evidence he would tender for this purpose :-- (1) Documentary evidence contained in charters, proclamations, official despatches, pronouncements by Ministers of the Crown, from 1833 to 1919 on the subject of the methods of administration of India; (2) Documentary evidence to prove that various reforms in the mode of administration, proposed or inaugurated from time to time by the Government, have not been realised or have been delayed or restricted by reason of the activity of Government officials in India, such as the Local Self-Government Scheme of the Marouis of Ripon, the Morley-Minto Reforms, and the Motague-Chelmsford plan for responsible Government; (3) Reports of Royal Commissions inclusive of dissentient minutes, such as the Industrial Commission and the Public Service Commission, in order to show how the development, of Indian industries has been retarded, if not sacrificed and how the pledges of successive sovereigns for the good government of India have remained unfulfilled; (4) Documentary evidence to show that the British Parliament has exercised little effective control over the affairs of the Indian Government with the result that officials in this country have been responsible neither to the Parliament nor to the people; (5) Oral and documentary evidence of events in the Punjab mentioned in the second article and the public feeling created thereby; (6) Oral evidence to prove the actual effect, produced on the minds of those who have read the offending articles; (7) Evidence as to the general policy of the paper. 84. The ostensible object with which this evidence was tendered was to establish the tendency of the articles in question, but the real purpose was two-fold, namely, first, to prove the absence of seditious intent, and, secondly, to establish the truth of the allegations made in the articles. Now, as I have already explained, the absence of seditious intent is not a material factor in the determination of the very specific issues we are called upon to try; an article may well be beyond the bounds of the Indian Penal Code: but may yet be drawn into the net of the Indian Press Act. Now, as I have already explained, the absence of seditious intent is not a material factor in the determination of the very specific issues we are called upon to try; an article may well be beyond the bounds of the Indian Penal Code: but may yet be drawn into the net of the Indian Press Act. We are thus concerned here with the tendency of these articles. That, tendency is manifest to every reader of ordinary intelligence. The evidence of witnesses on either side stating the impression produced on their minds by a perusal of the articles would, even if it were admissible, be of little assistance; the Court has to determine for itself, in a case like the present (where there is no doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning of the words), what effect they are, by their nature, likely to produce on the normal average reader understanding then in their plain natural meaning. Nor would it be useful, even if it were permissible, to investigate what class of people subscribe to the newspaper, for the actual readers may well be assumed to be far more varied and numerous than the subscribers themselves. The evidence to prove the truth of the allegations made in the articles is equally irrelevant. Justification cannot be pleaded to take the case out of the operation of sec 4, sub-sec. (1); and in one of the numerous cases cited by Mr. Das himself, R. v. M'Hugh (19), an eminent Irish Judge Lord O'Brien, L.C.J., pointed out that there were cases where the maxim prevailed "the greater the truth, the greater the libel." Consequently, the historical documents, formidably arrayed, which Mr. Das offered to put in evidence (and which, by the way, are familiar to all students of British Indian History) were inadmissible, for the simple reason that they were irrelevant for the determination of the question of tendency of the two articles. Nor was evidence of intention admissible, on this part of the case, for as already explained the question of intention does not arise in relation to (19) [1991] 2 I. R. 569. that portion of sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), which precedes the explanation. We are thus left with the evidence tendered by Mr. Das under sec. 20, namely, copies of the " Amrita Bazar Patrika " published after the commencement of the Indian Press Act. that portion of sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), which precedes the explanation. We are thus left with the evidence tendered by Mr. Das under sec. 20, namely, copies of the " Amrita Bazar Patrika " published after the commencement of the Indian Press Act. Such evidence could be given only in aid of the proof of the nature or tendency of the words which are alleged to be of the nature described in sec. 4. Here, again, the evidence must be tested from the standpoint of relevancy. Some prima facie connection must be made out between the offending articles and the matter contained in the copies of the newspaper tendered in evidence; if no such connection is established, the evidence must be rejected. On this ground, we rejected, forthwith, extracts which embodies a sermon by the late Bishop of Calcutta, speeches by the Secretary of State on the Reform Bill and the Mesopotamia Commission, Minutes of dissent by Pandit Madanmohan Malaviya and Sir Sankaran Nair, letters of resignation by Additional Members of the Imperial Legislative Council, such as Mr. Mazurul Huq and Mr. Jinnah, speeches by His Excellency the Viceroy, reports of public meetings and speeches delivered there, reports from press correspondents and like matters. They had no relevancy whatever to the definite question under investigation, namely, the true nature and tendency of the two articles. The same remark is applicable to the other numerous articles published in the paper during the last two years on a variety of political topics. They Had no bearing on the question of nature or tendency of the Articles under consideration; some of them might Have been of assistance, if the question of seditious intent had been material, but it must not be assumed that all of them would have Tended in" favour of the newspaper. 85. The position thus is that although evidence of the kind contemplated by sec. 85. The position thus is that although evidence of the kind contemplated by sec. 20 was admissible in aid of the proof of the nature and tendency of the articles, and other evidence, if available, might conceivably have been used for the same purpose, the evidence actually tendered was wholly irrelevant for the determination of the question of nature and tendency, I hold accordingly that, apart from the second explanation, the words contained in both the articles have a tendency to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in British India, and the words used in the first article also tend to bring into hatred or contempt & class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, namely, the officers of the Government recruited in England. This leads us on to the next question. 86. The second question raises the issue, whether the articles in their entirety fall within the scope of the second explanation and are thus excluded from the operation of cl. (c). It must be stated at the outset that in so far as the first article has a tendency to bring into haired or contempt a class or section of His Majesty's subjects in British India, it cannot be rendered immune by the operation of the second explanation. A comparison of the five categories included in cl. (c) with the three comprised in the explanation, makes it abundantly clear that the fifth category in cl. (c) has no counterpart in the explanation. With regard to this aspect of the first article, then, no question of intention can possibly arise, and this by itself would be sufficient to justify the refusal of the application with regard to that article. We have next to examine whether, apart from this, the two articles can be deemed to consist exclusively of comments of one or more of the three types mentioned in the explanation. The answer must be in the negative. As regards the first class of comments, namely, those expressive of the disapproval of the measures of the Government, it is plain that the term "measures" was intended to apply to legislative measures; the analysis of the explanation set out above shows that the comments were regarded by the legislature in three aspects, namely, tie legislative, the administrative and the judicial functions of the State. Mr. Mr. Das has contended that the articles contained comments expressing disapproval of the legislative measures as also the administrative acts of the Government. If it be assumed that some of the comments may fairly be regarded in this light, it is obvious upon a perusal of the articles that they contain a great deal which cannot possibly be deemed as comments of this description. On this part of the case, according to the Judicial Committee, the question of intention is material. Consequently, evidence would be admissible to prove the intention; but the evidence tendered is irrelevant. No portion of that evidence had any bearing upon the question of intention of the author of the articles. The question of intention comes in, as we have seen, from the use of the expressions "with a view to obtain" and "attempting to excite." These expressions are hardly applicable to "Comments"; but the explanation is ill-expressed, and in view of the decision of the Judicial Committee as to the materiality of intention in this connection, it would be fruitless to speculate as to the real intention of the framers of the Act. But, as the Judicial Committee point out, in judging the question of intent, the publisher must be deemed to intend that which is the natural result of the words used, having regard, among other things, to the character and description of that part of the public who are to be expected to read the articles. From this point of view, there can be little doubt as to the intention. The articles themselves speak of "the seething discontent that prevails from one end of India to the other" and state that "now the whole country is ablaze; it is not the educated Indians alone who are indignant at these gross outrages, but the masses as well." If this be a correct description of the condition of the people, and the writer of the articles is most emphatic in his assertion, the effect of comments of the character contained therein would plainly be to excite hatred, contempt and disaffection. The position then is that even if the two articles had not contained an attack upon Government, and had consisted exclusively of comments expressing disapproval of the measures of the administrative action of the Government, the explanation would have been of no avail, inasmuch as they constitute an atempt to excite, even if they do not actually excite, hatred, contempt and disaffection amongst a people who, on the unimpeachable testimony of the writer, were already in a state of excitement. But, as I have stated before, even if some of the passages can be treated as disapproving comments on the legislative measures and administrative actions of the Government, they contain a great deal not comprehended in that description. The result consequently is that the nature and tendency of the articles taken as a whole bring them within the operation of sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), cl. (c), and they cannot be excluded therefrom by the application of the second explanation. 87. In this view the conclusion follows that the application under sec. 17 fails and must be dismissed with costs, as directed in the judgment of Woodroffe, J. Fletcher, J. I agree with the judgment of Mr. Justice Woodroffe.