Fletcher, J.:- This is an appeal from a decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of Cuttack, dated the 28th March, 1912. The defendants are the appellants before us. The plaintiff brought this suit to recover possession of certain lands from the defendants. One of the issues raised in the case was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The learned Judge found that the suit was barred by limitation ; but he considered that as the title was originally in the plaintiff, he ought to give the plaintiff relief by way of making a declaration of title in his favour. Against that decision, the present defendants have appealed to this Court. From the facts found by the learned Judge of the Court below, it is clear that the case is barred by limitation. The learned Judge also found so. The defendants' ancestor had a lease of this property, which expired more than 12 years ago. At any rate, the learned Judge has found that no fresh agreement was entered into between the parties nor was there any evidence from which it could be inferred that there was a new tenancy. The question, therefore, arises, " Does Art. 139 of the Second Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act apply to a case like this ?" The decisions of this Court are that Art. 139 does apply. A tenancy by sufferance by a tenant holding over whose lease has expired, does not apply in this country. That has been held in the case of Madan Mohan Gossain v. Kumar Rameshwar Malta, (1907) 7 CLJ 615. A similar view has been adopted by the Bombay High Court in the case of Chandri v. Daji Bhau (1900) 24 Bom 504 : 2 Bom LR 491. The result, therefore, is that the present suit is, as the learned Subordinate Judge says, clearly barred by limitation. The learned Judge, however, has considered that in a case of this nature, when the suit is barred, the title still remains vested in the plaintiff. That obviously is not so : under S. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, it is expressly provided that at the expiration of the period prescribed by the Act for limitation of suits, not only is the remedy barred but the right is gone. That is quite clear. That obviously is not so : under S. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, it is expressly provided that at the expiration of the period prescribed by the Act for limitation of suits, not only is the remedy barred but the right is gone. That is quite clear. That being so, the statute has operated to revoke the estate that was originally vested in the plaintiff, and to confer a statutory estate upon the defendants. In that view, the judgment appealed from cannot be supported. The present appeal must, therefore, be allowed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs both in this Court as well as in the lower Court. The hearing fee will be according to the scale of the Court on the value of the suit. Nobody appearing in support of the cross-appeal it is dismissed. Richardson, J. :- I agree. On an application for review of the judgment the following judgment was delivered after the appeal was re heard in the presence of both parties. Fletcher, J. :-The point that we dealt with on the last occasion was a point of law arising on the findings of fact made by the learned Subordinate Judge in his judgment. On that occasion, Sir Rash Behari Ghose on behalf of the appellants accepted the findings of fact made by the learned Subordinate Judge, and argued that the learned Judge had arrived at a wrong conclusion on a point of law. We accepted the argument put forward by Sir Rash Behari, and decreed the appeal. On the appeal coming on before us for re-hearing, both sides agree that on the findings of fact made by the learned Judge of the Court below, his judgment cannot stand. But the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, has asked us to dissent from the findings of fact made by the learned Subordinate Judge, on which his judgment is based. The defendants who are the appellants before us, claim through their grand-father who had got a lease of the property for 18 years in the benami of Bishnupriya. That lease expired in 1880. The story put forward by the plaintiff is that there was a verbal lease or arrangement between one Hari Ballav Bose and the former Mohunt Hayagriba in the year 1887. The evidence shows that the late Mohunt Hayagriba was gathered to his fathers before the date of the lease. That lease expired in 1880. The story put forward by the plaintiff is that there was a verbal lease or arrangement between one Hari Ballav Bose and the former Mohunt Hayagriba in the year 1887. The evidence shows that the late Mohunt Hayagriba was gathered to his fathers before the date of the lease. An attempt was made by some of the Plaintiff's witnesses to place this verbal arrangement at an earlier date before the death of Hayagriba. That was the case which the plaintiff invited the learned Judge to express his opinion on, and when that case failed as false the learned Judge clearly and rightly refused to enter into a consideration of the case that this man Hari Ballav had entered into some arrangement other than that set up, resuiting in his possession of the property as a licensee. In that, I think, the learned Subordinate Judge was quite right. The documentary evidence read to us leaves no doubt in my mind that Hari Ballav was connected with the property solely as a relative or guardian of the two present defendants. The documentary evidence seem to me to be conclusive on that. This story about the verbal lease to Hari Ballav or his entering into possession of the property as a licensee in his own right, I am satisfied, is wholly untrue. On the evidence, I am clearly of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge came to a correct conclusion. That being so, the learned Judge was right when he held that the suit was barred by limitation. We pointed out in our former judgment that on that finding the learned Judge was not entitled to give to the plaintiff the relief that he has given. For the second time, I must express my dissent from the result arrived at by the learned Judge of the Court below. The appeal must, therefore, be decreed and the plaintiff's suit his missed with costs in both Courts. Richardson, J. :- I agree. Lord Shaw:-In the opinion of their Lordships, no reason has been shown for disturbing the judgment of the High Court. The question of fact is concluded by the concurrent findings of the Courts below. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal stand dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.