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1919 DIGILAW 78 (SC)

SAKINBAI v. SHRINIBAI

1919-11-17

AMEER ALI, LORD PHILLIMORE, LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE, SIR JOHN EDGE, SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS

body1919
Judgement Petition to withdraw an appeal to His Majesty in Council, a minor being a party. The petitioner, Sakinbai, in 1915 instituted a suit in the High Court at Bombay against the executors of the will of Khansubai, the widow of the petitioners brother, and the beneficiaries under the will. One of the defendant beneficiaries, a respondent to the pending appeal to the Privy Council, was still a minor at the date of present petition, being represented by his guardian, the first respondent, an executor. The trial Judge made a decree in favour of the petitioner for the recovery of 3,00,000 Rs. of Government promissory notes and a sum of 5914 Rs., and decreed a reference with regard to certain ornaments. The executor who was guardian to the minor, and the minor appealed to a Division Bench, which reversed the decree for the two sums above mentioned, and varied the decree for a reference by throwing the burden of proof on the petitioner. The petitioner appealed to His Majesty in Council, and printed the record. Pending the hearing of the appeal the parties entered into a written agreement compromising the litigation, the agreement providing for the withdrawal of the appeal upon certain terms. 76 Law. Rep. 47 Ind. App. 88 ( 1919- 1920) Sakinbai V. Shrinibai 177 The minors guardian made an affidavit dealing at length with the matters in dispute in the litigation, and stating that she was advised that the compromise was for the benefit of the minor beneficiary. The opinion of counsel who appeared for the executors at the trial, and for the executor and the minor in the appellate Court, advising the settlement in the interest of the minor, was annexed to the affidavit. The petition prayed for a certificate that the agreement of compromise was for the benefit of the minor, or that the case might be remanded to the High Court to inquire and certify whether the agreement was for the benefit of the minor, and upon such certificate that an order might be made granting leave to withdraw the appeal upon the terms of the agreement. 1919. Nov. 21. E. B. Raikes for the petitioner. Kenworthy Brown for the minor respondent. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. 1919. Nov. 21. E. B. Raikes for the petitioner. Kenworthy Brown for the minor respondent. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. Applications to allow an appeal to be withdrawn on terms when there are parties concerned who are not sui juris are not granted without grave consideration. In the present case Mr. Kenworthy Brown, as counsel for the minor concerned, having considered the whole proceedings,, both in their legal bearings and with a full regard to the interests of the minor and his estate, has assured their Lordships that he is of opinion that the compromise is for the benefit of the minor. The case is further strengthened in that direction by a certificate of Mr. J. B. Kanga and Mr. V. F. Taraporewala, the counsel for the minor in the Courts below, that the compromise which is proposed is for his benefit. If there were an appeal pending before the High Court this certificate would have been presented to the Court below, if advantage had been taken of Order xxxii., r. 7, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that " No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian." In these circumstances the Board finds itself in possession of what, according to ordinary practice, would have been satisfactory to the Court below, if its leave to enter into a compromise had been asked. It has the further assurance of learned counsel at its own bar ; and upon the whole their Lordships are of opinion that this compromise is for the benefit of the minor, and one that they should sanction. In terms of the compromise, accordingly, their Lordships will advise His Majesty that leave should be granted to withdraw the appeal. (In Kuppusami Reddi v. Dasu Reddi and Others, an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Madras reversing a decree of a Subordinate Judge, one of the respondents being a minor, the appellant (plaintiff), by a petition heard on November 21, 1919, prayed that an agreement of compromise entered into by the parties might be approved and an Order made in pursuance of its terms. A supplemental record containing the agreement and affidavits, which had been filed in the High Court, not having arrived in England, counsel on behalf of the minor was unable to assure their Lordships, from his personal consideration, that the compromise was for the minor’s benefit. Their Lordships ordered that the petition should stand over for an expression of opinion by the High Court upon that question. Upon a similar petition heard in Nagamma Naick er and Another v. Pothi Naick er, in which the respondent and one of the appellants were minors, three judges of Madras High Court, who had heard a letters patent appeal in the suit, upon an opposed petition to them for sanction of the compromise had certified under Order XXXII., r. 7, that the 76 Law. Rep. 47 Ind. App. 88 ( 1919- 1920) Sakinbai V. Shrinibai 178 compromise in their opinion was a proper one and beneficial to both the minors. Their Lordships advised the mak ing of the Order prayed.)