Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (February 29, 1916) reversing a decree of the District Judge of Vizagapatam. A Hindu named Ananta Row, the owner of an estate in the district of Vizagapatam, died in 1829 leaving a widow, named Hanumayamma, and a daughter. On May 5, 1830, the widow sold the estate to a purchaser from whom it ultimately became vested in the respondent. Hanumayamma died on December 15, 1900. On December 12, 1912 (within three days of the twelve years period of limitation, and eighty-two years after the sale), the appellants, the reversionary heirs of Ananta Row, instituted the present suit against the respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. By their plaint they claimed the estate as reversionary heirs alleging that the sale in 1930 was without legal necessity, and was binding only during the widows lifetime. The respondent pleaded that the sale was for legal necessity and bound the heirs. The suit was transferred to the Court of the District Judge for trial. Law. Rep. 47 Ind. App. 6 ( 1919- 1920) C hintamanibhatla Venkata Reddi V. Rani of Wadhwan 127 A mass of oral and documentary evidence was adduced at the trial. Amongst the latter was a memorandum of the terms of sale dated May 3, 1830. This document set out figures showing that the total sale price was Rs. 17,600, consisting of Rs. 14,000 as the price of the estate and Rs. 3600 for grain on hand and rents to be collected, and contained a statement of liabilities amounting to Rs. 16,500 (including Rs. 9647 for Government revenue) " to be discharged by Hanumayamma." The District Judge found that the price paid for the estate was a fair one, but that there was no legal necessity for the sale ; he accordingly decreed the suit with mesne profits. In the course of his judgment the District Judge said that the length of period which had elapsed since the sale could not affect the case ; it was for the defendants to prove that there was legal necessity. He found that though at the time of the sale an estimate was made showing arrears of Government revenue and other debts amounting to Rs. 16,500, the whole of that amount was not actually payable at the time. He found that though at the time of the sale an estimate was made showing arrears of Government revenue and other debts amounting to Rs. 16,500, the whole of that amount was not actually payable at the time. He thought it probable from the evidence that the widow was informed and believed that she must sell in order to pay the Government revenue, but that with the actual figures now before it the Court could form a better estimate of the necessity than the widow could. After further considering the evidence he said " The case therefore resolves itself into this question Can a widow who, after making the highest possible estimate of her husbands liabilities, has a reasonable prospect of liquidating those debts within five years (and, as the event proved, could have liquidated them well within that period), plead legal necessity to sell, or legal justification, in selling the reversioners estate, when she is not being pressed by any process of attachment? I know of no legally accepted definition of ‘necessity which permits of any but a negative answer. Accordingly I find on the fifth issue that the sale was not for legal necessity.” The respondent appealed to the High Court, and the appellants filed cross-objections under Order xli., r. 22. The High Court reversed the decree and dismissed the suit. The learned judges, in a passage of their judgment set out in that of their Lordships, said that though the onus was upon the respondent to prove that the sale was for necessity yet, having regard to the great lapse of time since it took place, presumptions were permissible to fill in the details of the circumstances in which it was made. They dealt at length with the evidence pointing out that the presumptive heirs had had a full opportunity of ascertaining the facts but had kept silence and had brought no suit for a declaration, and that the history of the estate, both before and after the sale, showed that for a long period it was a source of burden and anxiety to whoever held it. They found that at the time of the sale Rs. 5000 of Government revenue was in arrear that unless it had been paid speedily the estate would have been sold, and that within ten days of the sale a further Rs. They found that at the time of the sale Rs. 5000 of Government revenue was in arrear that unless it had been paid speedily the estate would have been sold, and that within ten days of the sale a further Rs. 4047 became due ; that the widow had no assets except grain worth Rs. 1870 to meet these and her husbands other liabilities. They found that, upon the most favourable calculation, the net average income realizable from the estate was Rs. 1500 per annum, that either a sale or mortgage was inevitable, and that the widow would have had great difficulty in effecting a mortgage. They said that a widow was not bound to wait until she was pressed by suits or demands and concluded " The law allows her discretion to judge what is the best course of action in the interest of the estate as well as of herself. Even judging her conduct in this case by the strictest standard, we should hold that the sale of the property was inevitable. By selling it in time she was able to save out of the wreck not only Rs. 1100 on the interest of which she maintained herself and her daughter, but also the house, some maniam lands and certain palmyra topes." 1919. Nov. 17, 18. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellants. The respondent did not satisfy the onus, which was upon her, to prove that there was necessity for the sale. Where a very long period has passed since the challenge alienation it may be that in many cases less evidence Law. Rep. 47 Ind. App. 6 ( 1919- 1920) C hintamanibhatla Venkata Reddi V. Rani of Wadhwan 128 is necessary to satisfy the onus, but the onus is not shifted. In the present case there were documents which supplied information as to the position in 1830, so that the period which had elapsed hardly affected the matter. Upjohn K.C referred to Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore. (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 249.) The deed in that case recited the existence of necessity ; here the deed was not in evidence. Admitting that there were considerable debts, the widow was not justified in selling the whole estate, which was large and valuable. Upjohn K.C referred to Banga Chandra Dhur Biswas v. Jagat Kishore. (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 249.) The deed in that case recited the existence of necessity ; here the deed was not in evidence. Admitting that there were considerable debts, the widow was not justified in selling the whole estate, which was large and valuable. Upon the evidence the trial Judge rightly held that the debts could easily have been discharged out of the income. Upjohn K.C, Sir William Garth K.C and Parikh for the respondent were not called upon. Nov. 18. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Madras, dated February 29, 1916. It reversed a decree of the District Court of Vizagapatam, dated October 7, 1914. The object of the suit, which was brought by reversioners, was for the purpose of setting aside a deed of sale, an alienation by a Hindu widow. The question for determination in the case, as argued in the Courts below and before their Lordships, is whether that alienation was made for legal necessity. The sale took place so far back as May 5, 1830. The widow in question survived that sale by no less a period than seventy years, she having died on December 15, 1900. The suit in the present case was instituted in the year 1912, within a few days from the expiry of the period of limitation under the statute. It results accordingly that the investigation subsequent to the initiation of the suit in 1912 was an investigation with regard to the circumstances of a transaction more than eighty-two years after that transaction took place. In these circumstances their Lordships, the case being singular in these points of date, are moved to repeat as part of their own judgment the following propositions, which represent, in their view, both the sense as well as the law of the situation so disclosed. In these circumstances their Lordships, the case being singular in these points of date, are moved to repeat as part of their own judgment the following propositions, which represent, in their view, both the sense as well as the law of the situation so disclosed. In the judgment appealed from the learned judges of the High Court lay down the law as follows "It is not disputed that the onus lay upon the defendant to prove the necessity for the sale, but having regard to the great lapse of time since the transaction took place, that is, about 82 years, perhaps the highest on record, it will not be reasonable to expect such full and detailed evidence as to the state of things which gave rise to the sale in question as in the case of alienations made at more or less recent dates. In such circumstances, presumptions are permissible to fill in the details which have been obliterated by time." Their Lordships adopt that statement of the law. They desire, indeed, only to add that it is matter of some surprise that so much documentary evidence still remains and from a perusal of it and the whole proceedings in the case they see no cause to doubt that the decree pronounced by the High Court is one which ought to be affirmed. They have the less reason to doubt this on account of the argument of the appellants presented to the Board, which appears to have exhausted every avenue of attack open to a person challenging an ancient transaction. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal stand dismissed with costs.