JUDGMENT Mookerjee, C.J. - This is an appeal by three of the Defendants in a suit to enforce a mortgage-security. The mortgage was created by the father and mother of the Appellants. The father took the loan and the mother furnished the security. Before the institution of the suit, the father died, and the suit was brought against the mother as also against the sons as representatives of the father. During the pendency of the suit, the mother also died. The mortgagee thereupon applied that it might be noted that the sons who were already on the record as the representatives of their father were also the representatives of their mother. The sons thereupon objected that the mortgage could not be enforced against them. The reason which they assigned in support of this contention was that the hypothecated property did not belong absolutely to their mother, but had been inherited by her from their maternal grandfather. They urged that she had the qualified interest of a Hindu daughter in the disputed property and that the mortgage was executed by her under circumstances which did not make the transaction operative against the property in their hands as the reversionary heirs of their maternal grandfather. The Court of first instance declined to investigate this question and yet made a decree op the basis of the mortgage. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that an issue was raised on this point and evidence was adduced before the Subordinate Judge who decided that the question was beyond the scope of the suit. Upon appeal, the District Judge has upheld the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge that the question raised by the Appellant should not be decided in the present litigation. In our opinion, the view taken by the Courts below is well-founded and must be maintained. Mr. Gupta has conceded that, as a general rule, the question of title paramount cannot be raised in a mortgage suit, as is clear from the decision in Joggeswar Dutt v. Bhuban Mohan Mitra ILR 33 Cal. 425 (1906) and Bhaju Chowdhury v. Chunilal Marwari 11 C.W.N. 284 : S.C. 5 C.L.J. 95 (1906). But his contention is that there are exceptions to the general rule and that the case now before the Court is not covered by the general rule but should be treated as an exception thereto. 425 (1906) and Bhaju Chowdhury v. Chunilal Marwari 11 C.W.N. 284 : S.C. 5 C.L.J. 95 (1906). But his contention is that there are exceptions to the general rule and that the case now before the Court is not covered by the general rule but should be treated as an exception thereto. Reliance has been placed upon a passage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in the case of Radha Kunwar v. Reoti Singh (3) ILR 88 All. 489 at p. 498 : S.C. 20 C.W.N. to show that the test to be applied is, whether the Appellants would have a right to redeem the mortgage in certain events. In our opinion the Judicial Committee did not intend to lay down that as the sole or exclusive test in cases of this character; on the other hand, it is plain that according to the Judicial Committee, the joinder of parties who set up an adverse claim to the mortgaged property is irregular. Reference has also been made to the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Sham Sunder Lal v. Achhan Kunwar ILR 21 All. 71 : S.C. 2 C.W.N. 729 (P.C.) (1898). That case, however, is distinguishable on the ground that there a suit was instituted not against the limited owner who had mortgaged the property but against the reversionary heir; in a suit so framed and instituted under such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the reversionary heir to contest the claim of the mortgagee upon proof that the mortgage had been granted under circumstances which did not make it binding on the ultimate owner. The same observations apply to the cases of Hare Krishna Bhowmick v. Robert Watson & Co. 8 C.W.N. 365 (1901) and Bibi Asmatunnessa Khatun v. Harendra Lal Biswas 12 C.W.N. 721 (1908). In those cases, the suits had been instituted against the transferees of non-transferable occupancy holdings, who happened to he the landlords themselves; they were entitled to contend that at the date of the institution of the suit, the mortgage, which was the foundation of the claim of the mortgagee, had become extinguished, as the property had vested in the landlord who was not bound by the transfer. In the case before us, the suit was instituted against the mortgagor. In the case before us, the suit was instituted against the mortgagor. No question could arise, in the suit so framed, as to whether the property was absolutely owned by her or had been inherited by her from her father as a limited owner; nor could the question arise, whether, in the event of her death, the mortgage transaction would be binding upon her sons as reversionary heirs to the estate of their maternal grandfather. Upon the death of the mother of the Defendants, it was noted on the record that they were her representatives. They could not then turn round and set up a title hostile to that created by their mother; that would create a position totally inconsistent with the character attributed to them by the Plaintiff mortgagee, and if the question were entertained, the scope of the original suit would be completely altered. In our opinion, the Courts below have rightly followed the decision in Girija Kanta Chakrarartty v. Mohim Chandra Acharji 20 C.W.N. 675 : S.C. 23 C.L.J. 587 (1915) and the decision of the question raised by the Appellants has been properly left to be tried out in a separate suit appropriately framed for the purpose. 2. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs. Fletcher, J. I agree.