JUDGMENT Mookerjee, C.J. Appeal No. 344. 1. This is an appeal by the find two Defendants in a suit for recovery of possession of land upon declaration of title as shebaits. The Plaintiffs-Respondents are orthodox vaishnabs, members of a family of Mondals, and are shebaits of a Sree Sree Iswar Mohaprabhu Thakur. Their case is that in 1893, the Defendants, who are members of a family of Chatterjees, were appointed pujaris or officiating priests under an agreement between the parties, that the Defendants have acted in contravention of the term of the agreement and have thereby forfeited the office; but that, notwithstanding this, they have wrong-fully retained possession of the disputed land which they were entitled to hold only during their incumbency as pujaris of the Thakur. On these allegations, the Plaintiff's seek to recover possession of the land. 2. The Courts below have found that the allegations of the Plaintiffs are substantially correct, that the interest in the land is vested not in the Defendants as pujaris hut in the Plaintiffs as shebaits, and that, under the terms of the agreement between them, the Defendants have forfeited all claim to the religious office held by them. This decision has been attacked on behalf of the Appellants on the ground that the contract was void, because it contravened the rule against perpetuities. In our opinion, there is no foundation for this argument. 3. The agreement between the parties was made and filed in a previous rent-suit, and the decree of the Court was made in accordance therewith. The record has been destroyed and a copy of the decree is not available : but it is plain that the decree must have incorporated the terms of the compromise by reference, if not expressly. Apart from this, the petition of compromise has been produced before us and we are in a position to judge the relative rights of the parties therefrom. Para. 2 of the petition defined the duties of the Chatterjees as pujaris of the Thakur. It recited that 14 bighas of land were placed in their possession in order that the income might be applied for the purpose of worship and maintenance in the manner directed. Para. Para. 2 of the petition defined the duties of the Chatterjees as pujaris of the Thakur. It recited that 14 bighas of land were placed in their possession in order that the income might be applied for the purpose of worship and maintenance in the manner directed. Para. 3 prescribed in the following terms the conditions on breach whereof the office of pujari would be forfeited : "The Chatterjees further stipulate that if they make default in conducting the sheba and other works, etc., in accordance with the above rules or if any of the Chatterjees themselves or if any of their sons, sons' sons and descendants in succession ever take to drinking or meateating or cook flesh or commit adultery then ten respectable principal gentlemen of different respectable Brahmin, Kayestha and Kaibartta families of Joypur village, shall, with respect to the said offence, hold a sitting and judge and the person, who would be declared guilty shall be for once pardoned after undergoing expiration ceremony. If such a thing occurs again, then they shall be competent to deprive the delinquent of the light of making sheba and the delinquent would be deprived of the right of worship and work of sheba and of holding and enjoying the debutter land dedicated for shebait." Directions are then given as to the steps to be taken for the appointment of a successor in the event of removal of a pujari for misconduct. The Courts below have found that the Chatterjees have been guilty of misconduct, misconduct of such a grave character as disqualified them from holding the religious office in question. The Court of first instance pointed out that the evidence showed beyond doubt that the Defendants had acted contrary to the terms of the compromise, inasmuch as they ate goat flesh which is an domination in the case of pujaris of Mohaprobhu Thakur they had besides converted the pucca temple of the Thakur into a store-room for keeping the articles of their shop and thereby damaged the paint on the image of the Thakur and had not only neglected to discharge the duties of the office held by them but had actually rendered it impossible to hold the annual Mahotsab ceremony. The Courts below have also found that, in these circumstance (sic) respectable gentlemen of the village assembled and after full investigation removed the Defendants from their spiritual office. The Courts below have also found that, in these circumstance (sic) respectable gentlemen of the village assembled and after full investigation removed the Defendants from their spiritual office. The decision of a body, so constituted in accordance with the agreement of the parties, is operative, if their proceedings were regularly conducted, us appears, to have been the case [Juro Ram v. Gobind Deb 12 C.L.J. 497 (1910)]. In these circumstances, the Defendants have clearly no right to retain possession of the land in suit. It has been argued, however, that the contract was void for remoteness. This contention is based on a manifest fallacy. The Appellants have referred to the case of Anath Nath Maitra v. Kumar Keshub Chandra Ray 14 C.W.N. 601 (604) (1910), which is an authority for the proposition that the rule against perpetuities prohibits the creation of such future interest as may possibly vest after an indefinite period, for the reason that the existence of such interest may render it impossible for the owner to alienate his estate, discharged of it, before the emergence of the condition, and that event may possibly never occur. In the present case, no interest in land was created in favour of the pujaris. Consequently, the well-established rule applies that personal contracts are not affected by the rule against perpetuities. As an authority in support of that proposition reference may be made to the decision of the House of Lords in the cases of Walsh v. Secretary of State for India 10 H.L.C. 367 (1863) and Witham v. Vane Challis on Real Property 440. In our opinion, the agreement was valid, the conditions annexed to the office were lawful, and as soon as the Defendants were disqualified for the religious office by reason of their misconduct, they became disentitled to retain possession of the land whose income was in funded to be applied by the pujaris for the maintenance and worship of the Titular. There is manifestly nothing wrong in principle that the holder of a spiritual office should be subject to discipline and should be liable to deprivation for what may be called misconduct from an ecclesiastical point of view or for flagrant and continued neglect of duty. There is manifestly nothing wrong in principle that the holder of a spiritual office should be subject to discipline and should be liable to deprivation for what may be called misconduct from an ecclesiastical point of view or for flagrant and continued neglect of duty. In the case before us, the matter has been simplified by an express agreement which defines the nature and scope of the offences and provides a tribunal authorised to hold an enquiry and to pass a sentence of deprivation. It is plain that although, so far as Hindus are concerned, there is now no State church and no Ecclesiastical Court, there is nothing to prevent Civil Courts from determining questions such as those raised in the present litigation and from holding that the pujari has been removed from his office on valid grounds. [Anandrav v. Shankar ILR 7 Bom. 323 (327-329) (1883), Vasudeo v. Vamnaji ILR 5 Bom. 80 (1880), Venkata v. Subba ILR 13 Mad. 293 (305) (1890), Krishnaswami v. Samaram ILR 30 Mad. 158 (164) (1906), Kooni Meera v. Mahomed Meera ILR 30 Mad. 15 (16) (1906), Soobbuo v. Tacoo [1857] Mud. (sic) Dec.) 80, Ramcharan v. Rakhalal Das ILR 41 Cal. 19 (29)(1913). Elayatwar v. Nambarumal ILR 28 Mad. 298 (304) (1899). Subbaraya v. Chellappa ILR 4 Mad. 315 (1881) and Vanama v. Krishna Swami 16 M.L.J. 130 (154-159) (1905)]. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with cost. This judgment will govern the other appeal (S.A. No. 707 of 1915) which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Fletcher, J. I agree.