JUDGMENT 1. After hearing the learned Government Pleader and considering the authorities cited we are of opinion that the three sale-deeds in question, in each of which the vendor mortgages lands not included in the sale as security for the due performance of his covenants, need not be stamped both as sales and mortgages by virtue of the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899, as the sale-deeds are not instruments comprising or relating to distinct matters within the meaning of the section. The decision in Reference by the Board of Revenue (1876) I.L.R. 1 Mad. 133 is not in point, as the terms of Section 14 of Act VIII of 1869 under which it was decided are different from those of Section 5 of the present Act, which was substituted for it in Section 7 of Act I of 1879, which again is practically identical with Section 4 a(1) of the English Stamp Act 1891. In In the matter of a reference Act of under Section 46 of the Stamp Act a decision under Section 7 of the 1879, it was held that an instrument by which a debtor leased certain lands to his creditor and empowered the latter to apply a portion of the annual rent in satisfaction of the debt was both a lease and a usufructuary mortage but only required to be stamped as a mortgage as it did not relate to two distinct matters within the meaning of the section. In Reference under Act No. (1899) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 176 of 1879 (Indian Stamp Act) Section 49(1899) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 176 it was held that an instrument by which certain parties took lands on lease and hypothecated other lands as security for the rent did not relate to distinct matters but only to the terms on which the lessors let the land and the lessees took the holding. In Reference under Stamp Act Section 57(1901) I.L.R. 25 Mad. 3 a lease which contained a covenant for renewal was held not to relate to two distinct matters as the option to renew the lease was merely ancillary to the lease and formed part of the consideration for entering into it. Similarly in Reference under Stamp Act, Section 57(1899) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 3 a lease which contained a covenant for renewal was held not to relate to two distinct matters as the option to renew the lease was merely ancillary to the lease and formed part of the consideration for entering into it. Similarly in Reference under Stamp Act, Section 57(1899) I.L.R. 24 Mad. 176 though it was held that the agreement between the company and each of the ryots who were parties to it constituted distinct matters within the meaning of the section, the agreement with each ryot by which in consideration of a payment of one rupee, he granted a license to prospect, agreed to sell if required and covenanted to indemnify the company against claims by other persons was held not to relate to distinct matters so as to require separate stamps. The same test was applied in England in Price v. Thomas 2 B & A. 128 where it was held that an instrument of lease in which both the lessee and a third party covenanted to pay the rent did not require to be stamped both as a lease and as a deed, Littledale, J., observing that the lease was the principal, to which the covenant was an accessory, and Parke, J., that the covenant was part of the consideration for granting the lease. In Govindan Nambudiri v. Moid in (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 469 : 38 M.L.J. 693 which was decided without argument, the answer would no doubt have been to the same effect if these authorities had been brought to the notice of the Court, and we think that that decision should not be followed in future cases.