Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 10, 1914) affirming a decree of the District Judge of Madura (January 16, 1911). The appellant (plaintiff) was the Pandara Sannidhi (or head) of the Thiruvaduthwari mutt at Tanjore. The first respondent (defendant) was the manager of the Meenakshi Sundares-waral Devastanam (temple) at Madura, and the remaining respondents (defendants) were members of the temple committee appointed under Act XX. of 1863. The plaintiff by his plaint claimed that he was huqdar or trustee of a religious endowment known as " Thanappa Mudali Kattalai," being an endowment for the performance of certain religious ceremonies at the temple at Madura above mentioned, and that in that capacity he was entitled to recover from the defendants possession of four villages and to have an account of the profits derived by the defendants therefrom ; in the alternative he prayed that he might have the whole of the income derived from the villages year by year paid to him as trustee. He alleged that the defendants were managing the endowed villages on his behalf under Act XX. of 1863, his case being that the temple was dependent upon the mutt of which he was Pandara, that the kattalai was merely for the purpose of the performance of certain ceremonies in the temple, and that the defendants had wrongfully applied part of the income of the four villages to the general expenses of the temple. The defendants denied the plaintiffs title, and alleged that the endowment was applicable to the discharge of the general expenses of the temple in addition to the performance of ceremonies, and they also relied upon the Limitation Act. The District Judge found that the funds of the kattalai were available for the general purposes of the upkeep of the temple, and that the Pandara Sannidhi had never been con stituted trustee nor acted as such. The above findings were conclusive of the case, but the District Judge considered also the defence of limitation, and expressed the view that the collector, the manager, and the committee were in possession adversely to the Pandara Sannidhi, and that consequently the suit was barred by limitation. The above findings were conclusive of the case, but the District Judge considered also the defence of limitation, and expressed the view that the collector, the manager, and the committee were in possession adversely to the Pandara Sannidhi, and that consequently the suit was barred by limitation. Upon appeal to the High Court the Chief Justice (Sir John Wallis) came to the conclusion upon the evidence that the Pandara Sannidhi was the rightful trustee or huqdar of the endowment, but he held that the suit was barred by limitation. Upon that question he said " Whatever the reasons which induced the Pandara Sannidhi to acquiesce in the suit villages being handed over to the manager of the temple in 1849, there is no doubt that they have since been in possession of the manager of the temple when there was one, and when they were not in the possession and management of the local temple committee under Act XX. of 1863 who for some periods managed the affairs of the temple, themselves, instead of appointing a manager as they are required to do under the Act. Their possession equally with that of the manager when there was one was clearly on behalf of the temple, and also as it seems to me on the facts already stated clearly adverse to the plaintiff. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff has all along been in possession of the office of huqdar of the kattalai so far as the ceremonial observances are concerned and also in possession of the other villages and lands belonging to the endowment through accounts for their proceeds, but he has been out of possession of the suit villages which have been in the management of the temple claiming adversely to him though the revenues of these villages have also been applied for the purposes of the endowment." Seshagiri Aiyar J. dissented from the view of the Chief Justice with regard to the title of the Pandara Sannidhi. He agreed that in any case the suit was barred by limitation; in his view the possession and management of the Government down to 1849 was not in derogation of the title of the true trustee, but that from that year there was adverse possession. The appeal accordingly was dismissed. 1920. Feb. 17, 19, 20. De Gruyther K.C., Kenworthy Brown and Narasimham for the appellant. The appeal accordingly was dismissed. 1920. Feb. 17, 19, 20. De Gruyther K.C., Kenworthy Brown and Narasimham for the appellant. The Chief Justice rightly held that the appellants predecessor in the office of Pandara Sannidhi was in 1849 the hereditary trustee of the kattalai and of all its endowments including the four villages in suit. The right of the appellant to possession as trustee is not barred by limitation. Such possession as the Government had in the exercise of its ordinary public functions, whether under Madr. Reg. VII. of 1817 or otherwise, was not adverse to the Pandara Sannidhi, nor did possession become adverse when it was entrusted by the officials to the temple manager. The possession of the temple committee appointed under Act XX. of 1863 was not and could not be adverse possession barring the rights of the hereditary trustee of the endowment Sitharama Chetty v. Subramania Iyer, (( 1915) I. L. R. 39 M. 700, 717.) There was no possession in the respondents or their predecessors under a claim of title to the villages ; what was taken over was merely the supervision, the rights of the trustee not being interfered with. Sect. 12 of the Regulation did not apply to the circumstances of the case ; with regard to Act XX. of 1863, s. 4 and not s. 3 was applicable. Balwant Rao v. Purun Mal Chaube (( 1883) L. R. 10 I. A. 90.) is distinguishable, because in this case the appellant claims that the income is being wrongly applied. Further, that decision is no answer to the contention that the possession under the Regulation and the Act was not adverse. The receipt of the income of the villages was not adverse to the appellants right to possession as huqdar Jalandhar Thakr v. Jharula Das. ([ 1914] L. R. 41 I. A. 267.) [Reference was also made to Vythilinga v. Somasundara Mudaliar (( 1893) I. L. R. 17 M. 199.) with regard to " kattalais."] Dunne K.C. and Dube for the respondents. April 27. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MOULTON. This is a suit brought by the Pandara Sannidhi of an important mutt situated in Tanjore to recover possession of four villages situated in the Madura District. April 27. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD MOULTON. This is a suit brought by the Pandara Sannidhi of an important mutt situated in Tanjore to recover possession of four villages situated in the Madura District. He alleges that he is huqdar or trustee of the " Thanappa Mudali Kattalai," which is an endowment for the performance of certain ceremonies in a temple at Madura, and that these villages form part of that endowment, and that, therefore, as such trustee he is entitled to their possession. The defendants are the manager of the temple and the members of the temple committee appointed by the Government under Act XX. of 1863. They deny that the plaintiff is trustee of the endowment, or that he has any right either to the management or to the possession of the properties in question, and they further allege that if he had at any time such right his claim is barred by limitation. In the Court of first instance the Subordinate Judge decided in favour of the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was trustee of the endowment, and also on the ground of the Limitation Act. On appeal to the High Court, both judges agreed with his finding that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation, but they differed in opinion as to whether the plaintiff had proved his claim to be trustee of the endowment. In the result, therefore, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed in both Courts, and from these decisions the present appeal is brought. The history of the villages in suit has been examined in great detail in the proceedings in the Courts below, and certain points in that history may be taken to have been established. The documents relating to the creation of the kattalai appear to be lost, but it is agreed that the founder was Thanappa Mudali, who was prime minister to the ruler of Trichinopoly between the years 1704 and 1735. It is not clear at what date or how these villages became connected with the endowment but it must have been at an early date because very shortly after the foundation of this kattalai the Mahomedan Government attached these villages and retained possession of them until about 1790, when the Madras Government assumed possession of the Madura District. It is not clear at what date or how these villages became connected with the endowment but it must have been at an early date because very shortly after the foundation of this kattalai the Mahomedan Government attached these villages and retained possession of them until about 1790, when the Madras Government assumed possession of the Madura District. Ultimately, in 1801 the villages came into the possession of the East India Company, and remained in their possession until 1849, when the general manager of the temple at Madura (who had been appointed by the company in 1842 in exercise of the powers given them under Regulation VII. of 1817) was placed by the company in possession of the villages. The income derived from the villages in suit has been applied in various ways during this period. During the time that they remained under attachment by the Mahomedan Government it would seem that a portion of the income was applied to the uses of the endowment, and the remainder was appropriated by that Government. There is no evidence as to what happened between 1790 and 1801. From 1801 to 1849, while the villages in question were in the possession of the East India Company, the revenue from them was applied in whole or in part by the company to the uses of the endowment. In the earlier years it appears to have been handed over as a whole, but from the year 1817 the Government followed the practice of settling each year a budget showing the amount necessary for the expenses of the kattalai for that year, paying over only so much of the income as was sufficient to satisfy that budget, and retaining the remainder. Since 1849 the villages have been in the hands of the predecessors of the defendants, and the whole of the revenue has been used for the purposes of the endowment (including the expenses of the temple) according to the directions of the temple manager and the temple committee. Throughout the whole of the history of these villages from the date of the Mahomedan attachment to the present time, there is one fact that is clear from the evidence, namely, that these villages have never been in the possession of the plaintiff or his predecessors. Throughout the whole of the history of these villages from the date of the Mahomedan attachment to the present time, there is one fact that is clear from the evidence, namely, that these villages have never been in the possession of the plaintiff or his predecessors. Other villages form part of the property of the endowment, and these have been in the possession of the plaintiff and his predecessors throughout. These latter villages appear not to have been attached by the Mahomedan Government, but to have been left in the possession of the predecessors of the plaintiff on behalf of the endowment. But in all the records relating to possession the contrast between those that relate to the villages in suit and those that relate to these other villages is marked. The latter are entered as being in the possession of persons representing the predecessors of the plaintiff. This is never the case with regard to the villages in suit. The argument in favour of the plaintiffs claim is therefore in reality an argument which is not founded on evidence relating to the past history of the villages, but is of a legal nature. It avers that he and his predecessors have held the position of general trustee of the endowment, and that as such the villages in suit whose revenues form part of that endowment must, as a matter of law, be his and he must therefore be entitled to possession. The people who manage the villages and collect the revenues are, he contends, acting for him, and cannot set up an adverse title, so that their possession has been, in the eye of the law, his own. In their Lordships opinion there is a fallacy in this reasoning. The property of an endowment may consist partly or wholly in the right to enjoy the revenues of property which is in the possession of persons who have the right and the duty to manage the property, collect the revenue and hand it over when collected to be used in the proper manner for the purposes of the endowment. Such persons may even have certain rights of apportionment of the revenue so handed over by them among the several purposes of the endowment. All this is compatible with there being a general trustee of the whole endowment including the revenues when so collected and handed over. Such persons may even have certain rights of apportionment of the revenue so handed over by them among the several purposes of the endowment. All this is compatible with there being a general trustee of the whole endowment including the revenues when so collected and handed over. But in such a case the general trustee would not be entitled to the possession of the properties out of which this portion of the revenue comes. His rights do not commence until after the collection of the revenues by and under the management of those who hold possession. It must be remembered that after all the general trustee is only a representative of the idol who is a juridical personage, and who is the true owner, and there is nothing legally incongruous in that personage having other subordinate representatives who have the right to manage certain special portions of his property, and pay over the income so collected to the endowment, and even to some degree to control its use. Such rights would, as has been said, not be inconsistent with the existence of a general trustee, but they would be fatal to his claim to possession of the properties from which these, revenues are derived. Possession would be in the hands of those entitled to manage these special properties, and their possession would be averse to his. Their Lordships therefore do not consider it necessary to decide whether the claims of the plaintiff to be huqdar or general trustee of the endowment are or are not well founded. The history of these villages from the year when they came into the possession of the company, and even from a far anterior date, indicates that their relationship to the endowment was such as has been just described. The possession was always in some other person than the predecessor of the plaintiff or any person appointed by him, or, indeed, any other person claiming title from the foundation of the endowment. The sole interest of the endowment in them has been an interest in. the revenues collected from them by such other persons who were in possession of and managed the villages themselves. . The sole interest of the endowment in them has been an interest in. the revenues collected from them by such other persons who were in possession of and managed the villages themselves. . Their Lordships would be very unwilling to value lightly the testimony of a long course of dealing with the possession of these villages such as the history of this case has disclosed, which, as already stated, indicates that the relationship of the villages to the general endowment has throughout been of this nature. But they consider that it is not necessary to base their decision on the testimony of the earlier history. It suffices to consider the events that have happened from 1849 onwards. In the year 1849 the Government, which was undoubtedly then in possession of the villages in suit, handed them over to the manager of the temple of Madura (the appointment of whom was in their hands), and there is no doubt that from that time they have been in the possession of such manager and the temple committee which is also appointed by Government. The Pandara Sannidhi made no opposition to their being so handed over. From that time forward it is beyond question that the plaintiff has been out of possession of these villages. If he has any right to claim possession in his suit he undoubtedly had the same right in 1849, and therefore, as at the date of the suit he had been out of possession of these villages for nearly sixty years, his claim is barred by the Indian Limitation Act, and this appeal fails. Originally a claim for some alternative relief was included in this action, but no case has been made out for it. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should stand dismissed, and that the appellant should pay the costs.