Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (March 12, 1917) reversing a decree of the District Judge of Amraoti (October 16, 1916). The respondents sued the appellants in 1914 for a declaration that the adoption of the second appellant by the first appellant, Sitabai, the widow of one Pralhad Narayan Jog, was invalid. Pralhad Narayan Jog, a Mahratta living in Berar and governed by the Bombay School of Hindu Law, died in 1901, leaving a widow, Sitabai (the first appellant), and four daughters by a deceased wife, but no natural or adopted son. Clause 22 of his will, which was in Maharatti, contained directions to his widow Sitabai with regard to the adoption of a son. These directions were, according to the official Law. Rep. 47 Ind. App. 202 ( 1919- 1920) Sitabai V. Bapu Anna Patil 59 translation, in the terms set out in the judgment of their Lordships. By clause 2 the testator bequeathed to Sitabai certain ornaments and an annuity of Rs. 10,000, and provided " if I adopt, or my wife after my death adopt a son, then that son shall keep her with him and treat her with affection and shall give her maintenance ; in case the adopted son and she do not agree Rs.15 shall be given her every month for her mainten ance, and my wife shall remain separate." Clause 24 pro vided that the adopted son should keep the testators mother, wife, and two unmarried daughters, with him, and should treat them with affection. By clause 20 the testator bequeathed Rs. 16,000 for the purpose of establishing an anna chattra for the feeding of mendicants, and provided by clause 25 that in default of an adoption the estate which an adopted son would have taken should also be applied to that purpose. The respondents were the manager of the anna chattra, and Shankar the boy whom the testator proposed should be adopted. On January 25, 1909, Sitabai wrote to the trustees of the will as follows "The reason for writing this letter is that I am going to adopt a boy. But Shankar Rao Jog and his father and brother quarrel with me. They have started proceedings in Court with a view that I should not get even maintenance. On January 25, 1909, Sitabai wrote to the trustees of the will as follows "The reason for writing this letter is that I am going to adopt a boy. But Shankar Rao Jog and his father and brother quarrel with me. They have started proceedings in Court with a view that I should not get even maintenance. There can, therefore, be no harmony between them and me, and so I have no mind to adopt Shankar Rao Jog. I will adopt another boy. My real sister has two sons of whom the elder is Narayan who is five years of age. I approve him and so wish to adopt him. Permission may, therefore, be given to me as mentioned in the will. If you do not approve this boy you may propose to me any other boy whom you may choose so that I may consider the matter and let you know about it. You may give me permission if you approve the aforesaid boy." The trustees having given their consent, Sitabai, on February 9, 1909, adopted Narayan, the boy referred to in the letter, who was the second appellant. The District Judge was of opinion that the will showed that the testator was anxious that a boy should be adopted, and that clause 22 amounted only to an expression of preference that the son to be adopted should be Shankar, and not to a prohibition against any other adoption. He accordingly held that the adoption was valid. Upon appeal the Court of the Judicial Commissioner took the opposite view, holding that the adoption was contrary to the provisions of the will, and that it was invalid under Hindu law. The learned Commissioners in the course of their judgment said "In our opinion the testator having directed the adoption of Shankar, if possible, provides for the contingency of Shankar not being available. In such a case the widow is to adopt with the advice of the trustees. The clause read as a whole was meant to fetter the somewhat unlimited power to adopt given to a Hindu widow in Berar and Bombay.....This restriction, clearly to our minds, shows that the defendant No. 1 had not the ordinary power of a Hindu widow in Berar and Bombay. In the matter of adoption she was restricted in the way indicated in the will. In the matter of adoption she was restricted in the way indicated in the will. It is only in the case of Shankar not being available for adoption that she was authorised to adopt with the advice of the trustees. If Shankar was available for adoption as he was, then she was not at liberty to adopt anybody even with the advice of the trustees." 1920. May 6, 7. Parikh and Sanyal for the appellants. According to the Bombay School of Hindu Law, which applies to the parties, a widow has an inherent right to make an adoption. The husband cannot wholly prohibit the exercise of the right, and can only fetter its exercise by a clear and imperative direction to her Lakshmibai v. Sarasratibai. (( 1899) I. L. R. 23 B. 789.) The terms of the will do not amount to a clear direction to adopt Shankar in the circumstances which arose. The will clearly contemplated the adoption of a boy who should be on affectionate terms with Sitabai. Having regard to the ill-feeling shown by Shankar and his family towards Sitabai, an adoption of Shankar was not " possible " within the intention of the Law. Rep. 47 Ind. App. 202 ( 1919- 1920) Sitabai V. Bapu Anna Patil 60 will, nor could Shankar " be obtained " in such an adoption as would fulfil the provisions of the will. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the respondents were not called upon. May 7. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. Their Lordships do not desire to trouble counsel for the respondents. There is no controversy as to the facts which lie behind this dispute, and the relevant proposition of law has been accepted in both the Courts below. It is this that according to the Bombay School of Law the duty of a Hindu widow to obey her husbands command compels her to act upon any mandatory direction that he may give by will as to the way in which her power of adoption should be exercised. The whole question in this case, therefore, is whether the will of one Pralhad Narayan Jog, dated June 12, 1901, imposed any such mandate upon his widow. The whole question in this case, therefore, is whether the will of one Pralhad Narayan Jog, dated June 12, 1901, imposed any such mandate upon his widow. The direction he gave is contained in clause 22, and it runs in these terms " If I did not adopt a son during my lifetime my wife should, as far as possible, adopt Shankar, the second son of my elder brother, Tirthoswarup Govind Narayan Jog. If he (the boy) cannot be obtained, any other boy should be adopted with the advice of the trustees." The point for determination, therefore, is whether those words merely appeal to the wife to exercise her discretion in the manner indicated, or whether they impose upon her a mandate so to exercise it. The difficulty in the construction is due to the rather confused and inartistic use of words in the clause ; but their Lordships, having given the most careful consideration to the arguments that have been advanced by both counsel for the appellants, have come to the conclusion that the view expressed by the Judicial Commissioner as to its effect was correct. " Should as far as possible " means, in their Lordships opinion, that unless there are conditions outside the will preventing the possibility of the adoption, the widow, when she does adopt, is to exercise her power in favour of Shankar ; and this view is strengthened and confirmed by the final words which provide that if the boy cannot be obtained another boy should be adopted with the advice of the trustees. The boy could be obtained. The only difficulty that arose was due to an unhappy and unfortunate difference of feeling between the widow and Shankar and Shankars family. Counsel for the appellants have suggested that this prevents the possibility of his adoption; and they point to two clauses in the will—clause 2 and clause 24—in both of which the testator in strong language directed that the adopted son should keep the widow, treat her with affection, and give her maintenance, which they say is in the circumstances impossible. That condition is, however, subsequent to the appointment, and not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. Their Lordships abstain from expressing any opinion as to what the effect of the will might be if the adopted son declined to exercise the duties which the will so imposes. That condition is, however, subsequent to the appointment, and not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power. Their Lordships abstain from expressing any opinion as to what the effect of the will might be if the adopted son declined to exercise the duties which the will so imposes. That question does not now arise. The only question is that to which their Lordships have referred, and although the words of the will might have been expressed with greater clearness their Lordships entertain no doubt that the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner is correct, and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.