JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is preferred by the defendants, the patnidars, and it arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff sought for a declaration that she had a brahmatter interest in one plot, and a mokararri maurasi jamai in another plot, within the limits of the defendants' patni. So far as the second plot is concerned the plaintiff baa succeeded in part, and the defendants do not challenge that part of the decision of the lower Appellate Court. The appeal relates to the first plot in which plaintiff claims a rent free interest. 2. A Record of Rights was prepared recently under Chapter X of the Tenancy Act, and the two plats were shown as in the occupation of Ram Sagor Roy, the plaintiff's husband, bearing a rent of Rs. 14 per annum. The plaintiff thereupon instituted a suit u/s 106 of the Tenancy Act in regard to plot No. 1 for the correction of the entry in the record, after establishment of her niskar right. That suit was transferred to the Civil Court for disposal, and was dismissed for default. 3. In the present suit the plaintiff's prayers (a) and (d) are for a declaration of her rent-free brahmatter title in respect of plot No. I and for a declaration that the Revenue Officer's decision in regard to both plots is illegal, invalid and without jurisdiction, and for orders that the record be amended. 4. The defendants raised the plea that on these facts the present suit is barred by the provisions of section 109 of the Tenancy Act, so far as it relates to the first plot. The Courts below are agreed in deciding that the suit is not barred. That is the first question which has been urged before us. 5. The terms of section 109 are very wide. The Courts below are agreed in deciding that the suit is not barred. That is the first question which has been urged before us. 5. The terms of section 109 are very wide. Subject to a proviso which does not concern us, it lays down that "A Civil Court shall not entertain any application or suit concerning any matter which is or has already been the subject of an application made or suit instituted or proceedings taken u/s 105 to section 108, both inclusive." Admittedly there has been a suit about this plot u/s 106, but it is argued on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that the subject-matter of the two suits is not the same, because in the suit u/s 106 the object was merely to have a correction made in the record, whereas in the present suit the object is to obtain a declaration that the plaintiff has a rent free title to the land. It is conceded that the plaintiff actually asked in the section 106 suit for the correction of the entry in the record after establishment of her niskar title, and it is clear that that prayer is very similar to the prayer I have quoted from the plaint in the present suit. It is argued, however, that the scope of section 106 is very limited, and that the relief-that can be granted under it is confined to a correction of the entry made in the Record of Rights. 6. In my opinion an examination of the relevant sections in Chapter X shows that argument to be wrong. u/s 102 the Revenue Officer is required to specify certain particulars: among those particulars are the name of the tenant, the class to which he belongs, the rent payable, the time the Record of Rights is being prepared, and if the land is claimed to be held rent free, whether or not rent is actually paid and if not paid, whether or not the occupant is entitled to hold the land without payment of rent, and if so entitled, under what authority. We do not know whether the plaintiff made any claim before the Revenue Officer, but that does not matter: the Revenue Officer recorded that the land was rent-paying land and that the rent was so much. We do not know whether the plaintiff made any claim before the Revenue Officer, but that does not matter: the Revenue Officer recorded that the land was rent-paying land and that the rent was so much. u/s 106 a suit may be instituted for the decision of any dispute regarding any entry which a Revenue Officer has made in the record: such dispute may be between landlord and tenant, as to whether land held rent free is properly so held or as to any other matter. It seems to me that the plain meaning of these words is that the suit shall relate to the substance of the disagreement between the parties and that when the Revenue Officer proceeds to hear and decide the dispute, be is to determine not merely whether certain words shall or shall not remain unchanged in the record, but whether the facts described by those words are correct; if he is satisfied that the entry does not describe the facts correctly, he will as a corollary cause an alteration to be made. 7. The lower Courts have referred to the case of Ram Chandra Bhanja Vs. Nandanandanananda Gossain as an authority for the view which they take. That case, however, is quite different, because it was about a dispute between the landlords of two contiguous villages, as to the village in which the land lay. The reasoning of the judgment is made more clear by the reference to the five earlier cases which are quoted in it Another case has been mentioned before us, namely, Aswini Kumar Aich Vs. Sarada Charan Basu and Others, 37 Ind. Cas. 253 , but that does not throw any light on the matter. 8. On the other hand, the decision in the case of Apurba Krishna Roy and Others Vs. Syama Charan Pramanik and Others, 54 Ind. Cas. 952 supports the view that I have taken. The facts are very like those of the present case, with this difference that the tenant raised his plea u/s 105A and not by a separate suit u/s 106. That difference, however, does not affect the reasoning. 9. In my judgment the present suit, so far as the first plot is concerned, was barred by section 109 of the Tenancy Act. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed. That difference, however, does not affect the reasoning. 9. In my judgment the present suit, so far as the first plot is concerned, was barred by section 109 of the Tenancy Act. The appeal will, therefore, be allowed. I have already mentioned that the learned Subordinate Judge gave the plaintiff a partial decree in regard to the second plot. Subject to that limited success, the suit is dismissed with costs in all Courts.