Judgement Consolidated Appeals, six being from a judgment and decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces (July 28, 1914), reversing decrees of the District Judge, Wardha, and the residue being from judgments and decrees of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner affirming decrees of the Court of the Divisional Judge, Nagpur Division, which reversed decrees of the District Judge. The sole question for determination in the consolidated appeals was whether one Saraswati Bai had been the absolute owner of two mauzas, Bidhi and Chikni, situate in the Wardha district of the Central Provinces, and entitled to alienate them. The facts appear from the judgement of their Lordships. The twenty-two suits giving rise to the present consolidated appeals were instituted in 1910 and 1911 in the Court of the District Judge, Wardha. The plaintiffs in eleven of the suits were the two surviving sons and the minor grandson of Saraswati; in the remaining suits purchasers from them were the plaintiffs. The defendants were persons who, as alienees from Saraswati, were in possession of different portions of the villages. The plaintiffs alleged by their plaints that Bapuji, the deceased father of Saraswati, was a resident at Chikni, in the Wardha district, Central Provinces, and contended that after his death his daughter Saraswati took only a Hindu womans estate in the villages, and consequently that the alienations made by her were not binding; they prayed severally for possession of portions of the villages. The defendants in each suit filed separate written statements, but their common defence was that Bapuji "was a resident of Mangrul Dastgir, district Amraoti " in Berar, and that after his death his daughter Saraswati "took an absolute estate under the Bombay law which governs the Mahratta Brahmans residing in Berar. Bapuji was a Maharashtra Brahman, whose domicil was in Berar, and who had brought with him from the country of his ancestors (Maharashtra) his personal law by which he remained to be governed. Bapuji was a Maharashtra Brahman, whose domicil was in Berar, and who had brought with him from the country of his ancestors (Maharashtra) his personal law by which he remained to be governed. He had not accepted any other law of domicil." By consent issues common to all the suits had alone been tried; among these issues one only was material to the appeals and was in the following terms " Was Bapuji a permanent resident of Berar and governed by the Bombay School of Hindu law and did he migrate to the Wardha district and bring with him his personal law and did he continue to be governed by that school of law ? " The District Judge found that Bapuji was a Maharashtra Deshastha Brahman; and he said that the Central Provinces High Court recognized the Benares school of law as prevailing in the Central Provinces, but that as regards Maharashtra Brahmans residing in Nagpur and other neighbouring Mahratta districts the Maharashtra school of Hindu law prevailing in Western India was held to govern them. A family migrating to another province governed by another law carried its own law as it existed at the time of emigration. He thought that the question was whether Bapuji migrated to the Central Provinces, intending to give up his original Berar domicil, at a period when his family could not have been influenced by the Bombay decisions of 1859. He found on the evidence that Bapuji at his death had not given up his original domicil, and that even if he did so it could not have been before 1860 to 1862. He therefore held that in accordance with the Bombay decisions Saraswati took an absolute interest, and he dismissed the suits. The plaintiffs in six of the suits appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner which allowed the appeals. The Additional Judicial Commissioner referred to the Nagpur decisions mentioned in the judgment of their Lordships, and said that he was not prepared to dissent from them. He said " the defendants were called upon to prove that at some time or other it could be said of Bapuji this man is a permanent resident in Berar and cannot be called a resident in the Central Provinces. In my opinion they have failed to prove so much as this. He said " the defendants were called upon to prove that at some time or other it could be said of Bapuji this man is a permanent resident in Berar and cannot be called a resident in the Central Provinces. In my opinion they have failed to prove so much as this. It is common ground that Bapujis ancestors had at one time lived in Maharashtra in the Bombay Presidency. It is not known whether Bapuji had himself emigrated or whether his ancestors had done so." The learned Commissioner then considered the evidence and said " After going through the whole of the evidence oral and documentary with the aid of counsel I cannot find that Bapuji had an exclusive domicil either in Berar or in the Central Provinces. The territorial boundary was not in his mind both sides of the river were equally his domicil. That being so the lex loci of the territory where the property was situated must prevail." In the remaining suits appeals from the District Judge were made to the Divisional Court, Nagpur, which gave effect to the above decision of the Judicial Commissioner, and that Court affirmed the Divisional Court. 1920. April 26, 27. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the appellants. It was found by both Courts that Bapuji was a Mahratta Brahman whose ancestors came from the Bombay Presidency. The question arising upon these appeals does not depend upon whether Bapuji was domiciled in the Central Provinces but upon whether he had renounced the doctrines prevailing in the Bombay Presidency in favour of those prevailing in the Central Provinces. There was no evidence that he had done so, nor indeed did the evidence establish a change of domicil. It is well established that a Hindu family upon migration to a different part of India continues to be governed by the doctrine prevailing at the place migrated from Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoneah (12 Moo. I. A. 81.) ; Parbati Kumari Debi v. Jagadis Chunder Dhobal (L. R. 29 I. A. 82.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. 48. It is also well established that in the Bombay Presidency, where the Mayukha is followed, a daughter takes an absolute estate. I. A. 81.) ; Parbati Kumari Debi v. Jagadis Chunder Dhobal (L. R. 29 I. A. 82.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. 48. It is also well established that in the Bombay Presidency, where the Mayukha is followed, a daughter takes an absolute estate. The decision in the present case was based upon the decision of the Court now appealed from in Narayan Vithal v. Govind Narayan (( 1905) 1 Nagpur L. R. 154.), in which earlier decisions of that Court were followed. The view taken in those decisions was contrary to the view of the Bombay Supreme Court in Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbhai (( 1859) 1 Bom. H. C. 130.) in 1859, which is well-established law. It was not disputed in Narayan Vithal’s Case (( 1905) 1 Nagpur L. R. 154.) and was affirmed in Dawlatrao v. Govindrao (( 1908) 5 Nagpur L. R. 13.), the later decision in the Central Provinces referred to in the judgment appealed from, that Hindu law as expounded by the Bombay Courts is applied to Mahrattas. Sir Erle Richards K.C. and Eddis for the respondents. The evidence did not establish that Bapuji was ever domiciled in Berar, on the contrary it was shown that he or his family had owned property in the Central Provinces from 1835 It is conceded that hs ancestors came from Maharashtra, but in that case the Mitakshara was his paramount authority Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. 28. [MR. AMEER ALI referred to the statement in Collector of Madura v. Mootoo Ramalinga Sathupathy (( 1868) 12 Moo. I. A. 397, 438.) that the Mayukha is peculiarly a Mahratta treatise.] It does not follow that it is an over-riding authority, it is merely a commentary on the Mitakshara. As appears from the judgment in Narayan Vithal v. Govind Narayan (( 1905) 1 Nagpur L. R. 154.) the Courts in the Central Provinces have for over forty years held that in the case of Mahratta Brahmans there settled a daughter takes a limited estate, the view held in the Central Provinces being that the Mayukha properly interpreted does not conflict with the Mitakshara. The right of inheritance of a daughter was the subject of a long controversy in Bombay Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. 615. That controversy still existed when Bapuji or his family became settled in the Central Provinces. The right of inheritance of a daughter was the subject of a long controversy in Bombay Maynes Hindu Law, 8th ed., para. 615. That controversy still existed when Bapuji or his family became settled in the Central Provinces. An immigrant cannot be bound by decisions of the Courts of a province from which he has migrated given after his migration. The present question is not one of the conflict of different systems of law but of the construction to be placed upon the Mitakshara on which the Mayukha is a commentary. Effect should be given to the long course of usage in the Central Provinces. A reversal of the judgment would upset titles based upon the view taken by the Courts there for a long period. De Gruyther K.C. in reply. The evidence showed that Bapuji did not live permanently at Chikni before 1866, the earliest date at which he resided there being 1862. In 1859 the Bombay Supreme Court in Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbhai (1 Bom. H. C. 130.) had held that in that Presidency a daughter took an absolute estate. That decision was followed in Vinayak Anandrav v. Lakshmibai (( 1861) 1 Bom. H. C. 130.) (affirmed by the Board sub. nom. Venayek v. Luxumeebaee (( 1864) 9 Moo. I. A. 516.)), and has since been followed in Babaji v. Balaji Ganesh (( 1881) I.L. R. 5 B. 662,672.) and other cases. The Sadar Adalat in Deo Baee v. Wan Baee ((1808) 1 Bor. 27.) had as early as 1808 given effect to the same view. But in any case the decision of the Supreme Court in 1859 did not alter the law but merely declared what it was and had been at all material times. June 24. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DUNEDIN. In 1868, one Bapuji died, leaving, amongst other properties, two mauzas, Chikni and Bidhi, situated in the Wardha district of the Central Provinces. He was succeeded by Saraswati, his daughter, who entered into possession of the mauzas. She died in 1889, leaving three sons. During her lifetime she alienated various portions of the mauzas to different persons. After her death her sons brought suits to recover their alienated portions, and cross-suits were brought by the purchasers. He was succeeded by Saraswati, his daughter, who entered into possession of the mauzas. She died in 1889, leaving three sons. During her lifetime she alienated various portions of the mauzas to different persons. After her death her sons brought suits to recover their alienated portions, and cross-suits were brought by the purchasers. All the suits depended on the determination of the same question—namely, had Saraswati an absolute right in the mauzas, or had she only the same class of limited interest as is possessed by a Hindu widow ? Accordingly, one action was taken as a test case, the others abiding by its result. The learned District Judge found that she had an absolute interest; but on appeal the Judicial Commissioner reversed his decree. Formal judgments in all the actions were pronounced. Appeal has been taken to this Board, and all the appeals are consolidated. The quality of the right which a daughter takes who inherits immovable property from her father, has been differently determined in different parts of India. The absolute right has been affirmed by the Courts of Western India, according to the view of the High Court of Bombay. The limited right has been affirmed by the other Courts, and this Board has upheld the rules as determined in each case as applicable to the persons whose law is the law of Western or of other parts of India. The question, therefore, is, what was the law which regulated the succession of Bapuji ? Now it is absolutely settled that the law of succession is in any given case to be determined according to the personal law of the individual whose succession is in question. It is well put by Mr. Mayne in para. 48 of his Hindu Law, where he says " Prima facie any Hindu residing in a particular province of India is held to be subject to the particular doctrines of Hindu law recognised in that province.....But this law is not merely a local law. It becomes the personal law, and part of the status of every family which is governed by it; consequently, where any such family migrates to another province governed by another law, it carries its own law with it." Ample authority for this statement may be found in Rutcheputty Dutt Iha v. Rajunder Narain Rai (( 1839) 2 Moo. It becomes the personal law, and part of the status of every family which is governed by it; consequently, where any such family migrates to another province governed by another law, it carries its own law with it." Ample authority for this statement may be found in Rutcheputty Dutt Iha v. Rajunder Narain Rai (( 1839) 2 Moo. I. A. 132.) ; in Soorendronath Roy v. Heeramonee Burmoneah (12 Moo. I.A. 81.) ; and in more recent times in Parbati Kumari Debi v. Jagadis Chunder Dhabal. (L. R. 29 I. A. 82.) Now it is certain that Bapuji did not originally live at Chikni, the place where he was actually living when he started on the pilgrimage in the course of which death overtook him. He was an immigrant. What law did he bring with him ? Of course, if nothing is known about a man except that he lived in a certain place, it will be assumed that his personal law is the law which prevails in that place. In that sense only is domicil of importance. But if more is known, then in accordance with that knowledge his personal law must be determined ; unless it can be shown that he has renounced his original law in favour of the law of the place to which he migrated. What are the facts here ? Of renunciation there is no trace whatever. Now it is found clearly by both learned judges that Bapuji was a Maharashtra Brahman. The District Judge says so in the first sentence of his judgment. The Judicial Commissioner says " It is common ground that Bapujis ancestors had at one time lived in Maharashtra, in the Bombay Presidency. It is not known whether Bapuji had himself emigrated, or whether his ancestors had done so." In the opinion of their Lordships that in this case settles the matter. His family was according to this admission subject to the law as expounded in Bombay. There is no trace of evidence that he ever renounced that law, and according to that law the daughter succeeds to her father in an absolute inheritance. This is a very simple view of the case, and their Lordships feel that explanation is needed why it did not commend itself to the Courts below. There is no trace of evidence that he ever renounced that law, and according to that law the daughter succeeds to her father in an absolute inheritance. This is a very simple view of the case, and their Lordships feel that explanation is needed why it did not commend itself to the Courts below. They think that the reason was that out of respect for authority the learned judges below really approached the case from the wrong point of view. In 1905, Mr. Drake-Brockman, Judicial Commissioner, in the case of Narayan Vithal v. Govind Narayan (1 Nagpur L. R. 154.) decided that the succession to a Maharashtra Brahman who had migrated to Berar to the Central Provinces about 1800 fell to be regulated by the law as interpreted by the Courts of the Central Provinces rather than as interpreted by the Courts in Bombay. In 1908, Mr. Skinner, Judicial Commissioner, decided that a Maharashtra Brahman settled in Berar had his succession regulated according to the law as interpreted in Bombay. Taking these two cases as laying down universal propositions, the learned judges then proceeded to consider the question whether on the evidence Bapuji had his real domicil in Berar or in the Central Provinces. This turned on whether his real original home was at Manjur or at Chikni. The learned District Judge held that his original home in Berar had been established. The Commissioner held that the evidence fell short of so establishing, and that consequently the Central Provinces must be taken as his domicil, in which case the decision in Narayan Vithal v. Govind Narayan (1 Nagpur L. R. 154.) would rule. It will be clear from what their Lordships have already said that this is not the way to approach the subject. It would be well, however, that something should be said about the judgment in the case just mentioned. First of all, it is necessary to remember what is the reason for the different results at which the Courts in the Bombay Presidency and the other Courts of India have arrived. The reason lies in the dominating influence of the particular commentaries. Further, it must always be remembered that the commentaries are only commentaries. They do not enact they explain and are evidence of the congeries of customs which form the law. The reason lies in the dominating influence of the particular commentaries. Further, it must always be remembered that the commentaries are only commentaries. They do not enact they explain and are evidence of the congeries of customs which form the law. It is the fact that in the Presidency of Bombay the dominating commentary is the Mayukha, which is a supplementary commentary to the Mitakshara. The result has been that in the question of succession, the Courts of Bombay, guided by the Mayukha, have arrived at one result; the other Courts interpreting the Mitakshara without the dominating influence of the Mayukha have come to another. Now, Mr. Drake-Brockman, reading the text for himself, and following the decision of Mr. Neill, Judicial Commissioner in 1886, came to the conclusion that there was no difference on the point at issue between the Mayukha and the Mitakshara, and that the proper interpretation was that given by the Courts other than Bombay. In so doing, he was necessarily going in the teeth of the decision of the High Court of Bombay in the case of Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbhai. (1 Bom. H. C. 130 ; 9 Moo. I. A. 533n.) He, however, was sitting in a Court not subject to the High Court of Bombay ; and he thought to avoid the question of whether that decision applied to the family with which he was dealing, by pointing out that the family had emigrated from Berar in 1800, and the date of the High Court decision was 1859. In this their Lordships hold that he was clearly wrong. He was treating the decision of 1859 as if it were a statute which imposed law for the first time. It was nothing of the sort. It was declaratory of the law as it had existed. As a matter of fact, the same point—namely, the quality of the succession of a daughter to her father—had been determined by a Sudder Court in 1808, and the fact that the judgment of 1859 and the succeeding judgment of Vinayak Anandrav v. Lakshmibai (( 1861) 1 Bom. It was declaratory of the law as it had existed. As a matter of fact, the same point—namely, the quality of the succession of a daughter to her father—had been determined by a Sudder Court in 1808, and the fact that the judgment of 1859 and the succeeding judgment of Vinayak Anandrav v. Lakshmibai (( 1861) 1 Bom. H. C. 117.) in 1861 were only in accordance with the practice of the law as upheld in the Bombay Courts, is well stated by Westropp C.J., in Tuljaram Moorarji v. Mathuradas (I. L. R. 5 B. 662, 671, 672.), where he says "It may here be properly mentioned that the decision of the Supreme Court in 1859, in Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbhai (1 Bom. H. C. 130; 9 Moo. I. A. 533n.), and its decision in 1861 in Vinayak Anandrav v. Lakshmibai (( 1861) 1 Bom. H. C. 117.), were in accordance with the pre-existing traditions in that Court and in the local profession in Bombay. .... The appellants in Vinayak Anandrav v. Lakshmibai (( 1861) 1 Bom. H. C. 117.) resorted to Her Majestys Privy Council against the advice given to them by counsel. The decision in that case and that in Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbhai (1 Bom. H. C. 130; 9 Moo. I. A. 533n.) have been steadily followed by the High Court in numerous unreported cases and by the legal profession.....Any departure now from those decisions would cause much confusion .... and no advantage that we can perceive." The decision in Narayan Vithal v. Govind Narayan (1 Nagpur L. R. 154.) may possibly have been right on facts if it could be shown that the family had allowed its succession after the emigration to be regulated according to the law prevalent in Central India. But the argument as it stands is unsound. It was argued by Sir E. Richards that this would entail the consequence that the law of the emigrated family would be subject to every change brought about by the decisions of the Courts of the Province where they no longer were. This is not so. The law must be the family law as it was when they left. A judgment declaratory of law as having always been would bind; but it would be a different thing if subsequent customs became incorporated in the law. This is not so. The law must be the family law as it was when they left. A judgment declaratory of law as having always been would bind; but it would be a different thing if subsequent customs became incorporated in the law. The distinction is pointed out in the case of Vasudevan v. Secretary of State for India (( 1887) I. L. R. 11 M. 157, 162.) in the judgment of the Court (Sir A. Collins C. J. and Muttasami Ayyar J.). It only remains to make clear the point that the result come to by the High Court of Bombay is correct as applied to the persons who lived under the law of Western India. The decision in Vinayak Anandrav v. Gorind Narayan (1 Bom. H. C. 117.) already cited, was affirmed by the Board. (9 Moo. I. A. 516.) Doubts were subsequently raised as to the effect of certain other decisions of this Board. These were considered in the High Court of Bombay in Bhau v. Raghunath (( 1905) I. L.R. 30B. 229, 236, 237.) by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. and Aston J., where Sir Lawrence Jenkins said as follows "In Pranjivandas v. Devkuvarbhai (1 Bom. H. C. 130.) it was determined by the Supreme Court that a daughter took an absolute interest, and though the case apparently arose in the Island of Bombay, still the decision was expressly based on a reading of Manu, the Mitakshara, and the Mayukha, and was in accordance with the opinions of the shastris both of the Sadar Adalat of Bombay and of Poona. In Vinayak Anandrav v. Lakshmibai (1 Bom. H. C. 117.) it was said ‘In Devkuvarbhais Case (( 1905) I. L.R. 30B. 229, 236, 237.) this Court, in 1859, after lengthened consideration of all the accessible authorities, and after consulting the shastris both in Poona and in the Sadar Adalat of Bombay, held that daughters, on this side of India taking by inheritance, take the estate absolutely. In Devkuvarbhais Case (( 1905) I. L.R. 30B. 229, 236, 237.) this Court, in 1859, after lengthened consideration of all the accessible authorities, and after consulting the shastris both in Poona and in the Sadar Adalat of Bombay, held that daughters, on this side of India taking by inheritance, take the estate absolutely. In Devkuvarbhais Case (( 1905) I. L.R. 30B. 229, 236, 237.) each shastri rested his opinion as to the inheritability of the daughters on this same passage of the Mayukha referring to it as a work of high and generally received authority, not only in Gujarat, but in Bombay and the Dekkan, that is to say, over the larger and more important portion of this Presidency.....That the sisters took absolutely was determined on appeal by the Privy Council.... and this result was apparently reached by the same train of thought. This view has ever since been followed, and it has now come to be recognised as the rule in Bombay that female heirs, except those who come into the family of the propositus by marriage, take absolute interests. To throw a doubt on this rule might be productive of great mischief." With this view their Lordships agree. The result is that the appeals must be allowed. The orders of the Judicial Commissioner and the orders of the Divisional Judge of the Nagpur Division must be set aside, and the decrees of the District Judge of Wardha restored. The appellants will have their costs in the Courts below and before this Board. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.