Judgement Consolidated Appeals from a judgment and two decrees of the High Court (June 1, 1915) affirming two judgments and decrees of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur (March 26, 1912). The principal respondents instituted the first of the two suits giving rise to the present appeals upon four mortgages to them dated September 16, 1896, August 1, 1898, September 21, 1902, and November 10, 1904; they prayed that, after taking an account of what remained due under the mortgages, the properties mortgaged might be sold and the proceeds applied to discharge the mortgage debts. The mortgagors were the first party defendants. The present appellants who had two mortgages dated respectively April 5, 1899, and April 5, 1901, which related to properties included in those mortgaged to the principal respondents, were second party defendants. The appellants by their written statement claimed under their two mortgages priority over the third and fourth of the mortgages above mentioned as made to the principal respondents, and contribution in respect of the proceeds of certain of the properties. All the mortgages in question were duly registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1877. One of the properties—namely, Mauza Khagra—was in a different position to the others. That mauza had been purchased by the mortgagors at an auction sale in execution on March 25, 1901, and was included in the mortgage to the appellants of April 5, 1901, confirmation of the sale not having then taken place. It was also included in the third and fourth mortgages to the principal respondents after the sale had been confirmed. The second suit was instituted by the appellants against the mortgagors (who did not contest it) and the principal respondents, the claim being to enforce the mortgages of April 5, 1899, and April 5, 1901. This suit raised the same questions as the first suit, and both suits were tried together. The Subordinate Judge held that the principal respondents had neither actual nor constructive notice of the mortgages to the appellants ; and that with regard to Khagra they were entitled as mortgagees under their later mortgages. He accordingly made two preliminary decrees, specifying the rights of the parties respectively, and allowing the claim of the respondents to sell the properties. The preliminary decree in the first suit was made absolute on January 18, 1913. The present appellants appealed to the High Court in each of the suits. He accordingly made two preliminary decrees, specifying the rights of the parties respectively, and allowing the claim of the respondents to sell the properties. The preliminary decree in the first suit was made absolute on January 18, 1913. The present appellants appealed to the High Court in each of the suits. The appeals were heard together, and were dismissed, the learned judges being of opinion that the respondents had not actual notice of the mortgages to the appellants, and holding (following earlier decisions of the Court) that the respondents had not constructive notice of the mortgages from the mere fact that they were registered. 1920. April 22, 23. Dunne K.C. and H. N. Sen for the appellants. Registration of the mortgages to the appellants was constructive notice of them to the respondents. The High Courts in India have taken different views upon that question. In Bombay it was held in Lakshmandas Sarupchand v. Dasrat (( 1880) I.L.R. 6 B. 168.) in 1880 that registration of a document under the Indian Registration Act, 1877, is constructive notice, and that decision has since been followed there in Dundaya v. Chenbasapa (( 1883) I.L.R. 9 B., 427.); Ramchandra v. Dareppa (( 1890) I.L.R. 14 B. 506.), Narayan Laksman v. Haibatrav (( 1892) I.L.R. 17 B. 741.); and other cases ; and the same view has been adopted at Allahabad Churaman v. Balli (( 1887) I.L.R. 9 A. 591.); Janki Prasad v. Kishen Dat. (( 1894) I.L.R. 16 A. 748.) A contrary view has been taken at Calcutta, the later decisions making the question turn upon the particular facts of the case Preonath v. Ghose (( 1899) I.L.R. 27 C 358.); Debendra Narayan Roy v. Ram Taran Banerjee (( 1903) I.L.R. 30 C. 599.) ; Monindra Chandra Nandy v. Troyluckho Nath Burat (( 1898) I.L.R. 2 Cal. W. N. 750.) ; Bunwari Jha v. Ramjee. (( 1902) I. L. R. 7 Cal. W. N. 11.) Madras has adopted the view taken in Calcutta Shan Maun Mull v. Madras Building Co. W. N. 750.) ; Bunwari Jha v. Ramjee. (( 1902) I. L. R. 7 Cal. W. N. 11.) Madras has adopted the view taken in Calcutta Shan Maun Mull v. Madras Building Co. (( 1891) I.L.R. 15 M. 268.) There is no decision by the Board exactly in point, but it has been held that a mortgagee suing for sale has for the purposes of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a mortgagee has constructive notice of all prior registered mortgages Mahomed Ibrahim Hossein v. Ambika Persed Singh (L. R. 39 I. A. 68.) ; Het Ram v. Shadi Lal. (L. R. 45 I. A. 130.) It is submitted that the Bombay decisions are right, having regard to the definition of " notice" in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 3 (Sect. 3 “. . . . a person is said to have ‘notice’ of a fact when he actually k nows the fact, or when, but for willful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have k nown it. . . . .”), and the fact that s. 59 of that Act in effect makes registration of a mortgage compulsory. A contrary view would deprive the Registration Act of a great deal of its utility as to mortgages. No doubt it has been held in England that registration is not of itself notice, but the decisions turned upon the terms of the registration Acts in England, and are not applicable in the case of the Indian Registration Act which makes unregistered documents unenforceable. Mauza Khagra vested in the mortgagors upon the auction sale being confirmed Code of Civil Procedure (XIV. of 1882), ss. 314, 316; and the mortgage of it to the appellants thereupon became effectual under s. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, the appellants having notice by reason of the registration. The respondents having already two mortgages upon the mortgagors property it was gross negligence not to search the register on taking their third and fourth mortgages. [Reference was also made to the Indian Trusts Act (II. of 1882), s. 91.] De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the respondents. Registration of itself is not constructive notice. The respondents having already two mortgages upon the mortgagors property it was gross negligence not to search the register on taking their third and fourth mortgages. [Reference was also made to the Indian Trusts Act (II. of 1882), s. 91.] De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the respondents. Registration of itself is not constructive notice. The principle applied in the English decisions applies to registration under the Indian Registration Act, the real test being whether there was an absence of good faith Bushell v. Bushell. ((1802) 1 Sch. & Lef. 90.) The decisions of the Calcutta High Court that the question depends upon the facts of each particular case are correct. In the present case there were no facts showing a wilful abstention from search or gross negligence ; the respondents in registering did all that was required of them by the Act. Having regard to the English decisions, if the Indian Legislature intended that registration was to amount to constructive notice that would have been expressly provided. Under the Act a mortgage of property in different districts in India, however far apart, can be registered in either. Though there are provisions for the registration being communicated to each district in which the property is situated, considerable confusion and hardship would arise if registration in any district was notice in every part of India to which the Act applies. Decisions under s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act are not in point, because that section imposes upon a mortgagee a duty to make inquiries. Mauza Khagra not being vested in the mortgagors at the date of the mortgage to the appellants, that mortgage was ineffectual Transfer of Property Act, 1882, ss. 6, 54; Per shad Sein v. Budhoo Sing. (( 1869) 12 Moo. I. A. 292, 307.) The appellants cannot under the doctrine of feeding the estoppel be in a better position than if th mortgage to them was made and registered after the sale confirmation. Dunne K.C. replied. July 2. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. The main question raised upon this appeal is a pure question of law, and depends upon the true construction to be placed on certain Indian statutes. Dunne K.C. replied. July 2. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. The main question raised upon this appeal is a pure question of law, and depends upon the true construction to be placed on certain Indian statutes. In the earlier stages of the dispute this question was associated with the history of a series of transactions to which detailed reference is now unnecessary, since the chief point that arises for determination is whether the effect of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is to provide that the registration of a deed shall by the mere fact of registration become, in the words of Lord Camden Morecock v. Dickens ((1768) Amb. 678, 680.), " presumptive notice »to all mankind." Opinion in India has differed upon the point. Certain decisions in the High Court of Bombay appear to be based upon the view that it is, while in Calcutta the decisions have been so uniformly in the opposite direction that in the present case counsel for the appellants, who contend in favour of the doctrine that registration is notice, found himself unable in the High Court to breast the tide of authority, while reserving the right to renew the struggle if the case should further proceed. Although this point is the chief one that now needs determination, eighteen issues were framed by the Subordinate Judge. These were all carefully examined and dealt with in his judgment, which was in favour of the respondents, and was affirmed by the High Court at Fort William, ii Bengal. These issues are either now finally disposed of or they are subordinate to the question of notice. It is unnecessary, therefore, minutely to examine the history of this case or to analyze the transactions out of which the dispute proceeded, or the form of the two suits which are now consolidated in this appeal. It is sufficient to say that the controversy arises between two sets of mortgagees claiming through six mortgages granted by the same mortgagor. The holders of the first and second mortgages are the contesting respondents, the third and fourth were in favour of the appellants, and the fifth and sixth were again in favour of the respondents. It is sufficient to say that the controversy arises between two sets of mortgagees claiming through six mortgages granted by the same mortgagor. The holders of the first and second mortgages are the contesting respondents, the third and fourth were in favour of the appellants, and the fifth and sixth were again in favour of the respondents. The second mortgage included two decrees obtained by the mortgagor against third parties—namely, No. 509 of 1895, and No. 4 of 1897—and these were also made subject to the subsequent charges. The fourth mortgage also included a one-half share in an estate known as Khagra, and this again was included in the fifth mortgage without any reference being made to the preceding dealing with the estate. At the date of the execution of the fourth mortgage, although the mortgagor had purchased the estate under an execution decree, the sale had not been confirmed and he had obtained no certificate of sale. This he subsequently acquired before the execution of the fifth mortgage. All the mortgages were duly registered. The decrees subject to the second mortgage in favour of the respondents were realized by the mortgagor and the respondents and were dealt with by them without reference to the rights possessed by the appellants under the third and fourth mortgages. If the respondents can be held to have had notice of the third and fourth mortgages, the case will have to be remitted for adjustment of the accounts ; but if, as found both by the Additional Subordinate Judge and by the High Court, such notice cannot be imputed, upon this point the judgment appealed from will stand. Now actual notice is not suggested, nor are any circumstances established in evidence affecting the duty of the respondents to make inquiry, except the bare fact that they did not search the register on taking the fifth and sixth mortgages or before dealing with the moneys arising on the decrees. Sect. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882) provides in express terms that a mortgage for a sum exceeding Rs. 100 can be effected only by a registered instrument, and as all the mortgages are subsequent to the date of this statute, and exceed the amount named, they are all bound by its terms. Sect. Sect. 59 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV. of 1882) provides in express terms that a mortgage for a sum exceeding Rs. 100 can be effected only by a registered instrument, and as all the mortgages are subsequent to the date of this statute, and exceed the amount named, they are all bound by its terms. Sect. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, which establishes the necessity for registration with regard to certain classes of documents defined in that section, which include a mortgage, is made effective by s. 49, which provides that any document so required to be registered shall not, unless it has been so registered, affect any immovable property comprised therein or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property ; while s. 50 secures that registered documents shall, as regards the property they comprise, take effect against every unregistered document relating to the same property. It will be observed from these provisions how wide and general is the scope of the statute. In England two systems of registration of deeds exist, one in the county of Middlesex and the other in the county of York. With regard to the former, non-registration avoids the unregistered deed as against a subsequent holder of a registered document, but leaves the deed good as between grantor and grantee and as between the grantor and his creditors. The Yorkshire system, though in form compulsory, also effects its purpose by giving priority to deeds according to the date of entry on the register. Neither of these systems affects the liability of the grantor upon the deed. In Ireland the system is slightly different, for by the statute 6 Anne, c. 2 (Ir.), non-registration in that country not only makes the deed void as against subsequent registered holders, but also as against creditors. There is no provision in any of these Acts corresponding to that to be found in the Indian Registration Act of 1877, which destroys the whole effect of the transaction as against immovable property and renders the document incapable of use in any proceedings by which such property is affected, or in the Transfer of Property Act, which wholly avoids an unregistered mortgage for a sum exceeding Rs. 100. 100. It is important to bear these differences in mind in considering whether, for the purpose of creating notice to the world, the Indian statute differs in effect from those operative in England and Ireland, for in England and Ireland no person is affected with notice of any registered deed unless an actual search has been made. This is well-established and indisputable law. In England, so far as Middlesex is concerned, it was first enunciated by Lord King in Bedford v. Backhouse ((1730) 2 Eg. Ca. Abr. 615.), a case identical in substance with the present dispute. In Hine v. Dodd ((1741) 2 Atk . 275.) there are reported statements of Lord Hardwicke to the contrary effect, but v/hen regarded in relation to the facts of the case then under decision it will at once be seen that they cannot be accepted as any authority upon the point. The question then raised was as to the priority of a registered mortgage over a judgment obtained and entered before execution of the mortgage, but subsequently registered. Lord Hardwicke gave priority according to date of registration and, refusing to accept the view that there was notice of the judgment, decided that to postpone a registered document there must be " clear and undoubted notice." It was as introduction to this decision that he said " The Registration Act (7 Anne, c. 20) is notice to the parties and notice to everybody, and the meaning of this statute is to prevent parol proofs of notice or not notice " ; and it is plain that the question of registration as notice in itself was never argued, and was wholly irrelevant. Lord Camden, in Morecock v. Dickens (Amb. 678.) followed, though perhaps with hesitation, the decision in Bedford v. Backhouse (2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 615.), and this has been accepted without qualification down to the present time see Moulton L. J. in Manks v. Whiteley ([ 1912] 1 Ch. 735, 757.), a case where, although there was much difference of judicial opinion upon the legal merits of the dispute—the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing that of Parker J., being itself reversed in the House of Lords ([ 1914] A. C. 132.)—yet there was no dispute as to this proposition. 735, 757.), a case where, although there was much difference of judicial opinion upon the legal merits of the dispute—the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing that of Parker J., being itself reversed in the House of Lords ([ 1914] A. C. 132.)—yet there was no dispute as to this proposition. In Yorkshire the statute of 1884 expressly provided that registration should effect notice, but this provision has been subsequently repealed (48 & 49 Viet. c. 26), and in the Yorkshire registry also registration does not by itself constitute notice Manks v. Whiteley, per Parker J. ( 1911] 2 Ch. 448, 457.) and Moulton L. J. ([ 1912] 1 Ch. 735, 758.) In Ireland again registration has been held not to create notice see Bushell v. Bushell (1 Sch. & Lef. 90.), and the reason given is that "if it is to be taken as constructive notice it must be taken as notice of. everything that is contained in the memorial." Unless, therefore, the differences between the operation of the statutes in India and the statutes to which reference has been made affect the principle upon which those cases rest, the appellants must fail. On behalf of the appellants it is urged that such differences exist, and further that this is emphasized by the statutory definition of notice contained in s. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. That section provides that a person has notice of a fact when he actually knows the fact or when, but for wilful abstention from an inquiry or search which he ought to have made, or gross negligence, he would have known it. Their Lordships do not think that this definition affords much assistance in the determination of the point,, for the question still remains, what was the inquiry which ought to have been made ? Now it is important to observe that the effect of the argument must extend to notice of subsequent as well as prior transactions. Their Lordships do not think that this definition affords much assistance in the determination of the point,, for the question still remains, what was the inquiry which ought to have been made ? Now it is important to observe that the effect of the argument must extend to notice of subsequent as well as prior transactions. Apart from registration, a subsequent incumbrancer, having knowledge of prior charges, would give notice of his charge to all having a prior claim ; in a country where registration is rendered compulsory, he could secure himself against all possibility of fraud by searching the register in order to ascertain what-were the prior claims upon the property and then giving notice of his mortgage to the prior mortgagees; this is doubtless one of the essential reasons for registration. If the appellants’ view be correct, it is not incumbent upon the subsequent mortgagee to give any notice; he may rely upon the fact that when he registers his security it ipso facto gives notice to the prior incumbrancer. In support of his argument he points to the cases decided in Bombay, beginning with the case of Lakshmandas Sarupchand v. Dasrat. (I.L.R. 6B. 168.) This decision depended in part upon the consideration of whether registration was equivalent to posses sion, every subsequent purchaser being deemed to have notice of such title as a person in possession may possess, but in the main it followed a statement of Mr. Justice Storey as to the law in America that the registration of a conveyance operates as constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers of any estate legal or equitable in the same property. It is important to observe that in that case the real question as to notice did notnecessarily arise for determination, since the point that was there determined was whether an unregistered mortgage that was optionally registerable was overridden by a mortgage subsequent in date which was compulsorily registerable and was in fact registered. It was decided that it was not, since the registration of the subsequent deed could not operate as notice to the earlier mortgagee at the date when he took his mortgage. None the less, the very careful and exhaustive judgments of the learned judges upon the point demand close attention. It was decided that it was not, since the registration of the subsequent deed could not operate as notice to the earlier mortgagee at the date when he took his mortgage. None the less, the very careful and exhaustive judgments of the learned judges upon the point demand close attention. In Dundaya v. Chenbasapa (I.L.R. 9 B. 427.) Sir Charles Sargent accepts the same view, stating that it must be taken as settled law in the Presidency that possession by or a registration of the title of a purchaser or a mortgagee prior in point of time is notice of that title to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. He again appears to have based his decision upon the doctrine of possession, and in a later case, Chintaman Ramchandra v. Dareppa (I.L.R. 14 B. 506, 510.), he says " If the mortgagor had been in actual possession, the registration of the mortgage would have been notice to the purchaser of the mortgagees title " ; and the same learned judge decided to the same effect in Narayan Laksman v. Haibatrav. (I.L.R. 17 B. 741.) It does not appear to their Lordships that the fact that these decisions are associated with the consideration of the doctrine of possession has a material bearing upon the point decided, for the decisions really rest upon following the statement of Mr. Justice Story rather than the authorities of the English Courts. In Storys Equity Jurisprudence, 3rd ed., paras. 401 and 402, this doctrine, however, receives some modification, and in para. 402 he states " The doctrine seems at length to be settled that the mere registration of a conveyance shall not be deemed constructive notice to subsequent purchasers." Acting upon this statement, which also appeared in the second edition, Brett and Mittra JJ., in Buniuari Jha v. Ramjee (7 Cal. W.N. 11, 18.), declined to accept the contention that registration was notice per se, while at the same time they refused to accede to the view that in no case can registration be notice in itself. W.N. 11, 18.), declined to accept the contention that registration was notice per se, while at the same time they refused to accede to the view that in no case can registration be notice in itself. The learned judges say " Whether registration is or is not notice in itself depends, we think, upon the facts and circumstances of each case, upon the degree of care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would necessarily take for the protection of his own interest by search into the registers kept under the Registration Act." In Shan Maun Mull v. Madras Building Co. (I. L. R. 15 M. 268.) Sir Arthur Collins and Handley JJ. had reached the same conclusion. They pointed out that if the Legislature desire to make registration notice it is expedient to enact it in express words, as had been done in the Yorkshire Registration Acts then on foot; and they continue "The-Indian Legislature must have been aware of the conflict between the English and Irish decisions and those of the Bombay High Court upon the subject, and yet in laying down what shall be the effect of registration and non-registration they have abstained from declaring that notice to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees shall be one of the effects of registration. We think it is not the province of the Courts to do that which the Legislature has abstained from doing." Their Lordships think it is unnecessary to pursue the examination of each one of the numerous cases quoted where the same principle has been stated and acted upon in the Calcutta High Court. They think it sufficient to refer in conclusion to Monindra Chandra Nandy v. Troyluckho Nath Burat (2 Cal. W. N. 750.), in which Sir Lawrence Jenkins examined the position. It is true that in that case the question of notice was not, in the view that he took of the case, necessary for decision, but it was argued and he made some comments upon it that are deserving of attention. W. N. 750.), in which Sir Lawrence Jenkins examined the position. It is true that in that case the question of notice was not, in the view that he took of the case, necessary for decision, but it was argued and he made some comments upon it that are deserving of attention. He says " Apart from authority, I should have thought, having regard to the statutes applicable in this country, that the proposition involved is not one of law but of fact, and that as each case arises it should be determined whether in that individual case the omission to search the register, taken together with the other facts, amounts to such gross negligence as to attract the consequence which results from notice ; and it well may be that this test will serve to reconcile the apparent conflict of view that at first sight the cases suggest." There are only two further cases to which reference need be made ; they are decisions of this Board, the one Mahomed Ibrahim Hossein v. Ambika Per sad Singh (L. R. 39 I. A. 68.), and the other Het Ram v, Shadi Lal. (L. R. 45 I. A. 130.) It is obvious upon examination that neither of these eases afford any real assistance in the present case. The point that arose in both these cases was as to the proper constitution of a suit by a mortgagee. By s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a duty is imposed upon a plaintiff in a suit for foreclosure, sale or redemption under that Act to make a party to the suit every person having an interest in the property comprised in the mortgage, provided that the plaintiff had notice of such interest— the object being to secure that all proper parties were before the Court. In order to discharge that duty the plaintiff was bound to search the register, and his omission to do so would be presumed to have been a wilful abstention from the search or gross negligence ; and in either case he would be deemed to have had notice of the fact that he would have discovered if the search had been made. It was this and nothing further that was decided in the two authorities quoted, and it is not surprising that, in these circumstances, it was stated in the judgment in the first case (L. R. 39 I. A. 68, 82.) that it is not alleged that when the suit was brought the plaintiff had no notice that a third party was appearing having an interest in the property comprised in the mortgage of the suit. In the latter case there is a further statement (L. R. 45 I. A. 130, 133.) to the following effect " The only other observation which it is necessary to make before considering the question of law that arises under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is that on the admissions of the parties it is to be taken that the second mortgage was duly registered and that the first mortgagee must be taken to have had notice of it when he brought his suit and obtained a decree for sale." But this statement again related merely to the question of notice of the interests that it was the duty of the plaintiff to bring before the Court in obtaining a decree for sale. Their Lordships do not think that in these circumstances, these authorities can be relied upon for guidance in the present case. After giving all the authorities quoted the fullest consideration, in their Lordships opinion the true position was best stated in the quotation made from the judgments of Brett J., Mittra J., and Sir Lawrence Jenkins. The real purpose of registration is to secure that every person dealing with property, where such dealings require registration, may rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the register as a full and complete account of all transactions by which his title may be affected, unless indeed he has actual notice of some unregistered transaction which may be valid apart from registration. In England such notice would prevent the registered document having priority over that which was unregistered. In India this would not be the result if it were a mortgage for over Rs. 100 or if the unregistered document was one brought within the provisions of s. 49 of the Registration Act. In either case the object of registration is to protect against prior transactions. If, however, the view contended for by the appellants be correct, it has a more extended effect. 100 or if the unregistered document was one brought within the provisions of s. 49 of the Registration Act. In either case the object of registration is to protect against prior transactions. If, however, the view contended for by the appellants be correct, it has a more extended effect. If after a first mortgage has been obtained a second mortgage were registered and the mere fact of registration constituted notice, the first mortgagee would be bound to search the register before he dealt with the proceeds of the mortgage. Such an extension would go beyond even the dictum of Chief Justice Story, who expressly limited the doctrine of notice to notice of previous transactions. It is true that this is not the position in the present case, since the respondent mortgagees are both prior and subsequent to the appellants, and therefore on searching when they took their subsequent charges they would have been aware of the intervening transactions ; but none the less it shows that it would not be reasonable to hold that registration was notice to the world of every deed which the register contained. The doctrine must be subject to some modification. There may be circumstances in which omission to search the register would, even under the definition already given, result in notice being obtained, and the circumstances necessary for this purpose may be very slight, but in the present case no such circumstances are found excepting those to be drawn from the fact that the mortgagor was executing several mortgages on the property. Further, their Lordships are impressed with the view that since registration has for nearly two centuries been held not to operate as constructive notice in this country, and the knowledge of this law, which was then old, must have been present to the Indian Legislature when they framed the different Indian Registration Acts and the definition of notice in the Transfer of Property Act, yet none the less they have omitted to state the principle for which, according to the appellants contention, it is essential that the register should provide. The appellants contend that the omission is due to the fact that the difference in the system of registration renders such a provision unnecessary. The appellants contend that the omission is due to the fact that the difference in the system of registration renders such a provision unnecessary. The main differences are these that in India non-registration in certain cases has the effect of rendering the registered document ineffectual even as between grantor and grantee and excludes it from evidence. Both in England and in Ireland it has no such effect. This is sometimes stated by saying that in India registration is compulsory and here permissive ; but the true difference is better expressed as it has already been stated. Their Lordships find it difficult to understand how such a difference can cause the register to be notice in the one case and not in the other. In either instance the doctrine of notice must necessarily depend upon the fact that there is a public register open for inspection, to which all persons having dealings with the property can have access ; in each case they have before them the means of acquiring knowledge. In India that knowledge may afford complete protection even if notice be otherwise obtained of an unregistered deed. In England and Ireland that is not the case. But the completion of the register and the penal effect of non-registration do not appear to their Lordships to be any reason for causing the register to be notice in the one case and not in the other. For these reasons their Lordships think that notice cannot in all cases be imputed from the mere fact that a document is to be found upon the register under the Indian Registration Act. This disposes of the whole appeal excepting for a question that arises with regard to the one-half share of Mauza Khagra. In the High Court and in the Court of the Subordinate Judge this question appears to have been dealt with by the mere consideration of whether the former registered deed did give notice. But their Lordships think that this is not a complete and adequate answer to the appellants case. It is true that no estate, title, or interest in the property was originally conveyed by the first deed ; but directly the certificate of sale was obtained, according to the English law, this passed the estate to the first grantee and, his conveyance being duly registered, the second grant could only operate subject to the first. It is true that no estate, title, or interest in the property was originally conveyed by the first deed ; but directly the certificate of sale was obtained, according to the English law, this passed the estate to the first grantee and, his conveyance being duly registered, the second grant could only operate subject to the first. This principle of law, which is sometimes referred to as feeding the grant by estoppel, is well established in this country. If a man who has no title whatever to property grants it by a conveyance which in form would carry the legal estate, and he subsequently acquires an interest sufficient to satisfy the grant, the estate instantly passes. In such a case there is nothing on which the second grant could operate in prejudice to the first Christmas v. Oliver (5 Man. & R. 202.), and discussed in Smiths Leading Cases, vol. ii., p. 724. It is unfortunate that this view of the case does not seem to have been presented either before the Subordinate Judge or to the High Court; but it appears to their Lordships that it could have been raised under issue 15 (Issue 15 was as follows “What are the respective rights of the parties in the properties mortgaged with them?”) and that it is raised in the appellants case. In these circumstances it is not in accordance with their Lordships practice to determine a point of law of such importance. There may be statutory provisions or provisions of native law which would prevent the operation of the doctrine ; for the law of conveyance in England depends on special and complicated considerations. They think, therefore, that the case ought to be remitted to the Subordinate Judge to be tried on this point alone ; but as the appeal has failed on the substantial question and the inability of their Lordships to deal with the other point is due to the omission of the appellants, their Lordships think that the right order would be to remit that part of the case, and that part only, for further consideration and, subject to that order, to dismiss the appeal with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty to this effect.