Judgement Appeal from a decree of the High Court (January 4, 1917) affirming an order of the District Judge, Patna (August 8, 1915). On July 10, 1896, a zamindar, who in 1893 had sold his zamindari, obtained a decree against a patnidar for arrears of rent accrued before the sale. On July 19 he conveyed his whole estate to trustees, and shortly afterwards died, leaving him surviving a son and a daughter, the appellants. Upon the trustees applying to have the patni tenure brought to sale, the respondent, a darpatnidar, instituted a suit for a declaration that the decree was not a " rent decree" within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and that consequently the patni was not liable to sale in execution. On April 8, 1908, the High Court at Calcutta, reversing the decision of the Court of first instance, held that the decree was a " rent decree " and enforceable by sale of the patni. Upon the application of the trustees the patni was sold ; it was purchased by the respondent for Rs. 61,200. The purchase money was paid into Court, and it was ordered that the trustees should not withdraw any part of it until they and the appellants gave security for its return. On July 4, 1909, the trustees and the appellants entered into a security bond 25 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 24 ( 1920- 1921) Maharaj Bahadur Singh V. A. H. Forbes 126 binding themselves, jointly and severally, to the District Judge in the sum of Rs. 40,708, being the amount due under the decree, to be paid in case the appeal then pending to the Privy Council was successful. Accordingly on September 4, 1909, the said sum was paid out to the pleader of the first appellant. On March 4, 1914, the Privy Council by a decision reported at L. R. 41 I. A. 91 reversed the decree of the Calcutta High Court. Meanwhile in 1908 applications were made by the respondent to set aside the decree under ss. 111 and 113 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882; after some delay arising from a remand, the sale was set aside by the District Judge on February 19, 1911, and his decision was affirmed on July 8, 1914, by the High Court at Calcutta. Meanwhile in 1908 applications were made by the respondent to set aside the decree under ss. 111 and 113 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882; after some delay arising from a remand, the sale was set aside by the District Judge on February 19, 1911, and his decision was affirmed on July 8, 1914, by the High Court at Calcutta. On May 27, 1915, the respondent filed the present application for the refund of the money paid by him into Court; at the same time he prayed that the appellant and the trustees should be ordered to repay the sum paid out to them with interest at 12 per cent, per annum. The appellants and trustees admitted their liability to refund the Rs. 40,708, but denied their liability to pay interest, as it was not provided for in the bond. On August 26, 1915, the District Judge ordered the appellants and trustees to pay interest at 6 per cent, per annum on the money paid out to them, and on January 4, 1917, that order was affirmed by the High Court at Patna (Roe and Chapman JJ.). 1920. Nov. 12, 15. Dunne K.C. and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. The order on the appellants to pay interest was erroneous. The bond contained no provision for the payment of interest, and s. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which the High Court acted, is not applicable. Further, the sale was set aside in 1911; any application for a refund and for interest under Order xxi., r. 93, was barred by art. 181 of sch. I. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The appeal did not suspend the operation of the statute Juscurn Boid v. Pirthichand Lal (( 1918) L. R. 46 I. A. 52, 56.) De Gruyther K.C. and OGorman for the respondent. There was power to order interest to be paid under s. 144, which is based upon s. 582 of the Code of 1882. The Court had a general power to allow interest Rodgers v. Comptoir dEscompte. (( 1871) 7 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 314.) The order could also be made under Order xxi., r. 93. No question of limitation was raised in Courts below. [VISCOUNT CAVE. The Court had a general power to allow interest Rodgers v. Comptoir dEscompte. (( 1871) 7 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 314.) The order could also be made under Order xxi., r. 93. No question of limitation was raised in Courts below. [VISCOUNT CAVE. The trustees had the use of the money, but there was no benefit to the appellants if the whole estate goes to the original decree-holders creditors.] The judgment imposes no personal liability for interest upon the appellants, merely a liability in respect of the estate of the decree-holder. Dunne K.C. replied. Nov. 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by VISCOUNT CAVE. In their Lordships opinion there is no ground for this appeal. Proceedings to set aside the sale were taken both under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882, corresponding with Order xxi., r. 90, of the rules scheduled to the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, and under s. 313 of the Code of 1882, corresponding with r. 91 of the same Order. The sale was duly set aside; and accordingly Order xxi., r. 93, applied and the Court had power to order interest to be paid on the sum 25 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 24 ( 1920- 1921) Maharaj Bahadur Singh V. A. H. Forbes 127 of Rs. 40,708 paid to the trustees. This being so it is unnecessary to consider whether, as the High Court appears to have held, s. 144 of the Code of 1908 also applied. It is true that the bond did not reserve interest, but the effect of this omission was, not that the Court was deprived of its power to order interest to be paid, but only that the security did not extend to interest. It is common ground that the order so far as it directs the payment of interest is not intended to be enforced against the appellants personally, but only binds the estate in the hands of the trustees in which the appellant is interested. An attempt was made to raise a question of limitation, but this question was not raised in the Courts below or in the appellants case on this appeal, nor are the facts upon which it depends fully before the Board. This plea, therefore, cannot be raised at this stage. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.