Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (May 4, 1917) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur (January 19, 1916). The sole question in the appeal was whether the execution of a decree made in a civil suit and dated July 27, 1906, was barred by limitation upon the appellant applying on December 18, 1914, to execute it. The facts appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The decree of July 27, 1906, was in the following terms " .... it is ordered and decreed that the plaintiffs claim be decreed together with costs and interest at six per cent, per annum and the decretal amount be realized by the sale of the property belonging to Janeshvar Singh, which is in the defendants possession, and by virtue of this order the plaintiff will have no right to any portion of the property of Janeshvar Singh, which might be in possession of any one else except the defendant, and that the sum of Rs. 18,738-15-9, the amount claimed and Rs. 1286-10-0 on account of the costs of this suit be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent, per annum from this date until realization." The Subordinate Judge held that execution of the decree was not barred, since the property of Janeshvar did not come into the hands of Ekradeshvar until December, 1914. Upon an appeal to the High Court the decision of the Subordinate Judge was reversed, it being held that execution of the decree was barred by art. 182 of Sch. I. in the Indian Limitation Act. The learned judges (Sharfuddin and Roe JJ.) were of opinion that the decree had not been incapable of execution. They said that immediately on Ekradeshvar obtaining a decree against the widow of Janeshvar—namely, on August 25, 1908, application should have been made to execute the decree of July 27, 1906 ; although upon the appeal a sale of the property would no doubt have been stayed by injunction, s. 15, sub-s. 1, of the Act would have prevented execution from becoming barred. 1920. Oct. 25, 26. De Gruyther K.C. and Abdul Majid for the appellant. Execution of the decree of July 27, 1906, was not barred by limitation. 1920. Oct. 25, 26. De Gruyther K.C. and Abdul Majid for the appellant. Execution of the decree of July 27, 1906, was not barred by limitation. Until December, 1914, when Ekradeshvar first came into possession of the property, no successful application for execution of its terms was possible. Until then " execution was suspended by no act or default of the decree " as in Shaik Kamar-ud-din Ahmad v. Jawahur Lal. (L. R. 32 I. A. 102.) In these circumstances art. 182 of Sch. I. of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, does not apply, and the matter is governed by art. 181, under which the decree holder had three years from December, 1914, within which to apply. If any part of art. 182 applies it is clause 7, the date when the property came into the hands of Ekradeshvar being treated as a "certain date," but in that case the same result follows. A statute of limitations cannot be applied so as entirely to exclude the exercise of a right given by a decree. [Reference was also made to Kalyanbhai Dipchand v. Ghanashamlal Jadunathji (( 1880) I.L.R. 5 B. 29.) ; Narayan Govind Manik v. Sono Sadashiv (( 1899) I.L.R. 24 B. 345.) and Order xxi., r. 99.] Dube for the respondents. Execution of the decree is barred by art. 182. The present application cannot be treated as one to revive the former application, first because the former application was definitely dismissed, and secondly because the process invoked is different, the former application being against the widow. The decree became capable of execution in August, 1908. In substance it was a decree against a legal representative in respect of property of a deceased person see ss. 368 and 252 of the 1882 Code (corresponding respectively to Order xxii., r. 4, and s. 52 of the 1908 Code). Upon Ekradeshvar obtaining a decree for possession against the widow in August, 1908, the Court could have ordered under the decree of 1906 a sale of his right, title, and interest in the property Durbhunga Raj v. Ramput Singh. (( 1872) 14 Moo. I.A. 605.) Time began to run from that date and continued to run ; it is not material that the High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge since no such injunction was granted as is referred to in s. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. (( 1872) 14 Moo. I.A. 605.) Time began to run from that date and continued to run ; it is not material that the High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge since no such injunction was granted as is referred to in s. 15 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The circumstances of the case are substantially the same as those in Sarup Ganjan Singh v. Robert Watson & Co. (( 1902) 6 Cal. W.N. 735.) [Reference was also made to Rajrup Singh v. Rangolam Roy (( 1888) I.L.R. 16 C. 1.) ; Desraj Singh v. Karam Khan (( 1896) I.L.R. 19 A. 71.) ; Ruddar Singh v. Dhanpal Singh (( 1903) I.L.R. 26 A. 156.); and Chalavadi Kotiah v. Paloori Alimelammah. (( 1907) I.L.R. 31 A. 71.)] De Gruyther K.C. replied. Nov. 16. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD PHILLIMORE. This is an appeal from the High Court at Patna, which has reversed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpur. The question is whether the appellant is entitled to execute a decree dated July 27, 1906, or whether his right to do so is barred by the Indian Limitation Act of 1908. The only provision of that Act which can apply is art. 182 of the schedule, which prescribes three years from the date of a decree or order of a Civil Court as the time within which it must be enforced, subject to exceptions which do not affect the present case. It appears that a former Maharaja of Darbhanga, who was the grandfather and predecessor in title of the appellant, made a babuana grant of land to his younger son on condition that the Government revenue and cesses to which it was subject should be regularly provided for payment over to the Government. This younger son died leaving two sons of his own, Ekradeshvar and Janeshvar, who lived jointly for some time and then divided the property. Default in the payment to be provided having been made, the then Maharaja, who was the elder brother of the appellant, brought a suit in 1898 to recover the arrears due. During the pendency of this suit the appellant succeeded as Maharaja, and an arrangement was come to under which the shares and liabilities of the two younger brothers in the babuana were defined. During the pendency of this suit the appellant succeeded as Maharaja, and an arrangement was come to under which the shares and liabilities of the two younger brothers in the babuana were defined. According to this arrangement the share in the babuana of the defaulter was to be in the first place liable for sale to realize the amount due. In 1905 the appellant brought another suit against Janeshvar for Rs. 18,738 15 6 due for arrears. Ekradeshvar was made a party. During the pen dency of this suit Janeshvar died, in April, 1906, and a dispute arose between his widow and Ekradeshvar as to the succession to Janeshvars share. In May, 1906, the appellant applied to have Ekradeshvars name substituted as defendant for that of Janeshvar, on the footing that, according to the kulachar, or custom, the former had succeeded to him in the property in question. In May, 1906, an order was made to that effect, but the widow, who was in possession and claimed to be entitled, was declared not to be bound by any decree passed in the suit, nor was her interest to suffer thereby. Ekradeshvar having admitted the principal claim of the appellant, on July 27, 1906, a decree was made against him for the sum above mentioned and costs. The decree did not provide that he was to be personally liable, but declared that the decretal amount was to be realized by the sale of the property belonging to Janeshvar and left in Ekradeshvars possession, but the appellant was not enabled to make any portion of the property of Janeshvar which was in the possession of any one else, liable for the decree. On the death of Janeshvar, in April, 1906, his widow had obtained possession of his share of the babuana property. A suit was brought in the Civil Court by Ekradeshvar against the widow, claiming that, in accordance with the custom, the property was his. On August 15, 1908, the Subordinate Judge decided in his favour. But on August 2, 1909, the High Court at Calcutta (execution having been stayed meantime) reversed this judgment. Ekradeshvar then appealed to the King in Council, and this Board, on July 22, 1914, reversed the judgment of the High Court and decided in his favour. On August 15, 1908, the Subordinate Judge decided in his favour. But on August 2, 1909, the High Court at Calcutta (execution having been stayed meantime) reversed this judgment. Ekradeshvar then appealed to the King in Council, and this Board, on July 22, 1914, reversed the judgment of the High Court and decided in his favour. The property in question had remained throughout in the possession of the widow, and it was not until after the judgment of the Privy Council that Ekradeshvar obtained possession. On April 13, 1908, the appellant had presented a petition for the execution of the decree of July 27, 1906, against Ekradeshvar, but the latter had objected, on the ground that no part of Janeshvars estate had come into his hands, and that no property in his possession, except what had belonged to Janeshvar, could be attached. The Subordinate Judge allowed this objection on January 23, 1909. After the High Court had delivered judgment in favour of the widow, in August, 1909, the appellant further endeavoured to enforce the decree of 1906 against her, but on November 21, 1910, the application was dismissed, on "the ground that the decree was not binding on the widow, and the High Court affirmed this dismissal. In December, 1914, after the decision of the Privy Council in favour of Ekradeshvar, the appellant applied to the Subordinate Judge for the enforcement of the decree of 1906 against him, but was met by a plea that the claim was barred by limitation. This plea raised the question that is now before their Lordships. The Subordinate Judge decided the point in favour of the appellant, on the ground that the decree had then become capable of execution for the first time. Ekradeshvar appealed] to the High Court at Patna, which held that there was no inherent defect in the decree which prevented the appellant from applying to enforce his claim so soon as, in August, 1908, the Subordinate Judge had decided in Ekradeshvars favour, and that he might then have pro ceeded against Ekradeshvar alone or the widow with him. Since the hearing in the High Court Ekradeshvar has died and is now represented by his sons, the respondents in the present appeal by the Maharaja to the Privy Council. Since the hearing in the High Court Ekradeshvar has died and is now represented by his sons, the respondents in the present appeal by the Maharaja to the Privy Council. Their Lordships are unable to concur in the view taken by the High Court at Patna when it thus reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge. They are of opinion that, in order to make the provision of the Indian Limitation Act apply, the decree sought to be enforced must have been in such a form as to render it capable in the circumstances of being enforced. A decree so limited in its scope as that of July 27, 1906, under consideration cannot, in their opinion, be regarded as being thus capable of execution. Under that decree Ekradeshvar was not made personally liable, nor did it extend to any portion of the estate of Janeshvar which was not in his hands. None of the estate came to his hands until after the decision of the Board in 1914. As to the ability of the appellant to have applied to enforce his claim when in August, 1908, the Subordinate Judge decided that Ekradeshvar was entitled to recover possession against the widow, it is enough to point out that the High Court at Calcutta promptly stayed execution of this decision, and later on reversed it. Neither can their Lordships accede to an argument put forward by counsel for the respondents that the decree against Ekradeshvar could be treated as a decree against the estate of Janeshvar, still less as one against that estate though not in the hands of Ekradeshvar. Their Lordships think that the appellant has not been shown to have been responsible for the delay which has taken place in giving effect to his title, which did not become complete until after the decision of this Board in 1914. They are of opinion that when the Limitation Act of 1908 prescribes three years from the date of a decree or order as the period within which it must be enforced, the language, read with its context, refers only, as they have already indicated, to an order or decree made in such a form as to render it capable in the circumstances of being enforced. This interpretation appears to them not only a reasonable one in itself but to be in accordance with the previously expressed opinion of this Board in Shaik Kamar-ud-din Ahmad v. Jawahur Lal. (L. R. 32 I. A. 102.) The case may also be put in this way. The decree against Ekradeshvar could not have been executed without a further application. This application could not have been made till Ekradeshvar had come into possession of the property of Janeshvar, and by art. 181 of Sch. I. to the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation for making an application is three years from the time when the right to apply accrues. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the judgment of the High Court at Patna should be reversed and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bhagalpore of January 19, 1916, should be restored. The appellant will have his costs of this appeal and of the appeal to the High Court of Patna.