Judgement Appeal by special leave from a judgment dated May 28, 1919, of a Commission appointed under the 56 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 96 ( 1920- 1921) Kali Nath Roy V. King-Emperor 157 Martial Law Ordinance, 1919, sitting at Lahore, whereby the appellant was convicted of an offence under s. 124a of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment. The facts and the argument sufficiently appear from the judgment of their Lordships. 1920. Nov. 23. Upjohn K.C. and Dube for the appellant. Sir Erle Richards K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the Crown. Dec. 9. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by VISCOUNT CAVE. The appellant was convicted on May 28, 1919, by a Court of Commissioners sitting at Lahore under Ordinance I. of 1919, and having the powers of a summary court-martial, of an offence under s. 124a of the Indian Penal Code—namely, of having by written words excited or attempted to excite disaffection towards His Majesty or the Government established by law in British India, and was sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment—afterwards reduced to three months simple imprisonment—and to a fine of Rs. 1000. Special leave to appeal was granted by His Majesty in Council on August 18, 1919. The facts are shortly as follows In March and April, 1919, there was unrest in the Punjab. Serious disturbances occurred at Delhi on March 30, when some persons were killed; and these disturbances were followed by disorder and violence at Amritsar and Lahore and elsewhere in the Punjab. The disturbances at Lahore occurred on April 6, 10, 11 and 12, the evidence showing that on April 11 Lahore city was "practically closed to the police." The appellant was the editor of the Tribune, a daily newspaper published at Lahore, and on April 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11, he published in that newspaper paragraphs and articles commenting on the deaths at Delhi (the persons killed there being repeatedly described as “martyrs”) and charging the Government with grave misconduct in connection with the disturbances. It was stated in the issue of April 10 that the "atmosphere was highly surcharged" and the "public mind in a state of unusual excitement." On May 6 the appellant was charged, in consequence of these paragraphs and articles, with the offence above described, and also with an offence under r. 25 of the Defence of India Rules ; and on May 28 judgment was delivered convicting him of the offence under s. 124a of the Penal Code and pronouncing sentence as above. The charge under r. 25 was not proceeded with. The appellant in his case gave two reasons against his conviction—namely, (1.) that his trial by the summary procedure of martial law was bad in law and wholly uncon stitutional; and (2.) that on a reasonable construction of the articles complained of the appellant was not guilty of the offence of sedition as defined by s. 124a of the Indian Penal Code. The facts and ordinances bearing on the first point raised by the appellant—namely, want of jurisdiction in the tribunal by which he was tried—were substantially the same as in the case of Bugga v. The King-Emperor (L. R. 47 I. A. 128.), decided by the Board in February last, the only distinction being that the order of the Lieutenant-Governor directing a trial before the Commissioners did not (as in that case) name the accused who were to be so tried, but applied to " all persons charged with offences connected with the recent disturbances." Their Lordships have no doubt that the offence with which the appellant was charged was connected with the disturbances referred to in the order, and accordingly that this case is not distinguishable from the case cited. This contention, therefore, fails. With reference to the second point raised on behalf of the appellant—namely, that on a reasonable 56 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 96 ( 1920- 1921) Kali Nath Roy V. King-Emperor 158 construction of the articles complained of, the appellant was not guilty of the offence with which he was charged—their Lordships have carefully considered the judgment delivered by the President of the Commission, with a view to ascertaining whether the Commission properly construed the section and gave proper weight to its terms and to the explanations annexed to it. The judgment was a very careful one and their Lordships do not find that the section was in any way misconstrued or misunderstood. This being so, there remains only the question whether the principles of the law were properly applied in detail to the language of the various articles ; and this question, as was pointed out in Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 176, 196.), is one which partakes so much of the nature of a question of fact that it would be difficult for the Board to interfere on this ground with the conclusions arrived at by a Court in India. The decision of such a Court must necessarily depend, not only on the con struction of the written matter complained of, but also on the local conditions obtaining at the time of publication and ca just appreciation of the effect which the publication under those conditions of the articles in question would be calculated to produce ; and the Board could not revise the conclusions of the local tribunal on facts of this nature without putting themselves into a position which they have repeatedly declined to assume—namely, that of a Court of Appeal in criminal proceedings. In these circumstances, their Lordships, while not thinking it necessary to express any opinion of their own as to the intention of the articles in question, are not prepared to advise His Majesty to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. It should be added that in the course of the argument their Lordships were informed by counsel for the Crown that since leave to appeal was given a free pardon had been granted to the appellant. If so, this of itself would be a sufficient reason, as pointed out in Levien v. The Queen (L. R. 1 P. C. 536.), for not entertaining the appeal; but as the pardon was disputed and direct evidence of its having been granted was not forthcoming, their Lordships did not stop the case on this ground. For the above reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed.