Judgement Appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court (January 19, 1917) affirming a decree of the District Judge of Darjeeling. On the death of one Rechuk in 1899 a dispute arose between his widow Nakimo, the first appellant, and his cousin Phurbu (now represented by the respondents other than the fourth respondent who represented the Court of Wards) with regard to an estate on the Sikkim frontier. On November 7, 1905, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal declared Nakimo " to be a disqualified proprietor under s. 6 (a) of the Court of Wards Act (Ben. Act IX. of 1879) and ordered that the estate in question should be managed by the Court of Wards. On December 18, 1905, the Court of Wards declared Nakimos daughters (appellants 2 and 3) to be minors under s. 6 (b) of the Act and took charge of their properties. In 1907 Phurbus son Jerung instituted a suit against Nakimo and her daughters, each of whom was described as a ward of the Court of Wards, claiming the estate. 28 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 27 ( 1920- 1921) Nakimo Dewani V. Pemba Dichen 129 In 1907 a compromise was arrived at and was accepted by the Board of Revenue, Jerung; the manager under the Court of Wards and Jerung thereupon presented a joint petition to the District Judge upon whose file the suit was praying for an immediate preliminary decree in terms of the compromise. On December 16, 1907, the District Judge made a preliminary decree in terms of the compromise, and on March 12, 1908, that decree was made absolute. In 1910 the present suit was instituted by the appellant No. 1 for a declaration that the decrees of 1907 were inoperative as against her on the ground, inter alia, that the compromise was made without the leave of the District Court. Sub sequently Nakimos daughters were joined as plaintiffs, and, Jerung having died, the first three respondents were brought onto the record ; the fourth respondent as representing the Court of Wards was also joined by order as a defendant. The District Judge dismissed the suit. Sub sequently Nakimos daughters were joined as plaintiffs, and, Jerung having died, the first three respondents were brought onto the record ; the fourth respondent as representing the Court of Wards was also joined by order as a defendant. The District Judge dismissed the suit. He held that the Court of Wards had under s. 18 of the Court of Wards Act the same powers over the properties of its wards when those properties were the subject of a civil suit as it had in other circumstances, and that the minor wards were properly represented under s. 51 of the Court of Wards Act. In his opinion the matter was governed by s. 464 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and s. 462 did not apply. Upon an appeal to the High Court the decision of the District Judge was affirmed. 1920. Dec. 13. Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. Under s. 51 of the Court of Wards Act the manager has not authority without the leave of the Court to enter into any compromise of a suit in which he acts as guardian ad litem. Sect. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure limits the power of the manager to compromise a suit by requiring that he shall obtain the leave of the Court. If s. 462 is excluded by s. 464 the managers power depends upon what his power was before 1882. But the general power of management given by s. 18 of the Court of Wards Act, 1879, did not include power to compromise ; that view is supported by Ganesha Row v. Tuljaram Row. (( 1913) L. R. 40 I. A. 132.) The manager under the Court of Wards, like any other guardian, requires the sanction of the Court to a compromise. The position of the widow, the first appellant, is different from that of the minors, but if the compromise is set aside as to the minor defendants it cannot be binding upon her. [Reference was also made to Trevelyan on Minors, 3rd ed., 1906, p. 319.] De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the respondents were not called upon. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. The sole question in this appeal is whether a guardian appointed by the Court of Wards on behalf of minors has power to compromise proceedings in the civil Court, to which those infants are defendants. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. The sole question in this appeal is whether a guardian appointed by the Court of Wards on behalf of minors has power to compromise proceedings in the civil Court, to which those infants are defendants. It is alleged on behalf of the appellants that such a compromise cannot take place unless the agreement for compromise has been examined by the civil Court and the civil Court has assented to its terms. Sect. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, provides that if a suit is wholly or in part compromised by any lawful agreement, such agreement shall be recorded "and the Court shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit, and such decree shall be final." That section received qualification by s. 462, which enacted that " no next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor"; but by the Code as it was originally passed it was expressly enacted that s. 462 shall not apply to any minor for whose person or property a guardian or manager has been appointed by the Court of Wards or by the civil Court under any local law. The position, therefore, under the Code was this By s. 375 the Court was compelled to register the 28 Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 27 ( 1920- 1921) Nakimo Dewani V. Pemba Dichen 130 agreement that had been come to for the compromise of the suit, and the necessity for the examination of the terms of the compromise on behalf of the minor did not arise where the minor was represented by a guardian or manager who had been appointed by the Court of Wards or by the civil Court under any local law. Alterations were made in that Code in 1888 and 1890, and instead of excluding in terms ss. Alterations were made in that Code in 1888 and 1890, and instead of excluding in terms ss. 400 to 462, as provided in the earlier Code, s. 464 extended s. 462 by providing that "Nothing in this chapter applies to a Sovereign Prince or ruling Chief suing or being sued in the name of his State or being sued by direction of the Governor-General in Council or a local Government, in the name of an agent or in any other name, or shall be construed to affect, or in any way derogate from, the provisions of any local law for the time being in force relating to suits by or against minors or by or against lunatics or other persons of unsound mind." The Court of Wards Act of Bengal is admittedly a local law within the meaning of that section, and, as already pointed out by the provisions of that law before the passing of the Codes of 1888 and 1890, the guardian so appointed was the only person who could assent to the agreement for the compromise of the litigation, and that agreement, when assented to, was necessarily recorded under s. 375, and there is nothing in the later provisions to take away this power. For these reasons, in their Lordships opinion this appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.