JUDGMENT Sanderson, C.J. - This is an appeal from the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Buckland. It was given with reaped to a petition which was presented be the Court by Gopessur Mullick and Gorachand Mullick, two of the Defendants in the suit. The petition that the suit might be dismissed will, costs of that an enquiry might be held by the Court to ascertain whether the suit was for benefit of the infant Plaintiff and whether Surendra Nath Banerjee was a fit and proper person to act as the next friend of the infant Plaintiffs in the suit and there were other usual prayers. 2. The decision of the learned Judge was that the suit should be dismissed with cost. 3. The suit was brought by Chandra Sekhar Mullick and Nanda Kishore Mullick as shebaits of an idol, both minors, by their next friends Surendra Nath Banerjee and there were 15 Defendants. 4. The main prayer in the suit was for a declaration that an indenture of tea dated the 18th of October 1919, was invalid and for an order cancelling the said lease. There were other incidental reliefs prayed for. 5. The lease which ii was desired to set aside was in respect of certain premises Ns. 78 and 80, Lower Chitpore Road. The facts with regard to the question, which is now before us, are fully set out in the judgment of my learned brother and I propose to read the relevant paragraphs in his judgment which are as follows :-- The property was decided in the year 1820 by one Chitra Dassi who died in the year 1855. In the year 1876 a suit No. 442 of 1876 was filed in this Court by one of the then shebaits against the others for construction of the instrument whereby the property was dedicated and of the Will of Chitra Dassi, and to have the trusts carried out. On the 4th December 1878 a decree was made in that suit and the Official Receiver was there by pointed and still is the Receiver of the property dedicated. 6. On the 26th April 1915 under an order made in this suit the Official Receiver granted a lease of Nos. 79 and 80, Lower Chitpore Road to the grandfather of the Plaintiffs and to Defendants Nos. 6. On the 26th April 1915 under an order made in this suit the Official Receiver granted a lease of Nos. 79 and 80, Lower Chitpore Road to the grandfather of the Plaintiffs and to Defendants Nos. 7 and 8; since then the Plaintiffs' grandfather has died leaving them as his heirs. 7. On the 18th August 1919 the shebaits offered and the 4th Defendant Mr. George Donglas agreed to accept a building lease of this property subject to the sanction of the Court of the terms being obtained. One term was that the Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 and the Plaintiffs should surrender their rights under the lease of the 26th April 1915. A week later on the 25th August 1919 Hashim Ebrahim Sallayjee offered to take a building lease of the same property upon the terms set out in a letter from his attorneys to Babu Pannalal Dey, the attorney for the Defendants Ashutosh Mullick, Monilal Mullick, Mania Lal Mullick and Sarat Chandra Mullick, but on the 27th August the Official Receiver approved the proposed lease to Mr. George Douglas being for the benefit of the estate. 8. Therefore on the 1st September 1919 the Defendants Nos. 7 and 8 applied to Rankin, J., with the consent of all the shebaits for sanction to the proposed lease to Mr. Gorge Douglas. On that application the infant Plaintiffs were represented by their mother Kadamabini Dassi for whom Messrs. G.C. Chunder & Co. were acting. Babu Pannalal De. Who was instructed to consent to the order, brought to the notice of the Court the offer made by Sallayjee and Rankin, J., accordingly adjourned the matter so that the parties could have an opportunity of considering that offer. 9. On the 5th September the application was renewed and on that occasion Babu Pannalal De put forward two offers, one of them Sallayjee's in terms differing slightly from those of his previous offer. The partners, however, said they preferred to accept the offer of Mr. George Douglas and with their consent an order was made sanctioning the proposed lease to him. 10. The partners, however, said they preferred to accept the offer of Mr. George Douglas and with their consent an order was made sanctioning the proposed lease to him. 10. On the same day Babu Pannalal De on behalf of the Defendant Ashutosh Mullick gave notice to the partners that he would apply on the 9th September that the order of the 5th might be reconsidered and in support of that application an affidavit of Ashutosh Mullick was filed in which he stated his wish that the offer Sallayjee made on the 5th should be accepted. 11. "The matter came on again before the Court on the 9th September when the application was dismissed and it was directed that the draft lease should be settled by senior Counsel and that the draft lease, if settled, should be sanctioned by the Judge in Chambers. This was done and the lease was executed on the 18th October 1919 and the lessee went into and now is in possession of the property." Those are the material facts about which there is no dispute. 12. The suit contained allegations that there was no necessity for the lease to Mr. Douglas, that it was not for the benefit of the estate, that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the order sanctioning the lease, and there were various charges fraud, misrepresentation and conspiracy against some of the parties, the allegation being that the Court had been misled. 13. The learned Judge upon considering point which were argued before him came to certain findings. He pointed out first that in the petition of the applicants it is alleged that the application made on behalf of Ashutosh Mullick on the 9th of September 1919 was really made on behalf of Sallayjee, that is, the application to set aside the order of Mr. Justice Rankin sanctioning the lease to Defendant Mr. Douglas and that in support of this charge reference was made to a petition for leave to defend a suit which had been brought by Ebrahim Sallayjee & Co., against Ashutosh Mullick, and in that suit Ashutosh Mullick alleged that he had been instigated by Sallayjee to make the ion to set aside Mr. Justice Rankin's order. 14. Douglas and that in support of this charge reference was made to a petition for leave to defend a suit which had been brought by Ebrahim Sallayjee & Co., against Ashutosh Mullick, and in that suit Ashutosh Mullick alleged that he had been instigated by Sallayjee to make the ion to set aside Mr. Justice Rankin's order. 14. The learned Judge then said that it was alleged that Surendra Nath Banerjee was a man of no substance, that as far as the Petitioners could ascertain, he was an employee of Sallayjee whose brick-field he managed. In this Court it has not been disputed that Surendra Nath Banerjee is an employee of Sallayjee. The learned Judge then referred to an affidavit which was put in by the mother of the infant Plaintiffs to the effect that she had been advised by competent solicitors and that she and her solicitors considered the offer of Mr. Douglas and had come to the conclusion that it was more beneficial to the estate than the offer of Sallayjee and that she and the other shebaits objected to let out the premises to a Mahomedan for the reasons which are set out in the affidavit. 15. As I have already said, in this Court the fact that I have referred to were not really disputed nor was it seriously disputed that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to make the order dismissing the suit. But it was argued by the learned Counsel for the Appellants that he should not have made the order without a previous enquiry for the purpose of tainting whether the suit was really brought for the benefit of the infant Plaintiffs, or to put it shortly, without an enquiry into the propriety of the suit. 16. The principle is correctly laid down in my judgment in Daniell'a Chancery Practice, Vol. I. page 103, to this effect--"Where it appeared clearly upon davit that the action was commenced by the next friend to promote his own and not for the benefit of the infant such an order (i.e., the order dismissing suit was made summarily and without an enquiry." For that proposition, sale v. Sale 1 Beav. 586 (1839) was quoted as an authority. 586 (1839) was quoted as an authority. That was a case which came before the Master of the Bolls and the head-note is this : In a clear case the court being of opinion that a suit had been commenced by the next friend of to promote his own views and not for the benefit of the infant summarily and without a reference to the Master dismissed it with costs to be paid by the next friend and the learned Master of the Rolls in his judgment said. 'I am perfectly satisfied that this suit is filed not for the benefit of the infants but to promote the views of the person who styles himself the next friend of the infants, and that being so, I apprehend there can be no doubt of the jurisdiction of this Court and that it ought to be exercised in such a case as this.' 17. The learned Judge in this case came to the conclusion that there was no doubt that this suit was filed, not for the benefit of the infant Plaintiffs but in the interest of Sallayjee and I agree with the learned Judge in this respect. It is clear to me that Surendra Nath Banerjee was merely the tool and instrument of Sallayjee. 18. The learned Counsel for the Appellant argued first that this Court must assume the facts as those stated in the plaint ; secondly, that if those facts were assumed then the Plaintiffs would be entitled to rescission of the lease ; and thirdly, that if the lease were rescinded then it must be for the benefit of the infant Plaintiffs. In view of the facts of this case and of the proceedings before Rankin, J., I am by no means satisfied that there is any substance in the first two contention even assuming for the present that the learned Counsel's argument was correct as regards the first two propositions I am certainly not satisfied that it would be for the benefit of the infant Plaintiffs if the lease, which was granted to Mr. Douglas, were rescinded. 19. Douglas, were rescinded. 19. The first ground upon which the learned Counsel relied was that the Plaintiffs were joint lessees under the old lease of the premises and that a year and a half of the term of that lease still remained unexpired at the time of the proceedings before Rankin, J., and that it was not in the interests of the Plaintiffs that lease should he surrendered. 20. I ought to have said that the land in question was occupied by bustees and the Plaintiffs and the other lessees were not in occupation but were endeavouring to realise rents from the tenants who where living in the busteces. 21. In my judgment the learned Counsel's argument is met by the statement which re to be found in para. 5 of the petition because it there appears that the Petitioner after stating that the lessees were unable to realise any rent from the tenants for 2 years proceeded to state : "Thereafter the income of the said property with taxes was only Rs. 881-13-5 p. a month whereas the rent payable in respect thereof was Rs. 750 a month and the municipal rates and taxes Rs. 248-5-4 a month. There was thus a loss of Rs. 116-7-11 a month in rent besides of litigation which amounted to Rs. 3,000 or thereabouts and establishment charges and the Petitioners and the said Sreemati Kadambini Dassi, the mother and natural guardian of the Plaintiffs, were always anxious to get rid of the said premises and to surrender the lease in respect thereof." Those facts are un-contradicted and in view of those facts it seems to me that the lessees would be benefited by being relieved of that lea inasmuch as it was an unprofitable lease; consequently in my judgment the first point which the learned Counsel urged cannot be sustained. 22. The next point which the learned Counsel argued was that, looking at the matter from the point of view of the Plaintiffs being shebaits, the lease was for a long period of 60 years and that there was no necessity as far as the estate was concerned for that lease. 22. The next point which the learned Counsel argued was that, looking at the matter from the point of view of the Plaintiffs being shebaits, the lease was for a long period of 60 years and that there was no necessity as far as the estate was concerned for that lease. It seems to that it is possible that there might be something in that argument (though I do not propose to express any definite opinion about it at the present moment, for in my judgment it is not necessary so to do) if that lease had not been approved by Mr. Justice Rankin, who after a full enquiry came to the conclusion that it was a proper lease for the shebaits to enter into having regard to the circumstances of the case into which he had made an enquiry. That judgment of my learned brother was not appealed against. It is stated in the petition of Ashutosh Mullick that Sallayjee bad instigated him to appeal against my learned brother Mr. Justice Rankin's judgment, but on further consideration he, Ashutosh Mullick, abandoned the appeal. Therefore my learned brother's judgment stands undisputed; consequently in my judgment the point that there was no necessity for this lease, having regard to the interests of the estate, is not open to the Appellant on this occasion. 23. It was further stated by Mr. Dass in the course of the argument and it was not denied that with regard to this debutter property the shebaits had no pecuniary interest and it was the idol only which would be benefited from the increment which would be derived from this lease. It is a building lease for GO years with a rent of Rs. 2,000 a month for the first 20 years with an increasing rent as in the lease provided. 24. It is further to be noticed that most of the shebaits are adults, and they approved, with the exception of Ashutosh Mullick who has been found to he acting on behalf of Sallayjee, of the lease being granted to Mr. Douglas. Again it must be remembered that the mother and natural guardian of the infant Plaintiffs although she was a purdanashin woman was advised by attorneys of this Court, and has sworn an affidavit that she approved of the lease being granted to Mr. Douglas. Again it must be remembered that the mother and natural guardian of the infant Plaintiffs although she was a purdanashin woman was advised by attorneys of this Court, and has sworn an affidavit that she approved of the lease being granted to Mr. Douglas ; consequently in my judgment looking at the matter from the point of view of the Plaintiffs being shebaits, the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant without substance. 25. Now let us look at the case from the other side. The plaintiffs are infants who are, we are told, about 10 and 12 years old. Surendra Nath Banerjee who appears on the record a friend a total stranger to them. He is also a total Stranger to the mother of the infant Plaintiffs, He is employed by Sallayjee and in my judgment there us no whatever that Surendra Nath Banerjee had been instigated by Sallayjee to bring this suit. The learned Judge has found that the suit has been instituted not for the benefit of the infants but for the benefit of Sallayjee and the learned Counsel for the Appellant did not seriously dispute that finding, his argument being based upon the allegation that even if that were so the suit must be for the benefit of the infants. Now, if it be taken as a finding, as I think it must be taken, that this suit instituted solely for the benefit of Sallayjee, what is the only conclusion to which this Court can come? In my judgment the conclusion is this that Surendre Naih Banerjee has been instigated to bring this suit with the same object as Ashutosh Mullick was instigated by Sallayjee when he made his application before Mr. Justice Rankin to set aside the order which the learned Judge had made. The Petitioners made a definite allegation as to the reason why this suit has been brought in para. 32 of their petition to this effect : "Your Petitioners further charge that this suit has not been brought for the benefit of the infants but for the purpose of benefiting the said H. E. Sallayjee and the real object thereof is to blackmail your Petitioners and the other Defendants and to compel them to enter into Borne am ment with the said Mr. H. E. Sallayjee regarding the lands which have been leased out under the orders of this Hon'ble Court for the Bake of peace." That statement is not denied as far I can discover although Surendra Nath Banerjee filed an affidavit, except in so far as he states in para. 7 of his affidavit follow :-- "I deny that I have any interest in this suit other than the interest of the infant Plaintiffs and of the idol referred to in plaint herein and the desire to see justice vindicated." Speaking for myself I do not believe for a moment that Surendra Nath Banerjee had the surendra justice vindicated, for in my judgment be was merely a tool of Sallayjee and lent himself to Sallayjee for the purpose of bringing this suit. The learned ed Judge has found as a fact that this has been brought in the interest of and for the benefit of Sallayjee and I see reason whatever for differing from the Conclusion of the learned Judge on that question of fact. It is not difficult to the that if this suit were allowed to proceed Mr. Douglas, the lessee, would be placed in an inconvenient and difficult position because a lung as this suit was pending undisposed of, it would be practically impossible for him to proceed with the development of the land of which he took the for the purpose of building and thus an opportunity would be provided for Sallayjee bringing pressure to bear upon Mr. Douglas to come to some arrangement. I consider this a bad case and the institution of the suit an abuse of the process of the Court. In my judgment the learned Judge was right in dismissing the suit and consequently in my judgment this appeal ought to be dismissed. 26. Before leaving the matter and having discussion which took place with respect to the question of the proposed change of Surendra Nath Banerjee's attorney, with which we dealt fully in the judgment which was then delivered, I desire to say that the peal was left in the hands of learned Counsel Mr. B. N. Ghose, instructed by Mr. Pannalal De and in my opinion everything was said by Mr. B. N. Ghose, instructed by Mr. Pannalal De and in my opinion everything was said by Mr. Ghose which could be said on behalf of the Appellant in this case and indeed as I said yesterday both my learned brother and I are indebted to him for the able argument which he presented to the Court. 27. As regards costs the Appellant Surendra Nath Banerjee must pay the costs of this appeal at far as Mr. Douglas is concerned. Be must also pay the costs of this appeal of the Petitioners, i.e., Gopessur Mullick and Gorachand Mullick and the costs of the Official Receiver. But Mr. Gonesh Chunder De, Messrs. cook & Co., Ltd. and Duyal Chand Mullick and Sarat Chunder Mullick must pay their own costs of this appeal, as we do see there was any necessity for their being separately separately represented in the appeal. Richardson, J. 28. I agree. The true owner of the property in question is the deity to whom it was dedicated. The infant Plaintiffs in whose names the suit is brought are two of the trustees or who manage the property on behalf of the deity. The endowment is a private family endowment. The shebaits, to include a number of adults as well as the Plaintiffs, are members of the family to which the founder of the endowment belonged by marriage. 29. Surendra Nath Banerjee who appears on the record as the next friend of the infants and by whom the suit was in fact instituted, nominally for the benefit of the infants, has nothing whatever to do with the original trust or with the family of the founder. He is an entire stranger. 30. The professed object of the suit is to obtain a declaration that the lease of this property, granted by the shebaits with the Leave of the Court to the Defendant Douglas, is invalid on the grounds in brief that the Court had no jurisdiction to accord leave and that the leave was obtained by means of fraud and conspiracy. 31. It is beyond all dispute that the true motive of the suit is to have the Lea invalidated in the interest of one H. E. Sallayjee who was also a candidate for a lease of the property. Sallayjee is the employer of Surendra Nath Banerjee. 32. 31. It is beyond all dispute that the true motive of the suit is to have the Lea invalidated in the interest of one H. E. Sallayjee who was also a candidate for a lease of the property. Sallayjee is the employer of Surendra Nath Banerjee. 32. The latter had no personal knowledge in respect of the various charges of fraud so liberally scattered about the plaint. It seems obvious that he could have personal knowledge of the circumstances, and the verification at the end of the plaint says: "That the statements contained in all the paragraphs of the foregoing plaint are based on informations received by me and I believe the same to be true." Nevertheless when this gentleman came to answer the application with which we are immediately concerned in effect that the suit should be dismissed on the ground that it was not brought in good faith for the benefit of the infants he said that the allegations in the plaint were true to his "knowledge, information and belief." The change form is not without significance and taken with the facts already referred to in detail by my Lord I have come to the conclusion that Surendra Nath Banerjee is intermeddling in what does not at all concern him merely for private ends of his own or of H. E. Sllayjee. He is not acting at all for the benefit of the infants. Surendra Nath Banerjee now here states the source of his information and the charges made appear to be entirely speculative and visionary. It would in my opinion be a waste of the time of the Court to investigate them. I can see no reasonable or ground for saying that it would be the advantage of the infants that this lease should be set aside. The lease was executed with the consent of the mother and guardian of the infants and at this stage at any rate is supported and adhered to by all the adult shebaits. In my opinion the suit is plainly an abuse of the process of the Court. 33. It may be unnecessary to deal with the on but personally I see no reason why any doubt should be felt as to the jurisdiction of the Court to give to give the shebaits leave to grant a Lease of kind. In my opinion the suit is plainly an abuse of the process of the Court. 33. It may be unnecessary to deal with the on but personally I see no reason why any doubt should be felt as to the jurisdiction of the Court to give to give the shebaits leave to grant a Lease of kind. So far as I can see full materials were placed before the Court and the learned Judge before whom the matter came exercised a careful and circumspect discretion upon those materials. My Lord has already referred to the abortive appeal from the order which the learned Judge made and the statement which the Appellant (one of the shebaits) afterwards made in reference to that appeal. I agree that the appeal should be dismissed.