JUDGMENT Richardson, J. - This appeal is an incident in long and wearisome litigation between the parties. In the present case the plaint was filed in 1910. The claim was for arrears of rent of certain lands for the years 1314 to 1316 B.S. and part of the year 1317 (part of 1907 to part of 1910). The claim so far as it related to the lands now in question failed in the trial Court but succeeded in the lower Appellate Court in virtue of a judgment pronounced by the District Judge on the 10th June 1915. On review the learned Judge on the 26th January, 1916, modified his decree. But the judgment and decree on review were set aside by the High Court and then the present appeal was taken by the principal defendants (the defendants Nos. 14) from the judgment of 10th June, 1915 2. The appellant-defendants (to whom I shall refer henceforth as the defendants) are admittedly the tenants of certain lands appertaining to the village of Kalikapur in the District of Burdwan. The plaintiffs are the proprietors of a 4 annas share of that village. The tenancy is an old one. At its original creation, it comprised lands abutting on the River Bhagirathi. The river gradually receded to the north or west. The defendants followed the river and took possession of the chur, or dry alluviated land, as it formed. The complications which have ensued are labyrinthine. The case before us must be decided with reference to the facts found or admitted, which are properly open for our consideration in second appeal. 3. There appears to have been litigation between the parties or their predecessors so far back as 1875 and in 1876a compromise was arrived at whereby the tenants agreed to pay rent at the rate of Re. 1 per Bigha per annum for the chur lands that there are and those which shall in future form as contiguous accretions to the aforesaid karari 20 Bighas of land appertaining to the mal portion of the six annas share of the said mouzah Kallai (or Kalikapur)." It appears that the share of the plaintiffs or their predecessors was known as the six annas share. In any case it is not disputed that the compromise is binding on the parties according to its true effect. 4. In 1894 there was further litigation. In any case it is not disputed that the compromise is binding on the parties according to its true effect. 4. In 1894 there was further litigation. Suit No. 7 of that year was a rent suit instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants. It was tried along with two other rent suits against the defendants being suit Nos. 15 and 16 of the same year, instituted by co-sharers of the plaintiffs. In the course of those suits two judgments were delivered by the High Court. The discussion before us turned largely on the effect of those judgments and the decision was ultimately arrived at River F Bhagirathi (Cha) (Chha) River Bhagirathi D (Gha) E (Uha) River Bhagirath C-ga B-Kha A-Ka 5. The above plan shows how the belt of land in the occupation of the defendants may be conveniently subdivided or plotted. The lettering follows that adopted by the District Judge in the judgment appealed from. 6. A (or Ka) represents that part of the original holding in Kalikapur which has not been affected by the action of the river. B (or Kha) is the remainder of the original holding. After being washed away it reformed and is known as the karari chur comprising the 20 Bighas mentioned in the compromise of 1876. C (or Ga) is the original bed of the river. D (Gha) E (Una) ["represent lands which were for merly on the F (Cha) & G (Chha) further or Nadia side of the river. 6. It is now disputed that plots D and E (and possibly a small part of plot G) were surrendered by the plaintiffs to the Government who claimed them as reformations in situ of certain Government estates. In this appeal the plaintiffs make no claim for rent in respect of these plots. As regards their right to rent in respect of plots A, B and C there is also no controversy. At this stage at any rate the dispute is confined to plots F and G. 7. At the outset it is clear that the plaintiffs are not in fact entitled to these plots, F and G, as an accretion to their lands in Kalikapur. Plot C may have accreted to those lands but F and G are separated from C by the intervening Government estates. At the outset it is clear that the plaintiffs are not in fact entitled to these plots, F and G, as an accretion to their lands in Kalikapur. Plot C may have accreted to those lands but F and G are separated from C by the intervening Government estates. Further, the fact is and must be that F and G are reformations in situ of estates which formerly lay on the Nadia side of the river. Speaking of the four plots D, E, F and G the District Judge says at the commencement of his judgment: Further north are the reformed lands of the touzis under the Nuddea Collector-ate. The fact is not seriously denied and indeed every surveyor who has been to the spot has found that these are lands of the touzis under the Nuddea Collector-ate. 8. The plaintiffs therefore had to fallback on the principle formulated in S. 116 of the Evidence Act, that a tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title and it was argued on their behalf that the question so raised was concluded against the defendants by the judgments of the High Court in the suits of 1894. 9. Before going further it is desirable to say that the District Judge incidentally refers to suits brought in 1398 and 1902 by co-sharers of the plaintiffs against the defendants and that the judgments in those suits have not been placed before us. 10. In the suits of 1894 plots E and F correspond to the present plots F and G and plots G and H to the present plots D and E. The case was argued before us on that footing, and in the judgment of the Additional District Judge, dated 28th March, 1903, to which some reference is made in the sequel plots E and F are described as lying to the north of plots G and H. For the sake of clearness therefore when quoting from the judgments in those suits, I shall alter the (sic) so as to make it correspond with the present Lettering. 11. The first and governing judgment of the High Court was that of Rampani and Pratt, JJ., dated 29th June, 1900. 11. The first and governing judgment of the High Court was that of Rampani and Pratt, JJ., dated 29th June, 1900. The following passage was relied on: In cases like the present, when the chur was lying open to the cultivation of the tenant and when in accordance with the plaintiff's permission the defendant took possession of that chur and cultivated it without any objection, obstacle or opposition, we think that it is not right that the Judge should say that this is not the manner in which a landlord should put a tenant in possession of any land who wants to take advantage of S. 116 of the Evidence Act. It seems to us that it is a sufficient way for a landlord to put a tenant into possession unless, the tenant requires some further assistance which does not appear to have been the case in the present instance. 12. Then the learned Judges continue: We therefore set aside the decision of the District Judge and remand the case to him for disposal of the question of the chur land in accordance with the above instructions, that is to say, bearing in mind that the defendants are estopped from denying the plaintiffs' title as to plots D, E, F and G. 13. The judgment does not end there but so far what the learned Judges decided was in effect that the plaintiffs had at least constructively let the defendants into possession of the whole chur. The defendants entered with the authority of the plaintiffs and there was nothing in the mode in which the defendants took possession to exclude the operation of the doctrine of estoppel. 14. If I may say so, I agree but there still remains the question whether the decision so understood concludes the defendants in the present suit. A later passage in the judgment shows that the learned judges were dealing with the period before plots D and E had been surrendered to the Government. 15. 14. If I may say so, I agree but there still remains the question whether the decision so understood concludes the defendants in the present suit. A later passage in the judgment shows that the learned judges were dealing with the period before plots D and E had been surrendered to the Government. 15. After referring to a suggestion that a small portion of F and G had been taken possession of by the Government and leaving it open to the defendants to prove that they had been evicted therefrom by title paramount, the learned Judges proceeded: Then with regard to plots D and E, it has been similarly argued by the learned counsel for the defendant that in this case also there has been eviction by title paramount. We do not see that this is so. No doubt subsequently to the period for which rent is now claimed, the plaintiffs have taken a five years' lease from the Government and acknowledged the Government as proprietor. That was in 1895 or 1302, but they can certainly claim arrears of rent for the previous period and proceed with the present suits which are for arrears of rent for the years 1297 to 1300. 16. The learned Judges, therefore, had not to consider either the effect of the surrender itself or any of the events which have since followed. 17. The suits went back to the lower Appellate Court and a further judgment (already referred to) was delivered by the Additional District Judge on the 28th March, 1903. The Judge, it is true, seems to have misunderstood the judgment of the High Court and to have considered himself at liberty to discuss again the question whether "the defendants had been put into possession of the lands...in the legal acceptation of the word." His conclusion, however, was that even if the doctrine of estoppel applied, the plaintiffs were not entitled to rent in respect of plots D, E, F and G because they had not shown with sufficient precision the lands in those plots in respect of which rent was claimed. 18. Thereupon, the plaintiffs again appealed to the High Court. The appeal came before Harington and Pargater, JJ. and judgment was delivered on the 26th July, 1905. Those learned Judges, as might have been expected, refrained from any further discussion of the question of estoppel. 18. Thereupon, the plaintiffs again appealed to the High Court. The appeal came before Harington and Pargater, JJ. and judgment was delivered on the 26th July, 1905. Those learned Judges, as might have been expected, refrained from any further discussion of the question of estoppel. They confined themselves to pointing out that in view of the previous judgment of the High Court, the only question which the Additional District Judge had to consider on the remand was "what was the rent payable by the defendants in respect of these particular lands." They went on to deal with the opinion of the learned Judge that there was no evidence before him on which he could determine that question. 19. It appeared that the defendants had paid certain monies into Court under the provisions of S. 149 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The payment was made on the footing that the rent was due to Government and Government not having made any claimprobably because in 1895 the Government had leased the lands they claimed to there plaintiffsthe learned Judges held that in the circumstances the plaintiffs were entitled to the monies in Court. Those monies did not cover the whole of the plaintiffs' claim. As the defendants alleged that the payment was made in respect of rent due to Government it may, in my opinion, be legitimately inferred as the learned Vakil for the defendants contended, that the payment was for rent due in respect of lands in plots D and E and perhaps a portion of plot G. As to the rest of the plaintiffs' claim, the learned Judges accepted the finding of the Court below. The result of the litigation, therefore, was that the plaintiffs obtained some rent for plots D and E but no rent at all for the greater part of plots F and G. Nothing however turns on that now. 20. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the present suit no rent was paid in under S. 149, the defendants not admitting that any rent was due from them. In paragraph 7 of their written statement they stated that they held plots D and E as tenants of the Government by whom the plots had been resumed in 1908. 20. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the present suit no rent was paid in under S. 149, the defendants not admitting that any rent was due from them. In paragraph 7 of their written statement they stated that they held plots D and E as tenants of the Government by whom the plots had been resumed in 1908. In paragraph 10 they pleaded that they had already paid the rents of plots F and G to the persons therein named including Girindra Pal who were the "real maliks" of those plots, but no issue seems to have been framed in reference to that plea. 21. As I have already intimated, there is nothing, in my opinion, in the previous judgments of this Court to preclude a consideration of the question now raised as to the effect of the admitted surrender by the plaintiffs of plots D and E and subsequent events. The circumstances have changed and the effect of the change is open to discussion. Hut the starting point must be that, as this Court decided, the defendants were inducted into possession of the whole chur by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs however are as much bound by the decision as the defendants. If the result was that the defendants were estopped from denying the right of the plaintiffs to lease the whole area to them, the plaintiffs in their turn were bound to secure the defendants in quiet enjoyment of the whole. The landlord's undertaking for quiet enjoyment by the tenant is implied from the relationship of landlord and tenant. [Transfer of Property Act, S. 108 (c); Budd Scott v. Daniel (1902) 2 K.B. 351 = 71 L.J K.B. 706 = 18 T.L.R. 675 = 87 L.T. 392= 51 W.R. 134. Markham v. Paget (1908) 1 Ch. 697= 98 L.T. 605 = 77 L.J. Ch. 451 = 24 T.L.R. 426 and the under taking would include the protection of the tenant from disturbance by strangers claiming by title paramount. 22. Moreover both in England and in India it is open to the tenant to prove a subsequent cesser of the landlord's title. S. 116 of the Evidence Act says that. No tenant of immoveable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immoveable property. 23. S. 116 of the Evidence Act says that. No tenant of immoveable property shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immoveable property. 23. The estoppel refers to the title at the beginning of the tenancy. So in England, "It is clear law that though a tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord to deal with the premises, he may prove that the title has determined." Serjent v. Nash (1903) 2 K.B. 304 = 19 T.L.R. 510 = 72 L.J. K.B. 630 = 89 L.T. 112 per Collins, M.R. 24. And one way in which the tenant can show that the title has determined is by proving an eviction by title paramount or the equivalent of such an eviction. 25. In the present case, the surrender by the plaintiffs of D and E did not at first make much difference because the plaintiffs took a lease of those plots from the Government and the defendants continued in possession under the plaintiffs. But when the Government resumed possession of those plots, there occurred both a breach by the plaintiffs of their undertaking for quiet enjoyment and an eviction by title paramount. 26. No doubt the defendants appear to have acquiesced and to have protected themselves by attorning to the Government. Nevertheless the surrender made it difficult, if not impossible, for the defendants to maintain a title to F and G as tenants of the plaintiffs. The reason has already been stated. F and G could no longer be even plausibly held as accretions to Kalkapur. 27. It was the plaintiffs, therefore, who by their own conduct disturbed the title of the defendants as their tenants and laid the defendants open to attack by third parties claiming the true title in F and G. It is not denied that the proprietary title has come in controversy in other litigation in which the plaintiffs have figured as parties. The difficulties of the defendants are apparent from the following passage in the District Judge's judgment. The plaintiffs are unjustly accusing the defendants of colluding with other proprietors. Take the case of Girindra Pal. His predecessor asserted his right to the lands in F and G as appertaining to the Touzi No. 125 of the Nadia Collectorate. The difficulties of the defendants are apparent from the following passage in the District Judge's judgment. The plaintiffs are unjustly accusing the defendants of colluding with other proprietors. Take the case of Girindra Pal. His predecessor asserted his right to the lands in F and G as appertaining to the Touzi No. 125 of the Nadia Collectorate. The defendants refused to pay rent to them or the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs then brought the suit in 1894.....It appears that when after the High Court remand the Additional District Judge again dismissed the plaintiffs suit on the ground that the defendants were not estopped, it was then that the defendants compromised the suit with Girindra Pal and came to an arrangement with him. The fact that they got very lenient terms is not very material. After the second decision of the High Court the defendants gave notice to Girindra Pal and refused to pay rent and Girindra Pal brought a suit making the plaintiffs parties. That suit has been decided by the Subordinate Judge in appeal in favour of Girindra Pal on all the important points. The Subordinate Judge, however, thought it necessary to remand the suit to have a local investigation made by a Commissioner. The plaintiffs have appealed to the High Court and there it is pending now. 28. Well, the learned vakil for the defendants informed us that since the District Judge wrote his judgment the suit has terminated in favour of Girindra Pal and the statement was not contradicted by the learned vakil on the other aide. The District Judge held that things had not at that time reached a stage at which it could be said that an eviction by title paramount had occurred. That in the circumstances is a conclusion of law or of marked law and fact. The conclusion was open to attack, and it was attacked in this appeal. It is necessary, therefore to examine the circumstances somewhat closely to see whether it is well founded. 29. The District Judge speaks as if Girindra Pal's [suit the name is used as including Girindra Pal and his co- sharers related to the whole of F and G. Girindra Pal claimed as the proprietor of a village named Chakandi appertaining to estate No. 125 of the Nadia District. 29. The District Judge speaks as if Girindra Pal's [suit the name is used as including Girindra Pal and his co- sharers related to the whole of F and G. Girindra Pal claimed as the proprietor of a village named Chakandi appertaining to estate No. 125 of the Nadia District. We must take it at any rate on the arguments addressed to us that Chakandi covers a substantial part of F and G. The suit was instituted on the 27th August, 1509, against the present plaintiffs and defendants. The plaint referred to the suits of 1894 by the proprietors of Kalikapur against the defendant. It set out that in 1311 (1904) the present defendants accepted a lease of the land from Girindra Pal's predecessor [which may be the arrangement spoken of by the District Judge] and that in 1909 they gave notice to Girindra Pal that owing to the result of the suits of 1894 they would no longer pay him the rent due under the lease. Girindra Pal went on to say that neither he nor his predecessor was a party to the suits of 1894 and he ended by claiming a declaration that he was entitled to the land as appertaining to Chekandi and to the performance by the present defendants of their engagements with him. 30. Written statements were filed by the present plaintiffs and other co sharers in Kalikapur joining issue on the question of title. The present defendants also filed a written statement. They did not traverse the allegations made by Girindra but frankly stated in effect that they were prepared to accept as their land, lords either Girindra Pal or the proprietor of Kalikapur whichever might prove successful. 31. I ought also to mention that Girindra Pal having stated in his plaint that the defendants had carried out their obligations as his tenants up to the year 1315-1908, made no claim for mesne profits. Declaratory relief was sought on the footing that the present defendants were his tenants and that their possession was his possession. 32. Now as to the period before institution of this suit it does not appear that the defendants gave notice to the plain, tiffs of their attornment to Girindra Pal. Declaratory relief was sought on the footing that the present defendants were his tenants and that their possession was his possession. 32. Now as to the period before institution of this suit it does not appear that the defendants gave notice to the plain, tiffs of their attornment to Girindra Pal. On the contrary it would appear from the District Judge's judgment that they made certain payments to the plaintiffs during the interval between the termination of the suits of 1894 and the institution of Girindra Pal's suit. Such payments would also be consistent with the notice which they subsequently gave to Girindra Pal. 33. But it seems clear on a survey of the material facts that after the institution of Girindra Pal's suit, they could no longer be expected to pay rent to the plaintiffs unless and until the latter proved their ability to secure them in quiet enjoyment. In other words even if there was no previous entry by Girindra Pal the institution of the suit amounted in the circumstances to such an invasion or entry by title paramount as to set the defendants free to say that they must protect themselves, if necessary, from that date by attorning to Girindra Pal. They had already had to attorn to the Government for plots D and E. 34. The question what amounts to an eviction by title paramount may present some difficulty and we are not referred to any Indian authority on the subject. In England the current of authority seems to favour the view that "it is not necessary for the tenant actually to go out of pas session, and that if, upon a claim being made by a person with title paramount, he consents by an attornment to such person to change the title under which he holds, or enters into a new arrangement for holding under him, this will be equivalent to an eviction and a. fresh talking." (Foa on Landlord and Tenant, 4th Edition, p. 169). 35. In Hill v. Saunders (1825) 4 B and C. 529 = 9 Mos. P.C. 238 = 107 E.R. 1157 Holroyd, J. said "The plea discloses that which was equivalent to an entry by the heir, it states that the heir threatened to evict the defendant and that he was obliged to attorn, in order to prevent it" and Littledale, J, seems to have concurred with that observation. P.C. 238 = 107 E.R. 1157 Holroyd, J. said "The plea discloses that which was equivalent to an entry by the heir, it states that the heir threatened to evict the defendant and that he was obliged to attorn, in order to prevent it" and Littledale, J, seems to have concurred with that observation. See also Grimwood v. Moss (1872) 7 C.P. 360 = 27 L.T. 268 = 20 W.R. 97 = 41 L.J.P.C. 239 and Surgent v. Nash (1903) 2 K.B. 304 = 19 T.L.R. 510 = 72 L.J. K.B. 630 = 89 L.T. 112 where it was held following Jones v. Carter (1846) 15 M. and W. 713 = 153 E.R. 1040 = 10 Jur, 33, that the bringing of an action of ejectment was equivalent to an entry. In those cases, it is true, the action was brought by the landlord to eject the tenant for breach of a covenant protected by a clause for reentry. 36. But I do not see why that should make any difference. The owner of the true title certainly has a right of entry against a trespasser and his action or suit in ejectment is brought to enforce that right. Girindra Pal's suit was rot inform a suit in ejectment because he assumed, that he had already entered when the present defendants accepted a lease from him. That may be so as between' him and the present plaintiffs or the present defendants as trespassers. But as between the plaintiffs and the defendants, what took place after the termination of the suits of 1894 has to be considered. The consideration arising from the giving of possession lasted (as between the plaintiffs and defendants) so long as the defendants held possession under the plaintiffs. 37. On the whole, differing from the District Judge, I come to the conclusion that the institution of Girindra Pal's suit marks the extreme limit of that period and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to rent from the defendants for any subsequent period. 38. The case, I may add, is not a satisfactory one to have to deal with. Such endless litigation as there has been about this chur is hardly creditable to the parties concerned. If the fault is chiefly that of the plaintiffs the defendants are not altogether free from blame. 38. The case, I may add, is not a satisfactory one to have to deal with. Such endless litigation as there has been about this chur is hardly creditable to the parties concerned. If the fault is chiefly that of the plaintiffs the defendants are not altogether free from blame. And the difficulty of dealing with complicated facts is enhanced by reason of the case coming before us eleven years after it was instituted. It is at least a case in, which the facts should be broadly dealt with in the interests of substantial justice. 39. The result is that the decree of the Court below will be modified and the plaintiff's suit, will be dismissed so far as rent is claimed in respect of plots F and G for any period subsequent to the institution of Girindra Pal's suit. 40. The parties should pay their own costs in respect of plots F and G throughout. Sanderson C.J. 40. I agree.