JUDGMENT 1. This appeal and the Rule connected with it arise out of proceedings under sec. 47 and Or. XXI, r. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code, under the following circumstances. It appears that one-half of the properties which are the subject-matter of the proceedings were mortgaged to the Appellant, and the other half to one Shyama Charan Biswas. The Appellant purchased the one-half mortgaged to him in execution of his mortgage decree for Rs. 4,000 on the 10th January 1905, and obtained symbolical possession in 1907. The other half was purchased by the other mortgagee. 2. The properties were comprised in a jote, and the landlord brought a suit for rent against the original tenant, the mortgagor, on the 11th February 1905, i.e., a month after the Appellant's purchase. The rent suit was decreed on the 31st March 1905, and the jote was sold in execution of the decree on the 11th April 1908 and purchased by the decree-holder for Rs. 185. 3. There was partition suit between the Appellant and the other mortgagee-purchaser, and it is alleged that when the Commissioner in the partition proceedings went on the laud, he was obstructed by the agent of the decree-holder purchaser; that the Appellant came to know of it in May 1918 and the application to set aside the sale out of which the appeal arises was made on the 17th June 1918. It is to be observed that the original tenant was left in possession notwithstanding the purchase by the landlord on the 11th April 1908. 4. The Court of first instance held that no notice under sec. 248 was served and the sale was, therefore, null and void for ward of jurisdiction; that the entire proceedings in execution were irregular and fraudulent from beginning to end; that all the processes were fraudulently suppressed; that the value of 25 bighas 17 cotthas of land containing the homestead of the judgment-debtors, with a big building containing thirteen rooms, valuable gardens and tanks with pucca ghats, which would he between Rs. 7,000 and 8,000, was intentionally understated in the sale proclamation as Rs. 150 and the properties were purchased by the decree-holder the only bidder for Rs. 185. 5. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge held that the service of the notice under sec. 7,000 and 8,000, was intentionally understated in the sale proclamation as Rs. 150 and the properties were purchased by the decree-holder the only bidder for Rs. 185. 5. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge held that the service of the notice under sec. 248 was not parsed, but that service was not suppressed, and the mere omission to serve the notice was a mere irregularity and did not vitiate the sale. He further held that there was no fraud on the part of the decree-holder there was no suppression of processes, and that the applicants, therefore could not get the benefit of sec. 18 of the Limitation Act. In the result, he set aside the order of the Munsif and dismissed the application. The judgment-debtors have appealed to this Court. 6. So far as the questions of fraud and irregularity in publishing the sale and the question of sec. 18 of the Limitation Act are concerned, we cannot go behind the findings of the Court of Appeal below, and so far as those questions are concerned there is no second appeal. The only question, therefore, is whether the proceedings are void by reason of no notice having been served under sec. 218. Civil Procedure, Code. It is admitted that no notice under Sec. 248 of the Code was issued in the 3rd and last execution case in winch the properties were sold. In the next previous execution case the second execution case however, a notice was issued, but it is found that the notice was not served. 7. It is contended on behalf of the Respondent that the issue of the notice is sufficient compliance with the provision of sec. 218. We do not, however, think that it is so. The object of the notice evidently is to enable the judgment-debtor to show cause, if any, why the decree should not be executed, and also to give him an opportunity of satisfying the decree. Such object cannot be attained by the Court merely issuing a notice which never reaches the judgment-debtor. In order that a, notice issued may be effective, it mast be served upon the judgment debtor and we think that the provision that notice is to be issued means that it must be served. 8. It is further contended with reference to the proviso to sec. In order that a, notice issued may be effective, it mast be served upon the judgment debtor and we think that the provision that notice is to be issued means that it must be served. 8. It is further contended with reference to the proviso to sec. 248 (which provides that no notice is necessary, if the application as made within one year of the last order against the party against whom execution is applied for, passed on any previous application for execution) that the order for issuing notice under sec. 248 made in the second execution case was an order within the meaning of the proviso, and that, therefore, no notice was necessary to be issued in the last execution case. But an order to issue notice against a judgment-debtor cannot be held to be an order within the meaning of the proviso which evidently contemplates an order for execution against the judgment-debtor. If the Respondents' contention were correct, the decree-holder can avoid serving any notice under sec. 248 upon the judgment-debtor by the simple expedient of getting an order for issue of notice under that section without getting it served, and then relying upon such order in the next execution case, as the "last order" passed on the "previous application" against the judgment-debtor within the meaning of the proviso. We are unable to accept either of these contentions as correct. 9. The question, therefore, is whether the absence of a notice under sec. 248 renders the proceedings void. Before the case of Malkarjun v. Narahari L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900) was decided by the Judicial Committee, it was held in some cases that the omission to serve notice under sec. 248 rendered the proceedings void. See Gopal v. Gunamoni ILR 20 Cal. 370 (1892) and Sahadeo v. Ghasiram ILR 21 Cal. 19 (1893). But since Malkarjun's case L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), it has been held in a number of cases that the omission does not render the sale void, but is a grave irregularity sufficient by itself to justify a reversal of the sale if a proper proceeding is taken in that behalf; in other words, that it is voidable. See Lavinia Ashton v. Madhahmoni 14 C.W.N. 560 : S.C. 11 C.L.J. 489 at pp. See Lavinia Ashton v. Madhahmoni 14 C.W.N. 560 : S.C. 11 C.L.J. 489 at pp. 495-496 (1910), Lakshmi Charan Sen v. Sris Chandra Roy 13 C.L.J. 162 at p. 164 (1910), Kumed Bewa v. Prasanna Kumar Roy ILR 40 Cal. 45 (1912), Sham Sundar Singh v. Jhumak Shah 20 C.L.J. 337 (1911) and Arjun Das v. Gunendra Nath 20 C.L.J. 341 at pp. 344, 345 (1914). In Malkarjun v. Narahari L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), Lord Hobhouse observed:-- "It is then necessary for the Plaintiff to set aside the sale in order to clear the ground for redemption of the mortgage. There can be no question that omission to serve notice on the legal representative is a serious irregularity sufficient by itself to entitle the Plaintiff to vacate the sale. But there may be defences to such a proceeding, and justice cannot be done unless those defences are examined by legal methods." In the case of Raghunath Das v. Sundar Das Khattri ILR 42 Cal. 72 : S.C. 18 C.W.N. 1058 (P.C.) (1914), the, Judicial Committee, in distinguishing Malkarjun's case L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), observed:-- "Their Lordships' attention was called in this connection to the case of Malkarjun v. Narahari L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), but in their opinion there is nothing in that case which has any bearing upon the present appeal. As hid down in Gopal Chunder Chatterjee v. Gunamoni Dasi ILR 20 Cal. 370 (1892), a notice under sec. 248 of the Code is necessary in order that the Court should obtain jurisdiction to sell property by way of execution as against the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor. In the case of Malkarjun v. Narahari L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), such a notice had been served, and the Court had determined, as it had power to do for the purpose of the execution proceedings, that the party served with the notice was in fact the legal representative. It had, therefore, jurisdiction to sell, though the decision as to who was the legal representative was erroneous. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), such a notice had been served, and the Court had determined, as it had power to do for the purpose of the execution proceedings, that the party served with the notice was in fact the legal representative. It had, therefore, jurisdiction to sell, though the decision as to who was the legal representative was erroneous. There being jurisdiction to sell, and the purchasers having no notice of any irregularly, the sale held good unless or until it were set aside by appropriate proceedings to the purpose. The present case is of a wholly different character. No proper notice was served under the section, and the Respondents had full notice of, and indeed were responsible for the irregularities of the procedure adopted." 10. That case has been considered in some decisions of this Court. In Syam Mandal v. Satinath Banerjee 21 C.W.N. 770 at pp. 779-780 (1910), Mookerjee and Cuming, JJ., observed:-- "It was pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Raghunath Das v. Sundar Das ILR 42 Cal. 72 : S.C. 18 C.W.N. 1058 (P.C.) (1914), that the notice prescribed by sec 18 of the Code of 1882 (now replaced In Or. XXI, r. 22) is necessary in order that the Court should obtain jurisdiction to proceed against the property of the judgment-debtor by way of execution. The omission to give notice as required by the Rule, is not a mere irregularity which makes the proceeding voidable, but is a defect which goes to the root of the proceeding and renders if void for want of jurisdiction [Gopal v. Gunamoni ILR 20 Cal. 370 (1892), Sahadeo v. Ghasisram ILR 21 Cal. 19 (1893) and Parashram v. Balmukund ILR 32 Bom. 572 (1908)] From the point of view that the notice is requisite as the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court, it is plain that the proceedings must be treated as inoperative even though a stranger may have acquired title in course thereof, but the position is obviously worse where the decree-holders themselves proceeding to acquire title on the basis of proceedings initiated by them and carried on in defiance of statutory requirements." 11. In the present case, as already stated, the decree-holder himself was the auction-purchaser, the property was sold at a gross undervalue, and the judgment-debtor was left in possession of the properties all along. 12. In the present case, as already stated, the decree-holder himself was the auction-purchaser, the property was sold at a gross undervalue, and the judgment-debtor was left in possession of the properties all along. 12. It is contended on behalf of the Respondents that having regard to the findings of the Court of Appeal below on the question of limitation the sale cannot be set aside. That no doubt would he so, where, as in Malkarjun's case L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), there is "a sale valid until set aside." It was accordingly held in that case: "But if the sale is a reality at all, it is a reality defensible only in the way pointed out by law : and it seems to their Lordships that the case must fall either within sec. 311 of the Code or within Art. 12 (a) of the Limitation Ad of 1877, or within both; any way, there exists a bar by one year's delay." And as stated above, Use Judicial Committee in the case of Raghunath Das v. Sundar Das Khattri ILR 42 Cal. 72 : S.C. 18 C.W.N. 1058 (P.C.) (1914), in distinguishing the case of Malkarjun v. Narahari, L.R. 27 I.A. 216 : S.C. ILR 25 Bom. 337; 5 C.W.N. 10 (1900), observed: "There being jurisdiction to sell and the purchasers having no notice of any irregularity, the sale held good unless or until it were set aside by appropriate proceedings for the purpose." But those considerations cannot apply where the proceedings are without jurisdiction and the sale is a nullity. In the case of Maharaj Bahadur Singh v. Indur Chand Bothra 22 C.W.N. 390 (1917). Sanderson C.J. and Mookerjee, J., held that an order for execution made without notice under Or. XXI r. 22 of the CPC (sec. 248 of the old Code) is without jurisdiction and is a nullity. Having regard to the decisions cited above, we must hold that the order for sate was without jurisdiction, and the sale a nullity, and that being so, the sale cannot stand. We accordingly set aside the order of the Court of Appeal below, and restore that of the Court of first instance. The parties will be relegated to the position in which they were on the date on which the last application for execution of the decree was made. We accordingly set aside the order of the Court of Appeal below, and restore that of the Court of first instance. The parties will be relegated to the position in which they were on the date on which the last application for execution of the decree was made. Each party will bear its own costs in all Courts. We make this order in the Rule, and no order is, therefore; necessary to be made in the appeal.