JUDGMENT Teunon, J. - This rule arises out of proceedings taken under the provisions of sec. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order initiating the proceedings was made on the 29th of June 1920 and the finding of the Magistrate is that up to the 26th of June the second party to the proceedings, one Mr. Harvey, was in possession. He next finds that on the night of the 26th of June, in the absence of Mr. Harvey, the members of the first party accompanied by a large body of men said in the evidence to number 30), armed with implements which might be used for offensive as well as for peaceful purposes came upon the land in question and effectively dispossessed Mr. Harvey by surrounding the land on all sides with a fence. On these findings the Magistrate applying the provisions of the first proviso to sub-sec. (4) of sec. 145 of the Code has made his final order in favour of the second party. 2. But there is a further finding or expression of opinion by the Magistrate based apparently on the documentary evidence that title is with the first party. 3. It is therefore contended on behalf of the first party, the Petitioners before us, that the title being with them, and no actual violence having been used, their dispossession of the second party could not be said to be either forcible or wrongful. 4. In support of this contention it Is urged that on any other construction the word "wrongful" would be superfluous and reference has also been made to the definition of the words "wrongful gain" and "wrongful loss" to be found in the Indian Penal Code. 5. We are unable to accede to this contention. Dispossession may be "wrongful" and yet not "forcible" and to hold that "wrongful" connotes absence of right or title would be to defeat the purpose of the section and to require the Magistrate to enter into questions which by the section itself are expressly excluded from his consideration. It is not necessary for us to attempt any exhaustive definition of the term "wrongful dispossession" but having regard to the context, in our opinion, to say that a dispossession otherwise than in due course of law is wrongful would more closely represent the intention of the legislature. 6. It is not necessary for us to attempt any exhaustive definition of the term "wrongful dispossession" but having regard to the context, in our opinion, to say that a dispossession otherwise than in due course of law is wrongful would more closely represent the intention of the legislature. 6. Nor in our opinion is it necessary that actual force or violence should have been used to some person or persons before a dispossession can he said to be "forcible." When the dispossession is effected by a show of criminal force sufficient as in this case to intimidate those in possession and to deter them from resistance, the latter, in our opinion, may well be said to have been forcibly dispossessed. In this view we discharge this rule. Ghose, J. I agree.