ORDER Kumarasami Sastri, J. 1. The petitioners were charged under Sections 147, 118, 379 and 323, Indian Penal Code, and the First Class Magistrate of Sivakasi discharged the accused as he was of opinion that no prima facie case was made cut. On revision the District Magistrate directed the accused to be committed for trial to the Sessions Court. He was of opinion that if theft was the common object of the rioters the offense becomes one of dacoity and so triable exclusively by the Court of Session. He was also of opinion that the Magistrate is bound to commit if there is any evidence in support of the charge. 2. I am unable to agree with the view taken by the District Magistrate. In the present case the First Class Magistrate has written a careful judgment in which he discussed the evidence on the side of the prosecution and comes to the conclusion that it is not untrustworthy. The District Magistrate does not go into the evidence and says that the Magistrates appreciation of the evidence is wrong. He thinks it would be out of place to go into the evidence. 3. Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives the Magistrate power to discharge the accused charged with offences triable exclusively by a Court of Session if after going into the evidence he is of opinion that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person for trial. To hold that, where there is some evidence, however untrustworthy in the Magistrates opinion, he is bound to commit a person for trial will be to make the preliminary enquiry directed by the Code a mere matter of form while it is intended to be a safeguard against false or frivolous cases being sent up for trial and innocent men from being put to the trouble and expanse of undergoing a trial in the Court of Session. 4. It is no doubt true that all that a Committing Magistrate has to see is, whether there is a prima facie case made out and that it is not his business to usurp the functions of the Sessions Judge or the Jury and I agree with the observations of Bakewell, J., in National Bank of India, Ltd. v. Kothandarama Chetti 21 Ind. Cas. 129 : (1913) M.W.N. 728, 14 M.L.T. 200 : 14 Cr. L.J. 529 so far. Cas. 129 : (1913) M.W.N. 728, 14 M.L.T. 200 : 14 Cr. L.J. 529 so far. I respectfully dissent from his view that the Magistrate cannot draw reasonable inferences from fasts deposed to by the prosecution witnesses where more than one inference can be drawn, and agree with the view taken by Sundara Iyer, J. 5. In Bai Parvaii, In re 8 Ind. Cas. 631 : 35 B. 163 : 12 Bom. L.R. 923 : 11 Cr. L.J. 692 it was held that where the Committing Magistrate finds that the evidence tendered for the prosecution is unworthy of credit it is his duty, under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to discharge the accused. A similar view was taken by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Damappa Pillai, In re 23 Ind. Cas. 741 : 15 Cr. L.J. 373; 6. It is not, as pointed out in Bai Parvati, In re 8 Ind. Cas. 631 : 35 B. 163 : 12 Bom. L.R. 923 : 11 Cr. L.J. 692, easy to draw, the line between the Magistrates duty and the Sessions Courts prerogative and each case must be treated on its merits. What the Court has to see in whether the evidence is such as to render the case a fit one for the Jury to decide between the conflicting probabilities or whether it clearly points to there being no prima facie case for the accused to meet. In arriving at a decision the Committing Magistrate must have discretion and power to weigh the evidence 7. In the prevent case the Magistrate has given excellent grounds for the conclusion he has arrived at. I reverse the order of the District Magistrate.