Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 37 of 1920) against a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 24, 1919) reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Hugli (December 23, 1915). The suit was instituted by the present first respondent to obtain the removal of the appellant from the office of shebait of certain debottar property, to set aside a purchase of part of that property—namely, a four-fifths share of lot Bahirgora, and for the appointment of a receiver. It was alleged by the plaint, and found by both Courts in India, that the purchase in question in the name of the first appellants son (appellant in the connected appeal) was made benami by the first appellant, the shebait. Other acts of misconduct as shebait were alleged. The facts of the case sufficiently appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge held that the appellant was entitled to retain the property purchased by him in his sons name, and rejected the claim to have it declared to be still part of the debottar estate. He also rejected the claim to have the shebait removed, being of opinion that his conduct had riot been such as to render him unfit to retain the office. An appeal to the High Court was allowed. The learned judges (Mookerjee and Panton JJ.), after affirming the finding that the purchase money had been supplied by the shebait, proceeded to consider whether the sale was valid. They said "It is regarded as a principle of fundamental importance in English equity jurisprudence that a trustee for sale is absolutely disabled from purchasing the trust property, directly or indirectly. The rule is universal that however fair the transaction the cestui que trust is at liberty to set aside the sale and take back the property.....It is equally well settled that a trustee for other purposes than for sale cannot purchase the property where the purchase would conflict with his duty respecting it, or his position in regard to it; but in this class of case there is no absolute rule against the trustee purchasing the trust property from his cestui que trust, although Courts of equity always regard such transactions with the utmost jealousy, and will not hesitate to set them aside if their fairness is not conclusively estab lished. The controversy before us has centered round the question, which of these principles govern the present case. Now, it is perfectly plain that the sale in this case was not by a cestui que trust to the trustee. As Sir Arthur Wilson pointed out in delivering the opinion of the Judicial Committee in the case of Jagadindra Nath v. Hemanta Kumari(( 1904) L. R. 31 I. A. 203, 209.), though there is no doubt that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person, capable as such of holding property, it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held, for the possession and management of the dedicated property must, in the nature of things, belong to the shebait, whether the religious dedication is of the completest kind known to the law or is of a less strict character. Consequently, when a shebait purchases debottar property, it is a purchase by a person who is the custodian of the property and who is charged with the duty to preserve it for the benefit of the endowment. In a case of this description, if the purchase were allowed, precisely the same mischiefs would result as have been apprehended by eminent judges in cases of purchases of trust properties by trustees for sale. Indeed, the mischief might be of a more aggravated character, less likely to be discovered and rectified, as, unless the shebait was removed, it might be impossible to determine the impropriety of the transaction and the injury inflicted thereby on the debottar estate. If the contrary view prevailed, it is not inconceivable that an unscrupulous shebait, anxious to seize a particular portion of the debottar estate for his personal use, might, notwithstanding ample funds at his disposal, be encouraged to borrow money in the character of shebait, allow a decree to be passed against him, acquiesce in the consequent execution sale, and ultimately purchase the property in his private capacity. The true nature of a scheme of this character elaborately planned and carefully carried out would never be unravelled except probably by a person intimately acquainted with the minutest details of the administration of the debottar estate. The true nature of a scheme of this character elaborately planned and carefully carried out would never be unravelled except probably by a person intimately acquainted with the minutest details of the administration of the debottar estate. On the other hand, if the shebait were allowed to bid, his interest would be to secure the property at the lowest price, and if he became the purchaser, an application to set aside the sale on the ground of irregularities in the proceedings would obviously be out of the question. In our opinion, no difference should, in this class of cases, be made in the application of this principle, by reason of the fact that the purchase is made at a sale publicly held or held at the instance of a Court in execution of a decree against the debottar estate. This view is supported by principles adopted in cases of the highest authority." After referring in detail to York Buildings Co. v. Mackenzie ((1795) 3 Paton, 378.), Nugent v. Nugent ([ 1908] 1 Ch. 547.) and other English decisions, the learned judges said " We hold accordingly that where a decree has been obtained against a shebait as representative of the debottar estate, he is not competent without the leave of the Court to purchase the debottar property in his personal capacity. In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to investigate whether the debottar estate has suffered a pecuniary loss by the sale of the property in question; but we may state that there is no reason to apprehend that the property has not been sold for its full value." They added that the sale could not be set aside so far as the execution creditor was concerned, and that the shebait might be entitled to some reimbursement from the surplus sale proceeds but that there were not sufficient materials on the record to determine that matter. Turning next to the question whether the conduct of the shebait was such that he should not be allowed to retain the office of trustee, the learned judges said that the Court in exercising its judicial discretion was guided by considerations of the welfare of the beneficiaries and of the trust estate, and that there must be a clear case of necessity for interference to save the trust property. After considering the facts with regard to the misconduct alleged they said " The consequence has been that, while during the time of his father, out of the receipts of the debottar estate savings were steadily effected and were invested in Government securities and landed properties, so as to raise the annual income from Rs. 4000 to Rs. 10,000 ; during his time, by reason of his unwise acts, the debottar estate has been involved in successive protracted litigations, is now burdened with heavy debts and has lost the most valuable portion of its assets. We are thus driven to the conclusion that his connection with the debottar estate has been singularly unfortunate and has led to the most unhappy results. But this is not all. Events have so shaped themselves that a situation has arisen which involves him in a clear conflict of duty and self-interest. In the view we have taken, the property sold in execution must be restored to the debottar estate, while the shebait must be reimbursed to an extent which requires judicial determination. .... It is plain that a person in this position cannot be allowed to hold the office of shebait in the best interests of the debottar estate." A decree was drawn up giving effect to the judgment, directing the appointment of a receiver of the trust property, and declaring the present first appellant should cease to be shebait from the date when the receiver took possession. Both defendants preferred appeals, which were consolidated. 1921. Feb. 14,15. Sir John Simon K.C., De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the appellants. The sale should not have been set aside having regard to the facts (a) that the shebait did not sell the property, nor procure it to be sold, and (b) tat he is found to have given a price which was its full market value. This was not the case of a purchase by a trustee for sale, consequently the transaction was not void, but merely voidable if he could not justify it upon the facts Thompson v. Eastwood (( 1877) 2 App. Cas. 215, 236.); Dougan v. Macpherson ([ 1902] A. C. 197 204.); Plowright v. Lambert. This was not the case of a purchase by a trustee for sale, consequently the transaction was not void, but merely voidable if he could not justify it upon the facts Thompson v. Eastwood (( 1877) 2 App. Cas. 215, 236.); Dougan v. Macpherson ([ 1902] A. C. 197 204.); Plowright v. Lambert. (( 1885) 52 L. T. 646, 652.) Upon the facts the purchase was justified ; not only was the price an ample one, but the evidence showed that the shebait tried to prevent this particular property from being sold under the decree on the ground that it was too valuable. A shebaits position towards the debottar property is not similar to that in England of a trustee towards the trust property. There is not that conflict of duty and interest which in England may arise from a trustees special knowledge with regard to the property sold, because in India all necessary information appears in public registers, and Order xxi., r. 66, provides what information the sale proclamation is to give. MacPherson v. Watt (( 1877) 3 App. Cas. 254, 266.) is distinguishable. The decision proceeded upon the basis that the solicitor who bought was the person conducting the sale. Here the shebait had no fiduciary duty towards the property at the time of the sale. Upon an examination of the facts of the case there was not any ground to justify the shebaits removal. Dunne K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the first respondent were not called upon. April 19. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. Many questions were originally involved in the dispute which has given rise to this appeal, but of these two only remain. The first relates to the continuance of the appellant Raja Peary Mohan Mukerji in the office of shebait to the debottar estate of Sri Sri Iswar Gopaleswar Shiva Thakur and Sri Sri Iswar Shridhar Thakur, and the second to the purchase in January, 1913, of a certain lot known as lot Bahirgora, which was sold in execution under circumstances to which their Lordships will briefly refer. By his will, dated September 11, 1840, Jaga Mohan Mukerji dedicated certain properties to the worship of the two Thakurs established by him, for the annual celebration of the Durga Puja, the Sradh of ancestors, and other pious usages, the will providing for the order of succession to the office of the shebait among the testators own descendants. The testator died shortly after the execution of his will, and in September of 1890 the succession to the shebaitship opened, owing to the death of the then shebait. Disputes arose as to who was the true successor, which resulted in a decree of January 29, 1894, that one Bijoy Krishna was the rightful shebait, but on the day of the decree he died. Further litigation then ensued between the sons of Bijoy Krishna and the Raja who is the appellant in the first of these appeals, which ultimately resulted in a decree of June 30, 1903, made by the Subordinate Judge in favour of the sons of Bijoy Krishna for Rs. 45,960, which sum it was ordered should be recovered by the plaintiffs out of the debottar estate in the hands of the Raja as its shebait. Appeals were taken from this judgment to the High Court, and again from the High Court to His Majesty in Council (( 1909) L. R. 37 I. A. 27.), but these appeals failed. Execution proceedings were then instituted in order to secure a sale out of the debottar estate of the lot that is now in dispute, and on January 14, 1913, the said lot was sold at a public Court sale for Rs. l,56,600 to the appellant in the second appeal, who is the son of the Raja. On February 17, 1913, proceedings were taken by Monohar Mukerji, who is the first respondent to these appeals, asking among other things for the removal of the Raja from the office of shebait and for an order to set aside the purchase of the estate. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, but he held, contrary to the contention of the Rajas son, that the purchase was benami and made with the Rajas money for his benefit. An appeal was taken from the decree following this judgment to the High Court of Calcutta and was allowed. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, but he held, contrary to the contention of the Rajas son, that the purchase was benami and made with the Rajas money for his benefit. An appeal was taken from the decree following this judgment to the High Court of Calcutta and was allowed. The High Court supported the view that the sale was in fact benami for the Raja who held a fiduciary position in relation to the estate, and they held that in these circumstances the purchase could not be supported. They also decided that the Raja should cease to be shebait and that the management of the estate should be vested in a receiver to be appointed by the Court. A decree was accordingly drawn up carrying out these views, and from this decree both the Raja and his son have brought the present appeals, which have been consolidated by an Order in Council. Upon the question of the removal of the Raja, the learned Subordinate Judge thought that there was no sufficient charge of misconduct to justify his removal; but the High Court took a different view, and thought that the protracted litigations by which the estate had become heavily burdened with debts, and the circumstances associated with the claims which he was seeking to establish against the estate for litigation expenses, were such as to render it undesirable that he should continue in the office. They also found that the purchase could not be sustained. Their Lordships are not prepared to interfere with these conclusions. The grounds for removing a shebait from his office may not be identical with those upon which a trustee would be removed in this country. The close intermingling of duties and personal interest which together make up the office of shebait may well prevent the closeness of the analogy, but as part of the office it is indisputable that there are duties which must be performed, that the estate does need to be safeguarded and kept in proper custody, and if it be found that a man in the exercise of his duties has put himself in a position in which the Court thinks that the obligations of his office can no longer be faithfully discharged, that is sufficient ground for his removal. It is this that forms the foundation of the judgment of the High Court, and the appellant has not satisfied their Lordships that the facts were misinterpreted 3 or the reasoning unsound. Upon the remaining question also their Lordships think that the High Court was right. The argument in favour of the appellant here also turns upon the dissimilarity between the office of shebait and the ordinary office of a trustee. A trustee for sale cannot purchase ; he cannot purchase because the same person cannot be both vendor and purchaser, and he who acts for another cannot also act for himself. But even if he be not a trustee for sale, if in any capacity he is trustee of the estate, although his incapacity to buy is not absolute and is subject to different limitations it is equally well established. A trustee may indeed acquire from beneficiaries who are sui juris an estate in which they are interested, but he can only do this if he has made the fullest disclosure to them of all the relevant and material facts within his knowledge affecting or that might affect the value and condition of the estate and the parties are at arms length, the cestui que trust knowing that he is dealing with the trustee. Otherwise the purchase is bad, and it is bad because any person who occupies a fiduciary relationship may be able by virtue of his position to acquire information with regard to the trust estate which he is not permitted to use for his own benefit. Their Lordships recognize the force of the argument that points out the dissimilarity between a shebait and trustees to whom this rule applies. There is no doubt that the word " trustee " covers a very large number of relationships, involving different obligations ; the word " trust," therefore, may be so used that it is intended to apply only to one class of such duties ; and it follows that rules and decisions which depend upon the special conditions attached to the particular class would not of necessity apply to another where these conditions did not exist. The rule forbidding the purchase of an estate by a person who stands in regard to his dealings with it in a fiduciary relationship is, however, general in its application. In the case of Nugent v. Nugent ([ 1907] 2 Ch. The rule forbidding the purchase of an estate by a person who stands in regard to his dealings with it in a fiduciary relationship is, however, general in its application. In the case of Nugent v. Nugent ([ 1907] 2 Ch. 292.) it was held that a receiver appointed by the Court cannot purchase the property of which he is receiver without the leave of the Court, even where the sale is not made in the action in which he was appointed, but by a mortgagee selling with leave outside the suit. Their Lordships think that this was a correct decision and shows the wide area of dispute which is covered by the rule. Further, in the present case it is now established by two concurrent findings of fact that the Raja purchased the property benami in the name of his son, and by this means concealed the fact that he was the real purchaser; their Lordships bear in mind that such classes of purchase are very common in India and are due to many considerations which may not find their counterpart here, yet none the less they can easily be made a cloak and cover for improper and even dishonest transactions, and they think the rule laid down by Lord St. Leonards in Lewis v. Hillman (( 1852) 3 H. L. C. 607.), that even if an attorney or agent can show that he is entitled to purchase, yet if instead of openly purchasing, he purchases in the name of a trustee or agent without disclosing the fact, no such purchase as that can stand for a single moment, should apply to this case. Their Lordships have not overlooked the fact that in the present instance the purchase was for an abundant price, one that is said to be largely above its market value, but such considerations cannot have weight where the purchase is challenged upon the grounds in the present suit. It is unnecessary to examine further in detail the law upon this matter, for it is fully, and in their Lordships opinion accurately, analysed in the judgment of the High Court, where the relevant authorities are quoted and properly applied. It is unnecessary to examine further in detail the law upon this matter, for it is fully, and in their Lordships opinion accurately, analysed in the judgment of the High Court, where the relevant authorities are quoted and properly applied. They think, therefore, that this appeal must fail and that an order must be made declaring that the purchase by the second appellant was invalid and that proper and necessary steps should be taken to secure the property ; and that the first appellant is entitled, subject as herein mentioned, to repayment of the purchase money. An account should be directed showing what, if anything, is due from the first appellant to the estate, and such money should be deducted from the purchase moneys, the balance, if any, of the moneys in Court to be paid out and the first appellant to have a charge on the estate for such sum. The appellants will pay the costs of the appeals. They will humbly advise His Majesty to this effect.