Lord Birkenhead (Lord Chancellor) :- Their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal fails. The contest has turned upon the facts, and the Board would not, in any ordinary case, have thought it necessary to make any detailed statement of the evidence and of the reasoning which have led them to this conclusion. The case, however, is not ordinary. It has involved a patient enquiry, extending over seven days, during which a mass of testimony has been adduced and sifted by the experienced counsel who have represented the appellant and the respondent respectively. The issues raised are of vital importance to the appellant. They involve his means of livelihood, his reputation, and his position in the calling which he has hitherto followed. Having regard to the office which he has filled in the Church of England, they are also of moment to all who are of that communion and to the Church itself. Their Lordships think it desirable, therefore, to discuss at some length those features in the case which, in the event, have proved decisive. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to state briefly the circumstances in which the appeal came to be heard before this Board. When their Lordships dealt with the matter previously, they advised His Majesty to grant leave to appeal. It was then, for obvious reasons, undesirable that any elaborate statement should be made of the grounds upon which that advice was given. They think it useful now, before discussing the matters principally at issue, to state upon what principles their Lordships decided that leave ought to be granted. The grounds upon which leave to appeal was sought fell under two heads-namely, those arising from the alleged misconduct of one of the assessors, and those based upon the allegation that the decision of the Consistory Court was against the weight of the evidence adduced before that Court. To support the first ground, the appellant produced before their Lordships two affidavits to show that one of the assessors had, before the trial in the Consistory Court, used expressions capable of bearing the construction that he had formed a bias against the appellant. To support the first ground, the appellant produced before their Lordships two affidavits to show that one of the assessors had, before the trial in the Consistory Court, used expressions capable of bearing the construction that he had formed a bias against the appellant. Under the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892 (55 and 56 Vic., c. 32), Section 2 (c), the assessors "Shall, for deciding a question of fact, be members of the Court ; and the decision of such question must either be the unanimous decision of the assessors, or that of the chancellor and at least a majority of the assessors." The assessors, therefore, occupy a position in deciding questions of fact which is not that ordinarily held by assessors, and is more closely analogous to that ordinarily occupied by a full member of the Court, or, in some respects, by a jury. The expression set out in the affidavit were of such a nature as would, if this ground for appeal had stood alone, have forced their Lordships to consider whether the statements were well founded, and, if so, whether they were not so grave as to disqualify the assessor from holding his office, and to vitiate the whole proceedings. As they came before their Lordships, the affidavits were uncontradicted, and owing to the procedure which had been necessarily followed they could not have been at that time contradicted. If, therefore, the Board had proceeded to deal with the matter upon this ground, they would have been forced to direct an adjournment, so as to give an opportunity to those conducting the prosecution, and to the assessor concerned, to answer the allegations and to address to their Lordships such observations as would assist them to a conclusion. This course would necessarily have entailed heavy cost alike upon the appellant and the respondent, and would have involved a further delay in the final disposal of the case, which would have been injurious both to the appellant himself and to the interests of the Church at large. Unfortunate as these consequences might have been, however, their Lordships would have had no choice but to direct such an adjournment, had it not been that it appeared to them that, for other reasons, leave to appeal must be granted, and that therefore a further hearing before the Board must, in any event, ensue. Unfortunate as these consequences might have been, however, their Lordships would have had no choice but to direct such an adjournment, had it not been that it appeared to them that, for other reasons, leave to appeal must be granted, and that therefore a further hearing before the Board must, in any event, ensue. Having regard to these considerations, their Lordships have not thought it necessary to go further into the questions which arise upon the affidavits, and express no opinion upon them. Before the questions of fact are considered, which it has been material to review upon the hearing of the petition, are considered, it appears desirable that their Lordships should indicate their view as to the principles which guide the Board in considering applications for leave to appeal upon facts. Appeals from the decision of the Consistory Court under the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892, have been comparatively rare. Only eight proceedings have come before this Board, two of which were appeals as of right upon a point of law. Of the remaining six :- Smith v. St. Albalns (Bishop) is not reported. It appears from the record that the allegation in this case was one of drunkenness. Leave to appeal on the facts was granted, but no record remains of the reasons which actuated their Lordships. The appeal was subsequently allowed on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge. 7th August, 1895, coram, Lord Herschell, L. C., Lord Watson, Lord Hobhouse, Lord Morris and Sir Richard Couch. The next case, Evans v. Barrett, is also unreported. Application for leave to appeal on the facts was made on the ground that certain evidence which the appellant had been prepared to produce had been excluded. Leave was refused, and Lord Watson in delivering the judgment of the Board said :- "It is sufficient to say that in it (an affidavit of the appellant) from beginning to end there is nothing to suggest to their Lordships that the petitioner is or was in possession of any evidence which would tend to shake the conclusions which the Court came to on the graver charges preferred against him, or even to displace their conclusions with respect to the charges of intoxication. Under these circumstances their Lordships will refuse leave to appeal." Evans v. Woods was an application for leave to appeal from a judgment of the Consistory Court of the Diocese of Worcester. Leave was refused, and the Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury), delivering the judgment of their Lordships, said : "It is impossible to suggest that any prima facie case has been made out. Ample evidence was before the Chancellor of the Consistory Court to justify the decision at which he arrived. It is idle to suggest that there is any ground for appeal on anything that has yet been seen or heard, and, indeed, even upon the present application, it is only suggested that some evidence might, or peradventure might, be forthcoming which might to some extent qualify the evidence given before. No definite proposition has been put before their Lordships, and no definite evidence suggested, in face of the fact that this gentleman himself, being a competent witness, did not tender himself for examination or deny the facts alleged against him. No new fact is now alleged that ought to reopen the inquiry." The next case is Moore v. Oxford (Bishop). The proceedings upon the petition for leave to appeal are not reported. Leave to appeal was granted, and the proceedings upon the appeal are reported. The Consistory Court convicted the appellant of definite immoral acts, and also of an immoral habit in that he had been habitually guilty of swearing and ribaldry, or, as the offence was stated in a further charge, of offences against the laws ecclesiastical, being offences against morality within the meaning of the Clergy Discipline Act, 1892, in that he was habitually guilty of swearing and ribaldry. On the first set of charges, those relating to a definite immoral act. their Lordships were of opinion that the charge broke down upon the ground that the statements of the only witness relied upon for the purpose of bringing the charge were uncorroborated by any conduct, act, or proof, and, being discredited by her own version of the transaction, could not be accepted as conclusive against the appellant. their Lordships were of opinion that the charge broke down upon the ground that the statements of the only witness relied upon for the purpose of bringing the charge were uncorroborated by any conduct, act, or proof, and, being discredited by her own version of the transaction, could not be accepted as conclusive against the appellant. On the second set of charges, those relating to swearing, their Lordships found that the appellant had on three or four occasions used language the use of which would be disgraceful to anybody, whether clergyman or layman, but they took the view that the offence contemplated by the statute-namely, of being habitually guilty of swearing and ribaldry, was not made out, and in these circumstances they were of opinion that the appeal should be allowed with respect to both sets of charges. In Lee v. Atherton leave to appeal was refused on the ground that the petition for leave was lodged six months after the delivery of the judgment of the Consistory Court-Rule 161 requiring a petition for leave to appeal on facts to be lodged in not more than sixteen days-and that no explanation was given of the delay such as would have justified their Lordships in enlarging the time under the powers conferred upon them by Rule 90. In Lovibond v. Lee-which is not reported leave to appeal on the facts was refused, and no reasons were given for their Lordships' decision. It is not easy to draw from these cases any principle which is of general application, or capable of affording much guidance to their Lordships in the consideration of the petition for leave to appeal in the present case. The statute itself leaves the matter at large, requiring their Lordships to grant leave if the appellant "satisfies the appellate Court that there is a prima facie case" (Section 4, sub-Section 2). The statute itself leaves the matter at large, requiring their Lordships to grant leave if the appellant "satisfies the appellate Court that there is a prima facie case" (Section 4, sub-Section 2). It may, however, be inferred from the observations of Lord Watson in Evans v. Barrett, which are set out above, of Lord Halsbury in Evans v. Woods, and from the proceedings in Moore v. Oxford (Bishop), that the petitioner must satisfy the Board, either that the evidence before the Consistory Court was not such as to justify the conclusion at which that Court arrived, that is, that the decision of that Court was against the weight of evidence, or that since the hearing before the Consistory Court the petitioner has obtained, and is now in a position to tender, definite evidence-the effect of which must be made clear-which, if it had been before the Consistory Court, might or would or ought to have affected the decisions. In the last case a satisfactory explanation must be offered to the Board as to why that evidence was not produced before the Consistory Court. In the present case, none of these doctrines, if they may so be termed, apply, but leave to appeal was granted upon the facts, not because the decision of the Consistory Court was, in their Lordships' opinion, contrary to the weight of evidence, but because the manner in which that evidence, or some of it, was presented to, and dealt with by, the Court was such as to render the whole trial unsatisfactory. The principal issues of fact before the Consistory Court in the present case were whether on two particular dates the appellant, who admittedly spent the night at the Bull Inn, Peterborough, was alone or in company with a woman unknown. If the appellant was accompanied by a woman on either date, he was guilty of an act immoral according to the law ecclesiastical. In the course of the oral testimony given before that Court, it became apparent that there existed, or were alleged to exist, documents in support of the allegation that, on one of those occasions at least, the appellant was not alone, and that, included in the bill for hotel accommodation which he discharged, there were items which were attributable to the presence of this alleged companion. Some of these documents were already in Court, but one of the most vital was not. This was a book, arranged somewhat in the nature of the cheque book, so that a slip could be torn from it and fastened as a receipt upon the bill rendered to the traveller. On this slip the total of the bill was entered, a second slip (which formed part of the book and was not detachable)-and a carbon paper being inserted behind it, so that words and figures written on the upper slip were impressed through the carbon upon the second piece of paper. When the existence of this book was disclosed in the Consistory Court, the book was sent for, but it only reached the Court when the case for the respondent had concluded and when Sir Marlay Samson, the appellant's counsel was in the act of making his final address to the Court in favour of his client. The book so produced disclosed that there were written upon the non-detachable slip words and figures which, when they were compared with the entries in a book called "the tabular book," made it clear that the bill for which the appellant had paid was in respect of two persons, and not of one. This book, when produced, must have made a great impression upon the minds of the members of the Consistory Court, as indeed it did upon the minds of their Lordships when produced before them, and, when joined with the other testimony, written or oral, against the appellant, formed an essential link in the chain of evidence which, in their Lordship's view, makes it impossible to interfere with the decision. This very circumstance rendered the manner in which it came before the Consistory Court below fatal to the proceedings of that Court. No opportunity was, or in the circumstances could be, available to the appellant, or to his advisers, of considering the effect of a piece of evidence very damaging and, in the issue before the Consistory Court, possibly conclusive. It might have been that, upon a more minute examination of the book itself, or upon a comparison between it and the other books kept at the Bull Inn, some explanation could have been offered or some mistake discovered. It might have been that, upon a more minute examination of the book itself, or upon a comparison between it and the other books kept at the Bull Inn, some explanation could have been offered or some mistake discovered. As events have turned out, there were circumstances in relation to the books which were open to, and in fact have received, much damaging comment, but at the moment the appellant's mouth was to all intents and purposes closed. Sir Marlay Samson his counsel could not have been expected to appreciate so swiftly the effect of this piece of evidence upon his client's position that he could then and there, in the closing stages of the proceedings, address his own mind and direct those of the Court to a serious consideration of the documents. It appeared to their Lordships, therefore, that a decision arrived at in such circumstances, and necessarily influenced by a piece of evidence adduced at such a time and in such a manner, was so unsatisfactory that it could not stand, and they accordingly advised that leave to appeal should be given. Upon the hearing of the appeal before this Board, the proceedings took the form of a retrial. There were called before the Board, the witnesses, who gave evidence before the Consistory Court, and a number of persons who did not, and their Lordships had also before them the documentary evidence produced below. This mass of oral and written testimony has been examined in minute detail. Every particle of the fabric which has been built up to establish the truth of the charges against the appellant has been the subject of debate and explanation. He is not charged with any offence against the ordinary criminal law, but with an "offence against the laws ecclesiastical, being an offence against morality," and upon that charge he has been "prosecuted." He is entitled to have such an offence proved against him as clearly as if he were the subject of a prosecution before an ordinary Criminal Court, and he is to be convicted, if at all, not on grounds of suspicion, however strong, not by reason of the peril to the Church of an acquittal on doubtful evidence, but only upon such proof as, if the charge were of an offence against the criminal law, would require a verdict of guilty. (His Lordship after a lengthy discussion of the evidence, proceeded as follows about what His Lordship termed the crucial point in the case :-) They have had before them the visitors' book or register in which entries occur in respect of both visits, on March 14 and 15 and 2nd April, 1920. Obviously if "J. Wakeford and wife" is in the appellant's handwriting the case is at an end. (Then the entry was commented on.) The appellant himself says that the words "and wife" resemble his handwriting "very closely." Mitchell, the handwriting expert called by the prosecution, has compared the words with other handwriting of the appellant, and says that they were written by him or are "a very skilful forgery." There can be no question, therefore, that if the words were not written by the appellant they were written by someone who desired to create the impression that they were; in other words, they are the work either of the appellant or of a forger, and we are thus driven back again upon the theory of conspiracy, and though in this case we are not obliged to date it so early as March 14, we are imperatively forced to the conclusion that it was as early as April 3. Their Lordships now turn to the examination of the words themselves. The expert called for the prosecution gave his evidence with great candour. "It is not possible," he says, "to say definitely that anybody wrote a particular thing. All you can do is to point out the similarities and draw conclusions from them." This is the manner in which expert evidence on matters of this kind ought to be presented to the Court, who have to make up their minds, with such assistance as can be furnished to them by those who have made a study of these matters, whether a particular writing is to be assigned to a particular person. Questions depending upon handwriting are in many cases doubtful, and in the past have given, and in the future will give, cause for great anxiety in Courts of justice. But upon them, as upon other matters, it is necessary to come to a conclusion, and in this case the Board have no hesitation as to the conclusion which should be reached. But upon them, as upon other matters, it is necessary to come to a conclusion, and in this case the Board have no hesitation as to the conclusion which should be reached. (His Lordship discussed the handwriting, and held that the writing furnished an overwhelming corroboration of the other evidence as to the guilt of the accused.) Their Lordships have applied their minds to this case with great care and with much solicitude. But the conclusions which they have reached seem to them inevitable. Reluctant as they were to believe such a charge against a man in the position, and with the history, of the appellant, they scanned vigilantly every circumstances and every argument which could possibly be urged in his favour. They have reached the conclusion that the judgment of the Consistory Court must be upheld. It is a source of satisfaction to them to find that the views which they entertain are shared by the Right Reverend Prelates who have been good enough to give them their assistance upon this occasion. The result, therefore, is that their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty to dismiss the appeal. Costs must follow the event. The appellant's action has involved the Bishop of Lincoln in heavy expenses, and their Lordships see no reason why he should not, so far as may be, be recouped for the expenditure which he has incurred in the execution of a public duty. Appeal dismissed.