Judgement Appeal (No. 57 of 1919) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 25, 1910) affirming a decree [@ page LRIA 535] of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam (September 30, 1907). The punchayetdars of a temple held a decree against the respondents or their predecessors in title for mesne profits. In 1905 the then punchayetdars (the appellants) applied to execute the decree. The petition was signed on their behalf by one Raghava Naicken their agent, and by a first grade pleader. Naicken held a special power of attorney from the decree-holders authorizing him (inter alia) to " execute vakalat to vakils to sign execution petitions." He had retained the pleader to support the petition which he (the agent) had verified. The judgment debtors con tended that the petition was not duly presented, since neither it nor the retainer was signed by the trustees. The Subordinate Judge on December 31, 1906, rejected the objection. The judgment debtors at a later stage of the execution proceedings renewed their objection, and the Subordinate Judge by a decree made on September 30, 1907, allowed it to prevail, and dismissed the petition. Upon appeal to the High Court the decision was affirmed. The learned judges (Seshagiri Ayyar and Napier JJ.) after referring to ss. 36 and 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, said " the decree-holders could not legally authorize the person who signed the vakalat to present the application Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 534 ( 1920- 1921) Thiruvenkatasami Iyengar V. Pavadai Pillai 272 for execution himself, and that being so he could not authorize any one else to do so." 1921. May 3. Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The Subordinate Judge held in 1906 that the petition was duly presented, and rejected the present objection; he had no power subsequently to review or set aside his own decision. Raja of Ramnad v. Velusami Tevar. (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 45.) But in any case the petition was regularly presented, since it was signed by a pleader duly appointed who, under s. 36 of the Code, had power to sign on behalf of the decree holders. He did not purport to sign as a " recognized agent " under s. 37, and it is not material that neither he nor Naicken were so. He did not purport to sign as a " recognized agent " under s. 37, and it is not material that neither he nor Naicken were so. This [@ page LRIA 536] was not a case of delegation of authority; Naicken was duly authorized to appoint a pleader on behalf of the decree-holders and did so. [Reference was made to Badri Prasad v. Bhagwati Dhar. (( 1894) I. L. R. 16 A. 240.)] The respondents did not appear. May 20. The judgment of the High Court was delivered by LORD ATKINSON. This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated November 25, 1910, which affirmed the decree of the Sub ordinate Judge of Kumbakonam, dated September 30, 1907, and made on an execution petition No. 279 of 1905. The appellants are the punchayetdars of a temple and as such hold a decree for mesne profits against the respondents or their predecessors in title. Their petition praying for the execution of this decree was dismissed by the Subordinate Judge, and his judgment was upheld by the High Court. From this latter decision the decree-holders have brought this appeal. There were nine plaintiffs originally in the suit. All but three of them have died or resigned or been removed from the trusteeship. The appellants, to use the words of s. 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, are resident within the local limits of jurisdiction of the Court within which limits the application by petition was to be made, and the sale applied for carried out. The case of the appellants does not come within any one of the sub-sections of s. 37. The execution petition No. 279 of 1905 was not signed by any of the appellants. It was signed by a pleader appointed in writing to make the application embodied in the petition, and that writing was filed in the Court. The case of the appellants does not come within any one of the sub-sections of s. 37. The execution petition No. 279 of 1905 was not signed by any of the appellants. It was signed by a pleader appointed in writing to make the application embodied in the petition, and that writing was filed in the Court. Both the High Court at Madras and the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam held that this petition was not validly presented, because, to use the words of the judgment of the High Court, " The person who executed the vakalat to the pleader to act on his behalf was not a ‘recognised agent of the [@ page LRIA 537] decree holder as defined under s. 37 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, and could not have presented the application for execution himself. Under s. 36 of the Civil Procedure Code the pleader appointed can only do what might be done by the party on whose behalf he is appointed." The only question for their Lordships decision is whether the construction in this passage put upon ss. 36 and 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure is their true construction. Their Lordships do not think it is their true construction for this reason that it confounds the intending litigant, the pleaders client, with the intermediary by whom, as the agent of that litigant, the pleader is appointed to act on the litigants behalf. The pleader is not appointed, on behalf of the intermediary or agent, to act on the agents behalf, but by the agent on behalf of his principal, the litigant, to act on the litigants behalf. The litigant is at once the principal of the agent and the client of the pleader. The lines of s. 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure immediately preceding the proviso run thus "be made or done by the party in person or by Law. Rep. 48 Ind. App. 534 ( 1920- 1921) Thiruvenkatasami Iyengar V. Pavadai Pillai 273 his recognised agent or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf/ The possessive pronoun " his " all through this sentence refers to the " party "—i.e., the litigant—not the intermediary or agent. This construction gives a reasonable and natural meaning to the provisions of s. 36. 534 ( 1920- 1921) Thiruvenkatasami Iyengar V. Pavadai Pillai 273 his recognised agent or by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf/ The possessive pronoun " his " all through this sentence refers to the " party "—i.e., the litigant—not the intermediary or agent. This construction gives a reasonable and natural meaning to the provisions of s. 36. The application is to be made or done by the party in person or by the recognized agent of the party in person, or by the duly appointed pleader of the party in person, while the other construction would leave entirely uncovered the case where the party himself in person without the intervention of any agent duly appoints his own pleader to act on his own behalf. In the present case, the appellants on September 8, 1902, executed, not a general power of attorney, but a special power of attorney in favour of one Raghava Naicken, authorizing him on their behalf to, amongst other things, " execute vakalat to vakils to sign execution petitions, and put in affidavits and to conduct all necessary proceedings " in this suit. On the same day this same Raghava Naicken, [@ page LRIA 538] the appellants agent, authorized the pleader to appear in the Tanjore Court to present the execution petition verified by him, the agent, to examine witnesses, argue, etc. No doubt the words run "to appear on my behalf in the Tanjore Court" ; and he describes himself as general agent of the appellants under a general power of attorney, but that was a misrecital. The power of attorney was not a general power of attorney, but a special one, and the words, " on my behalf" are misleading. The execution petition was to be presented on behalf of the appellants ; they were the only persons who had the right to put the decree into execution and have the property of the debtors attached and sold. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the judgment appealed from, as well as that of the Subordinate Judge which it affirmed, was erroneous, and should be reversed, and a declaration made that the appellants decree should be put into execution. They will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondents will pay the costs of the appeal.