Judgement Appeal (No. 2 of 1920) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (January 30, 1917) reversing a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Moradabad (August 12, 1915). The suit was instituted by the appellant as the sisters daughter of one Kunwar Randhir Singh, deceased, to recover from the respondent a one-twelfth share of the estate of the deceased. She claimed as one of the next of kin of the deceased under the Indian Succession Act (X. of 1865) on the ground that the deceased had died a Christian, and intestate, and that that Act regulated the succession to his estate. The respondent was in possession of the estate as surviving brother of the deceased. The appellant, who was pardanishin, also claimed to set aside a deed dated April 29, 1912, by which she had agreed to relinquish all her rights of succession to the deceased in consideration of a monthly payment of Rs.50. The respondent by his written statement denied that the Indian Succession Act, 1865, governed the succession, and contended that the deed was binding. The Additional Subordinate Judge made a decree in favour of the appellant. He held that the deed of April 29, 1912, was not binding upon her ; he found that the deceased died a Christian and that the succession to his estate was governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1865. On appeal the High Court set aside the decree of the trial judge. The learned judges (Richards C.J. and Banerji J.) held that the deed was binding upon the plaintiff ; in their view it was merely a ratification of a family arrangement made in 1908 as a compromise, and had been thoroughly understood and willingly executed by the plaintiff. The finding of the trial judge that the deceased died a Christian was not differed from ; but the view that the deed was binding made it unnecessary to consider whether the Act applied. The judgment of the Judicial Committee and the arguments of counsel upon the present appeal dealt to a great extent with the question whether upon the facts the respondent had established the validity of the deed by discharging the onus upon him having regard to the appellant being parda-nishin. That question depending upon well-established principles, a detailed report of the judgment and arguments upon it does not appear to be necessary. 1921. May 6, 9, 10. That question depending upon well-established principles, a detailed report of the judgment and arguments upon it does not appear to be necessary. 1921. May 6, 9, 10. Dube for the appellant contended that on the facts the deed of April 29, 1912, was invalid, the respondent not having satisfied the onus upon him to show that it was not obtained by undue influence. Reference was made to Sajjad Husain v. Wazir Ali Khan. (( 1912) L. R. 39 I. A. 156.) E. B. Raikes for the respondent. The Indian Succession Act did not apply to this case. It was laid down in Abraham v. Abraham (9 Moo. I. A. 195, 241.) that a Hindu converted to Christianity may, if he think fit, continue to be bound by Hindu law, although he has renounced the Hindu religion see also Gajapathi Radhika v. Gajapathi Nilamani. (( 1870) 14 Suth. W. R. (P. C.) 33.) The evidence in the present case showed that the deceased wished to live as a Hindu although he had renounced the Hindu religion, and indicates a wish that he should be treated as a Hindu for purposes of succession. It is conceded that there is a series of decisions of the Madras High Court, commencing with In re Joseph Vathiar (( 1872) 7 Mad. H. C. 121.), and including Tellis v. Saldanha (( 1886) I. L. R. 10 Mad. 69.), which are contrary to the respondents contention that the deceased could so elect. Those cases were followed by the Bombay High Court in Dagree v. Pacotti San Jao. (( 1895) I. L. R. 19 B. 783.) But a contrary, and it is submitted a correct view, was taken by that Court in Francis Ghosal v. Gabri Ghosal. (( 1906) I. L. R. 31 B. 25.) The whole question is, what is the meaning of " Hindu " in s. 331 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865 ? In Rani Bhagwan Kuar v. Jogendra Chandra Bose (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 249.), the Board held that Sikhs were included in the term. The policy of the administration of justice in India is to secure to all people in that country the rights which they have enjoyed for generations ; those rights are preserved to Hindus who become Christians. [Reference was also made to Lopes v. Lopes. (( 1868) 5 Bom. The policy of the administration of justice in India is to secure to all people in that country the rights which they have enjoyed for generations ; those rights are preserved to Hindus who become Christians. [Reference was also made to Lopes v. Lopes. (( 1868) 5 Bom. H. C. (O. C. J.) 172.)] On the question of the validity of the deed, the High Court rightly held upon the evidence that the appellant thoroughly understood the transaction. The absence of independent advice is only an element for consideration and not fatal to validity Kali Baksh Singh v. Ram Gopal Singh. (( 1913) L. R. 41 I. A. 23.) Dube was not called upon to reply. June 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree, dated January 30, 1917, of the High Court of Judicature for the North-Western Provinces at Allahabad, which reversed a judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Moradabad, dated August 12, 1915. The suit was instituted by the appellant, as the sisters daughter of one Kunwar Randhir Singh Sahib, deceased, to recover from the respondent (who, as his surviving brother, was in possession of his estate) a one-twelfth share of that estate. To this one-twelfth share the appellant would be entitled to succeed under the provisions of the Indian Succession Act. This would be so, Kunwar Randhir Singh having died a Christian, and the Act accordingly regulating the succession to his estate. An argument will be hereafter noted which challenges this proposition and alleges that in the circumstances of Randhir and his family it must be concluded that the Indian Succession Act does not apply to his case, and that the succession to his property is governed by the Mitakshara law. The defendants, however, substantially found their case upon the existence of a deed, dated April 29, 1912, whereby the plaintiff is alleged to have relinquished all her rights in respect of her inheritance. It is part of the plaint accordingly to have this deed declared invalid. Its annulment was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, but the High Court have upheld it. It is part of the plaint accordingly to have this deed declared invalid. Its annulment was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, but the High Court have upheld it. [Their Lordships after considering the circumstances in which the deed of April 29, 1912, was signed by the appellant said ] The deed, in short, is a deed substantially without any consideration by a pardanishin donor of her entire property in favour of a donee who, or whose representatives, submit the prepared document to her and obtain within the parda her signature. It is the established law of India in these circumstances that the strongest and most satisfactory proof ought to be given by the person who claims under a sale or gift from them that the transaction was a real and bona fide one, and fully understood by the lady whose property is dealt with. The cases upon the subject were discussed and the law as thus cited was repeated in Sajjad Husain v. Wazir Ali Khan. (L. R. 39 I. A. 156.) When, however, the law is that the lady must fully understand the transaction, this is but a secondary way of saying that it is the obligation of the donee in any transaction proceeding from her to see that she does so understand it. The relations of parties demand that this duty be performed, and when Courts of law declare that the onus rests upon the donee of showing that he did so, that, of course, is founded upon the fundamental fact that it was his duty to do it. If accordingly this obligation thus arising out of the relations of the parties be not fulfilled, the case for rescission and consequent remedy is clear. These principles apply to the present suit. [Their Lordships judgment, after considering and rejecting the ground upon which the High Court (reversing the trial judge) had upheld the validity of the deed, continued as follows ] It is only necessary in a few words to allude to an argument submitted to the Board by the learned counsel for the respondent, the object of which seemed to be to suggest that, even accepting the view that the deceased was a Christian, still he had by his acts made such an indication as the law would respect, to the effect that his succession was not to be governed by the Indian Succession Act. Their Lordships can give no countenance to such a principle. It is unavailing to quote the cases of Abraham v. Abraham (9 Moo. I. A. 195.) or Gajapathi Radhika v. Gajapathi Nilamani. (14 Suth. W. R. (P. C.) 33.) These cases preceded the Indian Succession Act and cannot modify or interpret it. By s. 2 of that Act it is enacted " Except as provided by this Act, or by any other law for the time being in force, the rules herein contained shall constitute the law of British India applicable to all cases of intestate or testamentary succession." This is the general rule, and the exception which bears upon the present case is s. 331, which says that " The provisions of this Act shall not apply to intestate or testamentary succession to the property of any Hindu....." If, accordingly, the late Randhir Singh had remained in or become a convert to Hinduism, the exception would apply. The question accordingly is, Was the late owner of this estate, or was he not, a Hindu ? If he was, the Mitakshara law would apply. If he was a Christian the Indian Succession Act would apply. The mutter has been fully investigated. Among other things, for instance, in the words of the Sub ordinate Judge " The plaintiff has proved the baptisms, marriage and burial certificates of the deceased; vide evidence given by the Chaplains Father J. Chrysostom and Father Angelo and by F. ONeill, barrister-at-law. The above evidence proves beyond doubt that Kunwar Randhir Singh in his latter portion of life was a Christian and died as a Christian." It is unnecessary to dwell upon the subject, because in a former litigation the respondent himself admitted these facts. But the argument is that, notwithstanding this, the Hindu law of succession should apply to this deceaseds estate. A situation of nothing but confusion could be thus produced. The plain law of the Indian Succession Act would be eviscerated, and in each case inquiry might have to be entered upon as to whether a deceased subject of the Crown wished or by his acts compelled that the law of the land should not apply to his case. A situation of nothing but confusion could be thus produced. The plain law of the Indian Succession Act would be eviscerated, and in each case inquiry might have to be entered upon as to whether a deceased subject of the Crown wished or by his acts compelled that the law of the land should not apply to his case. A particular subject can settle that in India, as in other parts of the Empire, by exercising—whatever be his religion—his power of testacy, and definitely declaring how he desires his affairs to be regulated so far as his own individual property is concerned. In this case Kunwar Randhir Singh did not do so, and it is not for a Court to enter upon an examination of his conduct so as to prevent the Indian law of intestate succession getting its full and proper application. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge should be restored, and that the respondent should pay the costs of the appeal.