Judgement Appeal (No. 107 of 1920) by special leave from a judgment and decree (July 27, 1917) of the High Court reversing a decree of the Subordinate Judge, Second Court, at Arrah. The suit was brought by the respondent against the appellant claiming a sum alleged to be due to him as a pension under an ekrarnama dated June 15, 1906. The terms of the ekrarnama and the circumstances in which it was executed appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The respondent by his plaint alleged that the ekrarnama was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the raj, and claimed to recover the pension, either (1.) from the general assets of the Maharani in the hands of the appellant, or (2.) from the savings of the estate, and the uncollected rents due to the estate at her death, or (3.) from her personal properties and stridhan. The appellant by his written statement pleaded (inter alia) that there was no consideration for the ekrarnama, further that the Maharani was only a tenant for life under the will of the late Maharaja, and that the ekrarnama was not binding upon him (the appellant) or upon the raj reasat. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. He held that upon the true construction of the ekrarnama the Maharani did not undertake a personal liability for the pension, and that she had no power to bind the estate. He found that the appellant had received the personal properties of the Maharani. Upon appeal to the High Court the decision was reversed. The judgment was delivered by Sir Edward Chamier C.J. (Sharfuddin J. concurring). The learned Chief Justice was of opinion that the ekrarnama did not create a charge upon the raj reasat in the hands of the present appellant, but created a personal liability against the Maharani, and that the pension was recoverable from the property left by her. He held that there was consideration, since the document stated that the plaintiff had given up his practice and that the object was to compensate him if he chose to resume it. He was prepared to accept the plaintiffs evidence that before accepting the employment he had received a verbal assurance that he should not be a loser, but he thought that the result would be the same if that evidence was not accepted. He was prepared to accept the plaintiffs evidence that before accepting the employment he had received a verbal assurance that he should not be a loser, but he thought that the result would be the same if that evidence was not accepted. The High Court made a decree for the sum claimed with interest at 6 per cent., to be recovered only from property of the late Maharani in the hands of the present appellant and not duly administered by him. 1921. June 16. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the appellant. There was no consideration for the ekrarnama within the definition in s. 2 (d) of the Indian Contract Act (IX. of 1872). If there was any request it was in 1902, and had no relation to the promise in 1906. Sect. 2 (d) must be read in conjunction with s. 2 (a) (b) and (c). Further, on the true construction of the ekrarnama the Maharani did not undertake a personal liability. She intended and purported to bind the raj reasat. If there was consideration the promise was binding upon her so long as she was alive and occupied the gaddi. On her death there was no further liability. Lastly, on the facts, the appellant was not an executor de son tort. [Reference was made to Bhagbutti Dall v. Chowdhry Bholanath. (( 1875) L.R. 2 I.A. 256.)] Dunne K.C. and Dube for the respondent. There was consideration for the ekrarnama on the ground stated by the Chief Justice, also in that the respondent continued his services to the neglect of his profession. The ekrarnama affected a change in the terms of the service. On the true construction of the document the Maharani undertook personally to pay the pension, whether or not she contemplated that the liability should be taken over by her successors or the gaddi. It was concurrently found that the appellant had in his hands properties of the deceased Maharani. July 5. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ROBERT STOUT. This is an appeal by Maharaja Kesho Prasad Singh against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge of the second Court at Arrah, which had dismissed the suit with costs. The suit was to recover Rs. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR ROBERT STOUT. This is an appeal by Maharaja Kesho Prasad Singh against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The High Court reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge of the second Court at Arrah, which had dismissed the suit with costs. The suit was to recover Rs. 5445 and the basis of the claim rests on an ekrarnama given by Maharani Beni Prasad Kueri, widow of Raja Sri Radha Prasad Singh Bahadur, K.C.I.E., gaddinashin and proprietress of Raj Reasat Dumraon (Dumraon estate) in pergana Bhojpur, district Shahabad, by caste an Ujjain Chhatri and by occupation a zamindar. The Dumraon Raj is impartible and the estate is an important one and of considerable extent. The family of the Maharaja trace their pedigree back for many centuries. The widow before named managed the estate after the death of her husband ; it had been devised to her for the term of her life by the will of her husband. A great number of questions was raised before the Subordinate Judge, and no less than seventeen issues were framed. These issues were issues of law and fact. In the High Court these issues were reviewed, and a decree was made for the payment of the principal sum claimed with interest at 6 per cent, per annum, from the end of each month till realization ; that the decree was to be executed only against the property of the Maharani in the appellants hands, which had not been duly administered by him. According, therefore, to this decree, the liability of the appellant was only as an administrator of the estate of the Maharani. The case has, however, been argued, and the respondent has claimed that he is entitled to his claim against the appellant on one of two grounds—that is to say, either against him as an administrator de son tort of the estate of the Maharani or as the owner of the Dumraon estate. The case of the respondent rests on the ekrarnama, and it was contended that this document binds the administrator of the Maharanis estate and also the owner of the Dumraon estate. The respondent was a pleader of the Courts, and had had conversations with the Maharani about becoming the manager of the estate. The case of the respondent rests on the ekrarnama, and it was contended that this document binds the administrator of the Maharanis estate and also the owner of the Dumraon estate. The respondent was a pleader of the Courts, and had had conversations with the Maharani about becoming the manager of the estate. At one or more of the interviews, his statement is that she said that if he gave up his practice in Court, and became the manager of the estate, she would see that he should not be the loser by so doing. There is no mention of such a promise in the contract of employment. This was evidenced by the letter sent by the Maharani to the respondent, and dated May 29, 1902. It reads as follows (omitting formal portions) " After expressing my desire to meet you I have to say that as Mr. Charles Fox, the manager, has resigned his post, I think it necessary that some competent man should live at my place and help me, so I write to you that you will please live at my place and execute the orders which I may issue to you, and will pay you Rs. 1200 per month as salary." The respondent entered on his work as manager, and on June 15, 1906, the ekrarnama was executed. The draft of this document was, before signature by the Maharani, seen by the respondent, and he seems to have made no objection to its terms. [After stating that the High Court adopted a translation of the material part of the ekrarnama differing from that adopted by the Subordinate Judge, which translation was set out, the judgment continued ] The translation adopted by the High Court of this part of the document reads as follows "I, therefore, in order to safeguard against the loss which the said Munshi may sustain, if perchance he vacates this post for any reason in future, I think it just and proper that if in future the said Munshi gives up this service for any reason or he has to resign the service according to his wishes or against his wishes for any other reason, and under any circumstance, justifiable or unjustifiable, he, the said Munshi, shall get Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred) monthly which amounts to Rs. 500 (rupees five hundred) monthly which amounts to Rs. 6000 (rupees six thousand) annually, as pension for life from the date he resigns the post of manager of Raj Reasat Dumraon, and I hope that by allowing this (torn) if perchance he, according to his desire, reverts to the profession of pleadership, he shall get to some extent compensation for the loss he may sustain for leaving his profession after (? for) a long time, and he will pass his old age in comfort. The heirs and representatives of me, the executant, and the Gaddinashin and administrators of Raj Reasat Dumraon should fully comply with the (terms of) this deed." There does not seem to be much difference in the language, so far as the creation of a liability on the part of the administrator of the estate of the Maharani is concerned, between the two translations. The respondent rests his case on the translation accepted by the High Court. The question, therefore, is Do the words used in the accepted translation show that the Maharani agreed or contracted with the respondent that, after her death, her executor or administrator should pay the pension named ? The ekrarnama provides that the respondent is to get Rs. 500 monthly, for life, from the date he resigns his post as manager, and it goes on to say that the Maharani hopes that by allowing this sum, he will pass his old age in comfort; but then comes the next, and important, sentence, as to who is to pay this, and the words already quoted show that there are two different parties mentioned—namely, first, her heirs and representatives, and, secondly, the owner or administrators of the Raj Dumraon estate, and the ekrarnama says that these parties " should fully comply with the terms of this deed." Are these words a binding promise to pay such a pension, or are they only a recommendation by the lady to two different parties to comply with the deed—i.e., to pay the pension ? If it had been intended to provide that the pension was to be a right of the respondent to obtain this money, the words are surely insufficient to effect such an intention. In the accepted translation, the words are that they " should fully comply " with the terms of the deed. She did not treat, therefore, the ekrarnama as an ordinary contract. In the accepted translation, the words are that they " should fully comply " with the terms of the deed. She did not treat, therefore, the ekrarnama as an ordinary contract. It has to be noticed that the work which the respondent did was work for the estate, not personal work for the Maharani. Why then should her personal estate be bound to pay a pension to this servant of the estate—namely, the respondent ? Their Lordships are of opinion that the ekrarnama is not in terms a contract binding the executor or administrators of the Maharani to pay the pension, nor can it be said that it is a binding contract on the owner or administrators of the Raj Dumraon estate to pay such a pension. Being of this opinion, it is unnecessary to consider whether the appellant was ever the administrator of the estate or the other questions raised in the appeal. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal must be allowed with costs, both here and below, and that the decree of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit be restored. They agree with the opinion expressed by the judges of the High Court, that in the Court below a mass of irrelevant matter was introduced, and that two documents specified have been printed that were irrelevant. The cost of printing these documents (i.e., p. 274 to p. 348 and p. 351 to p. 481 in the printed record) must be borne by the appellant, and the Registrar of the Privy Council should disallow all costs of, and incidental to, these irrelevant documents when taxing the costs of the appeal incurred in England. (For a similar order see appeal reported at L. R. 46 I. A. 299.) Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.