Lord Phillimore :- The circumstances of this case ate as follows : One Chhatrapat Singh, who was a land owner in Bengal, was also engaged in commercial transactions, as was his father before him. Both became involved in difficulties, and both at times resorted to various devices for protecting themselves and their property against their creditors. In 1903 the first respondent, who was a creditor of Chhatrapat and whom it is convenient to call the decree-bolder, issued an execution against seven properties collectively known as the Sukhsena Group, one of these being the Mahal known as No. 429. Thereupon Chhatrapat's wife, Jamaber Kumari, put in a claim to the properties, saying that they were heirs, and prcducing title-deed vesting them in her. Her claim was disallowed in the local Court as regards six of the properties, as being benami. As regards the seventh, No 429, it fell under the same conditions, and there is no doubt that in the opinion of the Judge she was as much a benamidar for her husband in respect of this as in respect of the other six; but it happened that it was not within his district or his jurisdiction and therefore be could pronounce nothing upon it. In respect of the other six, Jamaher Kumari appealed to the High Court and her appeal was dismissed. The decision in the local Court was given on the 20th July, 1903 and the decision in the High Court on the 4th January, 1904. On the 30th July 1904, the decree-holder endeavoured to execute his decree in the proper Court against the Mahal No. 429, when he was met by a claim put forward on behalf of the father of the present appellant. It is convenient to call the father the purchaser. Certain proceedings thereupon took place, the upshot of which was that the decree-holder was not allowed to execute his decree summarily and had to bring the action which is the subject of the present appeal. The case on behalf of the purchaser was simply that on the 6th July, 1904, at a time when the property was not under attachment, be bought Mahal No. 429 for one lakh and ten thousand rupees, paid for it, took his conveyance and entered into possession of the property. The case on behalf of the purchaser was simply that on the 6th July, 1904, at a time when the property was not under attachment, be bought Mahal No. 429 for one lakh and ten thousand rupees, paid for it, took his conveyance and entered into possession of the property. The case on behalf of the decree-holder was that the transaction was a sham and that the purchaser was only a benamidar for Chhatrapat The litigation has taken a singular course. The plaint to which not only the purchaser, but Jamaher Kumari, and Chhatrapat, were made defendants, after stating the decree-holder's title as execution creditor, proceeded to narrate various assurances by which the property in Mahal No. 429 had passed to Jamaher Kumari; and then averred that she held it as benamidar for Chhatrapat, and that she and Chhatrapat had executed the deed whereby they assumed to sell it to the purchaser. It then averred that the conveyance was a fraudulent document without consideration created by Chhatrapat in collusion with his wife and concurred in by the purchaser, who was aware of the indebtedness and evil motive of Chhatrapat and became his benamidar for the purpose of helping him in his wrongful endeavour to defraud the decree-holder. The defence denied the allegations of fraud and collusion and averred that the defendant was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, having taken a conveyance from both husband and wife, so that it did not matter which of the two was the real owner. Upon this the learned Subordinate Judge framed the following issue :- "Is the kobala executed by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in favour of defendant No. 1 collusive, fraudulent and without consideration? Is defendant No. 1 a mere benamidar of defendant No. 3? Was the kobala executed to delay or defraud the creditors of defendant No. 3?" The burden of proving this issue being upon the plaintiff and none-the-less so because he alleged fraud and collusion, he called three witnesses and no more. (Evidence was here discussed and the conclusion was as follows :-) There are some elements of suspicion. Was the kobala executed to delay or defraud the creditors of defendant No. 3?" The burden of proving this issue being upon the plaintiff and none-the-less so because he alleged fraud and collusion, he called three witnesses and no more. (Evidence was here discussed and the conclusion was as follows :-) There are some elements of suspicion. It is for these reasons that their Lordships have entered more minutely into the details of the case than they otherwise might have done; but upon the whole the decree-holder did not discharge the burden of proof which was upon him, and the suit was rightly dismissed by the Subordinate Judge. In a not dissimilar case [Sreemanchunder Dey v. Gopaulchunder Chuckerbutty (1)] their Lordships observed as follows :- (1) (1866) 11 M.I.A. 28=7 W.R. 10 = 1 Suther 651 = 2 Sar. 215 (P.C.). "Undoubtedly there are in the evidence circumstances which may create suspicion, and doubt may be entertained with regard to the truth of the case made by the Appellant; but in matters of this description it is essential to take care that the decision of the Court rests not upon suspicion, but upon legal grounds, established by legal testimony." The same principles ought to be applied to the decision in the present appeal. One other matter was pressed upon their Lordships. On a supplementary record there are documents to show that after the decision in the High Court, Jamaher Kumari applied for registration and mutation of name in respect of this Mahal, alleging that "the estate was benami in the name of Mansukhbhai Btaggubhai who has been succeeded by Seth Maniklalbhai Mansukhbhai, but in some civil cases the said Mansukhbhai Bhaggubhai having been declared benamidar it is no longer necessary to keep the estate benami, hence this application." And that she called two witnesses to prove that the estate was now in the actual possession, making, it should be observed, a case in one respect contradictory to that now set up by the first respondent, because she put herself in the position of true owner and not of benamidar for her husband. These documents also show that no appearance within the proper time was entered for the present appellant, a minor, and that his subsequent intervention was held to be too late, and mutation of names was ordered by the Deputy Collector. These documents also show that no appearance within the proper time was entered for the present appellant, a minor, and that his subsequent intervention was held to be too late, and mutation of names was ordered by the Deputy Collector. Their Lordships have grave doubts whether they ought to pay any regard to these matters, as having any bearing on the present appeal; but if they are to look into them, they carry the case no farther. The transaction took place after the decision of the High Court, and when, until the decision of that Court should be reversed, the present appellant had been ousted from all interest. What Jamaher Kumari might be pleased to say in such a business is no evidence against him. Nor for this purpose ought they to regard, as it has been suggested they should, some statements made by the legal adviser of the minor, when he unsuccessfully applied for leave to make opposition after the time for opposition was past. The case stands as it did when the High Court rendered its judgment, and for the reasons which their Lordships have already given, they are of opinion that this judgment cannot stand. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, the judgment of the High Court get aside and the suit dismissed with costs, here and below, to be paid by the first respondent. Appeal allowed.