Judgement Appeal (No. 112 of 1918) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (November 14, 1916) varying a decree of the District Judge of Tanjore pronounced on appeal from the Revenue Divisional Officer of Kumbakonam. The suit was brought in the Revenue Court under the Estates Land Act (I. of 1908, Mad.), s. 77, to recover arrears of rent of certain inam lands. The plaintiff (represented by the present respondent) was receiver in a partition suit of family property including the inam lands which were an " estate," as defined by that Act. The defendants were occupancy ryots in whom the kudiwaram interest in the land vested. The claim was for rent said to have accrued in accordance with a puttah tendered in respect of Faslis 1318, 1319, and 1320. The defendants had rejected the puttahs, and contended that a less sum, which they paid into Court, was due. The inamdar in proceedings under the Rent Recovery Act (VIII. of 1865, Mad.) had obtained decrees in respect of former years enforcing the puttahs in the form now tendered. The last of these decrees was made by the Divisional Officer in April, 1904. The material terms of the puttah appear from the judgment of their Lordships. The District Judge and the High Court (Oldfield and Phillips JJ.) held that the puttah, being in the terms of that previously decreed, was in force by virtue of s. 52, sub-s. 3, of the Estates Land Act (I. of 1908, Mad.), but the Courts had arrived at different results on its construction. The present appeal originally came on for hearing in December, 1920, and was then dismissed on the ground that the certificate for leave to appeal was insufficient (see L. R. 48 I. A. 31). Subsequently a certificate which had not been included in the record was produced, and by an order made on June 3, 1921, the appeal was restored to the list upon terms. The terms of the new certificate appear in the judgment. 1922. Feb. 9. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for respondent. The appeal is not competent under ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The amount of rent claimed was under Rs.4500, and the value of the subject matter was clearly under Rs. 10,000. The terms of the new certificate appear in the judgment. 1922. Feb. 9. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for respondent. The appeal is not competent under ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The amount of rent claimed was under Rs.4500, and the value of the subject matter was clearly under Rs. 10,000. The certificate having been wrongly given the appeal is not competent Banarsi Per shad v. Kashi Krishna Narain (( 1900) L. R. 28 I. A. 11.); Radha Krishu Das v. Rai Krishu Chand. (( 1901) L. R. 281. A. 182.) Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The subject matter was of a value of Rs. 10,000 and upwards. The valuation of the appeal does not wholly depend upon the sum claimed Gooroopersad Khoond v. Juggutchunder. (( 1860) 8 Moo. I. A. 166.) In the present case the decree settled the rent payable annually, and the capitalized value must be considered. Further under r. 2 of the Order in Council of 1838 the certificate of the High Court is conclusive of the value. That Order was repealed only by the Order of 1920 ; that was after this appeal had been entered. De Gruyther K.C. in reply. The rules in the Order in Council of 1838 were made in relation to 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 41, only; they do not apply to appeals which now are made under and subject to the Code of Civil Procedure. In Radha Kunwar v. Reoti Singh (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 187.) the Board held that a certificate of valuation was wrongly made and refused to hear the appeal. THEIR LORDSHIPS desired to hear the appeal, the question of competency being reserved. Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellants. The appellants are not bound by the previous puttah as the effect of s. 52, sub-s. 3, of the Madras Land Estates Act, 1908. That sub-section does not refer to puttahs decreed under Mad. Act VIII. of 1865. The Act of 1908 entirely altered the relations of landlord and tenant in Madras. The Act of 1865 by s. 11 made the rent depend upon agreement express or implied. The Act of 1908 introduced other considerations, its keynote being ss. 27, 28 and 29 ; s. 74 too was new. Act VIII. of 1865. The Act of 1908 entirely altered the relations of landlord and tenant in Madras. The Act of 1865 by s. 11 made the rent depend upon agreement express or implied. The Act of 1908 introduced other considerations, its keynote being ss. 27, 28 and 29 ; s. 74 too was new. " Decreed " in s. 52 means decreed as fair and equitable having regard to the provisions of the Act. Here the tenants had by agreement for many years paid at a lower rent than that now claimed. If the puttah is binding the rent now claimed was a penalty and as such was not recoverable under s. 77 of the Act of 1865. [Reference was made to Raja of Pittapuram v. Jonnalagadda (( 1915) Mad. W. N. 813.) ; Parthasarathi Appa Row v. Chevendra. (( 1910) L. R. 37 I. A. 111.)] De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the respondent. Both Courts rightly held that "decreed" in s. 52, sub-s. 3, includes a decree of the Revenue Court under the Act of 1865. There is no reason why the plain terms of the sub-section should be limited. Puttahs and muchalkas given in the Act of 1865 do not give rise to a contract, but are evidence of the terms of a pre-existing tenancy Shanmuga Mudaly v. Palnati Kuppu Chetty. (( 1902) I. L. R. 25 M. 613, 621.) The question here is whether the puttah tendered properly represents the terms of the holding. With regard to this class of tenant the Act of 1908 made no material difference. What was claimed was not a penalty, but the rent payable in the circumstances. Sir George Lowndes K.C. replied. March 14. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, dated November 14, 1916. It varied a decree of the District Judge of Tanjore, dated January 18, 1915. The suit between the parties was brought in the Revenue Court of Kumbakonam under s. 77 of the Estates Land Act (I. of 1908, Mad.). The claim of the plaintiff was for rent said to have accrued and to be due by the defendants in respect of their holdings in accordance with the terms of a puttah which will be after wards noted. The claim of the plaintiff was for rent said to have accrued and to be due by the defendants in respect of their holdings in accordance with the terms of a puttah which will be after wards noted. No further reference is required to the various stages of the litigation. A preliminary question, however, is raised as to whether the appeal is competent. It is pointed out by the respondent, who makes the objection that the rent sued for amounted to Rs.4560, being rent for three years in arrear. The respondent accordingly contends that it sufficiently appears that the amount or value of the subject matter of the suit is not Rs.10,000, as required by ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ; and upon the case reaching this Board their Lordships, on December 3, 1920, held that the certificate quoad value was at least ambiguous, and that such certificates " ought to be given in such a form that it is impossible to mistake their meaning on their face.” The only order then before the Board was in these terms " It is hereby certified that as regards the value of the subject matter and the nature of the question involved the case fulfils the requirements of ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council," and upon that the previous judgment of the Board proceeded. It now appears, however, that the above was not the only oder, and that the parties had failed to bring up the order embracing the actual certificate and granted on the same day. It is admitted by both parties that there did exist in the proceedings an order of September 21, 1917, in the following terms " We hold that the subject matter is of a value greater than Rs. 10,000, with reference to Gooroopersad Khoond v. Juggutchunder (8 Moo. I. A. 166.), and that a substantial question of law is involved. We therefore certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council with reference to ss. 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code." In their Lordships opinion, this certificate is sufficiently clear, and is not open to the objections under which the former certificate under argument before the Board stood condemned. We therefore certify that the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council with reference to ss. 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code." In their Lordships opinion, this certificate is sufficiently clear, and is not open to the objections under which the former certificate under argument before the Board stood condemned. The point, however, which still remains is whether that certificate must be accepted by the Board as conclusive, the actual sum in figures which is sued for being what it is, and so much smaller than Rs. 10,000. The ruling provision as to certificates of value was No. 2 of the schedule to the Order in Council of April 10, 1838. It is to the following effect " That in all cases in which any of such courts shall admit an appeal to Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, in Council, it shall specially certify on the proceedings that the value of the matter in dispute in such appeal amounts to the sum of 10,000 companys rupees or upwards, which certificate shall be deemed conclusive of the fact, and not be liable to be questioned on such appeal by any party to the suit appealed." It is admitted that at the date of the appeal that order was in operation, and it accordingly governs the case ; and, so far as the Board is concerned, it concludes the question of competency quoad value. In some of the cases which have occurred, it would rather appear as if the provisions of this order had been left out of view. On a date subsequent to the filing of this appeal—namely, February 9, 1920—the order was repealed by an Order in Council, passed by His Majesty on the date mentioned. While, however, in cases subsequent to that date, the value of the subject matter of the appeal is not concluded by the certificate of the Court below, their Lordships desire to make these two observations In the first place, the sum of money actually at stake may not represent the true value. While, however, in cases subsequent to that date, the value of the subject matter of the appeal is not concluded by the certificate of the Court below, their Lordships desire to make these two observations In the first place, the sum of money actually at stake may not represent the true value. The proceeding may, in many cases, such as a suit for an instalment of rent or under a contract, raise the entire question of the contract relations between the parties and that question may, settled one way or the other, affect a much greater value, and its determination may govern rights and liabilities of a value beyond the limit (Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain. (L. R. 28 I. A. 11.)) The Courts below may accordingly with propriety, as was done in this case, make the necessary certificate. In the second place, whether they did so or not, while their Lordships would, of course, be free, if greater value in the sense mentioned were established, to proceed with the appeal, yet they will always naturally and very greatly defer, on a subject of this nature, to the certificate given by the High Court. The objection to the competency of the appeal is accordingly repelled. Their Lordships proceed to the merits of the appeal. The original plaintiff in the suit was a receiver appointed by the Court and the plaintiff-respondent is his successor and represents the proprietors of an inam village called Kadira-mangalam. It is matter of admission that the appellants are occupancy ryots of certain of the village lands, having the permanency of tenure and the other rights attaching to that position under the law of Madras. Their Lordships desire to make it clear that nothing that has passed between these litigants during the long course of years, in which the law has been so frequently invoked, constitutes derogation from the status, privileges, rights and obligations of parties under the Madras Land Acts. The provisions, for instance, of ch. 5 of the Act as to the payment of arrears of rent, and the appraisement and division of produce, as also those of ch. 4, dealing with puttahs and muchalkas, can be appealed to and are plainly applicable. In particular, it should be noted that ch. The provisions, for instance, of ch. 5 of the Act as to the payment of arrears of rent, and the appraisement and division of produce, as also those of ch. 4, dealing with puttahs and muchalkas, can be appealed to and are plainly applicable. In particular, it should be noted that ch. 4 of the Act as is specially provided for by s. 50, applies to all ryots with a permanent right of occupancy, and by s. 52 accordingly puttahs and muchalkas may be exchanged for periods of one or more revenue years ; but no landholder shall be bound to tender, and no ryot to accept, a puttah for a period of more than one revenue year. It appeared to be maintained for the appellants that payments made during the course of twenty years should form the lines and limits of the ryots obligations for all time. Setting aside the manifest contradiction by this of the actual relations of these parties, the Board has, in view of the argument, thought it right to express its opinion that the statutory rights and obligations of parties have not been thus impinged upon. Past practice may, of course, have its weight as one of the elements which are considered in fixing under the Act what are the fair and equitable conditions of a particular puttah (Parthasarathi Appa Row Savaiaswa Row v. Chevendra Venkata Narasayya. (L. R. 37 I. A. 110.)) Under the (Madras) Estates Land Act, 1908, the inamdar, on October 28, 1908, tendered a puttah for Fasli 1318 to the tenants and demanded from them a muchalka, but the tenants refused to accept the puttah, or to execute a muchalka. Puttahs, in identical terms having been also offered and refused, and no muchalkas having been executed for the two following years, Faslis 1319 and 1320, the suit was instituted on December 15, 1911. It resulted in a decree for Rs.4367 7 3. It may be stated that it was admitted that there had been numerous suits and numerous decrees in which the rights of the inamdar had been determined in accordance with puttahs substantially, if not entirely, in the same terms as those tendered in the present suit. It resulted in a decree for Rs.4367 7 3. It may be stated that it was admitted that there had been numerous suits and numerous decrees in which the rights of the inamdar had been determined in accordance with puttahs substantially, if not entirely, in the same terms as those tendered in the present suit. The plaint correctly states " Puttahs were tendered for the under mentioned occupancy right lands in the enjoyment of the defendants for Faslis 1318, 1319, and 1320, duly according to custom and in conformity with the previous judgments, by the first defendant in O.S. No. 61 of 1904, who was managing during the said Faslis." In 1902, the inamdar had sued and on April 19, 1904, the Divisional Officer pronounced judgment in the plaintiffs favour, and he expressed himself thus "I consider that the dispute between the parties relating to the suit Fasli is identical with those decided in the previous Faslis in the judgments referred to above, and that no special pleas or circumstances are urged with reference to the suit Fasli for any fresh adjudication." Their Lordships pause to say that they may repeat in terms this dictum which was pronounced eighteen years ago. It is a truly deplorable circumstance that judicial time should have been occupied and the substance of parties wasted by litigation over a further period of eighteen years, for settling practically the same point. The careful provisions made by legislation for the steady protection from year to year of the rights of occupancy ryots on the one hand, and inamdars and other landlords on the other, have been put on one side and fruitless and repeated litigations have been indulged in. But in the judgment referred to, the Divisional Officer proceeds " I therefore find that the previous judgments are res judicata in these suits as they have gone fully into the question of custom relating to the different stipulations in the puttah." However natural it may have been to treat the position thus, their Lordships cannot sustain on legal grounds the plea of res judicata here suggested. In the language of the High Court; " The answer is that the general doctrine of res judicata is not in question, but the application of the special rule stated in s. 52, sub-s. 3, Estates Land Act, under which muchalkas decreed for any revenue year remain in force until the beginning of the year, for which fresh ones are exchanged or decreed, and that there is no reason for restricting the scope of the general reference to muchalkas decreed to those decreed by any particular description of Court." With that view the Board is in full agreement. The inamdar having again tendered puttahs in terms of s. 54 and the other relative sections, and the tenants having notwithstanding previous decrees again refused to accept the terms or to grant muchalkas, and the terms of the puttahs having been entirely approved by the Collector, the present suit had to be brought. The puttahs tendered are in terms of previous puttahs upon which judgment and decree were passed. It stands to reason, and it is in accordance with ss. 27 and 28, that the old rent thus decreed shall continue, until reduced or enhanced by special applications under the statute. No such applications have been made. All that remains in the case is the correct interpretation of the puttahs. [The puttah provided by clause 8 that " if the yield be carried away," contrary to clause 1, the tenant was to pay the melvaram specified in that clause, on " the total yield of paddy " calculated according to a stated average of yield. The tenant planted an oodu crop—i.e., a crop sown together, one part of which takes three months to ripen and be reaped, and the other part six months. Their Lordships held that the tenant was liable to pay at the specified rate on each part of the crop. Reference was made to the Madras District Gazetteer (Tanjore), p. 83, as to the oodu system of cultivation.] Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.