JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for recovery of possession of land on declaration of title. The property belonged admittedly to one Sobhan who had mortgaged it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted a suit on the 1st August, 1913, to enforce his security. The parties defendants to that suit were the representatives of the mortgagor who had died meanwhile. These representatives were his widow, his eldest son who was sui juris and three infant sons. The mother of the infants was apparently proposed for appointment as a guardian ad litem and we shall assume for our present purpose that the requisite notice was duly served upon her. There is no evidence to show that she entered appearance and accepted the guardianship. At the trial the suit was defended by the eldest son alone and there was no appearance on behalf of the widow either for self of as guardian of her infant sons. The trial was concluded, the arguments were heard and the judgment was reserved. Thereafter an order was recorded in the order sheet to the effect that the widow be appointed guardian ad litem of her infant sons The suit was then decreed on contest against the eldest son and ex parte against the other defendants. This decree was made on the 25th February, 1914. The decree was executed and at the sale which followed the plaintiff became the purchaser. In the interval the appellant had purchased the property from the representatives of the mortgagor on the 4th November 1913 and they resisted the, plaintiff when he proceeded to take possession. This is the genesis of the present suit The Court of first instance decreed the suit and that decree has been affirmed by the District Judge. On the present appeal it has been contended that the decree cannot be maintained beyond 11/32 share and that the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree in respect of 21/32 share which belonged to the three infants. In our opinion this contention is well-founded. It is now firmly established that no person can be appointed a guardian ad litem of an infant without his consent. In the present case the mother of the infants was appointed without her consent. In our opinion this contention is well-founded. It is now firmly established that no person can be appointed a guardian ad litem of an infant without his consent. In the present case the mother of the infants was appointed without her consent. She never entered appearance and it is consequently needless to consider that the position would have been if she had defended the suit on behalf of the minors without a formal order for appointment. In the events which have happened, it is plain that the infants were not represented at all and they were in no sense parties to that litigation. Consequently they were not affected by the mortgage decree. This view is in accord with the rule enunciated in Nursing Narain v. Jahi Mistry [1911] 5 C.L.J. 3 - 13 I.C. 414; Narendra Mandal v. Jogendra Narayan Ray [1914] 19 C.W.N. 537 - 20 C.L.J. 469 - 27 I.C. 139 and Surendra Nath Bose v. Aghore Nath Bose [1920] 25 C.W.N. 525 - 62 I.C. 464. 2. We have been pressed to hold, however, that the decree against the infant was not void but voidable, and that only at the instance of the infants themselves. In support of this view reliance has been placed upon the decision in Tangor Maihi v. Jalandhar Deari [1909] 14 C.W.N. 322 - 5 I.C. 691. But that case cannot be treated as good law in view, of the later decision of the Judicial Committee in Roshidunnisa v. Muhammad Ismail Khan [1909] 31 All 572 - 35 I.A. 168 - 10 C.L.J. 318 - 6 A.L.J. 822 - 11 Bom. L.R. 1225 13 C.W.N. 1182 - 19 ML.J. 631 - 6 M.L.T. 279 - 3 I.C. 864 (P.C.); namely, that when a guardian has not been validly, appointed in respect of a minor, he it not a party to the suit and is not bound by the decree made against him. This view is in no way inconsistent with decisions of the Judicial Committee in Walian v. Banke Behari [1903] 30 Cal. 1021 - 30 IA 182 - 7 C.W.N. 774 - 5 Bom. L.R. 822 - 8 Sar. 512 (P.C.) and Munnulal v. Ghulam Abbas [1910] 32 All. 287 - 37 L.A. 77 - 12 Bom. This view is in no way inconsistent with decisions of the Judicial Committee in Walian v. Banke Behari [1903] 30 Cal. 1021 - 30 IA 182 - 7 C.W.N. 774 - 5 Bom. L.R. 822 - 8 Sar. 512 (P.C.) and Munnulal v. Ghulam Abbas [1910] 32 All. 287 - 37 L.A. 77 - 12 Bom. L.R. 439 - 11 C.L.J. 557 - 14 C.W.N. 744 - 20 M.L.J. 591 - 8 M.L.T. 57 - 13 O.C. 123 - 6 I.C. 788 (P.C.). In Walian v. Banke Behari [1903] 30 Cal. 1021 - 30 IA 182 - 7 C.W.N. 774 - 5 Bom. L.R. 822 - 8 Sar. 512 (P.C.), the person who acted as guardian ad litem was not formally appointed, but he was recognised as guardian ad litem by the Court. In these circumstances, the Judicial Committee held that after such recognition and such representation of the interest of the infant, it was too late to dispute his appointment. In Munnulal v. Ghulam Abbas [1910] 32 All. 287 - 37 L.A. 77 - 12 Bom. L.R. 439 - 11 C.L.J. 557 - 14 C.W.N. 744 - 20 M.L.J. 591 - 8 M.L.T. 57 - 13 O.C. 123 - 6 I.C. 788 (P.C.), objection was taken on the ground that there was no affidavit filed before the guardian was appointed. It was ruled that the absence of the affidavit did not invalidate the appointment of the guardian. The case before us, however, is of an entirely different description. Here the record of the mortgage suit makes it abundantly clear that the infants were really no parties to the suit and are not bound by the decree made therein. 3. The result is that this appeal is allowed in part. The decree made in favour of the plaintiff will be restricted to 11/32 share of the property which represents the interest of the widow and the eldest son of the mortgagor. Each party will pay his own costs throughout the litigation.