JUDGMENT Richardson, J. - The plaintiff in the second appeal is the proprietor of a Zamindari of the entirety of which the defendant company holds a putni lease. The lease is evidenced by a Kabuliyat executed by the predecessor of the company in the year 1858. The terms of the lease were confirmed and ratified by the company by an Ekrarnamah executed on its behalf on the 2nd Falgoon, 1314, (February, 1908), by which the company agreed to abide by and conform to the terms and conditions embodied in the pottah and Kabuliyat of the original putni settlement. 2. The suit was brought for the recovery of an amount alleged to be due as the balance of Road and Public Works Cesses payable for the four years 1322 to 1325. Under S. 41 of the Cess Act of 1850 the total amount of the case annually payable by the Zamindar to the Government is Rs. 95-9-6, while the amount annually payable by the putnidar to the Zamindar is under the same section Rs. 80-6-3. The Company has regularly paid the latter amount to the Zamindar and the suit is for the balancestill due if the Company ought to have paid the larger sum. 3. It is conceded that it is open to the parties to a putni lease to contract themselves out of the provisions of S. 41 of the Cess Act; in other words the provisions of that section are subject to any special provision contained in the contract between the parties. The point at issue and the arguments advanced on either side are clearly and concisely stated by the learned Judge in the judgment from which this appeal is brought. "The main question in appeal" he says, "is that of the correct interpretation of the terms of the Putni Kabuliyat. The Kabuliyat was executed by a predecessor-in-interest of the Company in favour of the then Zamindar in the year 1858, that is, about 13 years before the passing of the Cess Act." The learned Judge was referring to the first Cess Act which was passed in 1871. The Kabuliyat was executed by a predecessor-in-interest of the Company in favour of the then Zamindar in the year 1858, that is, about 13 years before the passing of the Cess Act." The learned Judge was referring to the first Cess Act which was passed in 1871. He continues, "The clause relied on by the plaintiff has been translated thus," if there be any demand on the Zamindary for any new amount on account of Rajaswa or if any order is passed then I shall without any objection abide by it and pay my rent along with it (the new amount)." It is conceded before us that this is a substantially correct translation of the clause in the Kabuliyat, which is in Bengali. The learned Judge goes on,"The plaintiffs contention is that the annual demand of Rs. 95-9-6 imposed under the Cess Act on the Zamindar was a demand for a new amount on account of rajaswa within the meaning of the above clause, and as such payable in its entirety by the putnidar. On behalf of the defendant Company it is contended that a demand from the Zamindar is not the same thing as "a demand on the Zamindari," that the latter term includes all demands on the various subordinate interest comprised in the Zamindari and that in its application to the parties in the present suit it must be confined to the demand that may lawfully be made by the Zamindar from the Putnidar. It is also contended that the term rajaswa does not cover a demand under the Cess Act." 4. The learned Judge does not himself express any opinion as to the meaning of the term rajaswa' He agrees however with the trial Court in the view that the clause as a whole is ambiguous. Approaching the case in that way the learned Judge like the learned Munsif has attached great importance to the fact that for over 40 years the plaintiff and his predecessor were content to accept from the Company and their predecessor the smaller amount due under the provisions of S. 41 of the Act. Approaching the case in that way the learned Judge like the learned Munsif has attached great importance to the fact that for over 40 years the plaintiff and his predecessor were content to accept from the Company and their predecessor the smaller amount due under the provisions of S. 41 of the Act. I quite agree that if there is any real ambiguity the clause as it stands in the Kabuliat, it is open to the Courts to have regard to the conduct of the parties and to the construction of the clauses upon which they acted during this long course of years. Such construction hardly amounts to contemporaneous exposition because it does not go back to the creation of the putni but relates to a state of things which came into existence some years later at a time when the terms of the original agreement might have been forgotten or overlooked. Nevertheless if the meaning had been doubtful, assistance might have been sought from the conduct of the parties. But apart from any question of ambiguity, the mere fact that the parties have acted on an erroneous construction of an instrument furnishes in itself no reason why the Courts should not follow the general rule that an instrument should be construed according to its natural meaning in the light of the circumstances in which it was executed. It is not suggested that the Company has acquired a right by limitation, or by anything in the nature of binding agreement to pay case at the lower figure. 5. The question then is whether there is any real ambiguity in this clause and it turns in the main on the import of the word 'rajaswa.' The Munsif says. "Taking it literally it has the wide sense of anything payable to the King, although it is commonly used in the sense of rent or revenue payable." In my opinion, and 1 understand my learned brother is of the same opinion the word rajaswa as used in this document is wide enough to include any imposition or levy payable to State and is therefore wide enough in its natural meaning in the context in which it is found to include case payable under the Cess Acts of 1871 and 1880. 6. 6. It must be borne in mind that the putni tenure held by the Company extends to the whole of the estate in respect of which revenue and cases are payable by the Zamindar to the Collector on behalf of the Government. It may well have been the intention of the parties that the Putnidar should relieve the Zamindar of all additional burden in the nature of a tax imposed on the estate as such. 7. As to the contention that "a demand from the Zamindar" is not necessarily the same thing as "a demand on the Zamindari" within the meaning of the clause in dispute, that is no doubt true, but not in a relevant sense. income tax, for instance, might be a demand from the Zamindar, but not a demand on the Zamindari. On the other hand, a demand from the Zamindar of an impost payable by him as the superior landlord in respect of the lands comprised in his estate is, as it seems to me, a demand on the Zamindari. 8. It follows, that, in my opinion, the Company as putnidar, is liable to pay the Zamindar the whole amount payable by the latter to the Collector. That seems to me to be the meaning of the clause and I can see no reason why we should not give effect to that meaning. 9. I should add that the preliminary objection suggested rather than argued that no second appeal lay in this case under the provisions of S. 153 of the Be gal Tenancy Act is concluded by the terms of the section and by authority Rent as denned in the Bengal Tenancy Act includes case and the dispute between the parties to this suit is therefore a dispute as to the amount of rent annually payable. 10. The result is that, in my opinion, this appeal succeeds. The judgment and decree of the Court below should be set aside and the suit should be decreed with costs throughout. Suhrawardy, J. 11. I agree in the order my learned brother proposes to pass in this case. In the beginning I felt some difficulty in view or conduct of the parties namely, that no demand was made for this excess amount of case for over 40 years since the first Cess Act was passed, from the putnidars. Suhrawardy, J. 11. I agree in the order my learned brother proposes to pass in this case. In the beginning I felt some difficulty in view or conduct of the parties namely, that no demand was made for this excess amount of case for over 40 years since the first Cess Act was passed, from the putnidars. That created a suspicion in my mind that the parties did not intend that any imposition like the Road Cess was included in the contract. On however, carefully reading that pare of the putni Kabuliyat of 1858 which deals with this matter, I think, what the parties intended there was that the putnidar would pay to the Zamindar whatever taxation was imposed on the Zamindari by the sovereign authority. The sentence when translated stands thus, "if there be any demand on the Zamindari for any new amount on account of rajaswa or if any order is passed, then I shall abide by it and pay rent along with it" is an integral part of the Kabuliyat and one of the important terms of the contract. The whole question turns upon what meaning that ought to be attached to the word rajaswa as used in that sentence. 12. It is argued that at the time when the parties entered into this contract, it could not be, in their contemplation, that the case in future should be imposed by Government, and therefore, that word ought to be strictly construed as meaning revenue payable on account of the Zamindari to the Government and it would not include any other imposition. That is an argument which cuts both ways. If it was not in the contemplation of the parties, that any imposition of case would be made in future, then it may well be argued that the landlord wanted to provide for any future imposition in whatever name it might be, by the Government on the Zamindari, and the word rajaswa was used not in the limited sense of revenue alone, but in the sense which is natural to it namely, any amount payable by the Zamindar to the sovereign or Government. This view is strengthened by the other words used in that sentence, namely, "new amount on account of rajaswa." If the putnidar agreed to pay any addition, only to the revenue that may be imposed in future by the Government, one would have expected the use of the expression any additional amount 'instead of' any new amount. I am of opinion that there is no ambiguity about the expression rajaswa or about the meaning of the sentence as it stands. That being so, it is not the province of the Court to look to the conduct of the parties, which might have been due to neglect, over-sight or ignorance on their part in order to attribute ambiguity to a document where it does not exist. I think the appeal ought to succeed. 13. As to the preliminary objection, I think, there is no substance in it in view of the definition of rent in the Bengal Tenancy Act and 3, 47 of the Cess Act of 1880 and the reported authorities in this Court.