JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the defendants in a suit for recovery of possession of land on declaration of title. The case for the plaintiff's is that the disputed land is comprised within a permanently settled estate held by them within the Collectorate of the district of Bogra and known as Mahal Dihi Adgola. The defendants contend that the land is not comprised within the permanently settled estate of the plaintiffs but lies outside its ambit and has accreted to the neighboring permanently settled estate held by themselves. They further contend that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. The Court of first instance found upon the question of title in favour of the plaintiffs but dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation. Upon appeal the District Judge has affirmed the conclusions of the Subordinate Judge upon the question of title, but has reversed his decisions upon the question of limitation. The result has been that the suit has been decreed. 2. On the present appeal the decision of the District Judge has been assailed on the ground that his conclusion upon the question of title is erroneous in law. It is not disputed that the land in suit formed at one time the bed of a beel called beel Narail known also as Jalkar Sat Simulia. The plaintiffs assert that at the time of the permanent settlement the bed of this Jalkar was settled with their predecessors as included in the permanently settled estate granted to them. The defendants do not controvert the position that the land was at the time of the permanent settlement covered with water, but they contend that what was settled with the predecessors of the plaintiffs was nothing beyond the right of fishery and that the bed of the jalkar remained with the Crown. The grant made at the time of the permanent settlement has not been produced and consequently no question arises as to the construction of the fundamental title-deed. The plaintiffs as also the defendants have accordingly been constrained to rely upon subsequent documents which disclose various transactions connected with the disputed land or with the jalkar and the Courts below have thus been called upon to ascertain from the subsequent history of the disputed land the nature of the initial grant. The plaintiffs as also the defendants have accordingly been constrained to rely upon subsequent documents which disclose various transactions connected with the disputed land or with the jalkar and the Courts below have thus been called upon to ascertain from the subsequent history of the disputed land the nature of the initial grant. Prima facie this does not raise a question of law which can be investigated in second appeal. It was pointed out by Sir Richard Couch, C.J. in Nawbut Singh vs. Chatturdhari Singh 19 W.R. 222 that a special appeal does not lie because some portion of the evidence may be in writing and the Judge makes a mistake as to the meaning of it. For instance, a writing supposed to contain an admission may be put in as part of the evidence but a mistake in its meaning is not a misconstruction of a document upon which a special appeal will lie, if it is connected with other evidence affecting its construction. The misconstruction of a document which is the foundation of the suit, which is in the nature of a contract or a document of title is allowed to be a ground for a second appeal. As we have already stated the original grant is not available and consequently no question arises as to its legal construction. 3. The appellants have however attacked the judgment of the District Judge on the ground that he has lost sight of a very important distinction in connection with the meaning of the expression 'Jalkar'. We are of opinion that this charge cannot be justified. It is well-known that the term 'Jalkar' is ambiguous. It may mean either a grant of a mere right of fishery or it may mean the grant of a sheet of water together with the subsoil. This is pointed out in a long series of decisions from Bisen Lal Das v. Khyrunnesa Begum 1 W.R. 78 to Mohananda Chakraverty v. Mangala Keotani (1904) 31 Cal. 937. Amongst the intermediate decisions, the more important are those in Radha Mohan Mandal vs. Neel Madhal Mondal 24 W.R. 200, David vs. Girish Ch. Gupta (1883) 9 Cal. 183 and Rakhal Charan Mondal vs. Watson & Co. (1884) 10 Cal. 50. The distinction is also emphasized in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Radha Govinda Roy Sakeb vs. Inglis 7 C.L.R. 364. Gupta (1883) 9 Cal. 183 and Rakhal Charan Mondal vs. Watson & Co. (1884) 10 Cal. 50. The distinction is also emphasized in the decision of the Judicial Committee in Radha Govinda Roy Sakeb vs. Inglis 7 C.L.R. 364. The question whether what was intended to be granted in a particular case was restricted to a right of fishery or included a grant of a sheet of water together with the subsoil must depend upon the construction of the original grant if available or must be determined with regard to the subsequent history of the property. In the present case the Subordinate Judge has pointed out that the entries in the two registers known as A Register & B Register maintained under the Land Registration Act, 1876 undoubtedly support the contention of the plaintiffs. The B Register shows that the jalkar Sat Simulia alias Beel Narail is one of the Mouzahs comprised in the permanently settled estate Mahal Dehi Adgola and that the area of the Mouzah is 1051 acres and 13 polos. It is improbable that there should be a reference to the area if the right which the proprietors received from the Crown was a right of fishery. The entry in the A Register supports the conclusion that the grant includes the subsoil. That entry shows that Rs. 5,504-6-0 annas was the amount of land revenue payable for the entire estate, that is, in respect of all the Mouzahs comprised in the estate inclusive of the jalkar mouzah. This conclusion is borne out by Revenue survey map which shows that the area of the jalkar mouzah which, at the date of the survey in 1854, was all water, corresponds also with the area as subsequently shown. The Thak survey which preceded the revenue survey resulted in a map which supports the same conclusions. The Courts below were however pressed with the proceedings of the Collector under Act IV of 1840 which supports the contention of the defendant. We are not concerned in second appeal with the weight to be assigned to the different pieces of evidence on the record and it is not open to us to examine whether the Courts below have properly given preference to the documents which we have mentioned first. We are not concerned in second appeal with the weight to be assigned to the different pieces of evidence on the record and it is not open to us to examine whether the Courts below have properly given preference to the documents which we have mentioned first. But apart from all this, the outstanding fact remains that if the grant made at the time of the permanent settlement was in respect of the fishery right alone, the Crown has not taken steps to resume the land after the beel had dried up and to assess the land with revenue. The fact that the beel has dried up has been known to the revenue authorities and they have for more than quarter of a century allowed the plaintiffs to remain in occupation through their tenants of a large tract of land. Consequently, we cannot justly hold that what was granted was a franchise or an incorporeal right of fishery and not a territorial right. Evidence of a conclusive character would be required to justify the theory that in respect of a mouzah comprised within the ambit of a permanently settled estate there was no grant of the subsoil to the grantee and that what was granted was a mere fishery right, the right to the subsoil remaining in the Crown. Such a conclusion would be opposed to the decision of this Court in Mathura Nath Chatterjee v. Shib Chandra Bose (1907) 12 C.W.N. 334. It is plain that the defendants have no title whatsoever in the disputed land, it is not comprised within their permanently settled estate; nor can we conceive by what possible means they may have acquired title by accretion. The land never formed the bed of a public navigable river, it has not been claimed as land which has emerged from recession of a river, it has been made culturable because the beel has dried up. In these circumstances, it is impossible to conceive how the defendant can successfully claim title by accretion. The only chance of the defendants was to prove title by adverse possession, in this they have failed according to the judgment of the District Judge. Upon the question of title, there is the concurrent decision of two Courts in favour of the plaintiffs ; that decision has not been challenged on grounds admissible in second appeal. 4. The only chance of the defendants was to prove title by adverse possession, in this they have failed according to the judgment of the District Judge. Upon the question of title, there is the concurrent decision of two Courts in favour of the plaintiffs ; that decision has not been challenged on grounds admissible in second appeal. 4. The result is that the decree of the District Judge is affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.