Judgement Petition for special leave to appeal from an order of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces and Berar, dated October 12, 1921, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from being a pleader of that Court. The facts stated in the petition were shortly as follows. The petitioner was a pleader on the roll of legal practitioners of the Court above mentioned, and practised at Basim in the District of Akola, Berar. In March, 1921, a resolution was carried in the Legislative Council of the Central Provinces recommending the Government to abolish the mahar baluta system, which then formed part of the land revenue of Berar. The petitioner had made speeches at various places in Berar in support of the movement for the abolition of the system. In a public speech delivered 37 Law Rep. 49 Ind. App. 319 ( 1921- 1922) Shankar Ganesh Dabir V. Secretary State for India in C ouncil 138 subsequently to the debate in the Legislative Council, after stating that the system was " unjust and illegal," he had said " if you really wish that the injustice of baluta should be stopped and that baluta should not be paid, let Government recover it by attachment; do not pay it of your own will." The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, acting under s. 107, sub-s. 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, made an order that the petitioner should enter into a bond, with two sureties, for Rs.500 to keep the peace for a year. The magistrate was of opinion that the petitioners acts were such as to lead to a disturbance of public tranquillity, although no disturbance had yet taken place. The order was affirmed by the District Magistrate, and an application to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for a review was dismissed. The petitioner entered into the bond under protest. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner, by a notice to the petitioner dated September 17, 1921, directed him to appear before that Court to show cause why he should not be dealt with under s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. That section, which was substituted for s. 13 of Act XVIII. The petitioner entered into the bond under protest. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner, by a notice to the petitioner dated September 17, 1921, directed him to appear before that Court to show cause why he should not be dealt with under s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act. That section, which was substituted for s. 13 of Act XVIII. of 1879 by Act XL of 1896, s. 2, provides that the High Court may " after such inquiry as it thinks fit, suspend or dismiss any pleader or mukhtar holding a certificate," who should commit any of certain kinds of professional misconduct specified under the heads (a) to (e), or " (f) for any other reasonable cause." The matter was heard by two judges of the Court who in the course of their judgment said " It is clear that the pleader preached against the payment of baluta, and told cultivators not to pay that tax but to allow their property to be attached and sold for it. Baluta is a tax legally recoverable by distress. He has been delivering lectures in public and distributing placards headed The Iniquity of Baluta, instigating one class of persons not to pay money legally due to another class, procedure reasonably calculated to lead to a breach of the public tranquillity. The pleaders action seems to us incompatible with his obvious duties and responsibilities as an official of this Court. He has not expressed regret for what he has done, but attempts to justify it. We learn that he has already suspended practice in the Courts ; consequently suspension from practice would not be any punishment. We, therefore, cancel his sanad until such time as he satisfies us by his future conduct that he is fit for re-admission." 1922. May 23. Dube for the petitioner. The Court had no power under s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act to cancel the petitioners certificate. It cannot be alleged that the petitioner was guilty of any of the acts of professional misconduct specified in clauses (a) to (e). Clause (f), " any other reasonable cause," means something which is either professional misconduct or which amounts to moral turpitude. That view is supported by In re Wallace (( 1866) L. R. 1 P. C. 283.) and In re Koylash Nath Chowdhry. (( 1871) 16 Suth. Clause (f), " any other reasonable cause," means something which is either professional misconduct or which amounts to moral turpitude. That view is supported by In re Wallace (( 1866) L. R. 1 P. C. 283.) and In re Koylash Nath Chowdhry. (( 1871) 16 Suth. W. R. (Crim.) 41.) The petitioners conduct did not come within either of those categories. He was entitled to agitate by peaceful means against the tax, and the action of the Legislative Council showed that his agitation was justified. There was nothing in his conduct which rendered him unfit to be a pleader. The facts did not make s. 107, sub-s. 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable. Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. The Court had discretionary jurisdiction under s. 13 (f). In accordance with the principles upon which the Board acts, the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless strong cause is shown. In the present case no ground for interference appears. It is desirable to maintain the disciplinary jurisdiction of a Court over the pleaders and others appearing before it. The petitioner has not contended that s. 13 (f) is confined to grounds of professional misconduct; a Full Bench in Calcutta has held that it is not so confined Le Mesurier v. Wajid Hossein, (( 1902)I. L.R.29C. 890.) It is submitted that that view is correct. 37 Law Rep. 49 Ind. App. 319 ( 1921- 1922) Shankar Ganesh Dabir V. Secretary State for India in C ouncil 139 Dube replied. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER. As a concession to the urgent request of counsel for the petitioner, their Lordships will briefly state the reasons why they are not able to advise that leave to appeal should be granted to the petitioner, but this indulgence must not be taken as recognizing any departure from established practice, nor affording any precedent for the future. In expressing the opinion which they hold that this petition ought to be refused, their Lordships expressly desire to make plain that their opinion carries with it no approval of, or reflection upon, the order against which leave to appeal is sought. In expressing the opinion which they hold that this petition ought to be refused, their Lordships expressly desire to make plain that their opinion carries with it no approval of, or reflection upon, the order against which leave to appeal is sought. That order was entirely one for the discretion of the Court that made it, and the only matter that it has been necessary to consider is whether a prima facie case has been made out to establish that there was no foundation upon which that discretion could properly repose. It appears that the petitioner was, on May 3, 1921, bound over by the Sub-divisional Magistrate at Basim to keep the peace for a period of one year, and that order was confirmed by the District Magistrate and by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. The offence which he had committed was connected with an agitation against payment of the mahar baluta, and it appears that in the course of that agitation he did not confine himself to protests, however vehement, against the tax, or against its injustice, but that he urged an organized resistance to payment, and attempted to establish a system which would have impeded and might have defeated its recovery with grave danger to the public peace. These considerations led to the conviction to which reference has been made, and caused his conduct as a pleader to be brought before the Court in their jurisdiction under the Legal Practitioners Act of 1879. Their Lordships^ are of opinion that the circumstances to which they have referred were sufficient to found jurisdiction under s. 13, sub-s. (f), of that Act, which is not confined to acts done in a professional capacity, and for these reasons they think that no leave to appeal ought to be granted in this case, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.