JUDGMENT Walsh, J. - We are in the difficult position in this case of having come to the conclusion that we ought to reverse the decision of the learned Judge, although so far as the judgment which he has delivered is concerned, we can see no possible answer to it. We do not say that he is wrong in anything that he has said or ruled in the course of his judgment. Indeed it is a careful and accurate judgment, but the result is abortive, and we think that he has omitted to exercise a jurisdiction which this Act conferred upon him which in the very exceptional circumstances of this case he might, if he had seen his way clear to do so, have exercised himself and which we are prepared to exercise. All parties seem to be agreed that the attempt to arbitrate through the assistance or guidance of the Delhi Piece-Goods Association has, in this particular case, been, speaking of it as reasonably as one possibly can, a comparative failure. It has always been understood that commercial men were satisfied, particularly in regard to special kinds of goods the description of which and the contract in relation to which are full of trade technicalities, that they were able to supply themselves with justice cheaper, speedier, more satisfactory and more certain than they could get from any of His Majesty's Judges. If the experiences of the parties in this particular litigation may be taken as representing the normal experience of persons who indulge in this special form of litigation, one may be disposed to ask oneself whether the view which we have attempted to express and which is no doubt the explanation of the existence of the Arbitration Act upon the statute book, will continue to be held very long. The parties have been endeavouring for the last four years or so, with the assistance of an exceptionally complicated set of rules, and with every variety of Arbitrator and Umpire, to arrive at a final decision. Three documents have seen the light, which may be described as awards, and although the circumstances which gave them birth were to a large extent identical, their appearance on the face of them when they are set side by side, presents a contrast which can only be described as unusual. In one of them the figure was placed at Rs. Three documents have seen the light, which may be described as awards, and although the circumstances which gave them birth were to a large extent identical, their appearance on the face of them when they are set side by side, presents a contrast which can only be described as unusual. In one of them the figure was placed at Rs. 16,000, in a later production it re-appeared as Rs. 6,559 and within an hour or so it became Rs. 4,017. We have been almost inevitably influenced during the consideration of this case by the reflection that, if we were to yield to the plausible argument of Dr. Sen, and uphold the view taken by the learned Judge of the Court below, and allow the parties to seek a fresh award, (presumably as long as the reference exists and the parties are not ad idem, neither of them can sue the other with any hope of success), the result might be further to diminish the greatly attenuated claim which the representatives of the Delhi Piece-Goods Association have held that his client is entitled to recover. We have therefore decided in the best interests of the parties themselves, to take a course which we have not the slightest doubt the Legislature intended should be taken where the circumstances render it appropriate, although in doing so we would merely point out that we are influenced by the exceptional circumstances of this case and that it must not be taken as a precedent for future cases. The last -stage of these proceedings was taken by an Umpire, Mr. Gray, appointed by the Delhi Piece-Goods Association. Having made an award he deposited it with his Association who were no doubt acting as his agents for that purpose, and gave notice to the parties and supplied a copy to the present appellant. Somehow or other, (it does not appear quite clearly, but it is not suggested that this constituted any irregularity in itself) the parties or party drew the Umpire's attention to an error on the face of the award. So clear was the idea that he had formed of the rights of the parties that no sooner did he look at his award than he saw that he was wrong. So clear was the idea that he had formed of the rights of the parties that no sooner did he look at his award than he saw that he was wrong. In calculating the difference between the contract price and the market price he rightly intended to take into account the actual amounts realised by re-sale, but unfortunately in selecting the figure upon which the total sum of resales had to be calculated, he confused the list-price with the actual sum realized. It is a nice question, which we do not propose to decide, whether this is a clerical error arising from an accidental slip. It would be a dangerous principle to lay down that all such mistakes could be so described. There is a great deal in Dr. Sen's contention that it is a substantial mistake. There are persons who have been known to explain errors of judgment by describing them as accidental slip. On the other hand the learned Judge, who has expressed himself very clearly, is satisfied that it was a genuine mistake, and an honest mistake, and that the correction made was not made in any way which could amount to misconduct behind the back of either of the parties, and therefore if we were to remit the award to the Arbitrator as we think we have power to do, it is quite certain that he would repeat the correction which the learned Judge has held that he had no authority to make- The most elementary authority on the subject is the one which was cited to us by Mr. O'Conor, the case of Stringer v. Riby Brothers, (1901) 1K.B. 105 there, under a similar power to remit, the High Court in England remitted an award even although the arbitrator was functus officio. That is an a fortiori case for this reason. On this particular point, viz., when an arbitrator becomes functus officio, there is a wide difference between the Indian and the English Act. There is no point at which the two Acts make a more marked departure from one another. There is no express provision in the English law as to what is to happen to an award when it is made, with the single) exception of the section which enables the party to enforce it as though it were a judgment. There is no point at which the two Acts make a more marked departure from one another. There is no express provision in the English law as to what is to happen to an award when it is made, with the single) exception of the section which enables the party to enforce it as though it were a judgment. The reason for that is that the machinery is so familiar and habitual that no provision on the subject is necessary. Either party on receiving notice from the arbitrator that the award has been made, can take it up from him. Once the arbitrator has parted with it he is functus officio and he cannot exercise the power given to him by S. 7 of Act IX of 1899, none the less the Court is able to remit to him if satisfied that an honest mistake has been made. There are express provisions to be found in S. 11 of the Act as to what is to be done by an arbitrator if he has made his award. We do not propose to decide when, having regard to this provision, an arbitrator in India becomes functus officio. Nor whether Mr. Gray had become functus officio when he made this alteration because, after all, be it observed, the second award is only a fair copy of the altered first award. It is not necessary for us to decide that question, but we are satisfied that, when it comes to be decided, the line will have to be drawn somewhere in the procedure which is laid down in S. 11 for getting the award into Court. We would take leave of this point by merely saying that it is difficult to hold that an arbitrator is functus officio while there are still express statutory duties laid upon him by the Act. Upon the preliminary question as to whether the learned Judge ought to have entertained this matter at all, inasmuch as no award had been filed, we would merely say that although we think Dr. Sen's clients took a reasonable course in this case with a view to getting a decision, the procedure laid dawn by the Act seems to be that the various stages to be found in Ss. Sen's clients took a reasonable course in this case with a view to getting a decision, the procedure laid dawn by the Act seems to be that the various stages to be found in Ss. 11 to 15 are to be followed in the same chronological order as the numerical order of the sections, and that an application to set aside is not as a rule within the jurisdiction of the Court until some application or attempt has been made to file the award or some other similar step is taken to enforce it. 2. We allow this appeal, remit the case to the lower Court and direct the lower Court to file the last, and we hope it is the last, award in this matter between the parties made by Mr. Gray of Rs. 4,017. Each party must pay its own costs in the Court below and of this appeal. Ryves, J. 3. I agree in the proposed order.