JUDGMENT 1. The facts appearing in this Rule are as follows:Opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 as landlords obtained a decree for arrears of rent against opposite parties Nos. 6 to 8 as raiyats of an occupancy holding. In execution of the decree the holding was sold and purchased by the petitioner on the 7th December, 1920. Thereafter, opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 as under-raiyats under opposite parties Nos. 6 to 8 applied to have the sale set aside on two separate and several grounds, firstly that under Cl. (3) of S. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, on the ground that the holding had been in fact purchased by the judgment-debtors, opposite parties Nos. 6 to 8, benami in the name of the, petitioner and secondly under R. 90 of O. XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, on the ground of material irregularity in the conduct of the sale. The learned Munsif who tried the case in the first instance found in favour of the opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 on both these grounds. He, accordingly, set aside the sale. When the petitioner's appeal came before the learned Subordinate Judge, he held that though the trial Court's order was appealable as an order under the Civil Procedure Code, it was not appealable as an order under the Tenancy Act. He considered it unnecessary, therefore, to enter into the merits of the case made under the Code, inasmuch as the appeal must in any view of those merits prove infructuous. He accordingly dismissed the appeal. 2. The petitioner then obtained this Rule calling upon the opposite party to show cause why the order dismissing the appeal should not be set aside. 3. The learned Vakil for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner having a right, of appeal under the Code, it was also open to him in the appeal to contest the decision of the trial Court under the Tenancy Act. In our opinion, this contention cannot be supported. As we have said, the sale was set aside on two distinct grounds, and the fact that an appeal lay so far as one ground was concerned, would not confer a right off appeal in respect of the other. 4. There is a direct decision against the petitioner in Hara Bandhu Adhicari v. Harish Chunder Dey (1899) 3 C.W.N. 184. As we have said, the sale was set aside on two distinct grounds, and the fact that an appeal lay so far as one ground was concerned, would not confer a right off appeal in respect of the other. 4. There is a direct decision against the petitioner in Hara Bandhu Adhicari v. Harish Chunder Dey (1899) 3 C.W.N. 184. The learned Vakil cited Sreenath Haldar v. Bepin Behary Mal (1916) 33 I.C. 574. We have considered the judgment in that case. On the facts stated by the learned Judges it appears that the sale there was sought to be set aside substantially under O 21, R. 90. No. reference was made to S. 173 of the Bengal Tenancy Act in the judgment of the Court of first instance. Further the observations made in the judgment of the learned Judges in reference to that section were obiter inasmuch as in the result the Rule was discharged on the ground that a second appeal preferred against the same order of the lower Appellate Court having been summarily dismissed by another Bench, it was not open to the petitioner to move the Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The decision in Hara Bandhu's case (1899) 3 C.W.N. 184 is therefore binding on us and we must follow it. The Rule is discharged with costs, hearing fee three gold mohurs.