JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of money due from the defendants as representatives in estate of one Sefatulla Mandal, who had loan transactions with the plaintiff as also with the fourth and fifth defendants. There was an adjustment of accounts on the 23rd September 1909 when it was found that the debtor was liable for a sum of Rs. 2977-3 as-15 gds. On the date the debtor took a fresh advance of Rs. 500 in cash and executed a hatchita for Rs. 3,477 3-as-15gds. The document was duly stamped and was signed by Sefatulla. On the 27th September, 1909, Sefatulla paid Rs. 500 in cash and an entry to that effect was duly made in the hatchita. The subsequent transactions, as may be gathered from the entries in the hatchita were as follows: 11th October 1909 Sefatulla borrowed Rs. 2 20th October 1909 Sefatulla paid Ks. 16 6th November 1909 Sefatulla borrowed Rs. 400 18th September 1912 Sefatulla paid Rs. 2 2. The accounts were adjusted on the date last mentioned, and it was found that Rs. 3361-3-as 15gds was due to the lender. On the 27th December, 1914, Sefatulla paid Rs. 5. An entry was thereupon made in thehatchita in the following terms: Through self and Naziruddin Pramanik Rs. 5. 3. Credit was given for- the sum and the balance due was specified as Rs. 3356-3as-15gds. This entry was duly stamped and signed by Sefatulla "in the pen of Naziruddin." The evidence shows that Naziruddin was an officer of Sefatulla, and that Sefatulla who had been ill for some time previously, died on that very day after the payment had been made and the signature affixed. After the death of Sefatulla, his widow, paid Rs. 20 on the 11th October, 1916, for self and on behalf of his two infant daughters. The entry was signed by the widow in the pen of Niamatulla. The present suit was instituted on the 2nd January, 1018 for recovery of the sum due to the plaintiff together with damages. The defendants, the widow and the infant daughters of Sefatulla, denied all knowledge of the transactions and also pleaded the bar of limitation. The trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff on the merits, but dismissed the claim as barred by limitation. This decree has been affirmed by the Subordinate Judge. The defendants, the widow and the infant daughters of Sefatulla, denied all knowledge of the transactions and also pleaded the bar of limitation. The trial Court found in favour of the plaintiff on the merits, but dismissed the claim as barred by limitation. This decree has been affirmed by the Subordinate Judge. On the present appeal, the plaintiff has urged that the suit is not barred by limitation. From the arguments addressed to us, two points have emerged for consideration, namely, first, what is the legal effect of the entry signed by the borrower on the 23rd September, 1909, and, secondly, what is the legal effect of the entry of the payment made on the 18th September 1912. 4. As regards the first question the Subordinate Judge has held that the entry made on the 23rd September, 1909, which recites that Rs. 3477-3-15 gds was due on that date, is an acknowledgment, and is not sufficient to save the claim from the bar of Limitation, inasmuch as the plaintiff has not established that the acknowledgment was made, as required by section 19 of the Indian limitation Act, before the expiration of the period prescribed for a suit for recovery of the amount due. We are of opinion that there is no substance in this contention. The details of the entry made on the 23rd September, 1909, show that Rs. 2320-9as-15gds and Rs. 656-10as, were found due upon adjustment of two accounts of the previous year and that a sum of Rs. 500 in cash was taken as loan on that date, These three sums made up the aggregate of Rs. 3477-3as-15gds. There could not be an acknowledgment of a preexisting liability in respect of the sum of Rs. 500; there could only be a promise to pay that sum. Consequently, the legitimate interpretation of the entry is that there was a promise to pay Rs. 500 taken on the 23rd September, 1909 as also a promise to pay Rs. 2977-3as-15 gds found due on adjustment of account on that date. The view we take is supported by the judgment of Sir John Stanley, C.J. and Banerji, J. in Muhammad Abid Hussain v. Bhagwan Das (1910) 5 1 C. 418. In that case, a certain debt, barred by limitation, stood due to the plaintiff by the defendant. 2977-3as-15 gds found due on adjustment of account on that date. The view we take is supported by the judgment of Sir John Stanley, C.J. and Banerji, J. in Muhammad Abid Hussain v. Bhagwan Das (1910) 5 1 C. 418. In that case, a certain debt, barred by limitation, stood due to the plaintiff by the defendant. The plaintiff remitted, a portion of the debt and advanced a further sum in cash. The defendant thereupon executed a sarkhat in which he admitted the receipt in cash of a sum including the unmerited portion of the barred debt and the further sum advanced at the time, and undertook to pay interest thereon at a certain rate. It was ruled that the transaction amounted to a new contract and was not merely an acknowledgment of the barred debt. Sir John Stanley pointed out that the amount of the old debt might have been actually paid and then repaid, and if the parties had recourse to such formality, the transaction would undoubtedly have been treated as a new contract to secure the entire amount specified in it. Reference was made to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Jotha Roj v. Raghugir (1893) Bom. P.J. 48 and Vasudeo v. Ramkrishna (1900) 24 Bom. 394 where it was held that the defendant's conduct in borrowing a fresh sum and signing the old account must be taken as a promise which was the foundation of a new contract. From this point of view, it is needless to explore the history of the transactions between the parties antecedent to the 23rd September, 1909- for it was open to the borrower to make a promise, in writing signed by himself, to pay a debt of which his creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits; see section 25(6) of the Indian Contract Act, Muti v. Baikantha (1913) 18 C. L. J. 269 Bhowani v. Peari (1913) 18 C.L.J. 329 If the entry be construed as a promise to pay, such promise is applicable quite as much to the sum borrowed on that day as to the sum found due on adjustment of account: Appa Rao v. Suryaprakasa (1899) 23 Mad. 94); Muhammad v. Bank Installment Co (1909) 31 All. 495. Gangapathy v. Muniswami (1909) 33 Mad 159. 94); Muhammad v. Bank Installment Co (1909) 31 All. 495. Gangapathy v. Muniswami (1909) 33 Mad 159. The distinction between an acknowledgment and promise to pay is sometimes difficult to draw specially as in the words of Sir Alfred Wills in Maniram v. Seth Rupchand (1906) 33 I.A. 165 : 33 Cal. 1947 an unconditional acknowledgement has always been held to imply a promise to pay, because that is the natural inference, if nothing is said to the contrary; it is what every honest man would mean to do. The case before us is reasonably free from difficulty, as the entry was made in respect of an aggregate sum, with regard to a portion whereof there could only be a promise to pay and not an acknowledgment. This distinguishes the present case from the decisions in Debi Prosad v Ram Ghulam (1914) 19 C.L.J. 263; Ramji v. Dharma (1882) 6 Bom. 683 Chowksi v Chowksi (1884) 8 Bom. 405 Ranchhoddas v. Jeychand [1883] 8 Bom. 194; Jethibai Vs. Putlibai, (1912) 14 BOMLR 1020 ; Govind Das v. Sarju Das [1908] 30 All. 268, Ramaswami Pillai Vs. Kuppuswami Pillai, 7 Ind. Cas. 901(1) Reference may in this connection be made to the well-known principle that it is not necessary that the payment should be actually made in money, for any arrangement-between the parties intended to have the effect of discharging pro tanto the party indebted, will hare the same effect as a payment of money: Maber v. Maber [1867] L.R. 2. Ex. 153. Thus, where there are debts due on both sides and the accounts are gone through by the parties and a balance struck, this in effect constitutes a payment to the amount of the smaller debt: Ashby v. James [1843] 11 M.&W. 542; 63 R.R. 676; Re Hawkins [1879] 20 W.R. (Eng). 240. But it is the striking of the balance that constitutes the payment, not the mere existence or even statement in writing of cross demands: Williams v. Griffiths [1835] 2 Cr.M. & R. 45; 41 R. R. 685; Cottam y. Partridge [1842] 4 M. & G. 271; 4 Scott. N.R. 819; Clarke v. Alexander [1841] 8 Scott. 240. But it is the striking of the balance that constitutes the payment, not the mere existence or even statement in writing of cross demands: Williams v. Griffiths [1835] 2 Cr.M. & R. 45; 41 R. R. 685; Cottam y. Partridge [1842] 4 M. & G. 271; 4 Scott. N.R. 819; Clarke v. Alexander [1841] 8 Scott. N.R. 147; 66 R. R. 844; Scholey v. Walton [1844] 12 M.&W. 510; 67 R. R. 414; Pot v. Clegg [1847] 16 M.&W. 321; 73 R. R. 517; Stewart v. Connick [1871] 5 I.R.C.L. 562; Hence it has been ruled that an agreed statement of accounts, where all the items are on one side only, if the statement is not signed by the party liable and is inoperative as an acknowledgment, will not be allowed to support an action on an account stated in respect of items which are statute barred: Jones v. Ryder [1838] 4 M. &W. 32; 51 R.R. 452; Nash v. Hill [1858] 1 F. & F. 198 : 115 R.R. 897; Brenan v. Crawley [1868] 16 W.R (Eng). 754. 5. We hold accordingly that the liability of the defendants must be determined on the basis that there was a legally enforceable debt recoverable by the plaintiff from their predecessor on the 23rd September, 1909, to the extent of Rs. 3477-3as-15gds. 6. As regards the second question, we have to consider whether the entry of the payment of Rs. 2 on the 18th September 1912 made before the lapse of three years from the 23rd September, 1909, fulfils the requirements of section 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. That section provides that where part of a principal of a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid by the debtor or by his agent duly authorized in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made provided that the fact of the part payment of the principal of the debt appears in the handwriting of the person making the same. In the case before us, the payment was made by the debtor through the hand of his officer Naziruddin, and the entry was made in the following form "through self and Naziruddin Pramanik." This entry, it has been established, is in the handwriting of Naziruddin and must have been made with the concurrence of the creditor who had the hutcki'a in his custody. When an entry has been so made with the mutual consent of the creditor and the debtor the only two persons interested- neither of them can be permitted to repudiate the entry to the prejudice of the other, it is consequently needless to investigate whether the money was handed over by the debtor direct to the creditor or through the hand of his officer. They were all present on the scene, and the payment must have been made in the manner in order that the entry might, if necessary, be made by Naziruddin. It is clearly not open to the representatives of the borrower now to resile from an arrangement and the record thereof which was deliberately made by their predecessor with the approval of the creditor. We need not, accordingly, attempt to reconcile the decisions which deal with the precise effect of payment through a messenger or a menial servant: Sarujubala v. Sarada Nath (1918) 23 C.W.N. 336; Duraiswami v. Krishna Jyer (1919) Mad. W.N. 797; 10 M d. L.W. 466; Ramkrishna v. Ramsundar (1920) 8 O.L.J. 115. We are of opinion that the entry of the payment dated the 18th September, 1912, was effective to extend the period of limitation. This was followed by the payments of the 27th December, 1914 and 11th October, 1916. 7. The result is that the appeal is allowed. The suit will be decreed against the first three defendants for Rs. 1668-1-17 gandas 2 karas with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the date of suit till the date of realization. This order will carry costs in all the Courts. The sum decreed will be realizable only out of the assets of the original debtor in the hands of his representatives.