Judgement Appeal (No. 5 of 1921) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (March 7, 1918) reversing a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Moradabad. The question in the appeal was whether a deed of mortgage dated November 20, 1911, which the respondent sued to enforce was properly registered under the Indian Registration Act (XVI. of 1908). The material facts appear fully from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The trial judge held that the mortgage had not been duly registered, and he accordingly dismissed the suit. Upon appeal to the High Court the decision was reversed, and a decree made remanding the suit for the trial of other issues. The learned judges (Piggott and Walsh JJ.) held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the indorsement of the sub-registrar proved that the power of attorney was duly authenticated by him. They were of opinion that the Court was entitled to assume that the sub-registrar had acted in the proper exercise of his powers under the proviso to s. 33 of the Act. They held further that the presentation of the document in July, 1912, could be regarded as sufficient* without unduly straining the law; if there was a defect they considered that it was curable by s. 87. 1922. May 22. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellant. The mortgage was not validly registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and was consequently ineffective under s. 49. The onus was upon the respondent to prove the facts. The presentation in February, 1911, was defective; there is no proof that there was a power of attorney complying with s. 33. The decision of the Board in Jambu Par shad v. Muhammad Aftab (1) is conclusive in the appellants favour ; it shows that the registering officer had no power to certify. The subsequent presentation in July, 1912, did not comply with s. 32. Even if the first presentation is to be treated as duly made, the effect of s. 75, sub-s. 2, is that there had to be a presentation complying with s. 32 after the order was made. Dunne K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. Jambu Parshads Case (( 1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 22.) is distinguishable. Even if the first presentation is to be treated as duly made, the effect of s. 75, sub-s. 2, is that there had to be a presentation complying with s. 32 after the order was made. Dunne K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. Jambu Parshads Case (( 1914) L. R. 42 I. A. 22.) is distinguishable. The indorse ment there was merely that the document was presented by a person who purported to be the general agent under a power of attorney, and it was proved that the power of attorney in question had not been duly authenticated. As appears from the sub-registrars second indorsement he refused to register merely because the execution was not admitted. In these circumstances the first indorsement is prima facie evidence that the power of attorney was duly authenticated, and the presentation duly made in all respects. There is no evidence to the contrary. If s. 75, sub-s. 2, applies to a document which has been duly presented before the order is made, there was a sufficient re-presentation. In any case, having regard to all the circumstances, any defect in the second presentation was merely one of procedure, and by virtue of s. 87 does not invalidate the certificate of registration. [Reference was made to In re Shaik Abdul Aziz ((1387) I. L. R. 11 B. 691.) and Bharat Indu v. Hamid Alt. (( 1920) L. R. 471. A. 177.) De Gruyther K.C. replied. July 11. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BUCKMASTER On November 20, 1911, Maulvi Maqbulur-Rahman executed a mortgage of considerable property in the district of Meerut in favour of Sahu Parshadi Lal, to secure repayment of Rs. 10,000 and interest. The mortgagor subsequently executed several transfers of the mortgaged property, some by way of mortgage and some apparently by way of absolute transfer. The appellant claims under one of such transfers, but the extent and character of his interest is nowhere stated, nor need it be investigated, as it is admittedly sufficient to support . the appeal. He contends that the mortgage of November 20, 1911, was not properly registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act (XVI. of 1908), and is consequently invalid. The respondent is the Manager of the Court of Wards, acting on behalf of the three infant children of the mortgagee, who died on February 8, 1912. the appeal. He contends that the mortgage of November 20, 1911, was not properly registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act (XVI. of 1908), and is consequently invalid. The respondent is the Manager of the Court of Wards, acting on behalf of the three infant children of the mortgagee, who died on February 8, 1912. That the mortgage required to be registered is plain. The only question is, was registration effected? The facts are these. The mortgage was presented for registration before the sub-registrar of Moradabad on February 5, 1912, by Pandit Nanak Chand acting under a power of attorney, and was received by him. The mortgagor did not attend to admit execution, and on February 28, 1912, the sub-registrar refused registration, making an indorsement on the deed in the following terms " Under s. 35, Act XVI. of 1908, registration refused." Sect. 35 relates solely to the admission of execution of the deed, and as the mortgagor did not appear, the sub-registrar was bound to take the course he did, leaving the interested parties to appeal to the registrar under s. 73 (see In re Shaik Abdul Aziz (( 1887) I. L. R. 11 B. 691.)). It will, therefore, be noticed that the reason why registration was refused had nothing to do with defect in presentation ; but as it is now asserted that the original presentation was irregular, it is important to examine the facts and statutory provisions upon that head. The Registration Act has imposed several conditions regulating the presentation of documents for registration, and it is of great importance that those conditions, framed with a view to meet local circumstances, should not be weakened or strained on the ground that they may appear to be exacting and strict. Sect. 32 is the first section dealing with the matter, and it is in the following terms " 32. Sect. 32 is the first section dealing with the matter, and it is in the following terms " 32. Except in the cases mentioned in s. 31 and s. 89, every document to be registered under this Act, whether such registration be compulsory or optional, shall be presented at the proper registration office, (a) by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, in the case of a copy of a decree or order, claiming under the decree or order, or (b) by the representative or assign of such person, or (c) by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorised by power of attorney executed and authenticated in manner hereinafter mentioned." The exceptions mentioned in ss. 31 and 89 need not be considered, as they have nothing to do with the present case. Presentation here was not made in person ; it was made under sub-section (c) by an agent purporting to be authorized by a power of attorney. Such power of attorney must not be general in its form, but must confer the special authority to present on behalf of the principal, and even though the sub-registrar accepts the presentation under a general power of attorney, it is open to any interested party to show that the power of attorney was in fact imperfect. (See Jambu Parshad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan. (L. R. 42 I. A. 22.)) The fact that the presentation is accepted by the sub-registrar as in proper form is, however, prima facie evidence that the conditions have been satisfied; and after such acceptance, the burden of proving any alleged informality rests on the person who challenges the registration. In the present case no question arises upon the character of the power ; it has not been put in evidence and having been formally accepted by the proper official it may be regarded as complying with the provisions as to its character imposed by s. 32, sub-s. (c). By s. 33, however, special conditions are established with regard to the execution of such a power of attorney. By s. 33, however, special conditions are established with regard to the execution of such a power of attorney. This section provides that certain powers of attorney shall alone be recognized—namely, sub-s. (a) " (a) If the principal at the time of executing the power of attorney resides in any part of British India in which this Act is for the time being in force, a power of attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides." It is said that in this case that condition has not been satisfied, because the sub-registrars certificate, which was indorsed on the document on February 5, 1921, in the following terms " Presented by Pandit Nanak Chand, son of Pandit Tara Chand, caste Brahman, professional lawyer, resident of Moradabad, muhalla Raja Gali, at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Moradabad, this 5th day of February, 1912, between the hours of 3 and 4 p.m. on behalf of Sahu Parshadi Lal under a special power of attorney duly authenticated in this office on 3rd February, 1912. (Signed) Sham Behari Lal, officiating S.R.," does not refer to the fact that the power of attorney was executed before the sub-registrar. The indorsement is certainly lax in this respect, but it is made under no statutory obligation, and it has no statutory effect; it is only the evidence to show that the presentation has been accepted by the sub-registrar and its acceptance by him, he being the officer whose business it is to see that all essential regulations are regarded, is prima facie evidence that the power of attorney was regular in all respects. So far as the original presentation is concerned, therefore, their Lordships think that there is nothing to displace the inference that it was duly made, arising from the fact of its acceptance by the sub-registrar. His refusal to register was due to the circumstances which have already been narrated, and in due course appeal was had to the registrar by the present respondents. On June 28, 1912, the district registrar ordered registration, following upon which, on July 22, the Collector of the Court of Wards forwarded the mortgage and the copy of the Order by post to the sub-registrar and asked for registration. On June 28, 1912, the district registrar ordered registration, following upon which, on July 22, the Collector of the Court of Wards forwarded the mortgage and the copy of the Order by post to the sub-registrar and asked for registration. The order of June 28, 1912, removed the difficulty that prevented registration in the first instance, and accordingly, on July 23, 1912, the sub-registrar accepted the document for registration and made upon it the following indorsement " Having seen the order of the district registrar, Moradabad, dated June 28, 1912, I have satisfied myself that the execution of the document was proved before the said officer, and the document is therefore accepted for registration. (Signed) SHER SINGH, officiating S.R." And it was registered accordingly. It is objected that such registration was bad, because the presentation to the sub-registrar after the district registrars order ought to have been made with the same formalities as those necessary for the original presentation, and this, according to the appellants contention, is the only meaning that can be given to s. 75, sub-s. 2, which is in the following terms "75.—(1.) If the Registrar finds that the document has been executed and that the said requirements have been complied with, he shall order the document to be registered. (2.) If the document is duly presented for registration within thirty days after the making of such order, the registering officer shall obey the same, and thereupon shall, so far as may be practicable, follow the procedure prescribed in sections 58, 59 and 60. (3.) Such registration shall take effect as if the document had been registered when it was first duly presented for registration.” The weight of this argument depends upon the phrase " duly presented," and it is pointed out that the subsequent use of the same words in sub-s. 3 shows that "duly presented! means presented in accordance with all the formalities imposed by s. 32. Their Lordships are not prepared to differ with this reasoning, but it does not conclude the case in the appellants favour. means presented in accordance with all the formalities imposed by s. 32. Their Lordships are not prepared to differ with this reasoning, but it does not conclude the case in the appellants favour. Upon the hypothesis that s. 75, sub-s. 2, may be dealing with a case such as the present, in which original presentation has been properly made, and every condition satisfied, there would, in their Lordships opinion, be nothing to prevent the district registrar, when he had determined the question of execution, from directing that the registration should then be made. The last words in sub-s. 3, which provide that the registration shall date back, do not necessarily refer only to a registration effected pursuant to the provisions of sub-s. 2, but to every registration consequent on the order made by the registrar. The main point about sub-s. 2 is that it is mandatory in form and compels the registering officer to effect the registration if the document be duly presented. If this procedure be followed and registration is refused, the processes of the Court are open for the purpose of compelling obedience, a privilege that would not be enjoyed if the formalities were omitted. Their Lordships can find nothing in the section to prevent the registrar or the sub-registrar from registering a document which had been duly presented, and the execution of which has been proved, without requiring a repetition of all the original steps, but he cannot be compelled to register unless the document be u duly presented " a second time. There are many mischiefs against which the statute was designed to afford protection in requiring obedience to the provisions for presentation in the first instance, but when once the execution of the document has been proved, and the original conditions for presentation complied with, there is no reason why they should all be repeated. For these reasons their Lordships think that the conclusion to which the High Court have arrived is correct, although they are not prepared to accept all the reasoning by which that conclusion is supported, and they will, therefore, humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.