JUDGMENT Mookerjee, J. - This is an appeal by the first defendant in a suit for recovery of possession of land upon declaration of title. The disputed lands are described in two of the schedules attached to the plaint, namely, the homestead lands in the second schedule and the chara or paddy lands in the fourth schedule. The lands originally belonged to a family of Nags, and are claimed by the plaintiffs under title by purchase. The trial Court dismissed the claim in respect of the homestead lands and decreed the claim in respect of a share of the paddy lands. Both the parties were dissatisfied with this decision; the first plaintiff preferred an appeal and the first defendant filed a cross appeal. The Subordinate Judge varied the decree of the primary Court in favour of the plaintiffs and dismissed the cross-appeal. The result was that the decree of the Subordinate Judge gave the plaintiffs a decree in respect of the homstead land and share of paddy land which belonged originally to Gopal Chandra Nag, in addition to what had been awarded by the Court of first instance. This decree is now assailed by the first defendant as erroneous in law. The appeal was heard on the 24th January, 1922, by Greaves and Cuming, JJ., who made an order under Order 41, Rule 25, for investigation of three questions which appeared to them essential to the right decision of the suit upon the merits, namely first, whether the conveyance by Gopal Chandra Nag dated the 18th January, 1917, which is the root of the title of the plaintiffs, is a genuine document or not; secondly, whether the claim is barred by limitation and thirdly, whether the claim is barred by estoppel. The Subordinate Judge has returned his findings and the reasons therefor, and the appeal has now been placed before us for determination under Order 41, Rule 26. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents that the matters in controversy are concluded by the findings contained in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge now under appeal, and that it was not open to Greaves and Cuming, JJ., to make an order under Order 41, Rule 25. The appellant has urged that the respondents are not competent to take up this position and to invite the Court in substance to review the order previously made. The appellant has urged that the respondents are not competent to take up this position and to invite the Court in substance to review the order previously made. In this connection, our attention has been drawn by the respondents to Hiatunessa v. Kailas Chandra (1905) 16 C.L.J. 259, Jnanendra Nath v. Surjya Kant (1912) 17 C.W.N. 462, E.I. Railway Company v. Changay Khan (1915) 42 Cal. 888 = 22 C.L.J. 212 = 19 C.W.N. 1034 and Mobarak Hossain v. Behari (1894) 16 All 306. In each of these cases, an order or reference was made by a single Judge under Order 41, Rule 25 of the Code of 1908 or the corresponding provision (Section 566) of the Code of 1882, and it was ruled that when the appeal came to be heard ultimately by a Bench of two Judges, that Bench was not bound by the opinion expressed by the single Judge. This view has been defended before us on the ground that if, on receipt of the finding, the case had been determined by a single Judge on the assumption that he was bound by the order previously made, the entire case would have been open for reconsideration in an appeal under the Letters Patent before a Bench of two Judges. The same explanation, however, is not available in justification of the decisions in Hanuman Das v. Gursahay (1913) 18 C.L.J. 181 and Lachman Prosad v. Jamuna Prosad (1888) 10 All. 162; in each of these cases, the order for further finding was made by a Bench of two Judges, and the appeal was determined, after return of the findings, by another Bench of two Judges. Neither of these decisions, however, can be treated as an authority for the proposition that an order under Order 41, Rule 25, once made and carried out can be subsequently pronounced to have been erroneously made. In Hanuman v. Gursahay (1913) 18 C.L.J. 181 a new aspect of the matters in controversy was, at the final stage, placed before the Court, which had escaped notice at the time when the order for further finding was made. In Lachman Prosad v. Jamuna Prosad (1888) 10 All. 162, the findings on remand and the objections thereto were in fact considered before the final judgment was pronounced. In Lachman Prosad v. Jamuna Prosad (1888) 10 All. 162, the findings on remand and the objections thereto were in fact considered before the final judgment was pronounced. We are of opinion that it cannot, as a matter of principle be affirmed broadly that when an order has been made under Order 41, Rule 25, the Court called upon to determine the appeal finally under Order 41, Rule 26, is competent to treat the order as erroneously made. No doubt, as pointed out in Bonchan v. Ainuddin 24 W.R. 137, when an order has been made under Order 41, Rule 25, the appeal remains pending and indisposed of on the file of the Court. The order, whether rightly or wrongly made, is an order made with jurisdiction; its validity may be attacked on review, but till it has been set aside in an appropriate proceeding, it must be treated as an interlocutory order which is operative in law; Hook v. Administrator-General of Bengal (1921) 48 Cal. 499 = 48, I.A. 187, Ramkripal v. Rupkuari 11. I.A. 37. There can be no controversy that if the order had been made under Order 41, Rule 23, its propriety could not have been challenged in an appeal against the final decree made after remand; Ramkuber Bai v. Damodar 6 Bom. H.C.R. 146. Braja v. Jagat 21 W.R. 199, Gangaram v. Jammajay 1 C.L.R. 144, Surajdin v. Chattur (1881) 3 All. 755, Lachman v. Ganga (1911) 34 Mad. 72. The same principle is applicable here, subject to the obvious reservation that as the appeal remains pending, the ultimate decision must be based upon a consideration of all the findings before and after the order under Order 41, Rule 25. This, indeed, is plain from the language used by the legislature in Order 41, Rule 26. The evidence and findings become part of the record in the suit, and when the Court proceeds to determine the appeal, such determination must be based upon all the materials on the record; these include whatever was part of the record as it stood before the order under Order 41, Rule 25, was made, as also what has been added in the Court of appeal, namely, the order together with the evidence taken pursuant thereto and the reasoned findings thereon. No portion of the record can be disregarded, and neither the order nor the materials placed on the record on the basis thereof can be rejected as if brought in without lawful authority. This view is in accord with that adopted in Official Assignee of Bengal v. Bidya Sundari (1920) 24 C.W.N. 145. We may add that we do not overlook that when a finding is directed upon one or more of several inter-related points, there is a possibility that the new finding may, specially where based oh new evidence, not harmonise with the other findings. This wouldnot embarrass the court in a first appeal, where the entire evidence may be examined, as in the case just mentioned; but it may create a real difficulty in second appeals, where the Court is competent to examine the evidence only to the limited extent mentioned is section 103. This would seem to point to the conclusion that in a second appeal, involving several points difficult to disentangle, the appropriate course to follow is to make, not an order under Order 41, Rule 25, but an order of remand in the exercise of inherent power of the Court; Ghuznavi v. Allahabad Bank (1917) 44 Cal. 929, Brij Indar v. Kanshi Ram (1918) 44 I.A. 218 = 45 Cal. 94. We have next to consider the result of the application of these principles to the case before us. In respect of the share of Brojo Govinda Nag and Krishna Govinda Nag, the claim was dismissed by both the Courts below, and we are not concerned with the point in the present appeal. Here we have to deal with the share of Gopal Chandra Nag. The plaintiffs claimed title thereto under a conveyance dated the 18th January, 1917. The defendants contended that the conveyance was without consideration and passed no title. The Court of first instance found against the plaintiffs on this point. The Subordinate Judge held that it was not open to the defendants to raise the question of consideration, and in support of this view he relied upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in Lal Achalram v. Raja Kazim Hossain (1905) 32 I.A. 113 = 27 All. 271. Greaves and Cuming, JJ., held that the decision mentioned did not apply, and directed the lower appellate Court to come to an express finding as to the true character of the conveyance. 271. Greaves and Cuming, JJ., held that the decision mentioned did not apply, and directed the lower appellate Court to come to an express finding as to the true character of the conveyance. The Subordinate Judge has now found that there was no consideration that the transaction was fictitious, and that title was not intended to pass. This conclusion makes it manifest that the decision in Lal Achalram v. Raja Kazim Hossain (1905) 32 I.A. 113 = 27 All. 271 has no application. The principle enunciated by the Judicial Committee that a stranger to a deed, which is intended to be real and operative between the parties thereto, cannot dispute the payment or non-payment of consideration, its adequacy or inadequacy, has no bearing in a case where a deed is challenged as fictitious, never designed to operate as a real deed on to effect a transfer of the title. We hold accordingly that the conveyance of the 18th January, 1917, did not vest in the plaintiffs the title to the share which originally belonged to Gopal Chandra Nag. In this view, it is superfluous to consider, whether the claim to that share is or is not barred by limitation or estoppel. But we may add that we were not impressed by the argument of the respondents that the findings of the Subordinate Judge on these points were so clear as to render unnecessary an order under Order 41, Rule 25. It cannot he denied that the Subordinate Judge had not distinguished between the question of limitation as applicable to the claim put forward by the plaintiffs and the question of acquisition of title by adverse possession by the defendants or their predecessors. We must further bear in mind that questions of title and possession cannot always be properly considered piecemeal as disconnected fragments. We are consequently of opinion that the decree of the Subordinate .Judge in so far as it varied the decree of the trial Court cannot be supported, although it cannot be successfully attacked, either as to title or as to limitation, in so far as it allowed a part of the claim for the paddy land. 3. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the decree of the Subordinate Judge set aside, and that of the Court of first instance restored. This order will carry costs, both here and in the lower appellate Court.