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1922 DIGILAW 510 (ALL)

Sital Prasad v. Mahabir Singh

1922-11-02

LINDSAY, RAFIQ

body1922
JUDGMENT : RAFIQ, J.:— This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, Mahabir Singh, for the recovery of the property in suit on the ground of preemption. It was alleged in the plaint that defendants Nos. 1-8 were co-sharers of the plaintiff and had, without his knowledge and consent, sold their share to defendants Nos. 9-12 by a sale-deed, dated the 28th May, 1918. The consideration of the sale, as given in the deed, was Rs. 7,000 but, as a matter of fact, the real consideration that changed hands was the sum of Rs. 6,000. The plaintiff relied for the success of his claim on a custom alleged by him to obtain. In the village under which a co-sharer had the right to preempt the property of another co-sharer in case of sale by the latter. The vendees alone contested the suit. They urged five pleas in bar of the claim but we are concerned here with only two of them. They contended that no custom of preemption prevailed in the village and that the claim of the plaintiff was barred inasmuch as his father, who was alive at the time of the sale, had notice of it and had refused to purchase the property. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge, after duly considering the evidence for the parties, came to the conclusion that the custom set up in the plaint had been established and that the allegation with regard to the service of notice upon the father of the plaintiff and the alleged refusal of the latter, had not been made out. The claim was accordingly decreed. 2. In appeal before us, the argument is that the entry in the wajib-ul-arz upon which the plaintiff bases his claim, is not an entry of custom but, at the most, a record of contract. 3. It is said that the words of the wajib-ul-arz are capable of being construed as relating either to custom or to contract. We have examined the words in question. The contention is based upon three words in paragraph 3 of the wajib-ul-arz which are to the following effect, “Jikr-hag-shufa” (account of the right of preemption). The wajib-ul-arz was drawn up in 1870. It was prepared in accordance with the Circular of the Board of Revenue No. 24 of 1868. Paragraph 9 of the said Circular is to the following effect. The wajib-ul-arz was drawn up in 1870. It was prepared in accordance with the Circular of the Board of Revenue No. 24 of 1868. Paragraph 9 of the said Circular is to the following effect. “The wajib-ul-arz should be a record of the custom and usages prevalent in the estate.” 4. Having regard to the direction of the Board of Revenue, the only construction that we can put on the third paragraph of the wajib-ul-arz of 1870 filed in this case is that the record in the said paragraph is a record of custom. In addition to the wajib-ul-arz, the plaintiff filed two decrees of litigation between other co-sharers in 1901 & 1907. The said decrees show that the right of preemption was set up, and, in spite of its denial, was upheld by the Courts. We, therefore, are of opinion that the lower Court was right in holding that the plaintiff had established the custom of preemption upon the basis of which he came into Court. 5. The second objection to the decree of the lower Court is that the father of the plaintiff was duly notified of the intention of sale before the sale was completed. In support of this contention reliance is placed upon both oral and documentary evidence. 6. The documentary evidence, consists of a registered post-card said to have been sent to Bhopal Singh on the 5th Mach 1918 from the post-office of Manjhanpur and the acknowledgment slip. The vendees-appellants say that the notice was duly presented to Bhopal Singh who after having it read to him declined to accept it. Pt. Sital Prasad, appellant No. I has gone into the witness box in support of the allegation that a registered post-card was sent to Bhopal Singh. He has also examined the post-man who is said to have taken the post-card to Bhopal Singh. We have examined carefully the evidence of the post-man and we agree with the Court below that it lacks the ring of truth. We also find that there is internal evidence on the endorsement of the post-card itself to show that it is doubtful whether the post-card was ever presented to Bhopal Singh. The endorsement on the post-card purported to be in the handwriting of the post-man to the effect that the addressee had declined to take the post-card. The endorsement was originally dated the 7th March 1919. The endorsement on the post-card purported to be in the handwriting of the post-man to the effect that the addressee had declined to take the post-card. The endorsement was originally dated the 7th March 1919. It was subsequently altered to 1918. This change of date makes the endorsement very suspicious. Moreover the impressions of the postal seals on the post-card of different dates are also difficult to explain. Sital Prasad says that the day following the issue of the post-card by him Bhopal Singh came to his house and formally declined to buy the property. According to Sital Prasad the visit of Bhopal Singh must have taken place on the 6th of March 1918. The endorsements on the post-card and the acknowledgment slip showing that the post-card was presented on the 7th March 1918 give the lie to the evidence of Sital Prasad. We think that it has not been satisfactorily proved that the postcard in question was ever presented to Bhopal Singh. We might observe here that Bhopal Singh died before the institution of the suit. 7. The next piece of evidence relied upon is the oral evidence of Sital Prasad and two others to the alleged visit of Bhopal on the 6th March 1918 to the house of the vendees declining to buy the property. As we hate remarked above the endorsements on the post-card and the acknowledgment slip give the lie to the story of the vendees. Moreover if Bhopal Singh refused the post-card there was no occasion for him to go next day to inform the vendees that he did not want to buy the property. Another consideration which militates against the veracity of the oral evidence of the vendees on this point is that no notice was given to other co-sharers who stood in the same degree as the plaintiff nor was any statement made that, notices were given to the other co-sharers. The reason is obvious because those co-sharers are alive and if such a statement had been made, they would have come to the witness box and given the lie to the vendees. It is the death of Bhopal which has enabled the vendees to set up the story that a registered post-card was sent to him which he had refused and the next day had come to the vendees and declined to buy the property. 8. It is the death of Bhopal which has enabled the vendees to set up the story that a registered post-card was sent to him which he had refused and the next day had come to the vendees and declined to buy the property. 8. We think that the lower Court appraised the evidence in the case at its proper value. The appellants have failed to prove that any notice was given to the father of the plaintiff-respondent or that any refusal was made by him. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs including fees in this Court on the higher scale.