JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by certain defendants against an order of remand. One of the defendants named Sheo Zoor is the tenant of an occupancy holding. The other persons sued are impleaded as persons claiming mortgagee rights from Sheo Zoor. Now the plaintiff is the daughter of one Ajodhia. Her case is that there was a mortgage of this holding in the year 1910 in respect of which she now represents the mortgagee interest. There was a subsequent mortgage 4 years later and that was in favour of Nanku defendant No. 4 and Dalganjan defendant No. 5, and it was stipulated that these persons would pay off the mortgage of 1910. The allegation in the plaint is that they have in fact done so, but they paid the money to Bisheshar, Kandhai, and Bhawani, defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, who wrongfully represented themselves as the legal representatives of the original mortgagee under that mortgage. The plaintiff further alleged that she had been deprived of actual possession as usufructuary mortgagee three days prior to the institution of the suit. The reliefs sought were in the alternative, either recovery of possession or recovery of the mortgage money. The trial Court held that the plaintiff's entire claim was vitiated by the fact that the mortgage of the 3rd of January, 1910, was in contravention of the provisions of the Local Tenancy Act. It accordingly dismissed the suit altogether. The lower appellate Court has remanded the suit for trial on the merits. We think the order of remand is in substance right and that we must affirm it, subject to the following remarks: In any event, but subject of course to any plea that may be taken on the ground of limitation, a suit for recovery of the money lies on the facts alleged against defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3, on the other hand, a person who has contracted a usufructuary mortgage over an occupancy holding, in contravention of the provisions of the law, will not receive the assistance of the Courts in a suit for recovery of possession based upon title, such title being ex hypothesis invalid. The plaintiff however could undoubtedly have sued to be put back in possession u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act, without pleading her title at all. The plaintiff however could undoubtedly have sued to be put back in possession u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act, without pleading her title at all. If the claim for recovery of possession is further pressed in the trial Court, apart from the claim against defendants 1, 2 and 3 for recovery of the money, that Court must consider whether it can allow, or should allow, an amendment of the plaint, so as to deal with this suit as if it had been brought under the Specific Relief Act independently of any question of title. With these remarks we dismiss this appeal, leaving the costs of the same to be costs in the cause.