JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal by the decree holder against an order made in proceedings in execution of a decree. The appellant held a decree for money against the defendant and attached his holding in execution. The judgment debtor objected that the holding was not transferable and could not consequently be sold in execution. There was an investigation as to the nature of the tenancy, and the Court held that the holding was in fact nontransferable. Thereupon on the authority of the decision of the Full Bench in Dayamoyi v. Anandamottan Roy Chowdhury [1915] 42 Cal. 172 - 18 C.W.N. 971 - 20 C.L.J. 52 - 27 I.C. 61 (F.B.) the application for execution was dismissed on the 6th March, 1920. On the 21st December, 1920, the decree holder presented a fresh application for execution. The property he sought to attach was the identical holding which had been released in course of the previous execution proceedings. The reason for new application was that in the interval a Special Bench of this Court had ruled in the case of Chandra Benode Kundu v. Shaikh Ala Bux [1920] 48 Cal. 184 - 31 C.L.J. 510 - 24 C.W.N. 818 - 58 I.C. 353 (S.B.) that a non-transferable holding could be attached and brought to sale in execution of a decree for money. The judgment-debtor contended that the question, whether the disputed holding could or could not be brought to sale in execution of the decree held by the appellant against him, was res judicata. The Courts below have given effect to this contention and have dismissed the application for execution. 2. It is not disputed that the principle of res judicata as enumerated in Section 11 of the CPC of 1908, is not by its terms applicable to the present case. But it is not open to argument that a similar principle is applicable as ruled by the Judicial Committee in the case of Hook v. administrator General of Bengal [1921] 48 Cal. 499 - 48 I.A. 187 - 19 A.L.J. 366 - 40 M.L.J. 423 - 29 M.L.T.336 - (1921) M.W.N. 313 - 33 C.L.J. 405 - 23 Bom. L.R. 648 - 25 CW.N. 915 - 14 L.W. 221 - 60 I.C. 631 (P.C.), that principle is that there must a finality to litigation. 499 - 48 I.A. 187 - 19 A.L.J. 366 - 40 M.L.J. 423 - 29 M.L.T.336 - (1921) M.W.N. 313 - 33 C.L.J. 405 - 23 Bom. L.R. 648 - 25 CW.N. 915 - 14 L.W. 221 - 60 I.C. 631 (P.C.), that principle is that there must a finality to litigation. Consequently the question for decision is erroneous in law or in fact operates as a conclusive bar. The Courts below have given an answer in the affirmative. The authorities on the subject were examined by this Court in the case of Aghorenath Mukherjee v. Sremati Kamini Debi [1910] 11 C.L.J. 461 - 6 I.C. 554 and the principle deductible (sic) was thus formulated in the case of Purna-Chandra v. Rasikchandra [1911] 13 C.L.J. 119 - 9 I.C. 568. In respect of the true limits of the rule of res judicata, as regards a decision erroneous on a point of law, two principles are well settled. In on class of cases where the parties seek to litigate against the same cause of action as had been decided between them in a prior suit, the rule of res judicata applies. In another class where the dispute relates to matters which have been already in controversy and have form the subject of consideration in the previous suit, although the cause of action in the subsequent suit may be distinct, the estoppel is limited to matters distinctly put in issue and determined in the prior action; and it is further restricted to questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. 3. This principle was applied in the cases of Mohamaya Prosad Singh v. Ramkhelwan Singh Thakur [1912] 15 C.L.J. 684 - 15 I.C. 911 and Rambehari Sarkar v. Surendranath Ghose [1914] 19 C.L.J. 34 - 21 I.C. 979. The view thus taken is supported by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Badar Bee T. Habib Morian Moordin [1909] A.C. 615 (sic) 8. L.J.P.C. 161 - 101 L.T. (sic) (P.C.) where Lord Macnaghten pointed out that a decision erroneous in law may operate as res judicata 4. We have been pressed, however, to adopt a different view and our attention has been invited to the decision in the case of Alimmunnessa Chowdhurani v. Shamacharan Roy [1905] 32 Cal.749 - 9 C.W.N. 466, 1 C.L.J. 176 which is clearly distinguishable. We have been pressed, however, to adopt a different view and our attention has been invited to the decision in the case of Alimmunnessa Chowdhurani v. Shamacharan Roy [1905] 32 Cal.749 - 9 C.W.N. 466, 1 C.L.J. 176 which is clearly distinguishable. As pointed out by Maclean, C.J. there was a new cause of action in the subsequent suit and he guarded himself from holding that a decision on a point of law can never constitute res judicata. In fact he himself had indicated previously in the case of Raicharan Ghose v. Kumudmohan Datta [1897] 1 C.W.N. 687 that a decision erroneous in law may operate as res judicata. The decision in the case of Baijnath Goenka v. Radmanand Singh [1912] 39 Cal. 848 - 16 C.W.N. 621 - 16 C.L.J. 154 - 14 I.C. 124 is distinguishable on similar grounds and we find that the Madras High Court has adopted the rule enunciated in Aghorenath Mukherjee v. Kamini Debi [1910] 11 C.L.J. 461 - 6 I.C. 554 in the case of the Secretary of State v. Maharaja of Venkatagiri [1916] 31 M.L.J. 97 - 20 M.L.T. 284 - (1916) 2 M.W.N. 96 - 35 I.C. 266. In the case before us, the question in controversy is as it was in controversy in the previous execution case, whether the disputed tenancy is or is not liable to be sold in execution of the money decree held by the appellant against the respondent. That question was decided against the appellant on the 6th March 1919, and cannot now be allowed to be re-agitated merely because a Special Bench of this Court has enunciated a rule different from what was recognised in previous cases. 5. The order of the District Judge must consequently be affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs. We assess the hearing fee at one gold mohur.