Judgement Appeal (No. 56 of 1921) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (December 22, 1916) reversing a decree of the District Judge of Dharwar (January 6, 1913). The suit was brought by one Gururao, since deceased and represented by his widow the first respondent, against the appellant, the Secretary of State, and Vithalrao, the second respondent, to recover certain lands forming part of the Hebli estate. That estate had been granted by the Government of the Peshwa at some date prior to 1775. No sanad was in existence, but proceedings before the Inam Commission of 1858, which contained certain records, were put in evidence. On the introduction of British rule the estate was enjoyed in two moieties, one (which was not in question in the present proceedings) by Lakshmanrao representing the senior branch of the family, and the other by Ramchandrarao representing the junior branch. On the death of Ramchandrarao in 1818 the estate was continued, a nazrana being paid. Each of his two sons entered into separate enjoyment of a portion of their fathers estate, and that was recognized by the authorities. On the death of the elder son, which took place in 1842, the estate was continued to his son Pandurangrao above mentioned, on payment of a nazrana. In 1858 the Inam Commissioner decided under the Inam Rules that the Hebli estate was granted as a saranjam, which is a political tenure resumable by Government. In 1879 Pandurangrao executed a document purporting to partition his estate among his four sons. Pandurangrao died in 1899 and Government then resumed his estate and bestowed it on the second defendant. In 1907 Ramrao, a grandson of Pandurangrao, filed a suit against the Secretary of State claiming to be entitled to one-sixteenth share of the saranjam, alleging it to be sarva inam and non-resumable, but his suit was dismissed both in the District Court and by the High Court at Bombay on appeal (seel. L. R. 34 B. 232). The present plaintiff was another grandson of Pandurangrao,. and the second defendant was the son of Pandurangraos eldest grandson. The plaint alleged that the Hebli estate was a sarva inam, granted to the plaintiffs ancestor, and that consequently the lands in suit were his absolute property. L. R. 34 B. 232). The present plaintiff was another grandson of Pandurangrao,. and the second defendant was the son of Pandurangraos eldest grandson. The plaint alleged that the Hebli estate was a sarva inam, granted to the plaintiffs ancestor, and that consequently the lands in suit were his absolute property. By an amendment the plaintiff raised an alternative case as follows "Saranjam grant is a grant of the revenue only and the Government cannot resume the raitava rights which the plaintiff and his ancestors have been enjoying from ancient times. And even if the saranjam grant be of the soil, Government has no right to resume it. And the estate in suit is partible." The District Judge dismissed the suit. He held that the estate was a saranjam and not a sarva inam. In his view the saranjam was a grant of the land revenue only, but he was of opinion that the right to hold the lands was a part of the grant and that they were consequently resumable with the saranjam. He further held that under s. 4 of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X. of 1876) the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit, save so far as the plaintiff had acquired occupancy rights apart from the grant; and he found that no occupancy right had been acquired. The learned District Judge in the passage in his judgment which is referred to in the judgment of the Judicial Committee, said in relation to facts appearing in the Inam Commission proceedings " Now as Hebli was in the possession of Balvantrao in 1757-8 and was resumed by the Peshwa in 1761 and given in farm to Balwantrao, and was in the following year included in the saranjam grant to others who were merely directed to pay a certain cash allowance to Balwantrao, it seems clear that under the original grant the right to hold the land was taken to be a part of the saranjam and resumable with the saranjam." He also found that the documents showed that the nazrana had been levied not only on the royal share of the revenue, but upon the entire revenue derived by the saranjamdar, including that which he obtained in the same way as an occupant of unalienated land. Upon appeal to the High Court the plaintiff abandoned his contention that the estate was a sarva inam, but upon his alternative claim his appeal was allowed. The appeal was heard by Bachelor and Shah JJ., the former concurring with the judgment delivered by the latter learned judge. The proceedings are reported at I. L. R. 41 B. 408. Shah J. in the course of his judgment said "Now it is well established that in the case of saranjam or jahagir (the terms being convertible) the grant is ordinarily of the royal share of the revenue and not of the soil and that the burden of proving that in any particular case it is a grant of the soil lies upon the party alleging it see Krishnarao v. Rangrao (( 1867) 4 Bom. H. C. (A. C. J.) 1.); Ramcbandra v.Venkatrao (( 1882) I. L. R. 6 B. 598, 606.), and Ramkrishnarao v. Nanarao. (( 1903) 5 Bom. L. R. 983.) ....On not a single occasion does the grant appear to have been made in tennis which would indicate a grant of the soil or which would indicate that the grant had any relation to the occupation of the lands. The grantees were in prior occupation of the lands and they were continued in possession of the lands without any liability to pay the royal share of the revenue. It is also a settled rule in this Presidency that in the case of an inam, where the grant is merely of the royal share of the revenue and not of the soil, resumption means only the discontinuance of exemption from payment of land revenue, and that interference with actual occupation is not allowable. The Government Resolution of 1854 is clear on the point. This Court has consistently taken the same view as to inams see Vishnu v. Tatia (( 1863) 1 Bom. H. C. (H. C. R.) 22), and Balwant Ramchandra v. Secretary of State for India." (( 1905) I. L. R. 29 B. 480,498.) He was of opinion that the decided cases supported the view that the right to the possession of the land in the case of a saranjam grant of the royal revenue did not form part of the saranjam but was independent. He considered that it was unsafe to infer from the circumstances of the resumption and regrant by the Peshwas Government that the original grant was of the sow. 1922. Nov. 6, 7. Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the appellant. Having regard to the decisions of the Board in Suryanarayana v. Patanna (L. R. 451. A. 209.) and Chidambara Sivaprakasa v. Veerama Reddi (L. R. 49 I. A. 286.) it should not be presumed that the grant was only of the royal share of the revenue; the nature of the grant should be ascertained from the evidence. If, however, the grant was of revenue, the District Judge rightly held that the saranjam included the right to the possession of the land, and that that right could be resumed with the saranjam. The view of the High Court proceeded upon a misapprehension of the judgments in Ramchandra v. Venkatrao (( 1882) I. L. R. 6 B. 598.) and Ganpatrao Trinbak Patwardhan v. Ganesh Baji Bhat(( 1885) 1. L. R. 10 B. 112.), and upon the basis of "seri" right see Wilsons Glossary "Seri." Rjya v. Balkrishna Gangadhao (( 1905) I. L. R. 29 B. 415.), which was relied on, does not touch the present case. A saranjamdar cannot, as seridar or otherwise, become a permanent occupier adversely to Government. The right as seridar is not independent of the right as saranjamdar, but part of that right; it ceases upon resumption of the saranjam. The principle to which s. 90 of the Indian Trusts Act (II. of 1882) gives effect applies. If there is any presumption as to the nature of the grant it is displaced by the evidence in this case. The history of the saranjam and the terms of the documents appearing from the proceedings before, the Inam Commission show that the grant was of the soil. The original sanad. as there recorded, refers to grants of the land in inam with any hidden treasures. That the documents showed a grant of the soil is supported by the judgment of the Board in Shekh Sultan Sani v. Shekh Ajmodin (( 1892) L. R. 201. A. 50.) ; the sanad in that case is set out in Trimbrak Ramchandra v. Ghulam Zilani. (( 1909) I. L. R. 34B. 329.) On this point see also Vasudeo v. Collector of Puna (( 1873) 10 Bom. A. 50.) ; the sanad in that case is set out in Trimbrak Ramchandra v. Ghulam Zilani. (( 1909) I. L. R. 34B. 329.) On this point see also Vasudeo v. Collector of Puna (( 1873) 10 Bom. H. C. 471, 474.), and Raoji Narayan Mandlik v. Dadaji Bapuji Desai. (( 1875) I. L. R. 1 B. 523, 527.) If the saranjam was a grant of the soil it is clear that the Court had no jurisdiction. [Ramrao Govindrao v. Secretary of State (( 1909) I. L. R. 34 B. 232.) referred to.] De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the first respondent. The burden of proof was on the Government to establish that it had the right, not merely to reassess the land, but to dispossess the plaintiff. There is a presumption that a saran jam is a grant of revenue only; the decisions in India to that effect are not touched by the recent decisions of the Board referred to. The plaintiffs ancestors had been in possession since before 1775, at which period the Government had not any property in the land. A saranjam is partible only by consent of the Government, but in the present case there were divisions of the land without any consent. If the grant was merely of the revenue the plaintiff has the right to possession, although the Government can reassess. The terms of the grant so far as they appear from the record, do not show that the grant was of the soil see Elphinstones Report on Territories conquered from the Mahrattas, pp. 22, 129. [Reference was also made to Etheridges Narrative of Bombay Land Commission, pp. 12, 15; and to the Inam Rules (Bombay), 1898, rr. 5, 6.] Sir George Lowndes K.C. in reply. The District Judge found that there was no right of occupancy, and in the High Court it was not contended that that finding was wrong. Dec. 8. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SALVESEN. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated December 22, 1916, which reversed a decree of the District Judge of Dharwar, dated January 6, 1913. The suit relates to a part of the Hebli estate, from which the plaintiff was evicted by the Government on the death of his grandfather, Pandurangrao. This is an appeal against a decree of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, dated December 22, 1916, which reversed a decree of the District Judge of Dharwar, dated January 6, 1913. The suit relates to a part of the Hebli estate, from which the plaintiff was evicted by the Government on the death of his grandfather, Pandurangrao. Their object in doing so was to prevent partition of what they regarded as an impartible estate held under a grant of saranjam. It is not necessary to recapitulate the facts, which have been very fully stated in the judgment of the District Judge of Dharwar, or to consider the majority of the points which were disposed of by him and on appeal by the High Court at Bombay. The sole issue which remains for determination is whether the saranjam grant made by the British Government in favour of an ancestor of the plaintiff was a grant of the royal revenue only, or was a grant of the land itself, or of the whole revenue of the land coupled with a right to hold it. The learned District Judge held that the original grant by the British Government was a grant of the whole revenue of the land, and that this carried with it the right to make the best possible use of unoccupied land. The High Court at Bombay in reversing his decision held that the grant was one of the royal share of the revenue only and not of the soil. In reaching this conclusion it is impossible to resist the view that the judges of the High Court were much influenced by their view that there is a presumption that a grant of saranjam is a grant of royal revenue only, and accordingly that the burden of proving that, in any particular case of saranjam, it is a grant of the soil, lies upon the party alleging it. They relied upon various cases cited and which at that time seemed to establish this proposition. They had not, however, the benefit of two recent decisions of this Board—namely, Suryanarayana v. Patanna (L. R. 451. A. 209.), and Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerama Reddi (L. R. 491. A. 286.), in both of which it was held that there is no such presumption. They had not, however, the benefit of two recent decisions of this Board—namely, Suryanarayana v. Patanna (L. R. 451. A. 209.), and Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerama Reddi (L. R. 491. A. 286.), in both of which it was held that there is no such presumption. In conformity with these decisions their Lordships are of opinion that a grant of saranjam may be either of the soil and the whole revenue derived from it, or a grant of the royal share of the revenue only. It must be determined in each case upon the facts what was the quality of the original grant, although it may well be that it is ordinarily a grant of the royal revenue only. It may be that as the plaintiff was dispossessed by the British Government in 1901 there is a certain onus upon the appellant to justify his dispossession, but this becomes of little materiality when evidence is adduced from which a conclusion in fact may be legitimately drawn. In the present case the oral evidence is of no value as supporting the plaintiffs case, and an inference must be drawn one way or the other from the documents that have been produced in the case. These have been examined in detail by the District Judge, and their Lordships concur generally in the result of his analysis. It is plain that the original grant was made in respect of political services; and while it is no doubt possible that the grantees were at that time the owners of the estate, and that all that the grant was intended to give them was a release from payment of the royal share of the revenue, there is nothing in any of the documents produced which suggests such a limitation. On the contrary in one of the early documents founded on the grant was made expressly of the Kasba Hebli with its hamlets and Watnahal, with the Mahal Jukath and Mokassa " with the whole of the dues and cesses and hidden treasures, exclusive, however, of the dues of Huckdars and Inamdars " (The extract is from the Appx. On the contrary in one of the early documents founded on the grant was made expressly of the Kasba Hebli with its hamlets and Watnahal, with the Mahal Jukath and Mokassa " with the whole of the dues and cesses and hidden treasures, exclusive, however, of the dues of Huckdars and Inamdars " (The extract is from the Appx. A to the decision of the Inam Commissioner, that appendix consisting of "The substance of documents pro duced by the jaghirdara of Hebli in support of their claim to the village of that name, and to its hamlet of Watnahal." This document was referred to as an original sanad of 24th Moharam, A.D. 1771-2.—A. M. T.), and the language of the other documents is in similar terms. It is significant also that in the deed of partition executed by Pandurangrao in 1879, the property partitioned is described as the Jahagir villages of Kasbe Hebli and Majre Watnahal and the Mouza of Talvai and Kurdapur "obtained from the British Government." Throughout the documents there is no suggestion that what was conveyed was merely the royal share of the land revenue. They assume throughout that the whole revenue of the lands was conveyed to the grantees, and the amount of the nazarana which has been levied from time to time appears to have been based on the yearly revenue of the estate, " there being no suggestion (as the learned District Judge says) that revenue derived by the holder as occupant, as distinct from saranjamdar was not liable to nazarana." All these considerations are sufficient, in their Lordships opinion, to justify the inference that the original grant was a grant of the soil. It is significant as bearing on the result at which their Lordships have arrived, that the plaintiff in his original plaint nowhere maintained the view upon which the learned judges of the High Court proceeded. His main claim was that he was a full owner of the property in dispute, and that the estate in question was granted as sarva inam hereditarily in recog nition of the services which his ancestors had rendered in assisting the British in settling the country conquered from the Peshwas. This claim was rejected by the District Judge and has now been admitted by the plaintiff to be untenable. This claim was rejected by the District Judge and has now been admitted by the plaintiff to be untenable. As an alternative to this claim, based on the grant by the British Government, the plaint proceeds as follows M Saran-jam grant is a grant of the Revenue only, and the Government cannot resume the Raitava rights which the plaintiff and his ancestors have been enjoying from ancient times. And even if the saranjam grant be of the soil, Government has no right to resume it. And the estate in suit is partible." It is not clear what is meant by "raitava rights,” but the statement sufficiently discloses that they are rights of occupancy only and not of ownership, and a claim of this kind was strenuously maintained in the lower Court with regard to the occupation of lands which were unoccupied at the date of the original grant. This latter claim has now been abandoned. In no part of the plaint is it possible to find a claim that the saranjam grant was a grant of the royal share of the revenue only. It appears, however, that this point was argued, and it has not been the practice of their Lordships to construe the pleadings too strictly, or to exclude a plea, which was not embodied in the plaint, from being made an issue in the case. The fact, however, that it did not occur to the plaintiffs advisers to propound this contention on the evidence which he adduced has a bearing on the question as to the proper inference to be drawn in fact from that evidence. As the case was framed, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in India was apparently not ousted. But in the view which their Lordships now take, the right of the Government to resume these lands could not be questioned in the Civil Courts. In the result their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the decree of the High Court at Bombay should be set aside and the suit dismissed with costs, here and in the Courts below.