Judgement Appeal (No. 45 of 1919) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (October 25, 1915) varying a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (October 14, 1905). The suit related to the estate of the zamindar of Bodinaickenur, a sudra, who died in 1888? and was brought by the first respondent (since deceased) against the appellant (since deceased), who was the widow of the zamindar, his daughter, and other collateral relations, all of whom were defendants and respondents to the appeal. The zamindar left no legitimate sons. Both Courts in India had found that the plaintiff was illegitimate and had rejected his claim to the impartible zamindari. The trial judge, upon a remand, had found that the estate of the deceased included much property which was his self-acquired property; he held that the plaintiff was entitled to one-third of that property, and the widow to two-thirds. Upon appeal to the High Court the decree was varied, it being held that the illegitimate son and the widow were each entitled to a half of the self-acquired property. The litigation involved other points, but upon the present appeal the only substantial question was which of those views .was right. The learned judges of the High Court (Miller and Abdur Rahim JJ.) in dealing with the question in point said as follows " The first question to be decided is whether the plaintiff as the illegitimate son of his deceased father is entitled to share equally with his widow, the first defendant, or whether he is only entitled to half of her share, i.e., to one-third of the properties. In a series of cases in Madras beginning with Ranoji v. Kandoji (( 1885) I. L. R. 8 M. 557.) it has been held that an illegitimate son succeeding to his deceased father along with a widow, daughter, or daughters son, is entitled to half of the properties and not merely to one-third Parvathi v. Thirumalai (( 1887) I. L. R. 10 M. 334, 343.); Chinnammal v. Varadarajulu (( 1892) I. L. R. 15 M. 307.) ; Meenakshi Anni v. Appakutti. (( 1909) I. L. R. 33 M. 226.) In Rahi v. Govinda (( 1875) I. L. R. 1 B. 97.) Westropp C.J. elaborately reviewed all the texts of Hindu law dealing with the rights of an illegitimate son and came to the conclusion (as we understand the judgment) that the illegitimate son was entitled to a half share of the properties; and in Seshagiri v. Girewa (( 1889) I. L. R. 14 B. 282.), Sargent C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, took the same view and understood the decision in Rahi v. Govinda (( 1875) I. L. R. 1 B. 97.) as laying down the same " rule. The learned vakil for the respondent invited us to construe for ourselves the original text of the Mitakshara which he says is clearly in his favour. He also cited the commentary of Apararka on the text of Yajnavalkya and the commentary of Medatithi, the well known commentator of Manu, on the same text. He further contended that all the text-book writers on Hindu law who knew Sanskrit have construed the passage of the Mitakshara in the way he construes it. Much may no doubt be said in favour of this construction. But the decisions of this Court are not based merely on the interpretation of the text of the Mitakshara. In Ranoji v. Kandoji (( 1885) I. L. R. 8 M. 557.), in which the position of an illegitimate son was fully considered, reliance was placed on a passage from the Dattaka Chandrika which states in clear terms that the illegitimate son shares equally with the widow, daughter, and daughters son. It was this very passage of the Dattaka Chandrika which was relied on as authority for not excluding the widow from the succession when there is an illegitimate son, whereas the Mitakshara omits the widow from the category of persons who are not excluded by the illegitimate son. The Dayabhaga which gives the illegitimate son an equal share with the daughter and daughters son was also referred to. In this state of things, we are not prepared to depart from the course of decisions in this Court which hold that the plaintiff is entitled to share equally with the widow." 1922. Nov. 20, 21. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellant. Upon the true construction of the Mitakshara, ch. In this state of things, we are not prepared to depart from the course of decisions in this Court which hold that the plaintiff is entitled to share equally with the widow." 1922. Nov. 20, 21. De Gruyther K.C. and Dube for the appellant. Upon the true construction of the Mitakshara, ch. 1, s. 12, the illegitimate son takes only half the share to which the widow is entitled; he therefore takes one-third, and the widow two-thirds. That view is supported by Chellammal v. Ranganathan Pillai (( 1910) I. L. R. 34 M. 277.) and Gangabai Peerappa v. Bandu. (( 1915) I. L. R. 40 B. 369.) The latter, a decision of the Bombay High Court, is directly in point. In the decisions relied on in the High Court the extent of the share was not the real point at issue, and previous cases, or the view expressed in Maynes Hindu Law, para. 550, was given effect to without discussion. The decision of the Bombay High Court in 1915, already referred to, was arrived at upon a full consideration of the texts. The Dattaka Chandrika is against the appellants contention, but it is a treatise upon adoption not upon inheritance. [Reference was made to Sethurs Hindu Law of Inheritance, Part I., p. 163 ; Savarhikaris Law of Inheritance, p. 942; Ghoses Hindu Law, p. 771.] Mathew K.C. and Ingram for the first respondent. The illegitimate son takes a half of the share which he would have taken had he been legitimate; consequently, he and the widow take equally. That view is supported by a current of authority in Madras. Although the decisions do not always discuss the question, it is significant that over a long period of years the contrary view does not appear to have been contended for. This respondents contention is supported by the statement in Stranges Hindu Law, vol. ii., p. 70, by West and Buhler, and by Mayne. None of the Bombay cases deal with the case of a widow. Further, the text of the Mitakshara does not expressly mention the case of a widow competing with the illegitimate son, and it cannot be assumed that the same principle applies as in the case of a daughter or daughters son. The rule contended for makes the share definite, whereas the contrary view would give rise to less clear results. De Gruyther K.C. replied. The rule contended for makes the share definite, whereas the contrary view would give rise to less clear results. De Gruyther K.C. replied. Kenworthy Brown for respondents Nos. 3 to 8. Dec. 20. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS. This is an appeal from a decree dated October 26, 1915, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras, which varied a decree dated October 14, 1905, of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Madura. The case started as far back as April 25, 1902, and is one of much detail ill which numerous issues have been raised ; but the points now in contest have been reduced to two, and it will only be necessary to set forth so much of the complicated story as relates to them. In December, 1888, Kamaraja Pandiya Naicker, the zamindar of Bodinaickenur, a sudra by caste, died, and there survived him (among others) his illegitimate son the original plaintiff inthe suit, his wife the original first defendant, his daughter the second defendant, and certain collateral agnates who are parties to the suit. He left no legitimate male issue. The appellant set up a paper writing as her husbands last will. Both Courts have held it not proved. Though this finding has been questioned in the appellants case, its pro priety is, in their Lordships opinion, concluded by the concurrent findings of the Courts in India. And so the only point left for decision is whether the plaintiff, as the sole illegitimate son of the late zamindar, was entitled as against the appellant, the lawfully-married widow, to a one-third or a one-half share in the personal or self-acquired properties of the zamindar. The Subordinate Judge decreed only one-third in his favour; the High Court held him entitled to one-half. From this decision the widow has appealed. Both the widow and the illegitimate son have died during the litigation, and representatives have been substituted in their place. The rights of the illegitimate son of a sudra in the Madras Presidency rest principally on a text of Yajnavalkya as explained and developed in the Mitakshara and other authoritative commentaries. In the concluding section of ch. 1 of the Mitakshara the rights of a son by a female slave in the case of a sudras estate are considered. It is conceded that the plaintiff comes within the scope of the section. In the concluding section of ch. 1 of the Mitakshara the rights of a son by a female slave in the case of a sudras estate are considered. It is conceded that the plaintiff comes within the scope of the section. In para.1 the text of Yajnavalkya is quoted, and in the second paragraph it is interpreted. According to Colebrooks translation they run as follows "1. The author next delivers a special rule concerning the partition of a sudras wealth. Even a son begotten by a sudra on a female slave may take a share by the fathers choice. But if the father be dead the brethren should make him partaker of the moiety of a share; and one who has no brothers may inherit the whole property in default of daughters sons.5 2. The son begotten by a sudra on a female slave obtains a share by the fathers choice or at his pleasure. But after [the demise of] the father, if there be sons of a wedded wife, let these brothers allow the son of the female slave to participate for half a share ; that is, let them give him half [as much as is the amount of one brothers] allotment. However, should there be no sons of a wedded wife the son of a female slave takes the whole estate, provided there be no daughters of a wife nor sons of daughters. But, if there be such, the son of the female slave participates for half a share only." The words enclosed in brackets are a gloss by Balambhatta or Subodhini. Here the contest is between the illegitimate son and the widow, and though the widow is not named in the text it is well settled that as a preferential heir to the daughters son she is included among those who share with the illegitimate son, and it would serve no useful purpose to speculate why she was not mentioned in the text. But the measure of the respective shares still has to be determined. The text and the commentary speak of the illegitimate son being made partaker of a moiety of a share or participating for half of a share, but there is no explicit statement as to the unit in which he is to take his half-share. But the measure of the respective shares still has to be determined. The text and the commentary speak of the illegitimate son being made partaker of a moiety of a share or participating for half of a share, but there is no explicit statement as to the unit in which he is to take his half-share. There are two possible views—either that he is to take one-half of the other partici-pants share, or one-half of what the illegitimate son would have taken had he been legitimate. Mr. J. R. Gharpure, an able Sanskritist and a vakil of the Bombay High Court, in his recent translation of the Mitakshara, renders the text of Yajnavalkya as providing that the brothers should make the illegitimate son “a half-sharer "; and his translation of Vijnaneswaras commentary on this text is " these brothers should make that son of the female slave a half-sharer, i.e., they should give him a half from their own allotment," He appends a footnote in which he says this is made clearer by Balambhatta and Subodhini, and gives what purports to be a quotation from Balambhatta and Subodhini in these words " From the entire estate a half of what would be regarded as his share, i.e., one-half of the amount allotted to a legitimate issue." Their Lordships have unfortunately had no opportunity of examining these authorities. This rendering "half-sharer," which is not without significance, is also to be found in Rao Saheb Mandliks translation of Yajnavalkyas text. In the Savasvati Vilasa this text is cited, and the comment on it is in these terms "The meaning is that even when there is a daughter’s son, the son of the female slave takes only a half" (para. 396). The Dattaka Chandrika, ch. 5, s. 31, deals with the text as follows "Therefore if any, even in the series of heirs down to the daughters son, exist, the son by a female slave does not take the whole estate, but only shares equally with such heir." Though the Dayabhaga is not a governing authority in Madras it is worthy of notice that in. commenting on this text Jimuta Vahana lays down that if there be a daughters son the illegitimate son shall share equally with him, adding the explanation that as no special provision occurs it is fit that the allotment should be equal (ch. commenting on this text Jimuta Vahana lays down that if there be a daughters son the illegitimate son shall share equally with him, adding the explanation that as no special provision occurs it is fit that the allotment should be equal (ch. 9, 31), The Daya Krama Sangraha, another Bengal authority, is to the same effect (VI. 1-35). In Colebrooks Digest the rule is further elaborated, and it is there said that " after the death of the father, if no such will had been declared, the brethren born of a wife legally married shall allot him half a share—that is, half of such share as would have been assigned had his mother been legally married. Consequently a son by a female slave not superior in class to her sudra master shall obtain the moiety of a full share." Those last-cited commentaries, while not of governing authority in Madras, at any rate show the sense in which the text has been understood elsewhere. Though in ch. 1, s. 12, of the Mitakshara there is no explanation of how the half-share is to be computed, still in another part of the treatise there are directions which indicate the method of computation approved by its author in the ascertainment of fractional shares. Thus in ch. 1, s. 7, para. 5, it is provided that "sisters should be disposed of in marriage, giving them as an allotment the fourth part of a brothers own share." In para. 6 it is said that the meaning is that the girl shall be allowed to participate for a quarter of such a share as would be assignable to a brother of the same rank with herself. This is worked out in para.7 as follows "For example, if a person had only a Brahman wife and leaves one son and one daughter the whole paternal estate should be divided into two parts and one such part be sub-divided into four ; and the quarter being given to the girl, the remainder shall be taken by the son. Or, if there be two sons and one daughter, the whole of the fathers estate should be divided into three parts; and one such part be sub-divided into four; and the quarter having been given to the girl, the remainder shall be shared by the sons. Or, if there be two sons and one daughter, the whole of the fathers estate should be divided into three parts; and one such part be sub-divided into four; and the quarter having been given to the girl, the remainder shall be shared by the sons. But if there be one son and two daughters the fathers property should be divided into thirds, and two shares be severally sub-divided into quarters; then, having given two quarter shares to the girls, the son shall take the whole of the residue. It must be similarly understood in any case of an equal or unequal number of brothers and sisters alike in rank." In the second volume of Nortons Leading Cases, p. 499, reference is made to a case of Annasamy Moodelly v. Tandavaraya (Mad. S. R. 1860, p. 11.), and the ruling is stated in these terms "Where plaintiff (illegitimate) and defendant (legitimate) were two brothers the property was divided one-quarter to the plaintiff, three-quarters to the defendant." This would be in conformity with the rule of division that would give an illegitimate son one-half of the share to which he would have been entitled had he been legitimate. Reference, however, has been made to Gangabai v. Bandu (I. L. R. 40 B. 369.), where it was decided by the Bombay High Court that in a competition between the widow and an illegitimate son the son took only one-third. But from the judgment delivered it is apparent that this conclusion was not in accordance with the view that the learned judges took of the text and the commentaries, but was founded on what they understood to be case-law of the Bombay Presidency. If the true method of computation be to allot to the illegitimate son one-half of what he would have taken had he been legitimate, then where the competition is between the illegitimate son and the widow the allotment of the respective shares presents no difficulty. Such a son if born of a lawfully-wedded wife would have taken the whole; by reason of his illegitimacy this would be reduced to one-half; and so he and the lawfully-married widow would take in equal shares. Such a son if born of a lawfully-wedded wife would have taken the whole; by reason of his illegitimacy this would be reduced to one-half; and so he and the lawfully-married widow would take in equal shares. In Madras this result, according to the judgment of the High Court now under appeal, has the support of the case-law of that Presidency, and it was definitely stated in the course of the present argument, without being controverted, that as between an illegitimate son and a lawfully-wedded widow there has been no departure in Madras from the rule of equal shares. The learned judges of the High Court, after a reference to the decisions, say "In this state of things we are not prepared to depart from the course of decisions in this Court, which hold that the plaintiff is entitled to share equally with the widow." This, in their Lordships opinion, was the right conclusion at which to arrive, and they will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed with costs. There will be only one set of costs.