JUDGMENT 1. The plaintiff prayed for declaration of title to and separate possession of the lands in Schedule 2, for declaration of title to th share of the lands in Schedule 1 and for recovery of that share on partition, and for declaration of title to th share of the lands in Schedule 6 and 7 and for recovery of joint possession of the same and for other relief's mentioned in the plaint. The defendant No. 1 Contended that the plaintiff being a leper did not inherit the properties left by his maternal grandfather, one Jaggernath and that in any event the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. The defendants No. 2 and 3 pleaded that the plaintiff had no cause of action as against them. The defendant No. 4 supported the defendant No. 1. The Court of first instance found that the plaintiff was not disqualified to inherit the properties which belonged to Jaggernath on account of his leprosy and that the suit was not barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court, on appeal, found according to the medical evidence which had been adduced in the case that the plaintiff had anesthetic leprosy of the mildest kind and that it was not of a bad type and was not ulcerous and accordingly held that at the time when the succession opened, he had no leprosy of such a kind as could disqualify him from inheriting the properties which belonged to his maternal grandfather. On the question of limitation, the lower appellate Court found that inasmuch as Jaggernath's widow Sreemati Bhagabati was in possession of the joint properties till 1321 B.S. when she died, time began to run as against the plaintiff only from the death of Bhagabati when the succession opened, and therefore the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation. The lower Appellate Court accordingly affirmed the decree of the first Court. Against this judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court the present appeal has been preferred by the defendants Nos. 1 and 4 and on their behalf it has been contended before us that on the findings of the two Courts below it should have been held that the plaintiff was excluded from inheritance, and secondly that it had not been shown what the condition of the plaintiff was at the time when the succession opened. 2. 1 and 4 and on their behalf it has been contended before us that on the findings of the two Courts below it should have been held that the plaintiff was excluded from inheritance, and secondly that it had not been shown what the condition of the plaintiff was at the time when the succession opened. 2. Now, under the Hindu Law the grounds of exclusion from inheritance fall under the following six heads: (1) physical and mental defects, (2) incurable or agonizing diseases (3) degradation from caste by reason of crime or otherwise, (4) various, criminal or irreligious conduct, (5) becoming Naistaka Brahmachari (perpetual student) Vanaprasthasrami (hermit) or Sanyasi (ascetic). The physical and mental defects expressly mentioned in the text are impotence, dumbness, deafness, lunacy, lameness, blindness and idiocy. Manu has a further vague ground of exclusion. Nirindriyatwa i.e., absence of limb or sense which includes according to Saraswati Vilasa females as a class. Among the diseases, lunacy has already been referred to. Other diseases expressly mentioned are leprosy (Vishnu) and elephantiasis (Devala). Yagnavalkya has a general ground achikitsya roga (incurable disease) of which consumption is given as an illustration by the Mitakshara and Narada has a similar general ground (sic) rage obstinate or ageing disease. There is some difference of opinion as to some of these defects whether they should be credential. Sir Thomas Strange distinguishes between infirmities, such as blindness; deafness, dumbness & c. which to disqualify must be coeval with birth, and disqualifying diseases such as leprosy, &c. which the Hindu religion regards as visitations not only for sins committed in a preceding state, but also for sins committed in this life; and therefore such visitations are not necessarily congenital in order to disqualify. 3. Of the Smrithi writers the only one who expressly excludes a leper is Devala, whose text runs as follows: "When the father is dead, an impotent man, a leper, a mad-man, an idiot, a blind man, an outcast, the offspring of an outcaste, and a person wearing the token (of religious mendacity) are not competent to share the heritage. Manu excludes one who is a Nirindriya that is devoid of an organ, after expressly mentioning eunuchs and outcast one born blind or deaf, an insane and idiot and a dumb man, but a leper is not referred to by him. See Buhler Oh. IX., Sloka 201. Manu excludes one who is a Nirindriya that is devoid of an organ, after expressly mentioning eunuchs and outcast one born blind or deaf, an insane and idiot and a dumb man, but a leper is not referred to by him. See Buhler Oh. IX., Sloka 201. Apastamba and Basistha do not exclude him. Narada excludes persons afflicted with a chronic or acute disease (See Sacred Books of the East Vol. 33, page 194), or, us otherwise translated an acute or agonizing distemper. Atrophy or pulmonary consumption is instanced as a chronic and leprosy as an acute disease in the Ratnakara Yagnavalkya and Vishnu exclude persons suffering from an incurable disease. So far as leprosy is concerned, the later Hindu Law books generally lay down that to be a ground c exclusion it must be of the sinuous or ulcerous and no of the anesthetic type (See Jenardan v. Gopal 5 B.H.C. 145 (A.C.), Ananta v. Ramab (sic) (1877) I Bom. 554 Kungiah v. Jhani kachala (1896) 19 Mad. 74, Lislan v. Durgadas (1906) 4 C.L.J. 323 Mohun Bhagasar v. Raghunandan (1895) 22 I.A. 94 - 22 Cal. 843 (P.C.) Kayarohana v. Subraya (1915) 38 Mad. 250 - 25 M.L.J. 251. 4. The presumption of Hindu law is against disqualification and the burden of proof of disqualifications lies on a person who seeks to exclude another who would be an heir, should no cause of exclusion be established. It is also settled that where it is contended that a person is excluded from inheritance by reason of disease, the strictest proof of the disease as will disqualify him at the time the succession opened will be required. On The findings arrived at by the Courts below and on the authorities referred to, with which we are in agreement, we must hold that the plaintiff was not disqualified from inheriting the properties which belonged to his grandfather after the death of Sreemati Bhagabati Dasi. In this view of the matter, the two contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants fail and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.