JUDGMENT Ryves and Daniels, JJ. - The issue in this case is whether the mortgages executed in 19 (Sic) and 1908 by a Hindu widow Mussammat Kailasha were executed for legal necessity. 2. The suit out of which the appeal arises was brought by the mortgagees for sale of the mortgaged property. The defendants appellants are the reversioners of Musammat Kailasha's husband Radha Kishan There are Some parts of the judgment of the lower Appellate Court which are not Very clear, but there is no doubt as to What its findings are. It finds that the consideration for these mortgages was actually advanced for payment of revenue, and it is not disputed that it was applied in payment of revenue. The appellants contend that there was no legal necessity, first because It was not shown that the estate was actually threatened with sale when the mortgages were executed and Secondly because Mt. Kailasha received from the estate an income sufficient to enable her to pay the revenue. As to the latter point the, learned Judge finds that she had an income which would ordinarily be sufficient to enable her to pay revenue but at the time when these mortgages were executed, she had been obliged to incur unusual Expenditure by reason of a litigation in which she had been involved for the protection of the estate. The learned Judge therefore finds that there was at the time a pressure on the estate. He. also finds, though he has not attached to the circumstance the weight to which we think it is justly entitled, that the reversioners themselves paid off, as if it were a valid debt, another mortgage executed by Mt. Kailasha for payment of revenue, shortly after the mortgages in suit. These mortgages were actually recited in that deed. On these findings the question of legal necessity cannot be seriously disputed. The existence of arrears of revenue for which the estate is liable to be sold up is at least presumptive evidence of necessity, even though, when the loan is incurred, the government may not have taken measures to enforce the liability. This presumed necessity may no doubt be repudiated by showing that the widow had sufficient income to enable her to pay the revenue without the necessity of borrowing. This presumed necessity may no doubt be repudiated by showing that the widow had sufficient income to enable her to pay the revenue without the necessity of borrowing. The learned Judge in this case, though he finds that she had a substantial income, has also found that there were special circumstances which made it necessary for her to borrow money at this particular time. 3. Three other points have been urged by the appellants. The first is that the interest under the deed was excessive. This point is nowhere specifically raised in the grounds of appeal, though the memorandum of appeal is divided into seven paragraphs, and we do not think that the appellants are entitled to urge it. Nor do we think that 15 per cent, interest with yearly rests is an extraordinarily high rate. The second point is that instead of passing a mortgage decree in the usual form the Court below has given a personal decree against the reversionary. This is no doubt due to an oversight on the part of the office in drawing up the decree. The learned Judge merely says in his judgment that he allows the appeal and decrees the sum claimed. Reference to the plaint shows clearly that the claim was for a decree for the amount claimed by sale of the mortgaged property. This plea is therefore allowed and the decree will be amended and the decree in the form of order 34 rule 4 will be prepared. Accounts will be prepared up to a date sin months from now. Interest will run at the contractual rate up to that data, and thereafter simple interest will be allowed at 6 per cent, per annuity payment. We notice that the decree of the Court below was signed by the appellant's learned pleader who is therefore responsible for not pointing out the oversight 4. The last point was that the second mortgage was not proved, and this point is taken in para 7 of the grounds of appeal, but it does not appear to have been pressed in the Court below. In any case we are satisfied that here is no substance in it. There were three attesting witnesses to the deed. Two of them were dead and the third denied attestation. A witness has proved execution under S. 71 of the Evidence Act. In any case we are satisfied that here is no substance in it. There were three attesting witnesses to the deed. Two of them were dead and the third denied attestation. A witness has proved execution under S. 71 of the Evidence Act. The appellant's argument was that he should also have proved execution in the presence of the attesting witnesses. S. 71 does not require this and there is authority both of this Court in Narain Das v. Dilwar [1919] 41 All 250-17 A.L.J. 141-52 I.C. 830 and that of the Patna High Court in Lakshman Sahu v. Gokul Maharana 1922 Pat. 41-1 Pat. 154-70 I.C. 298 that proof of execution is sufficient. Except to tie extent stated above we dismiss the appeal. As the appellant has substantially failed the respondents will get their costs including in this Court fees on the higher scale.