Judgement Appeal and Cross-appeal (Nos. 93 and 94 of 1922) from a decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab (January 30, 1919) modifying a decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge of Kangra. An estate in the Punjab, known as the Gopalpur Tea Estate, comprised tea-garden lands, timber forests, factories (with plant and machinery) and other buildings. In 1911 the owners agreed to sell the estate to the first appellant for Rs. 97,000. In 1912 the respondents father instituted a suit praying for possession by right of pre-emption, on payment of Rs. 50,000 into Court, of portions of the estate situate in certain villages, on the ground that the plaintiff was a member of an agricultural tribe possessing land in the villages, and -accordingly entitled to pre-empt under the Punjab Pre emption Act, 1905. The total area of the estate was 13,658 kanals, i.e., about 1700 acres ; the right claimed by the plaintiff was in 10,524 kanals. He alleged that the land which he claimed to pre-empt was either " agricultural land " or " village immovable property " within the meaning of ss. 3 and 12 of Punj. Act. II. of 1905. The defendants by their written statement Law. Rep. 51 Ind. App. 11 ( 1923- 1924) Kaju Mal V. Salig Ram 132 pleaded, so far as is material, that no part of the estate came within the Act; and that the plaintiff was not an owner of lands within the estate, and had no right of pre-emption. The trial judge made a decree ordering possession of the portion of the estate claimed upon payment into Court of Rs. 75,000. He held that all the properties claimed by the plaintiffs were liable to pre-emption under ss. 3 and 12 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905. On appeal to the Chief Court the decree was modified by omitting from the land to be pre-empted certain factory buildings and forest land, and by altering the sum to be deposited. In granting leave to appeal the learned judge said that the appeal involved the substantial question of law whether tea-garden land was " agricultural" land within the meaning of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905. The cross-appeal was on the facts. 1923. Nov. 16. Dunne K.C. and S. Hyam for the appellants. Sir G. Lowndes K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. In granting leave to appeal the learned judge said that the appeal involved the substantial question of law whether tea-garden land was " agricultural" land within the meaning of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1905. The cross-appeal was on the facts. 1923. Nov. 16. Dunne K.C. and S. Hyam for the appellants. Sir G. Lowndes K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD SHAW OF DUNFERMLINE. These are two appeals from a decree of the Chief Court of the Punjab. The suit is for possession by pre-emption of a portion of an estate known as the Gopalpur Tea Estate. The issue in the case, upon which argument was presented to the Board, is in the following terms "Is the property in suit definable as agricultural land .... within the meaning of s. 3 of the Pre-emption Act ? " The reference is to Act II. of 1905 and particularly to s. 3, sub-s 1. Under that definition " agricultural land " is declared to mean " ‘land as defined in the Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900." The reference is to the Act XIII. of 1900 and to s. 2, sub-s. 3, thereof. The relevant portions of the definition there given are as follows "The expression land means land which is not occupied as the site of any building in a town or village, and is occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for purposes subservient to agriculture." The issue was accordingly properly framed and the argument was confined, as stated, to the simple question whether this land, which extended to about fifteen or sixteen hundred acres, came within the definition of land which is "agricultural land." Upon that subject both Courts have pronounced judgment clearly affirming that this tea garden in Punjab falls within the definition of "agricultural land." They have given sound and sensible reasons, if reasons were required, for the affirmation of that proposition and this Board does not think it necessary to cover the ground any further, and merely contents itself with affirming in all particulars the decree appealed from. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal fails. There is a cross-appeal. That cross-appeal is partly covered, no doubt, by the judgment already Law. Rep. 51 Ind. App. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal fails. There is a cross-appeal. That cross-appeal is partly covered, no doubt, by the judgment already Law. Rep. 51 Ind. App. 11 ( 1923- 1924) Kaju Mal V. Salig Ram 133 delivered, and it is sufficient to say that their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this cross-appeal should also be dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs of these appeals.