JUDGMENT Buckland, J. - The Petitioner Priyanath Gupta who was convicted by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Manikganj, of the offence of criminal intimidation and sentenced to pay a fine of rupees two hundred or in default to undergo six months' simple imprisonment appealed to the Sessions Judge of Dacca by whom the conviction and sentence were confirmed and has now obtained a Rule from this Court to show cause why the conviction and sentence should not be set aside. The case has been laid before me under secs. 429/439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complainant is one Lalji Koeri, a chowkidar. There was served on him by a peon a document in the following terms :- Notice for decision of suit. Before the (Body of) Arbitrators at Manikganj, District Dacca. Civil Suit No. 595 of 1328-29. Claim laid at Es. 2,499. To Lalji Koeri, father's name not known of Gheor Bazar Defendant. Whereas the Plaintiff Gabin Bhar, son of the late Jhiguri Bhar of Pechar Kandarhat, Thana Gheor, has brought a suit against yon on the allegation that the Defendants Nos. 2 to 6 have kept confined the Plaintiff's married wife, Parbati and the other Defendants are in collusion with them, that the Plaintiff at the time of his going to Benares had entrusted the Defendants with the charge of his shop and that the Defendants have misappropriated many articles of the said shop and has prayed for the recovery of possession of those articles and of his wife under the decision of Salisi Nispatti Mandali (Body of Arbitrators) at Manikganj and whereas if a case be brought in Court in respect of the said matters there is likelihood of a heavy loss being suffered by both the parties, you are hereby informed that you will appear before me at 10 A.M., on Thursday (the 11th Jaisiha next and make arrangement for an amicable settlement thereof, otherwise you will be put to loss for nothing. 2. Be it mentioned here, that if the Defendants do not put in an answer on the aforesaid date, the suit will be decreed on the evidence of the Plaintiff and no objection will be allowed thereafter. List of Property. 1. Har Magan Bhadai Cash Rs. 64. 2 Taken by Gabari Cash Rs. 500. 3. On accounts of ornaments Cash Rs. 30. 4. Mangal Karmakar Ghatak Cash Rs. 1,000. 5. Gold Mohur 1 Rs. List of Property. 1. Har Magan Bhadai Cash Rs. 64. 2 Taken by Gabari Cash Rs. 500. 3. On accounts of ornaments Cash Rs. 30. 4. Mangal Karmakar Ghatak Cash Rs. 1,000. 5. Gold Mohur 1 Rs. 30. 6. Gobin Bhar on account of shop Cash Rs. 425. 7. Guru Prosad on account of shop Cash Rs. 450. Total-Rs. Rs. 2,499. 3. Portions of this document are in print, the remainder is in manuscript, in particular the last paragraph from the words "Be it mentioned" to "allowed thereafter." The Petitioner whose signature if bears is the President of what is known as the Salisi Nispatti Bichar Mandali at Manikganj, and the charge is that by causing it to be served upon the complainant he committed the offence of which he was convicted. 4. Two points have been argued upon the hearing of the Rule. The first is that there is no evidence to support the findings of the lower Courts that the last paragraph in manuscript was there when the Petitioner signed the notice as to which I am not prepared to hold that there is no evidence to support the inference which the lower Courts have drawn in this respect. 5. The other point which is more substantial is that this notice cannot constitute the offence charged. 6. Excluding immaterial portions of the section, criminal intimidation is defined as follows :-Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property with intent to cause alarm to that person or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do.... as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat commits criminal intimidation. 7. That the notice in question conforms in many respects to the forms, used by Courts established by law does not admit' of dispute. Expressions used are similar, the word "suit" is employed to specify the proceedings before this Tribunal which was self-constituted and had no legal sanction, and the complainant is required to put in an answer which he was not legally bound to do, as the means of avoiding that "the suit will be decreed on the evidence of the Plaintiff's" which fulfils the requirements of the section as regards intent. 8. The question then arises whether that which according to the notice the complainant could so avoid was injury threatened to his person, reputation or property. 8. The question then arises whether that which according to the notice the complainant could so avoid was injury threatened to his person, reputation or property. That a decree of a Civil Court harms an individual against whom it is made in his person, reputation or property is a proposition which was not controverted when I put the questions to the learned Vakil for the applicant in the course of argument and in my opinion he rightly accepted it as correct, though it might be more strictly accurate to say that the harm is caused by the probable legal consequences of a decree. Consequently a threat of a decree is a threat of harm to an individual in his person, reputation or property. 9. But it is submitted that this notice cannot be construed as a threat of such harm as the Tribunal was incompetent to execute its decree. That in my judgment is immaterial. The section says nothing about the capacity of the person making the threat to carry it into execution. Were such capacity essential, the threat implied in the presentation of an unloaded pistol at the head of another would not further the commission of the offence of criminal intimidation unless the act was accompanied by threatening words, which would reduce the section to an absurdity. Nor does the section say anything about the effect upon the person threatened, and whether or not the complainant knew that the notice was innocuous is equally immaterial. 10. Looking at the notice as a whole the only inference to be drawn is that it was the intention of the Petitioner to cause the complainant to think or believe that unless he did what the notice required him to do, a decree as ordinarily understood would be passed against him and he would become liable to those penalties which are the sanctions for decrees made by Courts of justice duly constituted by law. No other intention can be attributed to the use of the forms of expression and words employed. The Petitioner therefore threatened the complainant with harm in his person, reputation or property by threatening him with a decree. Under sec. 44 of the Indian Penal Code injury denotes harm illegally caused. No other intention can be attributed to the use of the forms of expression and words employed. The Petitioner therefore threatened the complainant with harm in his person, reputation or property by threatening him with a decree. Under sec. 44 of the Indian Penal Code injury denotes harm illegally caused. By no legal process or means could this Tribunal make or give effect to such a decree, as it was the intention of the notice to cause the complainant to believe would be made if he failed to comply with it. Therefore in that the Petitioner threatened the complainant with such decree, he threatened the complainant with harm to be caused illegally. Upon the facts found by the lower Courts I hold that the Petitioner committed the offence of criminal intimidation. The conviction and sentence are affirmed and the Rule discharged.