JUDGMENT Daniels, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff Thakur Laiq Singh for sale of the mortgaged property on the basis of his mortgage. The mortgage was executed by Sumer Singh the original owner of the property as far back as the 1st June 1904. Sumer Singh subsequently sold his equity of redemption. The defendant appellant Parshadi Lal brought a pre-emption suit on the basis of this sale and was successful. He is therefore the owner of the property subject to the plaintiff's mortgage. He himself subsequently on 22nd October 1908. executed a mortgage in favour of one Ram Prasad who is not before the Court. The sols question for decision in this appeal is whether the whole suit should hare been dismissed on account of the plaintiffs failure to implead Ram Prasad. 2. Both Courts have relied on this ruling in Alatn Singh v. Gokul Singh [1913] 35 All 484-11 A.L.J. 749-21 I.C. 271. That was a case in which the plaintiff mortgagee omitted to implead a subsequent mortgagee who held a mortgage of part only of the mortgaged property. The Court held that it was not necessary to dismiss the entire suit but gave a decree against that portion of the property which was not covered by the subsequent mortgage. The trial Court considered that it necessarily followed from this ruling that if the subsequent mortgage covered the entire property the entire suit must be dismissed. In the appellate Court the plaintiff relied on the principle that Order 34 rule 1, which directs that all persons having an interest in the mortgaged property must be joined as parties, is subject to Order 1 rule 9 which says that no suit shall be dismissed merely on the ground of non-joinder of parties. If therefore relief could be given to the plaintiff without prejudicing the right of Ram Prasad who had not joined. Order 34 rule 1 did not necessarily stand in the way of such relief being granted. The learned judge considered that if this object could be effected in one way it could also be effected in another according to the circumstances of the particular case. In the case cited it was effected by passing a decree for sale of part of the mortgage only. The learned judge considered that if this object could be effected in one way it could also be effected in another according to the circumstances of the particular case. In the case cited it was effected by passing a decree for sale of part of the mortgage only. In the present case, in order that the rights of Ram Prasad should not be prejudiced, the plaintiff offered to give up his priority and to accept a decree subject to the mortgage in favour of Ram Prasad which should be t(sic) as having preference over his (sic) The learned Judge of the Court (sic) low has passed a decree in these terms. 3. The decree under appeal does full justice as between the parties to the suit. The appellant is in no way prejudiced by it. He was bound to pay the plaintiff's mortgage. He was bound also to pay the mortgage in favour of Ram Prasad. So far as he is concerned the respective priority as between these two mortgagees is a matter of comparative indifference. He has in fact tried to take advantage of the technical ground of nonjoinder of Ram Prasad in order to escape liability for paying the plaintiff's mortgage altogether. Unless the provisions of law very clearly require it this contention ought not, on ground of justice and equity, to be accepted. 4. In my opinion the reasoning of the Court below is sound. The object of Order 34 rule 1 is to prevent multiplicity of suits and to secure that no injury is done to the rights of any party through his not being impleaded. The provision is expressly made subject to other provisions of the Code which include Order 1 rule 9, and it has been laid down many times that where it is possible for the Court to do justice as between the parties before it, it should do so and should not make order 34 rule 1 a ground for dismissing the entire suit. The Bombay High Court recently in the case of Shivubai Rajaram v Shiddheswar [1921] 45 Bom. 1009-23 Bom. L.R. 405-61 I.C. 590, refused to allow a redemption suit to be dismissed altogether because certain heirs of the original mortgagees had not been joined. But the case which is most directly parallel to that before me is that of Sital Prasad. v. Asho Singh 1922 Pat. 651-2 Pat. 1009-23 Bom. L.R. 405-61 I.C. 590, refused to allow a redemption suit to be dismissed altogether because certain heirs of the original mortgagees had not been joined. But the case which is most directly parallel to that before me is that of Sital Prasad. v. Asho Singh 1922 Pat. 651-2 Pat. 175-69 I.C. 677. The f(sic) of that case were exactly on (sic) fours. The plaintiff was suing on mortgage and had failed to implead a subsequent mortgagee. The contention was, as here, that the entire suit should be dismissed in consequence. The Court went further the it is necessary to do in this case (sic)eld that a decree could be pass-(sic) favour of the plaintiff without (sic)ing any condition as to the absent defendants, on the ground that the decree could not in any case be allowed to operate to the prejudice of the subsequent mortgagee who was no party to it. In the present case the decree passed by the Court below does substantial justice between the parties and in my opinion the provisions of Order 34 rule 1 which must be read subject to those of Order 1 rule 9 do not have the effect of rendering is illegal. I accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs including in this Court fees on the higher scale.