JUDGMENT Stuart, J. - It is found on the facts that Mahabir Rai son of Gaya Rai and Kalpu son of Ram Baron eon of Gaya" Rai were, in 1908, members of a joint Hindu family. On the 23rd of January 1908 Mahabir Rai sold a portion of the joint family property, in which Kalpu had interests, to three woman called Rameshra, Subhadra and Talouda for Rs. 750/-. In 1908 Kalpu was about 9 years old. In 1919, when he had attained the age of 20, he instituted a suit against the vendees of Mahabir Rai for possession over a half (sic) of the property transferred. (sic) lower appellate Court has decreed the claim. The Rs. 750/- was made (sic) of fire items: Rs. 303/10/- left with the vendees to pay off the amount due on a mortgage deed of the 6th of May 1906: Rs. 199/15/- left with the vendees to pay off a mortgage deed of the 11th of June 1902; Rs. 99/15/- left with the vendees for payment of a mortgage-deed dated Jeth badi 13, 1309; Rs. 96/7 price of grain with interest previously purchased and Rs. 50/1/- previously advanced by the vendees to the vendor. The lower appellate Court rightly applied the principles laid down in the case of Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh [1917] 39 All. 437 (P.C.) as subsequently interpreted by this Court and required from the defendants proof of legal necessity or payment of legitimate antecedent debts. The defendants were unable to adduce proof of any item which satisfied the lower appellate Court. The learned counsel for the vendees appellants has laid stress upon the assertions in the various deeds. The existence of these assertions in no way advances his client's case. It was for them to prove not to assert. The lower appellate Court has held the proof to be inadequate. The finding that the proof is inadequate is a good finding of fact which cannot be impugned in second appeal. An application was put on the day before hearing, requesting permission to tender documents in evidence at this stage. The mere acceptance of these documents would in noway advance the appellant's case, for it would be necessary to prove the contents before advantage could be taken of the assertions in the documents. An application was put on the day before hearing, requesting permission to tender documents in evidence at this stage. The mere acceptance of these documents would in noway advance the appellant's case, for it would be necessary to prove the contents before advantage could be taken of the assertions in the documents. The object of the appellants is to establish now that the consideration was taken for purposes of legal necessity. It is a well known rule that the parties must in absence of very special circumstances, be confined to the evidence which they tendered before the trial Courts. The special circumstances asserted here are that the appellants were ignorant of the law on the subject at the time that the suit was heard. They were represented by counsel and I cannot accept the excuse of ignorance. In view of what was stated in the case of Chandradeo Singh v. Mata Prasad [1909] 31 All. 176 as far back as 1909, they should have had their evidence ready. But apart from that the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh [1917] 39 All. 437 (P.C.) was arrived at in January, 1917, and the appellants filed their written statement in August 1919. In these circumstances they have made out no cause for not being ready with their evidence at the right time. The learned additional Subordinate Judge having applied the law correctly and his findings on the facts being final, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Judgment in L.P.A. Piggot, J. 2. After hearing arguments in the case and considering the recently pronounced decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Raja Bahadur Raja Brij Narain Rai v. Mangla Prasad Rai 1924 P.C. 50 we are of opinion that this case was rightly decided by the learned Judge of this Court There is nothing in the principles laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case above quoted to warrant the view that an uncle acting as manager of a joint family is entitled to sell the share of his nephew in the joint family property in order to discharge a debt incurred by his own father even though the father was also the grandfather of the nephew whose property is alienated. On this ground we dismiss the appeal with costs.