JUDGMENT Davedoss, J. 1. The question involved in this appeal is, one of limitation. The plaintiff sues for the recovery of, certain jewels described in schedule A to the plaint and certain articles described in schedule B. His case is that he deposited with the defendants son for safe custody the jewels mentioned in schedule A and that he left in the house which he occupied along with the defendants son the articles mentioned in the schedule when he vacated it on the 14th December 1918. The, defendants deny the deposit as well as the allegation that the B schedule properties were left in the house occupied by the defendants son. The defendants son seems to have died on the 6th December 1918 and his wife, the 1st plaintiffs sister, died on the 18th December. The learned City Civil Judge has dismissed the suit on the ground that Article 48 of the Limitation Act applied, and the suit having been brought more than 3 years from the date of the alleged deposit was barred by limitation. 18. Mr. Bhashyam Iyengar for the appellant contends that the proper Article applicable to a case of this kind is Article 145 under which he has 30 years to bring a suit. The learned Judge has taken the view that the suit is not based upon a contract but upon tort inasmuch as the plaintiff stated that the defendants were in wrongful possession of the jewels. In a case like this where no evidence has been adduced, it is the averments in the plaint that have to be looked to and not any case that may be set up, in evidence on the side of the defendants. The defendants statement is a mere denial of the plaintiffs allegations. That being so, the plaintiffs allegation that they deposited the jewels mentioned in schedule A with the defendants son, should be taken as the sole basis for considering what period of limitation is applicable to the case. Mr. Desikachari who appears for the respondents contends that the son being dead the suit against the depository does not lie, and his clients being alleged to be in possession of such property should be held to be persons who have converted the property to their own use and, therefore, either Article 48 or Article 49 is applicable, in which case the suit is barred. But I fail to appreciate the argument on behalf of the respondents, for in the case of bailee or depository or pawnee, it cannot be said that the contract of bailment or deposit or pawn comes to an end on the death of the bailee, depository or pawnee; and the legal representative of the estate of the deceased is bound by any contract to which the deceased was a party, That being so, I think the proper Article of the Limitation Act applicable to a case like the one set out in the plaint, viz., the deposit is Article 145. 19. So far as the jewels mentioned in schedule A are concerned, Article 145 is the proper Article to be applied. 20. As regards the articles mentioned in schedule B to the plaint, the contention on behalf of the respondents is that Article 19 should be held to be applicable. Article 49 is in these terms: "For other specific moveable property, or for compensation for wrongfully taking or injuring or wrongfully detaining the same." When the plaintiff vacated the house which he occupied with the defendants son, he left according to his own statement certain articles. There is no allegation in the written statement that these were converted to the use of defendants. If such an allegation was made, and if conversion was more than 3 years old, no doubt the plaintiffs suit would be barred. Then we have to see whether Article 48 would be applicable to the claim in., respect of the B schedule properties. Article 48 applied to a suit for the recovery of the specific moveable property lost, or acquired by theft, or dishonest misappropriation or conversion or compensation for wrongfully taking or detaining the same. As I have already said, the defendants did not plead that these properties were converted to their use more than 3 years before the date of suit. Their being in possession cannot be held to be wrongful so long as they did not convert them to their own use inconsistent with the plaintiffs ownership. Their denial that they ever came into possession of such property precludes the contention that they converted them to their use. Mr. Desikachari relies upon Arunachalam Pillai v. Alagianambia Filial 3 M.L.T. 324. That case has no application to the facts of the present case as there was no deposit in that case. Their denial that they ever came into possession of such property precludes the contention that they converted them to their use. Mr. Desikachari relies upon Arunachalam Pillai v. Alagianambia Filial 3 M.L.T. 324. That case has no application to the facts of the present case as there was no deposit in that case. Taking all the averments in the plaint into consideration as well as the statements in the written statement, I think the learned Judge erred in holding that either Article 48 or Article 49 applied to the claim for B schedule properties. As I have already stated Article 145 applied to the claim in respect of A schedule jewels and as regards B schedule articles, the claim is made within three years, and time began to run only from the date, when there was refusal to deliver or denial that the defendants were in possession of such property I therefore set aside the decree of the City Civil Judge and direct him to restore the suit to his file and dispose of it according to law. Costs of this appeal will abide the result. 21. The appellants will be entitled to refund of the Court-fee paid in this Court.