Judgement Appeal (No. 84 of 1923) from a decree {January 30, 1922) of the Chief Court of Lower Burma, reversing a decree (December 6, 1920) of the Additional District Judge of Tavoy. The suit was instituted by the present respondents, Nos. 1 to 4, minors suing by their guardian, against the appellants and respondent No. 5, who was joined pro forma. The plaintiffs by their plaint alleged that Ma Shwe Kin was the third wife and surviving widow of one Khoo Shwe Goon deceased ; as step-grandchildren of Ma Shwe Kin they claimed administration of her estate, on the basis that as step-grandchildren they were entitled to her estate jointly with respondent No. 5, her stepson. The appellants were sued as having intermeddled with, and being in possession of, the estate. The material facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. Upon the grounds stated in that judgment the Additional District Judge at Tavoy dismissed the suit, but upon appeal the Chief Court made a decree for administration, on the basis that the plaintiffs jointly with defendant No. 5 were entitled to the whole of Ma Shwe Kins separate estate, and to one-half of her undivided share in the estate of her deceased mother. 1924. July 29, 30. Harney K.C. and R. L. Parry for the appellants. Under Burmese Buddhist law a step-child or step-grandchild does not inherit unless the filial bond is shown to have existed with the step-parent or step-grandparent. That bond did not exist in this case, as the respondents did not live with the deceased, or bury her upon her death. The judgment in Ma Gun Bon v. Maung Po Kywe (2 U. B. Rulings ( 1897- 1901), 66.), which was relied on below, shows that the decision applies only where the filial bond exists. Further, the property in that case was property which had been inherited by the deceased from her husband. The same observations apply to Maung Sein Thwe v. Ma Shwe Yi. (10 L. B. Rulings, 396.) [Reference was made also to Ma Oungs Burman Buddhist Law of Succession and Inheritance ( 1919), pp. 198, 254, 259, 260.] Sanders for the respondents 1 to 4. The dhammathat Maungye expressly lays down the rights of step-children see U Gaungs Digest, s. 295. Here, as in the case there discussed, the property had not become part of the spouses community of property. 198, 254, 259, 260.] Sanders for the respondents 1 to 4. The dhammathat Maungye expressly lays down the rights of step-children see U Gaungs Digest, s. 295. Here, as in the case there discussed, the property had not become part of the spouses community of property. That dhammathat should be applied in this case, as no other dhammathat raising any relevant exception has been referred to Mah Nhin Bwin v. U Shwe Gone (( 1914) L. R. 41 I. A. 126.); Ma Thaung v. Ma Than. (( 1923) L. R. 511. A. 1.) It is only by a partition upon remarriage, such as took place in the case last cited, that the rights of the step-children are affected. Breach of the filial bond operates as forfeiture but proof of its existence is not a condition to the right of inheritance see Chan Toon Leading Cases, p. 131. In the present case there was no pleading nor issue as to the filial bond. R. L. Parry replied. Oct. 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DUNEDIN. This is the case of a disputed succession to the property of a lady named Ma Shwe Kin, a Chinese Buddhist living in Tavoy, who was the third wife and the widow of Khoo Shwe Goon. Khoo Shwe Goon was first married to Ma Lin, and by her he had a son now deceased and another son Khoo Ping Hoe, one of the respondents in the appeal. Ma Lin died and Goon married Ma In, by whom he had a son Khoo Ping Kyan, now deceased. Khoo Ping Kyan married and had three sons and a daughter, who are the other respondents. Ma In died, and after some years Goon married his deceased wifes sister Ma Shwe Kin. Goon died in 1917 before his third wife, who died in 1919. He disposed of his own property by will. Ma Shwe Kin died in 1919 possessed of considerable pro perty, which was her own. She was also entitled to a share of the succession of her mother Pwa Zo. Ma Shwe Kan was survived by a brother and married sister. This brother, the sister and her husband are the appellants in the present case. Ma Shwe Kin died in 1919 possessed of considerable pro perty, which was her own. She was also entitled to a share of the succession of her mother Pwa Zo. Ma Shwe Kan was survived by a brother and married sister. This brother, the sister and her husband are the appellants in the present case. Originally a question was raised as to whether Goon really ever married his third wife, but it was held in the Courts below that the marriage was sufficiently established by habit and repute, and no question as to that was raised before their Lordships. The case, therefore, resolves itself into the question, who are to be preferred, the stepson and step-grandchildren on the one hand, or the ladys own brother and sister on the other? The case was tried before the District Judge, who preferred the appellants. That learned judge took the view that, though in Ma Chin Bon v. Maung Po Kywe (1) the grandchildren, as descendants, were preferred to the collaterals, that case really turned, not upon the general principle, but upon the fact that the property there in question had come from the real father and gone to the second wife and thus only reverted to the original family. He also held that, in this case, the step-grandchildren had not lived with the deceased and had not buried her, that ceremony being performed by the brother and sister. Appeal was taken to the Chief Court of Lower Burma, and the learned judges in appeal reversed the judgment. They held that the case of Ma Gun Bon v. Maung Po Kywe (1) proceeded on general principles and not upon the special character of the property in question. They also held that the facts above narrated created no disqualification. Their Lordships have examined the Digest of Burmese Buddhist Law, which is the available source of reference to the rules of the dhammathats. They also considered the authorities cited. The leading case on the subject is undoubtedly the case of Ma Gun Bon v. Maung Po Kywe. (2 U. B. Rulings ( 1897- 1901), 66.) It is quite true that in that case the property in question had come from the husband to the wife, and that it was that property that was the subject of the disputed succession, but the judgment in no way proceeds on that point. (2 U. B. Rulings ( 1897- 1901), 66.) It is quite true that in that case the property in question had come from the husband to the wife, and that it was that property that was the subject of the disputed succession, but the judgment in no way proceeds on that point. There is a large citation of texts as to step-children, and the learned judge sums up the matter thus " These texts go to show that step-children are regarded as heirs without limitation, except in the case of ancestral property, and even in that they are granted a share provided the step-parent has lived to have a vested interest in it, or to reach it according to the Burmese expression." This is quite in accordance with certain citations which are to be found in the dhammathats. Thus s. 6 (Manugye) " There are 4 kinds of inheritance, namely, (1.) that which is obtainable by children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren only; (2.) that which is obtainable by children and step- children." And in s. 295 (Manugye) "The father marries again and both father and step-mother die leaving no offspring of the marriage. The rule of partition between the step-children and their step-mothers co-heirs is as follows The children shall receive the whole of their fathers as well as their step-mothers animate and inanimate property. As regards the share of inheritance to which the step-mother was entitled in her deceased parents estate which still remains undivided, her step-children shall inherit one half and her co-heirs the remaining half." Manu, to the same effect, says "The children shall inherit the property owned by the father and step-mother jointly." Once it is determined that step-children are descendants they necessarily oust collaterals, for by Buddhist law the property never ascends as long as it can descend. The learned appeal judge in this case says "The point of view of the Buddhist law is undoubtedly based on the community of interest between husband and wife. So strong is the bond between them that, in the absence of natural children the husbands or wifes children, as the case may be, rank as the children of the step-parent in the matter of inheritance to the exclusion of collateral blood relations." Their Lordships agree with that statement. So strong is the bond between them that, in the absence of natural children the husbands or wifes children, as the case may be, rank as the children of the step-parent in the matter of inheritance to the exclusion of collateral blood relations." Their Lordships agree with that statement. There remains the question whether the appellants are disentitled to succeed, because, first, the respondents did not live with the deceased, and, second, that they did not bury her. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that these services, which he designated by the name of the filial bond, were a condition precedent to the allowance of a stepchilds right. Their Lordships cannot accept this view. In the same paragraph, s. 6 of the Digest of Burmese Buddhist Law, heading 4 is "That which should be withheld from children who failed in filial duty," and this is explained thus "Among laymen disobedient and idle sons cannot inherit their parents estate." Their Lordships think it clear that conduct can indeed operate as a disqualification of the right, but that it is in no sense a necessary qualification to obtain the right. They agree with what was said in Maung Sein Thwe v. Ma Shwe Yi (10 L. B. Rulings, 396, 397,) " We are not prepared to assent to the view that a man who has proved that he is an heir has further to prove that he has not broken off filial relations in such a case as this," and again " Mere separate residence does not nowadays and by itself prove or even set up an inference of a breach of filial relations such as would deprive a child of his rights." Their Lordships, upon the whole matter, agree with what was said by the learned judges of the appellate Court, that in this case there is no forfeiture. It would only be natural that the children, who are all minors, should live with their own mother, and for the same reason, they could not have been the conductors of the funeral ceremony. As to the hereditary property to which the deceased became entitled in respect of her mother, but which was not as yet in her possession, the judgment is in accordance with the texts quoted. As to the hereditary property to which the deceased became entitled in respect of her mother, but which was not as yet in her possession, the judgment is in accordance with the texts quoted. In view of the fact that Buddhist law is in many ways obscure and the judgments are few, their Lordships think that it is necessary to make two observations in case this judgment should be used for the purpose of upholding pro positions which it does not contain. The stepson here has made common cause with the step-grandchildren and was content that they should share along with him. Their Lordships pronounce no opinion as to what would be the result in a contest between the stepson and the step-grandchildren; but either or both are entitled to exclude the appellants. Further, though the whole theory of succession depends upon the strict Buddhist view that intestacy is compulsory, this has so far been impinged upon that a Chinese Buddhist is allowed to test; which accounts in this case for Goons will as to his own property. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal shall be dismissed with costs.